Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider whether a former employee who alleged that she was terminated from her at-will employment because of her gender pled a cause of action against her former employer for wrongful discharge.
The trial court decided this case on demurrer. Accordingly, we recite as true the material facts alleged in the motion for judgment and the fair factual inferences deducible therefrom. Palumbo v. Bennett,
Bailey’s motion for judgment alleges, citing Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corp.,
Scott-Gallaher filed a demurrer, asserting, inter alia, that Bailey’s common law claim was not actionable because she was an employee-at-will and, therefore, terminable without need for cause. The trial court sustained the demurrer, holding that Bailey had not stated a cognizable claim for wrongful discharge under Virginia’s public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. We awarded Bailey an appeal.
Virginia strongly adheres to the common law employment-at-will doctrine. As recently as last year, we stated:
*124 “Virginia adheres to the common-law rule that when the intended duration of a contract for the rendition of services cannot be determined by fair inference from the terms of the contract, then either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate the contract at will, upon giving the other party reasonable notice.
An employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave his employment for any reason or no reason, upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring liability to his employer. Notions of fundamental fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which extends a corresponding freedom to the employer.”
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks,
We have also held, however, that the common law employment- at-will doctrine is not absolute, and we have recognized certain narrow public policy exceptions to this doctrine. For example, in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,
[b]ecause the right conferred by [Code § 13.1-32] is in furtherance of established public policy, the employer may not lawfully use the threat of discharge of an at-will employee as a device to control the otherwise unfettered discretion of a shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the corporation.
Id.
Subsequently, in Lockhart, supra, we permitted two former employees who alleged that they had been terminated because of their race or gender to prosecute causes of action against their respective former employers. In Lockhart, we stated:
In Bowman, we recognized the plaintiffs’ rights to bring actions for wrongful discharge based upon violations of Virginia’s public policy that a stockholder should be permitted to exercise the right to vote stock free of duress and intimidation from corpo*125 rate management. Here, however, we are concerned with rights of even greater importance, the personal freedom to pursue employment free of discrimination based upon race or gender. Indeed, there are few, if any, greater restrictions on personal freedoms that an employee can suffer than to be terminated because of discrimination based upon race or gender.
Id. at 104,
We recognize that the Virginia Human Rights Act does not create any new causes of action. Code § 2.1-725. Here, we do not rely upon the Virginia Human Rights Act to create new causes of action. Rather, we rely solely on the narrow exception that we recognized in 1985 in Bowman, decided two years before the enactment of the Virginia Human Rights Act.
Id. at 105,
In Lockhart the former employers’ alleged discriminatory acts, if proven, would have violated Virginia’s strong public policy against race and gender discrimination as reflected in Code § 2.1-715, which is a part of the Virginia Human Rights Act. That it is the strongly held public policy of this Commonwealth to protect employees against employment discrimination based upon race or gender is beyond debate or challenge. Thus, in Lockhart we stated:
Without question, it is the public policy of this Commonwealth that all individuals within this Commonwealth are entitled to pursue employment free of discrimination based on race or gender. Indeed, racial or gender discrimination practiced in the work place is not only an invidious violation of the rights of the individual, but such discrimination also affects the property rights, personal freedoms, and welfare of the people in general.
Id.
Our decision last year in Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp., supra, is consistent with the narrow public policy exception to die employment-at-will doctrine we have previously recognized. There, the plaintiff’s claim was that he was terminated when he refused to follow the employer’s directions to repair a car by utilizing an alleg
In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were permitted to pursue causes of action against their former employers, identified specific Virginia statutes in which the General Assembly had established public policies that the former employers had contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that Lawrence Chrysler violated.
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp.,
Guided by these settled principles, we turn now to consider Bailey’s claim. Bailey argues that she pled a viable cause of action for gender discrimination and that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer. The Attorney General of Virginia, who filed a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Rule 5:30(a)(l), also argues that Bailey pled a cause of action for gender discrimination. Scott-Gallaher asserts that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer because Bailey failed to identify a statute which identifies a public policy that ScottGallaher had violated. We disagree with Scott-Gallaher.
We are of opinion that Bailey pled a viable cause of action which clearly falls within the scope of the narrow public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that we recognized in Bowman and Lockhart. Specifically, we will apply Lockhart here because we perceive of no reason why we should overrule or retreat from our holdings in Bowman and Lockhart, and we decline ScottGallaher’s invitation that we do so.
Bailey pled factual allegations similar to those pled by plaintiff Wright in Lockhart which, if proven true, could support a jury finding that she was discriminated against because of her gender. Bailey’s factual allegations, if proven true, would support a reasonable inference by the finder of fact that Scott-Gallaher terminated
In view of our holding, we need not consider the litigants’ remaining arguments. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a trial on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
Bailey asserted two claims in her motion for judgment. The first claim, predicated upon Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., was voluntarily nonsuited after it was determined that Scott-Gallaher did not employ a sufficient number of employees to bring it within the operation of Title VII.
Dissenting Opinion
with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE STEPHENSON join, dissenting.
The basis of the plaintiff’s so-called “common law” claim is that she has been the victim of discrimination in the workplace because of pregnancy and childbirth. The plaintiff contends, and the majority agrees, “that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination.” But “pregnancy” discrimination is not expressly prohibited by the Virginia Human Rights Act, Code §§ 2.1-714 through -725 (the Act), or any other Virginia law. Sound public policy may indeed justify legislation to prohibit the sort of conduct about which the plaintiff complains in this case. However, that public policy should be declared by the General Assembly, not four judges.
The plaintiff said in the trial court that the issue here, “simply put,” is “whether a female employee’s giving birth is grounds for termination of employment in Virginia.” She suggested to the trial court “that disparate treatment of female employees because they have the capacity to give birth or have in fact given birth is a quintessential expression of gender discrimination.” That contention makes interesting rhetoric, but it disregards the settled law that any narrow exception to Virginia’s employment-at-will doctrine must be based on a specific Virginia statute in which the General Assembly has established a public policy that the employer has contravened. See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks,
As pertinent, the Act declares the Commonwealth’s policy to safeguard in employment all individuals “from unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status or disability.” Code §2.1-715(1). Courts may construe or interpret statutory language that is “difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness. . . . But when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given to it; we take the words as written to determine their meaning.” Lee-Warren v. School Bd. of Cumberland County,
Moreover, at the time the plaintiff filed her motion for judgment, the Act provided: “Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Nor shall the policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to allow tort actions to be instituted instead of or in addition to the current statutory actions for unlawful discrimination.” Code § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1987). Thus, even if discrimination because of pregnancy or childbirth is, by implication, the same as discrimination because of gender, the General Assembly clearly has stated that the public policies set forth in the Act may not be used as the basis for private tort actions, such as the present case.
Finally, the majority places great reliance on Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Systems Corp.,
In 1995, the General Assembly acted promptly to nullify the scope of Lockhart, the legislature extensively amended Code § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Acts 1995, ch. 838. These amendments confirm, contrary to the majority’s holding today, that the Act does not establish a Bowman-type public policy exception to Virginia’s employment-at-will doctrine.
Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.