Ruth Bailey (“Appellant”) appeals from the denial of her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“the Commission”) found that the injury, which occurred while Appellant was employed by and at Phelps County Regional Medical Center (“Employer”), did not arise out of the course and scope of employment. We affirm the decision of the Commission.
Appellant’s brief fails to substantially comply with Rule 84.04.
1
Appellant’s
Appellant’s point relied on is slightly longer than the statement of facts. In it, she claims:
THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN THE CASE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT RUTH ANN BAILEY DID NOT HAVE AN ACCIDENT THAT AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. THE DECISION HAS REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE THE COMMISSION RELIED ON THE CASE OF BIVINS V. ST. JOHN’S REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER,272 S.W.3d 446 [Mo.App. S.D.2008]. THE BIVINS CASE WAS A MAJOR RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION.
IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CASE THE COMMISSION IN RELIANCE OF BIVINS CONCLUDED ERRONEOUSLY THAT THE FACTS DID NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. THERE IS MUCH RELIANCE ON HER ALLEGED LACK OF CREDIBILITY BASED ON CONFLICTING HISTORIES GIVEN TO THE VARIOUS TREATING DOCTORS. WHEN VIEWED IN THE TOTALITY OF EVEIDENCE [SIC] PRODUCED AND TESTIMONY GIVEN BY RUTH ANN BAILEY SHE CLEARLY SET OUT AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE PHELPS COUNTY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER.
Rule 84.04(d)(2) requires each point relied on to “(A) identify the administrative ruling or action the appellant challenges; (B) state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant’s claim of reversible error; and (C) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Appellant’s point does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) in that it does not tell us the law on which she bases her claim of error, nor does she tell us how, although she uses the words “in the context of the case,” the facts in her case support her claim of error. Points relied on that do not comply with Rule 84.04(d) present nothing for appellate review.
Coale v. Hilles,
The violations of Rule 84.04 found in Appellant’s brief seriously hinder our review. “Failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for review and warrants dismissal of an appeal.”
McCullough v. McCullough,
Respondent argues that Appellant failed to cite the appropriate standard of review, failed to explain how the facts found by the Commission do not support the award, and failed to explain why there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. We agree.
Respondent claims that Appellant was walking down the hall when her knee simply popped out of place; Respondent states the Commission actually relied upon
Miller v. Missouri Highway and Transportation,
When reviewing a decision of the Commission, this Court
“must examine the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Whether the award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining the evidence in the context of the whole record.”
Id.
at 672 (quoting
Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection,
The Commission relied upon Miller. Appellant has cited to nothing that distinguishes Miller from her case. 2 The Commission determined that Appellant’s knee simply popped out of place while she was walking. While there was evidence provided by Appellant that contradicts that factual finding, the determination is supported by the facts in evidence of statements made by Appellant to her treating physicians. Furthermore, there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2010), unless otherwise specified.
. Appellant’s injury may very well be distinguishable from Miller. The record may support a finding that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment and that employment was the prevailing factor in causing her injury; however, unless we become Appellant’s advocate, which we cannot do as explained previously, we cannot make that determination.
