| Superior Court of New Hampshire | Jul 15, 1841
The general rule that where a party having color of title enters into the land conveyed, he is presumed to enter according to his title, and thereby gains a constructive possession of the whole land embraced in his deed, seems to be settled by the current of authorities. 3 N. H. Rep. 27, Riley vs. Jameson; Ditto 49, Lund vs. Parker, and cases cited.
And such entry may operate as a disseizin of the whole tract; and the possession under it, continued for the term of twenty years, may be deemed an adverse possession, which will bar the entry of the owner after that lapse of time. 3 N. H. Rep. 49; 13 Johns. R. 118, Jackson vs. Ellis; Ditto 406, Jackson vs. Smith; 18 Johns. 355, Jackson vs. Newton.
Exceptions have been suggested to the rule in some cases. One is, where a large tract of land is embraced in the deed, and a small part only has been improved. 1 Cowen 276, Jackson vs. Woodruff; 6 Cowen 677, Jackson vs. Vermilyea. Another, where the deed under which the claim is made includes a tract greater than is necessary for the purpose of cultivation, or ordinary occupancy. 8 Wend. R. 440, Jackson vs. Oltz.
These exceptions seem not to be very definite in their application, for lots, like other things, are large or small by comparison, and a tract which would be much too large for cultivation by one, would not suffice for another. But they serve to show the principle upon which the rule is founded. It is, that the entry and possession of the party is notice to the owner of a claim asserted to the land; that the limits of such claim appear from the deed ; and that if the owner for twenty years after such entry, and after notice, by means of the possession, that an adverse claim exists, asserts no rights, he may well be presumed to have made some grant or conveyance, co-extensive with the limits of the claim set up;
There should be something more than the deed itself, and a mere entry under it — something from which a presumption of actual notice may reasonably arise. It is not necessary to show actual knowledge of the deed. Acts of ownership, raising a reasonable presumption that the owner, with knowledge of them, must have understood that there was a claim of title, may be held to be constructive notice, that is, conclusive evidence of notice. 8 N. H. Rep. 264, Rogers vs. Jones. The owner may well be charged with knowledge of what is openly done on his land, and of a character to attract his attention. The presumption of notice arises from the occupation, long continued ; and the notice of the claim may well be presumed, as far as the occupation indicates that a claim exists, and the deed, or color of title, serve to define specifically the boundaries of the claim or possession. If the occupation is not of a character to indicate a claim which may be co-extensive with the limits of the deed, then the principle that the party is presumed to enter adversely according to his title, has no sound application, and the adverse possession may be limited to the actual occupation.
Thus cutting wood and timber, connected with permanent improvements, may well furnish evidence of notice that the claim of title extends beyond the permanent improvements, and the deed be admitted to define the precise limits of the claim and possession, provided the cutting was of a character to indicate that the claim extended, or might extend, to the lines of the deed. It might, at least, well indicate a claim to the whole of a tract allotted for sale and settlement, of which the party was improving part, unless there was something to limit the presumption. But no presumption of a claim, and of color of title beyond the actual occupation, could arise respecting other lots than that of which the party was in possession. And where the possession was in a
If the possession was not of a character to indicate ownership, and to give notice to the owners of an adverse claim, although the grantee might be held to be in possession according to his title, in a controversy with one who should make a subsequent entry without right, his possession ought not to be held adverse to the true owner, to the extent of his deed, merely by reason of the deed itself, even if recorded, nor by any entry under it. There are several cases which tend to sustain this view of the principle. 6 Pick. R. 172, 176, Poignard vs. Smith; 13 Maine R. 178, Alden vs. Gilmore; 4 Mass. R. 415, Prop'rs of Kennebeck Purchase vs. Springer; 4 Vermont R. 155, Hapgood vs. Burt; 1 Peters' R. 41, Ewing vs. Burnet; 2 Greenl. 176, Little vs. Megquier.
We are of opinion that the rule cannot apply to a case where a party, having a deed which embraces land to which his grantor had good title, and other land to which he had no right, enters into and possesses that portion of thedand which his grantor owned, but makes no entry into that part which he could not lawfully convey. There is no notice in such case to the owner of the land thus embraced in the deed, and no possession which can be deemed adverse to him. If it may be said that the color of title gives such a constructive seizin and possession that the grantee could maintain trespass against any person who did not show a better right, (that is, a title, or prior possession,) there is nothing in the nature of it which can give it the character of a disseizin, or possession adverse to the true owner, so as to bind him. For that purpose, there must be actual possession of
it is not necessary to settle whether an entry into an enclosed lot, under a deed purporting to convey unenclosed lands adjoining, belonging to the same person, would operate as a disseizin of the latter. Where two separate lots, included in the same deed, belong to different owners, an entry into one can in no way operate as a disseizin in relation to the other.
The entry into the house lot, therefore, to which Amos Town, who conveyed, had title, was no disseizin of Solomon Town, who had title to the lot unenclosed, on the other side of the road.
The next question is, what entry into the land itself is sufficient.
Here was an entry in 1821, upon the tract in dispute, and a possession, by placing a building on it, by Ebenezer Carle-ton, the grantor of the defendants. This was, without doubt, an act of ownership. The character of it was adverse to the title of Solomon Town, and it was of a nature to give notice that Carleton claimed title to that land.
But the possession before that time was of a more ambiguous character.
Ebenezer Carleton, to whom the conveyance was made in 1815, made no entry or use of the lot up to 1821, except by laying lumber upon it, or placing farming utensils there. Those acts by one having a deed, if nothing further was shown, might be held to be a sufficient entry and possession to operate as a disseizin of Solomon Town. But it appeared that so far as the laying of lumber on the lot was concerned, this was no more than Carleton, and divers other persons, had been in the habit of doing before, and that others continued to do the same afterwards. Those acts, prior to 1815, were done by him, and others, without claim of title, and of course in subservience to the title of the true owner. If not acknowledged trespasses, they must have been under a
It was not, therefore, until 1821, when the building was removed on to the land, that any entry was made upon it by Oarleton, from which Solomon Town, with knowledge of the entry, should have understood that Carleton made any claim to the ownership of the lot; and until that time, therefore, there was nothing from which an ouster can be inferred, and no possession by him that can be deemed adverse, except at the election of the owner. 21 Pick. 140, Magoun vs. Lapham; 13 Maine 336, Thomas vs. Patten.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
Woods, J., having been of counsel, did not sit.