139 N.Y. 302 | NY | 1893
The failure of the defendant to perform its duty to use reasonable care in the inspection of the brake, the defect in which caused the injury to the plaintiff, is the gravamen of the action.
The plaintiff was nonsuited on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. We think the case should have been submitted to the jury. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was employed as brakeman on a freight train of the defendant, running from Norwood to Rome. On the day of the accident, after the train had been made up at Norwood ready to start, five flat cars loaded with railroad iron were placed in the train next to the engine, and the train, consisting of thirty cars, then proceeded to De Kalb J unction. The train having been stopped at that station, was started again with a view of placing it on a side track, moving upon a down grade. The plaintiff, in the performance of his duty, attempted to set the brake on the fourth flat ear from the engine, and swayed upon the wheel in the usual manner, when the brake rod came out and he was thrown from the car and injured by the moving train. On examination after the injury it was found that the pin in the bottom of the brake rod, designed to hold the rod in place, was gone. There is no evidence how long this defective condition of the brake had existed. The plaintiff testified that the rod came out easily when he swayed upon it. The absence of the pin could not have been seen by one working .the brake, but an inspection of the brake from under the car would have disclosed its absence.
It is claimed in behalf of the plaintiff that the evidence
In this case the company had provided for a proper inspection, which, if it had been made, would have led to the discovery of the defective condition of the brake at Norwood, assuming that the pin was not in the rod when the train started from that place. The rule required an inspection at that point, and if due inspection was omitted there, and the injury resulted from a defect then existing, a case was made for the jury, because the master is never exonerated by the negligent omission of subordinates to perform duties which are imposed upon him in his character as master, resulting in injury to other employees. We think there was enough shown from which the jury might infer that the pin was not in the rod when the train left Norwood and that the failure to discover the defect there, was in consequence of the omission
The evidence of the negligence, of the defendant is not direct or positive. But this is an infirmity which attends the investigation of facts in courts of justice in very many cases. While a verdict founded upon inferences having no just basis in the proven facts ought not to stand, and where the grade of proof is such that the inference therefrom of an essential fact is a mere speculation, it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury, we are unwilling to say in this case that there was no evidence from which a just inference might not be drawn by the jury, that the defective condition of the brake existed when the car left Norwood, and that there was a negligent failure to discover it at that point.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.