The husband of appellant was employed by respondents. On August 13, 1925, he fell down an elevator shaft and was killed. Thereafter, on August 14, 1925, respondents made the report to the Industrial Commissioner required 'by section 9478, Rev. Code 1919, showing that the employer was operating under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Rev. Code 1919', § 9436 et seq.) with liability insured in the Integrity Mutual Casualty Company. This report was filed with the Industrial Commissioner on August 19, 1925. On September 1, 1925, Mrs. Bailey gave written notice to respondents of her husband’s death while in respondents’ employment. This clаim for compensation, if such it was intended to be, was not filed with the Industrial Commissioner as required by section 9457, Rev. Code 1919. Thereafter, appellant and respondents agrеed that $2.50 per day for a total of $3,000 should be paid to appellant under the South Dakota Compensation Daw, and a memorandum of that agreement showing that said employers had insured their liability thereunder with the Integrity Mutual Casualty Company was filed on August 29, 1927, and approved- by the Industrial Commissioner on August 29, 1927, in accordance with section 9467, Rev. Cоde 1919. This memorandum of agreement does not show when it was signed or the settlement made; but, on November 9, 1925, appellant received from the Integrity Mutual Casualty Company thе sum of $180. and executed a receipt for that amount for compensation under the South Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Daw; and thereafter, from November 9, 1925, to May 8, 1926, appellant received from the casualty company weekly payments in accordance with the memorandum oí agreement, and executed receipts therefor which were filed with the Industrial Commissioner. In May, 1926, the casualty company became insolvent and made no further payments under the agreement, leаving a balance unpaid of $2,430. On September 20, 1927, appellant instituted proceedings
Respondents objected that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter such decree, claiming that apрellant’s right to compensation was barred under section 9457, because no claim' for compensation had been filed with the Industrial Commissioner. On this objection, the pеtition of appellant for a judgment against respondents was denied and the proceeding dismissed; and from this order and decree this appeal has 'been taken.
Section 9467 is as follows: “If the employer and employee reach an agreement in regard to the compensation under this law, a memorandum thereof shall be filed with the industrial commissioner by the employer or employee, and unlеss the commissioner shall, within twenty days, notify the employer and employee of his disapproval of the agreement, by registered letter sent to- their addresses as given on the memorandum filed, the agreement shall stand as approved and be enforcible for all purposes under the provisions of this article.”
Section 9475. is in part as fоllows: “Any party in interest may present a certified copy of an order or decision of the commissioner or a 'decision of a board of arbitration from which no claim for review has been filed within the time allowed therefor, or a memorandum of agreement approved by fhe commissioner, and all papers in connection therewith, to the circuit court of the county in which the injury occurred, whereupon the court shall render a decree in accordance therewith and notify the parties.”
Section 9457 is as follows: “The right to compensation under this artiсle shall be forever barred unless, within one year after the injury or, if death results therefrom, within one year after such •death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the Industrial Commissioner.”
■Respondents contend that the provisions of section 9457 are mandatory and require that the claim be filed in order to give the Industrial Commissioner jurisdiction to enter an award. In support of their contention respondents cite many cases well supported by authority. Particularly well supported is Mingus v. Wadley, 115
It is apparent from the language of sectiоn 9475 above quoted that the decree may be based upon either a decision of a commissioner, or a decision of a board of arbitration, or a memorandum of agreement approved by the commissioner. In Beckwith’s Estate v. Spooner,
In Garbouska’s Case,
In Maki v. School District of Wakefield Tp.,
The purpose of requiring the filing with the Industrial Commissioner of a claim for compensation within a year after the injury or death is to give an оpportunity for investigation of the claim when the matter is fresh in the minds of those who saw or knew of the accident; and the requirement of section 9457 is a just and reasonablе one. When, however, the employer and employee have reached an agreement in regard to the compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Raw, filed a memorandum thereof with the Industrial Commissioner, and secured his approval of the agreement, the employee no longer has a mere inchoаte right of compensation; his rights have been determined to the same extent as though an order or decision of the Industrial Commissioner had been made, or to the samе extent as if a decision of a board of arbitration had been rendered from which no claim for review had been filed within the time allowed therefor. To permit the employer to thereafter avoid liability merely because no claim for compensation had been filed with the Industrial Commissioner within a year would neither be just nor reаsonable. To construe section 9457 as construed by respondents would be to- disregard other sections in the article of which it is part.
For all the reasons hereinbefоre stated, we are of the opinion that the refusal of the trial court to enter decree as prayed for was error, and that this cause should be remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment as prayed for. It is so ordered.