14 Ga. 384 | Ga. | 1853
delivering the opinion.
It is complained, that the jury found contrary to the first clause of the charge; and that the latter clause is not law.
We are not prepared to say, that were we satisfied that the verdict was contrary to the first clause in this charge, that we should on that account award a new trial in this cause. We are strongly inclined to the opinion, that Mr. Jones is entitled to all the land contained in his deed; and that he would not be estopped by a mere parol division, founded on no consideration whatever, which give him less. But be this as it may, this branch of the case was fairly submitted to the jury upon the proof. And they have either found, under the instructions of the Court, that there was no such division; or else, under the power given to them by the presiding Judge, under the second clause of his charge, the jury have found that Jones was deceived ,in making this line, by the fraudulent misrepresentations of Bailey; and that the partition was founded on the mistake of the parties; and consequently Jones ought not to be bound by it.
It only remains to inquire then, does this portion of the charge enunciate the law correctly ? If it does not, then the decision of this Court, in Smith et al. vs. Mitchell, (6 Ga. Rep. 458) was wrong. We there held, that if a party innocently, by mistake, misrepresents a fact which is material, and which the other party confided in, it. is cause for rescinding the contract, on the ground that it operated as a surprise and an imposition on the party seeking relief.
There is direct and uncontradicted testimony in this record, that Jones trusted alone to the representations of Bailey, in running the dividing line between the North and South halves of these lots. This line, therefore, will not foreclose^ him from
Judgment affirmed.