ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
We grant the State’s Motion for Clarification, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
Meigo Bailey, Appellant, was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and two counts of attempted robbery. He appeals these convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting an audio-recorded statement, which he contends was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On December 2, 2004, Appellant was shot during an alleged home-invasion robbery attempt, and as a result, he was hospitalized. On December 6, 2004, Detectives Padgett and Parrales went to the hospital to interview Appellant about the alleged robbery attempt. There is no recording of this interview. According to Detective Padgett, he read Appellant his Miranda 1 rights and ascertained that he understood them before proceeding with substantive questioning. Detective Pad-gett testified that Appellant began to talk with him about various robberies Detective Padgett had already been investigating. This conversation led to information regarding a murder that had been the result of a home-invasion robbery on Phillips Highway on November 9, 2004. Detective Padgett recalled that Appellant admitted to being involved in this crime and was able to give details about the crime, including which firearms were used. According to the information Appellant provided Detective Padgett, Appellant remained outside the home while his companions went inside. While Appellant was outside, he heard shots fired. When Appellant’s companions emerged from the home, one of them informed Appellant that “it had gone wrong.” At the end of the interview, Detective Padgett told Appellant he would return the next day with a homicide detective.
The next day, Detective Padgett returned, as promised, with three other detectives: Parrales, Gupton, and Meacham. Detectives Gupton and Meacham both carried digital audio recorders, and the majority of Appellant’s interaction with the officers was recorded. The pertinent portions of the recording were played for the trial court at the suppression hearing, and we have listened to those portions as well. 2
When the officers arrived at the hospital on December 7, 2004, Detective Gupton reviewed a constitutional rights form with Appellant, which Appellant referred to as a “Waiver of Rights Form” in the proceedings below. The audio recording reflects that Detective Gupton read each right aloud and asked Appellant if he understood each one. Not all of Appellant’s responses are audible, but each audible response is “Yes.” At the suppression hearing, Detective Gupton testified that Appellant appeared to understand the form, did not have any questions about it, and did not ask for a lawyer. The form itself reflects that Appellant placed his initials next to each right and signed at the bottom.
*811 After reading Appellant’s rights and ascertaining that Appellant understood them, Detective Gupton asked Appellant some preliminary questions regarding his background and his gunshot wound before proceeding to substantive questioning. The substantive questioning began with the following exchange:
DET GUPTON: Meigo, in speaking with Detective Padgett, as he had said, there was an incident that occurred on Phillips Highway.
MR. BAILEY: Uh huh.
DET GUPTON: Are you aware of that incident? I ...
MR. BAILEY: Yes sir.
DET GUPTON: I’m sorry. Could you do me a favor, Meigo, and try to talk a little louder.
MR. BAILEY: Yes, sir.
DET GUPTON: Okay. I know it’s hard but it helps me understand things clearer. What can you tell me about that incident?
MR. BAILEY: Man, I don’t really want to talk about that (inaudible).
DET PADGETT: Why is that?
MR. BAILEY: Huh?
DET PADGETT: Why is that?
MR. BAILEY: Cause I don’t want no record of it on tape[.]
DET PADGETT: Cause what?
MR. BAILEY: Cause I don’t want to record on tape or nothing like that.
DET GUPTON: Okay, well, I’ll tell you what. I’ll turn mine off, okay? I’ll turn it off. How about that?
MR. BAILEY: You sure you (inaudible)?
DET GUPTON: What?
MR. BAILEY: (Inaudible)
DET GUPTON: Yeah.
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MR. BAILEY: Let me see it. Is it turned off? Let me see it. Is it turned off?
DET PADGETT: Yep. Ain’t no tape in it is there?
DET MEACHAM: Naw, it’s just a little digital thing. It’s shut off.
DET PADGETT: Digital recorder, that’s all.
MR. BAILEY: Okay.
After this exchange, the interview continued. Appellant repeated the information he had given to Detective Padgett the day before, named the other perpetrators, and described the home where the November 9, 2004, robbery and murder occurred.
In his motion to suppress the interview, Appellant argued that he was attempting to invoke his right to remain silent when he stated, “Man, I don’t really want to talk about that.” He contended that, based on this statement, the officers should have ended the interrogation and were not permitted even to ask clarifying questions. Instead, he argued, the officers should have honored his right “to cut off questioning.” After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, opining that “what the officers did was appropriate under the circumstances.” The recording was played at trial, and the jury ultimately convicted Appellant of several crimes based on the incident that occurred on Phillips Highway on November 9, 2004.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to deem his statement, “Man, I don’t really want to talk about that,” an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent. He relies primarily on
Cuervo v. State,
The factual distinctions between the instant case and the cases the parties cite illustrate the following point, made by the Florida Supreme Court in
State v. Glatzmayer,
Suppression issues are extraordinaiity rich in diversity and run the gamut from (1) pure questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law and fact, to (3) pure questions of law. Reviewing courts must exercise care when examining such issues, for while the issues themselves may be posed in broad legal terms ..., the actual ruling is often discrete and factual....
(footnotes omitted). After noting the marked diversity in suppression issues, the Glatzmayer court emphasized, “As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-based issues, and the proper standard of review depends on the nature of the ruling-in each case.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
An appellate court reviewing a ruling on motion to suppress is required to “interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”
See Connor v. State,
Our decision in this case results from the interplay of all of these standards, as well as the general notion that, as an appellate court, we always presume that a trial court’s decision is correct until the appellant has met the burden of showing error. See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 18:2 at 336 (2009 ed.). In the absence of such a showing, affir-mance is required. Id.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the substantive law, beginning with the well-settled rule that, to protect a suspect’s rights under the constitutions of the United States and Florida, an officer must give
Miranda
warnings before conducting a custodial interrogation.
See Miranda v. Arizona,
In
Alvarez v. State,
Invocation and waiver of constitutional rights are distinct inquiries, though, and should not be merged. See Smith v. Illinois,469 U.S. 91 , 98,105 S.Ct. 490 ,83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a suspect has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before a statement may be used against him. See Colorado v. Connelly,479 U.S. 157 , 168,107 S.Ct. 515 ,93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Ramirez v. Stale,739 So.2d 568 , 575 (Fla.1999). Thus, an ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning. See [U.S. v.] Rodriguez, 518 F.3d [1072] at 1080 [ (9th Cir.2008) ]. However, once a suspect has waived his rights, an attempt to revoke the waiver must be unambiguous. See Owen,696 So.2d at 717-718 ; Collins v. State,4 So.3d 1249 , 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Unlike the pre-waiver context, an ambiguity need not be clarified before proceeding with questioning. See Davis,512 U.S. at 459 ,114 S.Ct. 2350 ; Given,696 So.2d at 717 ; Collins,4 So.3d at 1250 . This rule regulates the tension recognized in Miranda between, on the one hand, the preservation of the right against self-incrimination and, on the other, the need for clear rules for law enforcement in the field. See Davis,512 U.S. at 461 ,114 S.Ct. 2350 .
Id.
at 745. The Fourth District’s discussion of pre-waiver and post-waiver analysis is consistent with case law from the Florida Supreme Court, such as
Almeida v. State,
In arguing that the statement was equivocal, the State notes the similarity between the phrasing of Appellant’s statement and the phrasing of some statements deemed equivocal in
Owen v. State,
Owen’s ambiguous responses came ... when he was being interrogated by Of *814 ficers Lincoln and Wood about the Slattery homicide. Owen had not yet confessed at the time he made the statements. Lincoln asked Owen, “There’s a few things that I have to know, Duane. A couple pieces don’t fit. How did it come down? Were you looking at the particular house or just going through the neighborhood?” Owen’s response was, “I’d rather not talk about it.” A short time later, following additional questions and answers, Lincoln asked, “Now, did you have a bicycle? Of course you did. Now, where did you put it?” Owen answered, “I don’t want to talk about it.”
Id.
at 697 n. 6. The
Owen
court held that the interrogating officers had no duty to either terminate questioning or ask questions to clarify the defendant’s responses “in the context presented.”
Id.
at 697-98. In one of the
Owen
defendant’s prior appeals, the supreme court had characterized the questions that elicited the equivocal responses as concerning “relatively insignificant details of the crime.”
State v. Owen,
Essentially contending that the context of a challenged statement is more important than the exact wording, Appellant directs our attention to
Cuervo v. State,
In explaining its holding, the
Cuervo
court emphasized that the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence “came solely in response to the inquiry concerning his
Miranda
rights, before any questions specific to the crime were asked.”
Although we do not agree with Appellant that the ruling in the instant case was erroneous, we do agree that context is generally as important, if not more impor
*815
tant, than the exact words a suspect uses in a statement that is alleged to be an invocation of the right to remain silent. We also note the Fourth District’s observation in
Alvarez
that “courts have been more apt to find a revocation of a waiver of the right to remain silent unambiguous and unequivocal if made
before
substantive questioning.”
[I]f a suspect has not answered any questions and fails to clearly waive his right to remain silent, or has waived his right but then answered only “mundane” questions before any substantive questioning, announcing he does not want to answer anymore, it is reasonable to conclude that he has decided not to speak. However, where a suspect has heard, understood, and waived his Miranda rights, and has been answering substantive questions without incident and continues to do so, a statement which may have been unambiguous if uttered initially may be objectively ambiguous when considered in context.
Id. at 745. Despite these general principles, we believe that, on the record before us, Appellant has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred in concluding that the officers’ response to Appellant’s statement was reasonable under the circumstances.
As noted above, the parties have not cited any case with facts so similar to those presented here that we are compelled to agree with either side. We agree ■with the State that the words Appellant used in the instant ease were similar to the words used in Owen. We also acknowledge that here, as in Owen, the statement at issue came in response to a question about the crime, rather than a question concerning whether Appellant wanted to waive his rights. However, these observations do not settle the matter. One key distinction between the instant case and Owen is that the statement at issue was made at the beginning of the substantive questioning, rather than after hours of questioning. Similarly, this case is not resolved simply by an acknowledgement that, as in Cuervo, the statement in question was made at the beginning of the interview before the officers began to ask difficult, specific questions about the crime. Cuervo is distinguishable because the statement at issue here came after a valid waiver of Miranda rights and was not made in response to an inquiry as to whether Appellant wished to waive those rights. These critical distinctions illustrate that the instant case cannot be resolved merely by analogy to Owen or Cuervo.
Because we have found no case that is more closely analogous than either Owen or Cuervo, we are left to draw our own conclusions regarding the specific statement Appellant uttered. In most appeals, courts have only the cold record to consider. In this case, we had the relatively unique opportunity to listen to the statement as it was uttered at the time of the interview. If we had only the cold record to consider here, we might be persuaded that the Alvarez court’s reasoning requires reversal, as Appellant did make the statement at issue at the inception of the substantive questioning. Because, like the trial court, we were able to listen to the interview, we were able to consider the manner in which the words at issue were expressed and determine whether the officers responded reasonably.
Having listened to the pertinent portions of the recording, we can understand why the trial court reached the result it did. At first blush, the transcribed words “Man, I don’t really want to talk about that” may appear rather emphatic. How *816 ever, the State has noted, and we agree, that the word “really” is not always used to express emphasis, but is sometimes used in a hedging manner. This point led us to consider the words in their audible context. From the recording, we know that Appellant essentially mumbled the words in question and followed them with additional, indecipherable language. The words on the recording simply do not come across as a clear assertion of a right. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellant’s words were insufficient to trump his prior waiver of his right to remain silent. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED.
Notes
.
Miranda v. Arizona,
. As the supreme court noted in
Almeida v. State,
. In his arguments to this Court, Appellant notes that after having him sign the rights form, the officers never asked whether he wished to waive those rights, arguably implying that a pre-waiver analysis applies. However, Appellant failed to argue to the trial court that he did not waive his rights before stating that he "really [didn’t] want to talk about that.” Instead, in his motion to suppress, Appellant referred to the rights form as a "Waiver of Rights Form” and argued that Appellant was asserting his right to cut off questioning (rather than to avoid being interrogated altogether) when he made that statement.