148 Iowa 715 | Iowa | 1910
George O. Sanger was the original defendant. Shortly after the commencement of the suit, he died, and his administratrix was duly substituted. In the discussion of the case it will be more convenient for us to refer to Sanger, whose acts are called in question, as the “defendant,” rather than his administratrix. The plaintiff alleged in his petition that about nine years previous the defendant “did by protestations of love and affection, undue influence, and other means, alienate the affection of the wife of the plaintiff.” He also alleged that the defendant induced the wife to refuse,to return to plaintiff or to live with him, and that the defendant lived and cohabited with her as his wife, and so continued down to the time of the filing of the petition. These allegations were all denied in the answer. The petition was filed in April, 1907. The defendant died in June, 1907, and before the cause was reached for trial.
Hnder the issues as made, the burden was upon the plaintiff to show: (1) That the conduct of the defendant did result in alienating from plaintiff the affections of his wife; and (2) that such conduct of the defendant was in itself wrongful, or, if not wrongful in itself, that it was done with intent to alienate the affections of plaintiff’s wife.
In advance of trial some depositions were taken on behalf of the defendant. These were all introduced in evidence by plaintiff in his main case. The motion to
The question for our consideration is reduced therefore, to the inquiry whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could properly find that the conduct of the defendant was wrongful in the sense that it did result in separating the plaintiff from his wife, and that such was the object maliciously intended by the defendant. The following excerpt from the testimony of the plaintiff as a witness discloses the previous relations of plaintiff and his wife:
After we were married we first lived in the house that belonged to Tom Tucker; lived ■ there about six months; then went to Bred Léhrman’s house, abdut a mile and
Philip Bailey, an uncle of plaintiff, was a witness in his behalf, and testified as follows:
I do not remember visiting them except when they lived in my own house, and that was frequent; that was quite a while before they went to Sanger’s. Before they went to the Gruwell house I was there almost every day. I took meals with them. Pie had no place rented; did not pay any rent for the house. Pie had no property there — no household goods. Pie owned a cow before he came to my place, only had one cow. I paid him for every. day he woi’ked on the farm. IPe worked for me that year probably from fifty to seventy-five days; woi’ked in the neighborhood for others when he could get it. I saw Ann with a black eye when he lived on my place. He said that she bumped
This testimony offered by the plaintiff in his own behalf shows quite conclusively that he was holding his wife’s affections by a very slender thread, and, if it broke at last, this fact was not so remarkable in the light of the circumstances as to require us to look in other directions for the cause of it. It is ui’ged in argument by appellant that his previous unhappy relations with his wife constitute no bar to the present action, and this may be conceded as a legal proposition. But these unhappy relations are a very important consideration when the mere loss of his wife’s affection is put forward by the plaintiff as a circumstance sufficient to warrant the inference that such loss was caused by the conduct of the defendant, even though such conduct was not criminal nor in itself wrongful.
It is argued that a stranger may not harbor the wife of another, even though she live apart from her husband, without assuming the burden of showing good cause and good faith. This proposition involves a definition of the term “harboring,” and we need not enter into a discussion of it. Taking the situation of these parties as it was in 1903, the plaintiff’s wife was living apart from him and was in poverty and dependent upon her own efforts to make a living. If, under such circumstance, her father-in-law could not employ her, or even furnish her a home without being guilty of harboring her in an evil sense, then, her situation was very helpless indeed.
We have gone through this record with much care, and we are satisfied that the evidence would not warrant
Certain alleged errors aré argued by appellant based upon the rulings of the trial court in the admission of testimony. It is sufficient to say that, if all the rulings adverse to plaintiff were changed so as to be in his favor, it would not save his case.
We think the trial court properly directed the verdict, and its order is affirmed.