11 Utah 175 | Utah | 1895
This action was brought in the district court of the Fourth Judicial District, to restrain the issuing of execution on a judgment rendered in a cause between the same parties in favor of Anson Thornton, one of the defendants herein, and to obtain a new trial on the ground that the records in said cause in which judgment was rendered, as aforesaid, were destroyed by fire, and that, therefore, an appeal to the supreme court, to correct certain errors claimed to have occurred on the trial of the original cause, was rendered impossible. The defendants Stevens and Thornton demurred separately to the complaint, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrers, dismissed the action as to said defendants, and entered judgment in their favor. From this judgment the plaintiff prosecuted his appeal.
The first point argued by counsel for the appellant is whether the district court, by virtue of its chancery jurisdiction, can grant the relief prayed for. We think counsel are correct in their views on this point. The district court, sitting as a court of chancery, has power to grant, relief in a proper case of this character. This is an ancient, jurisdiction of a court of chancery, and there is nothing in our statutes which abrogates such jurisdiction. The fact that such a court has both common-law and chancery jurisdiction in no way changes or obliterates its equitable jurisdiction in the absence of express legislative restriction. Such equitable relief will not be granted, however, except, in a meritorious case, and that a case is meritorious must be shown by the bill itself. Sproles v. Powell, 10 Heisk.
The main question, therefore, is whether the record in this case presents a state of facts which entitles the plaintiff to the equitable relief sought. The record shows substantially that the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants on the 26th day of February, 1891, to compel defendant Stevens to convey to him certain land, and to have the claim of defendant Thornton thereto declared void; that in proper time Thornton filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, and, by way of cross complaint, set up his possession to said land as commencing in September, 1884, and alleged that he paid for the same; that he had a right to a- conveyance from plaintiff, defendant Stevens, and from one Montgomery; that Stevens was ready and willing to so convey; that Montgomery was attempting to acquire interests in said lands, and was in collusion with plaintiff, and, because of selfish and corrupt motives, refused to convey to him, Thornton; that on March 27, 1891, plaintiff filed his answer to the cross complaint; that on April 12, 1891, said Montgomery was made a party defendant by order of the court; that the cause was tried on April ¡4, and the decision of the court rendered in favor of Thornton on April 28, 1891; that on March 7, 1892, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which motion was heard and overruled by' the court on December 20, 1892; that the plaintiff appealed from the decree entered in favor of Thornton, and from the order overruling the motion for a new trial; that, after all the papers on appeal had been prepared, they were on March 14, 1893, while in the office of plaintiff's attorneys, ■entirely destroyed by fire; that the destruction of said papers was caused by the burning of the building in which they were kept; that the papers thus destroyed included
While the plaintiff may not be directly responsible for this state of affairs, yet it seems clear that he is indirectly ^responsible, because of his laches in prosecuting his appeal.
Where, as appears in the case at bar, a party postpones-the doing of a thing because there is further time in which to do it, he will not be heard to complain if, while-lie so delays, something happens by which he is deprived of rights to which he would otherwise have been entitled, and when the granting of relief might work an injustice upon another party, not at fault. Equity does not encourage unreasonable delay to do a thing or to enforce-a remedy at the proper time. Neglect and laches are always discountenanced. Nothing can call forth the-power of a court of equity but conscience, reasonable diligence and good faith; and, before it will grant relief in a case like the one at bar, it must not only be satisfied that a loss or accident has actually occurred, which may possibly have deprived a party of his rights, and that, such party was not at fault, but it must also sufficiently appear to the chancellor that error was committed in the trial by the court at law, in material matters, affecting-
We are of the opinion that the record in this case does not present a case which entitles the plaintiff to a new trial, and that the demurrer to the complaint was properly ■sustained. The judgment is affirmed.