202 Mass. 549 | Mass. | 1909
This is a bill in equity by the trustee in bankruptcy of one James A. Wood to recover the proceeds of a paid up endowment life insurance policy on the life of Wood alleged to have been transferred by him in fraud of his creditors to his wife, the defendant Caroline A. Wood, in December, 1901. The policy matured, as alleged, in. April, 1904, and upon maturity the insurance company paid over the amount due thereon, $20,000,
The sole question is whether a paid up endowment life insurance policy, taken out by the husband and transferred by him to his wife by a voluntary assignment, comes within the provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 73, now R L. c. 118, § 73. The plaintiff contends in effect that the statute applies only to the ordinary case of a life insurance policy where the premium is to be paid from year to year, and does not apply to a case like that before us, or, if it does, that it is unconstitutional and void.
The statute provides that “ every policy of life insurance made payable to or for the benefit of a married woman, or after its issue assigned, transferred, or in any way made payable to a married woman, or to any person in trust for her or for her benefit, whether procured by herself, her husband or by any other person, and whether the assignment or transfer is made by her husband or by any other person, shall inure to her separate use and benefit, and to that of her children, subject to the provisions of this section relating to premiums paid in fraud of creditors.” St. 1894, c. 522, § 73. R. L. c. 118, § 73. The provisions “relating to premiums paid in fraud of creditors ” follow a provision that, when a policy of insurance has been effected by a person on his own life or that of another in favor of some other person than himself having an insurable interest therein, the beneficiary shall be entitled to the proceeds as against creditors and representatives of the person affecting the same, and may maintain an action thereon in his own name, “ Provided, [and these are the provisions referred to] that, subject to the statute of limitation, the amount of any premiums for said insurance paid in fraud of creditors, with interest thereon, shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy.”
The statute, it will be observed, does not undertake to exempt from its operation paid up endowment policies, or to confine its
The plaintiff concedes that the question of the construction of the statute and the validity of the exemption is one of State and not of federal law, and that the bankruptcy act recognizes the exemptions established by the several States. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202. But he contends that the exemption being unlimited in amount is unreasonable and that the statute is, therefore, unconstitutional. If a man’s life were property which his creditors could seize, there might, perhaps, be something in the contention. But, as already observed, the statute provides, in effect, that so much of the insurance as consists of property of the debtor which he has put into it by way of premiums in fraud of his creditors shall inure to them. Subject to this there can be nothing unreasonable in providing that one may insure his life to any amount that he chooses for the benefit of his wife and children, or that he may assign to his wife policies already issued to him. Various statutes have been enacted in which
The conclusion to which we have come on the main question renders it unnecessary to consider whether upon the facts alleged in the amended bill the statute of limitations would operate as a bar, though it is to be observed that the bill nowhere alleges that the defendant Caroline A. Wood fraudulently concealed the cause of action, but only that she “ concealed the cause of action.” See Leslie v. Jaquith, 201 Mass. 242.
Decree affirmed with costs of appeal.
This decree was made in the Superior Court by Fox, J.