Bailey v. StateBailey v. State
The defendant, Robert Bailey, was convicted by a jury of burglary, a Class B felony, Ind.Code § 385-48-2-1 (1984 Supp.), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty years. On direct appeal he raises the following issues:
1. Whether the court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his confession;
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
A brief summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state shows that a policeman, a neighbor of the burglary victims, saw the defendant run out of the victims' house and into a waiting car. The policeman gave chase as the defendant and the other occupant of the car drove away, and they were finally apprehended.
I
After the defendant and his friend, the other occupant of the car, were transported to jail, a detective took them from the booking area to the interrogation room. While in the elevator, the defendant -and the detective, long acquainted from the defendant's previous involvement with the law, engaged in what the detective called "chit-chat." The detective asked the defendant, "What are you doing in here?" The defendant told the detective that, although he was caught with the stolen merchandise, he had not committed the burglary.
Meanwhile, both the defendant and his friend were protesting that the friend was not involved and should be released. The detective proceeded to tell the defendant that his explanation of what happened would not suffice and that he would have to tell the truth if he wanted his friend to be released. The three then proceeded to the interrogation room where the detective prepared to take a statement. He handed the rights waiver form to the defendant who stated he understood his rights. He signed the form and confessed to the burglary. His statement exculpated his friend who was released.
The defendant's claim that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given is two-fold. He argues first that he was tricked or coerced into making his statement by the detective's "promise" to release his friend. Second, he argues that the confession was a product of the conversation in the elevator which he characterizes as interrogation.
When the defendant raised the issue of the voluntariness of his confession, the state had the burden of proving it was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Woolston v. State, (1983) Ind.,
As to the defendant's claim that he was coerced into his confession, it is true that a confession induced by promises, threats, or deceit is not voluntarily made. Peterson v. State, (1983) Ind.,
The defendant next claims that his confession and the waiver of his Miranda rights were involuntarily made because of the preceding conversation in the elevator. He argues that the detective interrogated him when he asked, "What are you doing in here?" and by urging him to tell the truth. The defendant claims that this interrogation was improper, having occurred prior to the signing of the waiver form, and that the subsequent waiver was merely a product of the allegedly improper questioning.
Whether or not the conversation in the elevator was interrogation or merely a casual exchange, we will not find the subsequent post-waiver confession inadmissible if we find from the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case that the waiver was intelligently made. Tawney v. State, (1982) Ind.,
II.
The defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for burglary. He argues specifically that evidence was lacking on the element of entering with the intent to commit a felony. He makes this argument because the state did not prove by direct testimony that the husband did not give permission for the defendant to enter the house. Only the wife testified at trial, and she stated she did not give anyone permission to enter.
Also, during the taking of his statement, the defendant was asked if he had permission to enter the house, and the answer "Yes" was typed on the statement as the response given. However, at trial, the detective who took the statement testified the defendant had in fact answered "No" to the question but that the detective had mistakenly typed "Yes." We believe that this evidence most favorable to the state supports the inference that the defendant had no authorization to enter. Besides, regardless of authorization, if entry is established and is coupled with independent evidence of felonious intent, a burglary is proved. Perkins v. State, (1976)
Even if the defendant's confession is ignored, we find sufficient evidence of his felonious intent to support his conviction. Such intent may be inferred from the time and manner of the entry and from evidence of flight. Lee v. State, (1976)
For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.