*1 filing Although inquiry further his claim. Mr. Buser about 1951, March, respondent he received the letter of made nc still to file claim with re- effort his and did not contact Mr. Buser gard he, Buser, promise Mr. that had been made that respondent pre- would tell him when to his claim. The file good delay sumed to have law. The test of cause for known the ordinary prudence. promise The mere that Mr. Buser respondent tell would not meet when to file claim does his Respondent friendship test. stresses the fact that a existed close Slayton, at all times between Mr. Mr. Buser and himself and respondent they that on each occasion when the two would visit they work; would tell him that believed that he would return to August, 1951, delivery date of of the last sick- check, respondent ness-benefit Mr. Buser considered that would Respondent be able to return to work. advances the contention the statement made Mr. Buser that he would tell him claim, coupled when to file his would be returned to with the assurances that he work, filing excused him from claim case, until October 1951. In hold, view of the record in the we law, promise by as matter of that a employee’s mere su- perior that at time some in the future he would be told when good file his claim does not constitute cause for the failure file the claim until Indemnity October 1951. See Texas Cook, App., Ins. v.Co. Texas Civ. writ refused. judgments of the trial court and Ap- the Court of Civil peals judgment are reversed here respondent rendered that nothing. take Opinion 4,May delivered 1955.
Rehearing overruled June 1955.
Emery Eugene Bailey v. American General Company Insurance May 11,
No. A-4785. Decided 1955. Rehearing overruled June 1955. (279 315) S.W. 2d Series *2 Hill, Broion, Abraham, Kronzer & L. Hill and James John W. Kronzer, Houston, petitioner. all of for holding petitioner’s erred Court Civil
incapacity disability per- did result from an compen- term is defined the workmen’s sonal as that Ry. Gulf, Hayter, F. v. 93 sation statute. C. & S. Co. Texas Dorsett, 944; Houston v. Elec. Co. Texas S.W. 546.
Vinson, Elkins, Clayton, Weems & Searls and L. J. of Hous- ton, respondent. opinion the Court.
Mr. delivered Smith Justice case was sub- suit. This is workmen’s issues, resulting in a verdict jury upon special mitted to disability. judg- That petitioner partial judgment for for 50% Ap- rendered Civil ment been reversed and has peals. 2d 528. 268 S.W. workman, course petitioner in the while another employment, opposite movable scaf-
of their at were ends build- supported roof of a fold which was ing. cables petitioner opposite end of the scaffold that on gave way, his death on the stood other workman fell to eight building Petitioner saw roof of another stories below. thought he himself his co-worker strike the roof below and killed, caught fall about but was cable in *3 blowing fall. such manner that he did not wind was and swung wall, swung away the petitioner from the as it back scaffold but jump was was able released and to to roof of building height about another which was the same as the scaf- leg burn, a on fold. Petitioner suffered bruise and cable his injuries nature, completely in were such minor were healed incident, short time within a after not did cause or any disability part. to on contribute his Petitioner contends upon sys- that the traumatic effect of accident his nervous directly disabling neurosis, “anxiety tem resulted in a termed an “anxiety experts reaction” state” both medical heard in court, impossible the trial has rendered which for claim- engage employment in ant to the field of for which he is trained depends majority which he for his livelihood. The respondent’s of Civil sustained contention disability petitioner’s due to an within meaning statutory injury. of the definition of With this agree. we conclusion do Emery Eugene question is: Has Bailey here suffered harm body? structure of his Peti- young tioner, man, worker, aas became an iron ap- took an graduated fairly promptly
prenticeship, journeyman’s ato scale work, journeyman’s in and the evidence shows that at all times prior petitioner the date of this to unfortunate accident was capably perform worker; to duties as an able iron was he one iron of the better considered workers and that he was not suffering from nervous disorder steady and was as as the testimony average individual. the trial shows that when petitioner tried to resume his work as an iron worker he was tense, nervous, overpowering jumpy an ter- and affected with alertness, impending ror and fear faculties disaster. His ability under the normal concentration and to think and act definitely employment im- stress and strain his have been longer paired qualified as a such extent he is no moody structural steel and He iron worker. has become irritable; periods “blanking out”; he rest has he is unable to working day constant, at the end of a and is affected with re- curring nightmares by quivering, jumping cry- evidenced ing sleep. out record shows on one occasion petitioner “froze,” literally paralyzed, attempting work while a height following at by performed considerable his accident. Tests neurosurgeons prior peti- two to the trial showed that pressure hypersensitive tioner’s blood 140/92; that he was pain, eyelids and that there was tremor of his closed that his reflexes were underactive. excerpts We find from testimony that Dr. Brown
testified, response suestions, as follows: “Q. ‘Anxiety something neurosurgeon state’ is that can diagnose, just like fractured arm?
“A. Yes. “Q. State whether or not that is a term neuro- surgeon, a terminology by medical neurosurgeon which a de- scribes harm to system. the function of the nervous neurosurgeon, “A. Yes. The neurologist, or the psy- or the *4 chiatrist would describing use the same terms in disturbance of system. function to the nervous “Q. not, your opinion, State whether or upon your based findings first you examination and the made, you any which had opinion then as to whether or disturbance, had there been a interference, or harm to the Bailey’s function of Mr. nervous system aas result of the accident or accidental event which he having described as occurred on October 31st.
“A. Yes. I would definitely great think there was a psychic trauma to the individual and developed that he this nervous really condition as a result of it. It was a precipitation rather cause, probably than a but he wouldn’t developed have it with- experience. out this traumatic “Q. ‘trauma’, you You word say ‘psychic use this trauma’ and you say experience’. you ‘traumatic "Vthiatdo mean ‘trauma’ ? or ‘traumatic’ damage so the individual injury that or “A. I mean instance, particular functioning properly. In this he is not damage, a functional dam- organic we call but what
it is not age are still might circuit. wires be likened to short functioning as he out, there, they is not shorted he have should. clear, “Q. is Doctor, Now, I sure the record só can be degree of upon a reasonable
your professional opinion, based brought about certainty, has been this condition medical of 31st produced event occurrence October this or or occurred on that scaffold that he described?
“A. Yes. suggestions,
“Q. your primary Doctor? have been What much work as he I he do “A. recommended that as have possible doing, get as is capable as much recreation of that he get him, adequate rest. and that he :'í “A. drugs attempt given control his I him in an have enough rest, away nervousness, gets with and to do to see he original depression, I after his visit. his learned about “Q. get your question Doctor, I ideas on this would like to system, psychic or to the nervous nervous it, you where it a man’s or whatever want to call affects trauma non-tenseness, disposition, degree of tenseness or nervous his degree apprehension non-apprehension. just Is that as accepted just in the medical literature of well as well known country injury, any type direct it be a as other whether this skull, back, anything or a else? fractured broken Yes, say I “A. would so.
“Q. thing just type Is that calculated to be real and disabling, system, damage any to the nervous part of a man? other usable “A. Yes.
“Q. why Bailey there reason in the world Mr. could Is gone along, assuming per- for the moment he not have man, fectly he suffered normal most serious dis- *5 order, just any individual, like other that he was normal no ‘scary-cat’ either, hero, functioning normal man but things, normally normal, situations, normal reacted to like episode any reason without this that occurred there on October con- probability in all forward looked he could not have 31st set-up ? as type before tinuing with that same I think so. “A. don’t you seen both “Q. your experience have Has been damage harm, interference with out, or or
the service and brought episode system, about function of the nervous being actually without there here similar to the one described lasting damage, broken and the any physical, such bones as like?
“A. Yes.
“Q. disabling? Is that Yes, Definitely.”
“A. concerning relationship No issue is causal be- raised psychosomatic injury psychic tween the accident and the agree parties experience All described above. of see- ing plunge narrowly escape a fellow workman to his death and himself, directly produced death disabled which has petitioner. determining meaning In the definition of con Compensation tained the Workmen’s the Court should Statute guided by the often announced construction in refer rule of statute, “remedial,” ence to this that since it is “if there be may particular reasonable doubt which arise in a right injured compensation, employee should same right.” Indemnity be solved in favor of Jones v. such Texas Co., App., Ins. Texas Civ. writ refused. following definition is contained Article Section Compensation Subsection Workmen’s Law: “The terms ‘injury’ ‘personal injury’ shall be construed mean harm and such diseases naturally or infection as (Emphasis added). result therefrom.” ways There “physical are two to construe the word structure of body.” respondent “physical considers structure” to im * * ply grouping individual, connected, parts bones, tissues, nerves, vessels, Then, blood reasoning pro etc. so ceds, statutory requires gross definition a lesion or actual alteration of one or more of parts these individual in order to qualify “injury.” agree as an We do interpreta with this A tion. liberal construction below, statute as outlined proper interpretation. the more desirable and *6 body,” used it is phrase “physical of the as structure body, simply to the statue, the entire must refer to digestive system circulatory toor the structure or to the skeletal complex perfectly in- whole, system. to the It to the refers organs bones,
tegrated interdependent tissues electrical, chemical and mechanic- together by means of function fuctioning breathing living, individual. To processes in a al body,” the by “physical structure of meant what is determine living person a that of should considered the structure be —not thing. static, a inanimate as “damage arises, or harm” question there been has Now body? Recall the de- “physical structure” of claimant’s to symptoms was the plaintiff’s out What scription of set earlier. concerning witnesses these or of the various verdict estimation said, Kirk, pusher, or “he symptoms? Mr. claimant’s foreman plaintiff had suffered just Dr. Brown stated that out of luck.” by “injury “psychic he meant or a damage trauma” and that severe functioning proper- the individual so that he is not to attorney, ly.” question plaintiff’s Dr. Brown In answer to a just “calculated to as real affirmed that such be * * disabling, *, part of to other the usable as added). body (Emphasis a man.” agreement testimony of all shows The substance longer Now, say body properly. plaintiff’s no functions can we law, though that, “physical structure” as a matter of even longer properly, it has suffered no “harm” ? no functions What body that, meaning “harm” if can the word have question, body of the event or condition has result properly? living, “Harm” with to function reference to a ceased active body essentially is—in fact means structure —as longer it no functions as should. It is a natural “physical word “harm” with reference to the construction living person, look to the of a effect of the event structure” functioning question effective of that or condition structure. significance it is not without feel that the words We Legislature
“damage harm” were used or in the definition injury. “damage” cannot assume that either the word We Some difference “harm” is extraneous. must have been in- legal ordinary as well connotation of tended. “harm” is “damage.” import Damage than of broader embraces cell, organ tissue, organ system; direct physical structure of embraces “harm” also im- structures, directly caused pairment of use or control of control in an use or This interference with accident. good organism depends upon unified action and health whose disabling synthesis productive can same balanced cells, tissues, signs physical injury symptoms as direct *7 organs organ systems. supported by This conclusion is tetimony medical in this case. part
The definition construed here of a revision of the was Compensation in 1917. last Workmen’s Act enacted section legislation now stands of that reads as follows: “The law it being wholly inadequate protect rights of industrial em- may injured ployees who be in and the industrial accidents employees may of such beneficiaries who be killed in such acci- emergency imperative public necessity an dents creates and an requiring the constitutional rule bills to be read on three days suspended, hereby suspended, several and the same is Act passage, and this shall take effect from and after its and it (Emphasis added). Acts, Leg., Reg. is so enacted.” Sess., 35th 1917, 103, p. passed Ch. 293. The Act was and became law on 28, express March extend 1917. Such an declaration of an intention to protection coverage beyond available that available pre-existing directly contrary under law seems to the restrictive imputed intention lawmakers respondent. Louisiana, The Court faced compen- with a involving sation case arising nervous disorder out of an ac- organic cident from which no demonstrable pathology resulted, following language quoted from Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation approval Law with compensation: awarded “ though may ‘Even an accident produce an pa- anatomical thology, if nevertheless the workman does in fact become dis- accident, abled as a result of that although injury is compensable, disability may such hysteria be the result of may —and to a mental be traceable condition physical and not a disorder’.” Peavy Co., v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber La. Court Appeals, 1949, 505, 2d 508. The So. definition of in the Louisiana Compensation Law is as follows: “ ‘Injury’ Injuries’ and ‘Personal only includes injuries by structure of violence and such disease naturally as construed to result infections or in no therefrom. These terms shall case be include other form of disease or derangement, howsoever caused or contracted.” Louisiana Re- Workmen’s vised Statutes Compensation, Ch. 10 Sec p. (7), 358. statutory restrictive words, despite definition more In other Act, a result has in the Texas that contained its than on face with the one here. in accord in Louisiana reached been rulings prior jurisdictions, Looking as well as to other dichotomy rejecting the be- courts, our own seems decision, purpose we “body” for the of this “mind”' tween decisions, both trend of depart well established from the do negligence litigation. ordinary Compensation and in Workmen’s Co., Indemnity Ins. 146 Texas Texas In Hood v. workmen’s ruled that this Court resulting disability from a nervous properly awarded for case, man cannot use “This In the Hood the Court said: disorder. case, petitioner in- present physical powers.” In the his capacitated he sus- the reason that has to do labor using incapable of and con- him which renders tained *8 case, trolling In Hood the Court physical structure. the present incapacity In the is not simulated.” further said: “That agree incapacity cannot petitioner’s not simulated. We is case Legislature say a that as the intended to claimant such that the one in the claimant such as injury cation, compensation, a that Hood case was entitled to but petitioner The definition of would be excluded. by not, impli- in terms in does contained the statute causally employ- with the an connected exclude entirely case, the claimant recovered from In Hood ment. the injury in In our case evidence physical four weeks. shows system persists petitioner’s nervous a disorder to incapacity, opinion, disability: in our is more His even serious course, in the Hood case. it is that of the claimant Of than real leg, had suffered to his that his that Hood true leg injury. said have arisen out disorder was however, looking distinction, purpose Conceding out, agree Legislature, by set we cannot above announced precludes recovery holding Hood case of com- in the that pensation present petitioner by in the case. think the We attempted drawn the Court of Civil to be distinction a difference. one without is 694, 511, Case, Mass. 75 N.E. 2d and Bur-
In Charon’s Ridge Rayon Hagood, Corp., Mills Division v. lington Blue Mills compensation workmen’s was al- 13 S.E. 177 Va. incapacity due to nervous disorder in the physical ab- lowed language organic injury. opinions any of these last sence substantially courts of acceptance other same re- shows physical as the disorder and lation between nervous one announced here. respondent F. case of Bekelski v. O. relies Company, 2d 741. The dissent
Neal 141 Neb. N.W. substantially position present same as the Bekelski case took Although case, opinion. recovery no allowed in that was Dredge expressly approved v. dissent Fund, in case Roberts 71 Idaho 232 Pac. 2d awarded. (Comp. 48-152) and The statutes of both Nebraska St. § (I.C. 72-201) require Idaho “violence to the struc- § body.” only possible ture of the distinction between the Dredge Fund case the instant is that the emotional fatal, trauma petitioner former case was whereas has only finding organic been disabled. no There was lesion plaintiff’s tissue had sustained been decedent in Idaho only finding body that his had ceased function. Pe- case— improperly. titioner’s functions Is this distinction material ceasing here? That to function “harm” or is “violence” to the body, functioning improperly structure of the with resulting distinct and admitted detrimental effect not? It this, too, seems to us that distinction without difference. impression This is a case of first in Texas. The authorities are in jurisdictions. substantial conflict in other must This case conformity be decided in with the discernible intention of our Legislature enacting presently the statute before this Court. seeking In implement intention in our construction of the statute we by judicial cannot be expressions concluded foreign jurisdictions. Looking prior next decisions of this ordinary negligence actions, Gulf, we find the cases *9 Ry. Hayter, C. & F. 239, S. Co. v. 54 Texas S.W. L.R.A. and Dorsett, Houston Electric Co. v. 145 Texas Hayter plaintiff riding SW. 546. In the was on a train when it, striking another train collided with the car be- hind the plaintiff riding. one in which was Plaintiff saw the coming other experienced train and the emotions of a man who expected death. plaintiff The car where was did not leave plaintiff track and was even thrown out of his chair. He physically was not greatly. any way, frightened disturbed in him developed Thereafter he “neurasthenia” which Black- iston’s, New Gould Dictionary, Medical group defines as “A formerly symptoms debility ascribed to or exhaustion of the symptoms fatigability, nerve centers. include energy, lack of pains, various aches and and activity. disinclination to Some many symptoms, individuals have symptoms in others the center gen- organ region.” particular some or Neurasthenia is a including encompassing eral term “anxiety a class of disorders Blumer, Library “The neurosis.” See Practitioner’s Surgery, IX, “Neurology” “psychiatry,” and Medicine and Vol. damages pp. (1938). plaintiff recovered in the 460-466 appealed. trial court. The Rairoad appellant’s (55 Appeals brief in the Court of Civil “
128) only question states: ‘The that will considered be plaintiff damages whether the can recover the mere result fright shock, unaccompanied by any bodily injury mental in- opinion flicted on him the defendant’.” The of that con- Court following: recovery tains “It is settled state that no this fright, physical injury had can be for mere where there is no (Citing quoting Kimball, and from inflicted. 210, Hill v. 76 Texas * * * 618) clearly 13 S.W. 7 L.R.A. The distinction is case; is, recovery drawn cannot had be suffering fright, from mere but where results recovery mental a (Emphasis shock can had.” added) judgment of the trial court was affirmed. apeal, courts,
On saying: “But, this Court affirmed the lower light science, nay, light in knowledge, of modern in the of common — say, law, strong a court a as matter of —can may produce subject bodily mental emotion injury? or mental * * * that, physical injury conclude We where results fright shock, from a wrongful other mental caused another, injured party act or omission of is entitled to re- * * damages, (93 cover his 945) (Em- Texas 54 S.W. added) phasis Note that there was some evidence in Hayter this case that pain
suffered from in the small of his back and that he had “weakened” muscles in that area. This is th convincing most argument concerning any “physical his favor injury.” all merely poor other evidence tended to digestion; show that he shaky” following accident; “nervous that he was fatigue general bothered with “muscle weakness of the extremities,” lower and “nervous Nevertheless, exhaustion.” both the Court of Civil spoke in terms plaintiff having “physical” suffered a injury. The dis emphasized opinions tinction made in both is not the dis psychic tinction between neurosis or disorder “physical” and a injury, but rather that distinction fright” between “mere *10 injury,” “physical Courts the assumed to have been Hayter by plaintiff in suffered the the case. Yet it is clear from Hayter that the case reading opinions record in and the the much, harm, as if “physical” indeed no more suffered from plaintiff principal case. does the in the applied when analysis produces results similar
The same the In that case in 1946. case decided to the Dorsett which was Company’s narrowly Bus defendant plaintiff missed “impact” suf- and negligently operated sustained no bus. She The of tissue. or alterations fered no observable lesions again distinguished recovery court nevertheless allowed and resulting fright” “physical injury” from and between ‘“mere emotional opinions appears the only from evidence which shock. complained injuries tell there of with reference to the “great upset, plaintiff and us that fright, shock suffered emotional resulting derangement system; and in the of her from extreme that as a of incident she suffered result such headaches, lapse memory, nervousness, brain severe and quoting liberally Hill v. and deterioration.” After Kimball Gulf, recog- Ry. Hayter, supra, again F. C. & S. Co. v. the Court nized the distinction essential announced those cases said, merely are not here concerned with an action “We based fright, accompanied by bodily on neither in- nor followed * * jury accordingly recovery. con- Court allowed inescapable clusion by plaintiff was assumed “bodily” injury quota- have suffered a and the tion Hayter from the Kimball case and the case show that “physical injury” “bodily Court made no distinction between injury.” compelling Another type reason to hold that (cid:127) by petitioner sustained “injury” comes within the definition of as contained in the statute is the fact that the Workmen’s Com pensation right employee bring Act eliminates the of an an damages against subject employer Act, action for ex cept provided by holdings Hayter statute. cases, supra, Dorsett support proposition “injury” petitioner sustained compensable would be under com law, mon ligence. dependent, course, upon findings neg ordinary Legislature doWe not believe that intended such an petitioner compensable as sustained would be law, at common Compensation but not under Act. hold To place employer position being otherwise would required to though defend an action at common law even such employer foresight qualify had exercised the under the terms procured compensation pro Act insurance for the tection of employer employee. Further, both em- *11 protection, adequate provide for himself
ployer, in order to liability against at provide for insurance would forced be becoming individually re- risk of law or assume the common might ob- any judgment payment which sponsible for of action, common law against of him result such tained as the compensation paying insurance at time he was while premiums the same protection employees under the of his Work- for the Compensation Act. men’s only passed upon question one herein discussed was respondent’s Appeals. examined of have Court Civil We points error were filed in that and find that 29 of
brief presented. Only Court points of were considered. Several of these points, considered, present questions where- which were not Appeals jurisdiction. of final Court Civil has Therefore this cause is reversed and remanded to the Court proceedings of Civil opinion. for further consistent with this Opinion May 11, delivered 1955. Calvert, dissenting. joined by
Mr. Justice Justice Walker, agree I majority am unable to with the decision. It is statutory every part cardinal rule of construction stat- given effect, ute should be and that should be a construction any part nugatory avoided that inoperative, will render of an act superfluous. State, Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. writ ref. Compensation Our Workmen’s Act authorizes incapacity injury, resulting to work provides “injury” “personal injury” the terms damage shall be construed to mean or harm to body structure naturally of the and such diseases or infection as holding result position majority pro- therefrom. The is based petitioner’s body prop- failure of to function erly constitutes or harm to body meaning within incapacity statute. All work results inability from the failure or func- normally. tion It would seem to follow from the decision in this disability case that curring resulting all from an oc- accidental event employment compensable. the course of is The stat- utory injury is, therefore, definition of inoperative rendered '(cid:127) nugatory in principle violation of the fundamental of construc- 'ion mentioned construction, above. The alternative adopted Appeals, rejected by Civil Court, certainly and does no violence not unreasonable provision word or of the statute. undoubtedly majority opinion quoted in
The evidence real supports petitioner’s condition is the conclusion that described, simulated, and not susceptible the occurrence is caused disability. diagnosis, caused two and has agree- experts are in medical ment, who in the trial of the case testified *12 entirely however, petitioner’s disability to a is due physical mental condition and is not caused bqdy. Brown, peti- structure of his Dr. who was offered tioner, testified, part, as follows: * * *
“Q. brain, say system You this in the and nervous takes spinal cord, not. branches of the nerves and what Can you organs any specific trace this function to ? failure to of those
“A. Yes. It the brain.
“Q. [*] In [*] other [*] [*] words, [*] this failure of his mind to function prop- erly specific thing talking in connection with this we been have about, climing this and what not?
“A. Yes. :¡í jjs # just synonym “A. ‘Trauma’ injury, ‘psychic trauma,’ course, psychia refers to trauma or to the mind of the individual rather than to the structure. It is an interference with function rather than an interference with the structure. “Q. Now, you then, I you as understand what have been testi-
fying a psychic about here is trauma? Psychic
“A. trauma, yes. “Q. something And that is interferes with the function- ing system something the nervous damages rather than body? structure of the
“A. That is correct.” following excerpt testimony Skog- is an from the of Dr. land, who respondent: was called “Q. you any diagnosis Did arrive at conclusion or about the you man’s condition at the time saw him? organic
“A. I Yes. felt that had he actual disease of no his or system of his brain or no actual brain or his nervous viewpoint words, of structure system. In from the nervous other good ever system it all, was as and his nervous his brain ‘anxiety re- was, I what we call but that the fellow had felt gotten words, call and he had In he had had a close action.’ other yet down. sort of anxious it and had not settled about “Q. you question right, All I to ask another sir. would like state, anxiety all, two will Doctor. Is about that something it, it- you that manifests I believe that is what call sys- any change nervous self in in the condition of brain if anything you find physically? there or tem Is there can see you internally? examine the man
“A. No.
“Q. Doctor, clumsy my question, be- I am I am sure about field, try I will to boil I am with that cause not familiar getting way man’s jmu inside the down this. If had some system, body now, examining brain, and his it, you goes find with would the nerves and whatever change physical make-up time that structure since the *13 you ? told in of this occurrence that he about October of perfectly “A. would normal.” No. He be Indemnity pointed out in Texas Insurance Com- As Hood v. 345, statutory pany, definition 2d the Texas 209 S.W. noted, liberally how- of It should must be construed. ever, that construed” the statute states that the term “shall be damage body. physical to mean or harm to the structure of the are, therefore, assign permitted law mean- We not to common ing “injury” to the word or to construe the term as we consider proper, petitioner’s required but are to determine whether the damage disability arises from harm or to the body. of the “damage” synony- practically
The words and “harm” are mous, not, my presence opinion, and their in the statute does in support majority the of Act conclusion. critical words the The applied present “physical as to the are the structure of body.” majority opinion (268 of the Civil 531) “physical” calls attention to Webster’s definition of pertaining body mind,” as “of or with as contrasted points antonyms “physical” and ity out that same author- meaning
uses the words “mental” or “emotional.” The “structure,” appears equal, greater, the word if to be of not determining importance proper in construction the stat- “arrangement of ute, term is defined Webter particles, in sub- organs, tissues or or parts, of constituent their assign the statute body.” words of If we stance or Legislature It clear. meanings, of the the intention usual to ex- how an intention would, fact, in be difficult conceive more purely could be stated clude a mental or plainly. inability' might failure It be held that well damage
body properly or harm to constitutes to function damage body, body, requires, simply or harm to the the Act but or harm to structure of burn, body. exception of and cable the bruise With body disability, petitioner’s in resulted no the structure after the occurrence as it was before accident. the same heights great pre- structure of same at is the ground. pressure, on carious situations as it is His blood n hypersensitiveness pain, eyelids tremor the closed illness, deep symptoms underactive reflexes are of the mental organic injury but the evidence is conclusive there no appear disability symptoms does that his results from the mentioned. England workmen’s statutes and in jurisdictions
most require merely American “injury” or a “personal injury,” and contain no definition of the terms. Case, Charon’s Burlington Mass. 75 N.E. 2d Corporation Hagood, Mills v. 177 Va. 13 S.E. 2d cited majority opinion, were under decided statutes which con tain “injury,” no definition of persuasive and are not toas proper construction of the Texas Act. states, statutes of a few including Nebraska, American *14 Idaho, require Louisiana and “damage” or “harm” or “violence” “physical to the body. structure” of the In Bekeleski v. O. F. Co., Neal 141 passenger Neb. N.W. 2d a on an operated by elevator caught the claimant was the between floor of the and building elevator the floor of the and killed. The claimant physical sustained no person, to her but was dying in the elevator with thirty the man for some minutes. aAs result of system, shock to the her nervous she was unable perform to the operator. work of an referring elevator After “ statutory to the meaning definition of ‘only violence ” physical to the body’ pointing structure of the and out that liberally the act should construed, the said: “* * * phy- language between The indicates a clear distinction mental, bodily injury and sical and on the one hand nervous and physical psychiatric injury unaccompanied to the violence import body plain the of the of on the other. The structure operation disabilities used the law words resulting eliminates from the of disturbances, psychiatric from and mental nervousness body the physical of ailments when structure violence * * cannot be *. established. (i<i % [*] arising compensable
“It to an accident is clear us that to be accompanied employment out of and in the course of the must be physical body the claim- the structure of the * * * liberally, ant. as we act should be construed While the many held, to cases which have by plain times it should not be extended * * language scope. are excluded its majority Peavy opinion v. The Mansfield cites cases Dredge Co., Lumber v. Hardware So. Roberts Fund, Peavy 71 Idaho Pac. 2d case the 975. In side, upon left re- workman lost sulting fell head and balance and his slight in a him unconscious concussion which rendered proof pleadings for a time. that he suffered showed neurosis, from ing a traumatic mental or illness result- nervous physical right compensation injuries. from his in In- such demnity case our in Hood v. Texas established decision Co., Dredge supra. In Insurance Fund accompanied by electrical short circuit was a roar and ball of standing employee, by, not fire. who was near did receive shock, system an electrical but the shock to affected affirming opinion his heart and death. In caused his its apparently award of court relies cites jurisdictions do decisions from in which statutes require damage or violence to structure body. present majority opinion case reasons that Dredge only possible Fund case and distinction between the died, employee the instant case is that in the former the one concludes the distinction is material because case the ceased function in the other functions recognized by expressly improperly. The distinction was the Su- moreover, observed, preme Court of Idaho. It should be inevitably bodily only death tion, func- results not the cessation disintegration complete of the
but also body. portion majority opinion A is devoted substantial
447 Hayter, Ry. 93 Texas Gulf, v. F. C. & Co. a discussion of S. v. Dor- Electric Co. L.R.A. and Houston 325 S.W. undoubtedly cases
sett, 95, 2d 546. These Texas common recovery may had at be the in Texas that reaffirm rule being pres- negligence cause law, proximate of the elements resulting suffering from pain ent, and mental for system by shock. emotional injury caused to the nervous weakness, holdings prostration, muscular plaintiffs in those pains and other suffered headaches recovery physical injury justify at com- cases sufficient were law, not, my opinion, authority proposition for the mon are petitioner in or harm the instant sustained that the body. of these deci- his fact that support recovery by petitioner sions would this case negligence against employer law common action based extending compelling Compensa- would afford a reason for legis- tion Act to cover mental if we vested with illness were submitted, however, power. contrary lative It that the is true approach question standpoint judicial when we from the construction. compensation, There is no common law of workmen’s petitioner’s right solely arise must applicable provisions of the statute. first Workmen’s Compensation Law in Texas was enacted in 1913 and did not “injury” “personal
undertake to injury.” define The definition appears which now in our statute was included in amend- ment part of 1917 and has been of our law time. It since that originally appeared 1; part of Art. but was Sec. trans- ferred to Legislature part and retained as of Art. Sec. when provide coverage amended the law in 1947 to for occupational Legislature diseases. Had the intended that apply injuries Act might should recovery all for which law, had at accomplished common the result would have been simply by omitting the definition of from the statute. The clearly inclusion of Legislature definition indicates the intention of the application to limit the of the law and to exclude injuries might certain recovery for which be had at common law. petitioner’s disability Since the entirely due to his mental
condition, the failure of his property, my mind to function it is opinion it does not result from term is de- Compensation fined propriety extending Act. character, Act to cover cases consequences and the so, failure do Legislature. are matters consideration *16 change made, If a it should come in the law to be safeguards provision restrictions with the such may appropriate. deem May 11, 1955. Delivered
Rehearing overruled 1955. June Mary
City of v. E. Adams Houston A-4840. 1955. May 11, No. Decided Rehearing 1955. June overruled Roy City Campbell, of Houston F. Honorable v. Judge the 80th District Judicial 1955. May 11, No. A-4854. Decided Rehearing 1955. overruled June (279 308) 2d Series