Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.

15-7-7(a)(3), the remainder of his portunity spend § to make rea- pursuant family setting in a or her childhood strengthen parental sonable efforts to and thrive. grow which the child relationship petition until a termination is * * * 7—7(b)(2). posi- In re long espoused have [W]e pursuant filed 15— B., Kathaleen, rights parents In re 203; tion Kristen 558 at consideration, (R.I.1983). we fur- most essential The issue of 460 A.2d interests the best recognize ef- ther department’s the reasonableness of the all outweigh of the child and welfare “partic- be determined from the forts must Stephanie, In re other considerations.” circumstances of each case.” ular facts and (R.I.1983) B., re 203; (quoting Kristen 456 A.2d In re 558 A.2d at (R.I.1981)). David, (R.I.1983). 795, 801 Marie, re 427 A.2d Ann Here, psychiatric mother received Mary have been Joseph Both counseling services from numerous institu- custody care and since birth state’s including St. Jo- organizations, tions and respondent. have never resided with Butler, Mental Health seph, South Shore in their best interest clearly It CCC, Center, Wings drug program, for four and remaining in foster care and the Providence Center. Crossroads children con- respectively, these years five services, Despite plethora mother and safe environ- tinue to live in the stable into appropriate insight failed to achieve adoptive parents. offered their ment recognize her illness and refused to her appeal is Accordingly, respondent’s medication, preferring instead to need for of the The decree denied and dismissed. devastating cycle in a of violent remain papers Family is affirmed and Court behavior followed institutionalization Family case are remanded recognized by the trial hospitalization, as Court. justice. Although department is re- efforts, making reasonable sponsible guarantee success and

DCYF does not the additional

ought not be burdened “with the hand of a

responsibility holding B., In re Kristen parent.”

recalcitrant Therefore, are satisfied

A.2d at 204. we reasonable ef- department that the made et al. BAILEY Robert respondent unification of with forts toward responsible for her children and is not inability comply

mother’s chronic ALGONQUIN TRANSMISSION GAS plans. DCYF’s case et al. COMPANY that the best We are also satisfied 2000-315-Appeal. No. Joseph Mary require interests both Rhode Island. Court of Supreme parental rights mother’s a termination of with their for these children to remain 30, 2002. Jan. home. This family pre-adoptive foster process has held that this right “involves the determination child to reasonable care and

of a minor

maintenance, freedom from abuse or ne right given op- to be

glect, and the Jr., A. Pelc-

Joseph Cavanagh, Karen V. Davison, Providence, for zarski/Dorothy S. Defendant. WILLIAMS, C.J.,

Present BOURCIER, LEDERBERG, FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, and JJ. OPINION FLANDERS, Justice. inglorious in a chapter

This is another which, civil long-running series of cases in agent of the regrettably, lawyer the sins the client as principal. visited defendant-client, Maguire Group, The (Ma- Planners, Architects, Engineers, Ltd. guire), Superior from a or- appeals denying der motion to vacate a default against Au- judgment that entered it on $458,533.69, gust in the amount of including The court interest costs. entered because Ma- the default Coffey, (Coffey), guire’s lawyer, John Jr. had failed to to a re- inexcusably respond quest production of documents and inexcusably respond then failed follow-up series of motions and conditional compelling pro- court orders requested Despite duce documents. proper service of these documents Cof- Maguire’s stony fey, both his and silence entry of a eventually culminated against damages pre- plaintiffs’ amount of the judgment interest. plaintiffs alleged they

The suffered personal injuries while were excavat- laying gas line in East ing a trench and Providence, negli- defendants’ injuries. Although gence caused these denying an answer these filed mooted what- allegations, its later default Wistow, may have to its possessed ever D. defenses Max Robert Parrillo/Antho- Providence, But Cottone, liability on these claims. ny F. for Plaintiff. asserted plaintiffs attempted receipt when to execute on of several com- plaintiffs’ lawyer mendable letters from judgment, Maguire the default learned for entreating comply, Coffey him to failed to lawyer’s time first of its malfeasance respond Ultimately, of them. sought vacate the so, however, Sep- execution on the issued on refused to do plaintiffs tember and it to caused finding injustice holding no manifest duly Maguire served on soon thereaf- Maguire’s feet to the fire lit its own Finally waking up ter. to the fact that its lawyer’s neglect. Because we own had asleep been the switch are unable to conclude that the motion while this train wreck of a default was justice in denying abused his discretion occurring, Maguire engaged new counsel judgment, motion to vacate the default we who, in October filed a motion to amplified affirm for the reasons below. vacate the The court denied Facts and Travel and then Maguire appealed defendant, Algonquin The Gas Trans- this Court. Company (Algonquin), employed mission representing Maguire Before on this plaintiffs to excavate trench lay a a case, particular many years Coffey for had gas line in East Providence. The work for types handled various that alleged personal injuries suffered client, mostly corporate this of the same working result of there because of variety. when this lawsuit During Algonquin’s neg- and the other defendants’ Court, Ma- pending Superior was ligence. Although complaint did not office, guire Coffey with providing assert specific allegations against Maguire, his administrative ex- absorbing certain of

plaintiffs alleged that defendants or knew him a retainer of penses, paying should have known that the soil and $15,500 meetings per quarterly month. At ground water that had excavated company, he attended with officers of been contaminated with various toxic Coffey report Maguire would on the They chemicals. further averred that de- the various other status of this case and on fendants were in failing to warn en- legal matters for which had plaintiffs about the presence of toxic chem- company. Al- gaged represent him to misrepresenting icals at this site and in receiving in the though Coffey recalled dangers working in that area. production mail a for document request during pretrial March did not inform discov- he testified he ery, plaintiffs propounded request anyone Maguire to Ma- it.1 He admitted about guire production request for the docu- for respond of relevant he did not ments, production compel to which failed to or to the motion to respond. followed, course, ac- There due a motion followed soon thereafter. He also compelling Maguire knowledged during pe- and an order the 1997-1998 pro- documents, riod, items of mail requested duce a condition- he had received several order, case; default, that he entry al default of a in connection with this and, hearing damages, finally, opened on a default and looked at some but not all had mailed judgment, August Despite proper 1999. of these court documents were papers Maguire’s responding of these court to him. to the re- service Instead Calabretta, searched, avail, Maguire's actually 1. But Victor executive had to no president operations, vice testified that he requested. documents request production was aware of the for 60(b)(1) court, that a provides party dure. quests and to orders of however, “just a final for [the mail] he would be relieved from stack ultimately “mistake, inadvertence, I throw someplace surprise, would excus- away.” him about When asked allows relief neglect.” Rule able Coffey quarterly meetings, at its “any justifying case for other reason testified, he would tell client that noth- (Empha- judgment.” of the operation he ing happening. added.) He conceded denied the sis nothing in the from the time determined, done grounds. both He motion on he request pro- first had received the first, that there was no causal connection the time he up duction March Coffey’s and his failure to tippling between notice of on the received the execution noting that properly, handle this case Cof- September Ap- default 1999. various oth- fey competently managed had to parently, Coffey considered the case during Maguire matters legal er for priority compared one relative low with of ignoring discovery he period same legal handling matters he was other Indeed, case. Ma- requirements this for Maguire. to a causal connec- guire’s attempt show and Coffey’s crapulence between his tion Coffey any nor Maguire

Neither offered neglect handling this case inexcusable explanation justice to the motion for his when witness recant- expert foundered its case, total inaction than refer- opinion medical to that effect after ed his ring imbibing fact that Coffey became aware of the other ser- he heavily during consuming this time Coffey ably performed vices that had for eight glasses day, begin- of per to ten wine (after during period. this same ning leaving Maguire’s lunch premises day) ending when he justice concluded that The motion next night. Ultimately, Coffey went to bed plaintiffs’ failure to Coffey’s respond checked Hospital himself into Butler requests did not constitute ex- document 1999, he was treated September where neglect, rather it was the cusable but Coffey for that his alcoholism. believed either or willful unexplained result of of alcohol his consumption had affected appeal, Maguire does not conduct. On handling impairing of this case by justice’s findings challenge the motion judgment. He stated: 60(b)(1), con- respect with Rule pattern “I it was a had devel- think that vacate should tends that its motion to oped making judgments of bad that sort 60(b)(6). granted under Rule have been you, just of happened steam roll I no—I can’t be there. And have justice reasoned The myself.” explain 60(b)(6) for relief under Rule grounds from the “mutually based its motion to vacate the must be exclusive” (6) 60(b)(1) relief that are available for grounds on Rule 60(b)(1) (5).2 He through of Proce- concluded Superior Court Rules of Civil Rule Supreme grounds show for relief under party 2. States has stated must The United 60(b)(1) 60(b)(6) separate analogous provisions and distinct Rule Rule that the (6) under Fed.R.Civ.P. Civil Proce- from those available of the Federal Rules of 60(b)(l)-(5). Liljeberg Services Ac mutually In- v. Health Pioneer dure "are exclusive.” 847, 863-64, Corp., quisition 486 U.S. Co. v. Associates vestment Services Brunswick 2194, 2204, 874-75 100 L.Ed.2d Partnership, 507 S.Ct. U.S. Limited States, (1993). (1988) (citing Klapprott v. United 123 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 614-15, 384, 390-91, Thus, judgment, a 69 S.Ct. U.S. to obtain 60(b)(1) attorney’s neglect because inexcusable standard Rule and re- neglect, Maguire was not entitled to relief granting nearly sult all motions to 60(b)(1); therefore, decided, under Rule he attorney’s vacate based this same disqual- Indeed, conduct. the more inexcusable ified from obtaining relief under reprehensible neglect, 60(b)(1) could not offer it relief under likely the more the client would be entitled found to relief under Rule but not under that defendant “failed to establish cir- 60(b)(1). leading cumstance to the default * * * herein which would serve to work a 60(b)(1), unexplained Under Rule injustice manifest to defendant.” Conse- alone, neglect, standing whether coun quently, applying agency prin- black-letter a party, party’s sel or will not excuse a ciples, he concluded that Maguire should noncompliance orderly procedural re be held liable for the actions and inactions quirements, compliance such as with dead it had represent selected to discovery lines responding requests init and he therefore refused orders. Id compliance court’s

vacate the default Brown, dings, King A.2d at 553. 154, (1967), 103 R.I. this 235 A.2d 874

Analysis held not entitled to party Court that a was willWe not disturb a trial court’s judgment resulting relief from a default ruling on a motion to a judgment vacate comply from the failure of his counsel to showing absent a of abuse of discretion or procedural requirements unless it is Perrotta, error of law. Webster v. attorney’s neglect first established that the 68, (R.I.2001); A.2d v. Iddings McBur was occasioned cir extenuating some (R.I.1995). 550, ney, 657 A.2d Ma cumstances significance of sufficient guire argues that it should not be held 157, render it excusable. at 235 A.2d Id. liable for the actions of attorney its be 60(b)(6) at 875. A Rule motion can be cause the Coffey evidence showed that was granted only justifying for some “other reason grossly negligent handling of this specified lief" than the reasons case. Even though the motion re 60(b)(1) (5) “only Rule through found Coffey’s negligence that was inex unique prevent circumstances to manifest cusable, Maguire argues, he should have Elliott, 328, injustice.” Vitale v. 120 R.I. granted Maguire relief from the (1978). might 60(b)(6) It under Rule attorney because its argued neglect” be that is “inexcusable merely negligent, was not grossly so justifying indeed an relief’ and his malfeasance “other reason misrepresen included 60(b)(6) tations that under Rule “excusable ne led to believe because nothing happening was in the relief under glect” required justify case. The is 60(b)(1). respond neglect that Rule But if the is inex interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) cusable, would eviscerate the thereby precluding any excusable- relief un (1949)). 60(b)(6). Rather, truly extraordinary L.Ed. 277-78 We concur that if reasoning equally applicable is to our particular- unusual also circumstances exist— 60(b)(6), Super. except own R. Civ. P. that ly beyond if the control both the are we do not believe that the mere existence of guilty innocent and the who is client neglect by lawyer, thereby inexcusable dis- neglect relief under Rule —the qualifying lawyer's obtaining client from 60(b)(6) might possible still be notwithstand- 60(b)(1), disqualifies relief under Rule also ing lawyer's misconduct. obtaining the client from relief under Rule usual attribution 60(b)(1), not to follow the that inexcusa decided der Rule then same constitute “other determined that neglect King, ble cannot rule set forth in grounds” required to obtain relief under requiring that agency, general rule 60(b)(6) extraordinary Rule unless other imputed to attorney be of an present that factors also unusual client, under those inappropriate Thus, justify granting would such relief. Palazzolo, circumstances. extraordinary Norberg, 122 R.I. Corp. Bendix 1051; King, 103 R.I. at A.2d see (1979), 404 A.2d 505 this Court noted 157,235 at 875. A.2d 60(b)(6) Rule was not intended to consti however, distin- Palazzolo quoted it tute a “catchall” and Professor In at bar. Palaz- guishable from the case stating that “circum Kent’s treatise extraordinary zolo, justify to sever the attempted stances must the client relief ].” Id. [under attorney-client relationship Kent, (quoting 404 A.2d at 506 R.I. Civ. a default court had entered (1969)). Prac. 60.08 at 456 addition, opposing against the client. that plaintiff counsel had informed been maintains that this case pre- very extraordinary counsel and type attempting change sented the and was its unusual circumstances cried out for process doing in the so. It argues notice, Nevertheless, opposing despite this not be held should accountable motion to actively pursued counsel dis- gross negligence attorney ignoring of its on these miss the Based cir- complaint. requests document order court cumstances, determined that directing compliance. support of its longer agency relationship no existed be- argument, it cites Palazzolo v. Re- Coastal and, the client tween the Council, Management sources reason, apply agency to that it declined curiam). (R.I.1995) case, (per In that defaulting the client for the principles in complaint against the defen- case, attorney’s In this how- negligence. dant after the plaintiffs was dismissed at- ever, there that Maguire is no evidence torney appear hearing had failed to for a agency attempted to terminate its relation- on the defendant’s motion to dismiss entry of ship Coffey with before the had absented himself Indeed, it was not until default hearings. several other court an execution on the Maguire received evidence, however, also that showed action in that it took this plaintiff to attempted obtain new Notwithstanding attorney that its regard. representation in the hin- but was failing perform performing was dered in efforts to do so his his former Maguire’s litigation question services in release attorney, plain- who failed to was premises pay- own and while lawyer. tiffs to the new This file Court Coffey’s significant office ing portion noted tried strenuously client] “[the not discover at- expenses, Maguire did its extricate himself from situation which until torney’s malfeasance severely being prejudiced by his case accompli. Although judgment was a protect his failure to his inter- fait parties stipulated have ests.” Id. at 1051. Under these unusual situation, in this itself circumstances, reasoned, the Court circumstances not we mention these impute to plaintiff seemed “unfair to this only point fault out but continuing attorney.” dereliction of this reason, between significant Id. differences at 1052. For the Court neglect facts Palazzolo on which Ma- and their [the clients] counsel guire relies. was excusable.” Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Co. Associates Holding the client responsible for the 380, Partnership, Limited 507 U.S. 396- lawyer’s neglect may seem to 113 S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d constitute a harsh result these circum- (1993). 90-91 stances, it comports agency with the Maguire also cites to cases from principles that control in this other area of the jurisdictions position support Supreme law. As the United States it should not have to suffer the conse has stated: quences attorney’s gross negligence. of its “[W]e have held that clients must be See, (1st Smith, e.g., Chang v. 778 F.2d 83 held accountable for the acts and omis- Cir.1985); Court, Sumler v. City District sions of their attorneys. Link v. (Colo. Denver, County P.2d Co., R. Wabash 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 1995); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. (1962), 8 L.Ed.2d 734 we held that Hill, 250 A.2d Al (D.C.App.1969). a client be made to suffer the con- though agree some courts appear sequence of dismissal of its lawsuit be- proposition,3 the United States Su cause of its attorney’s failure to attend preme gen Court has indicated as a pretrial scheduled conference. In so rule, responsible eral clients are concluding, we found ‘no merit acts and attorneys omissions of their contention petitioner’s that dismissal of course of representing their clients civil claim because of his counsel’s unexcused litigation. See Pioneer Investment Ser imposes unjust conduct penalty on Co., 396-97, vices U.S. S.Ct. at Id., the client.’ 82 S.Ct. at 1390. 1499, 123 Certainly, L.Ed.2d at 91. contrary, To the the Court wrote: ‘Peti- proper focus in a Rule motion is voluntarily tioner chose this whether the of the nonmoving par action, representative in the and he ty or of that party’s counsel was excusable. cannot consequences now avoid the inquiry Id. But this equally appropriate the acts or omissions freely of this se- necessary under Rule See agent. lected Any notion would Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina wholly system inconsistent with our Caribe, Universidad Central Del 257 F.3d representative of litigation, in which (1st Cir.2001) (holding 67 that because party by each is deemed bound the acts [attorneys party] “both for the defaulted lawyer-agent of his and is considered to conduct,” were far from faultless their facts, have “notice of all notice of which ’ party the seeking relief under Rule can charged upon attorney.” be the Id. 60(b)(6) could not that it was show “fault 633-634, 82 (quoting S.Ct. at 1390 Pioneer, in the delay” required by less as Smith Ayer, v. 101 U.S. 25 * * * 507 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. at 123 (1880)). 955 L.Ed. This principle 88). L.Ed.2d at applies equal force here and re- quires respondents theory be held account- advances—that able for the acts and omissions of their an attorney’s gross negligence should not * * * chosen Consequently, imputed counsel. to the client and that such proper the focus gross negligence is whether the grounds can be 4(b) (1988) § negligence 3. See 4th attorney Annot. A.L.R. for a to the client when the is recognize excep- collection of cases that an guilty gross negligence. of general imputing tion rule an 60(b)(6) case has particular misconduct in a Rule from under —also “gross” constitute by promi- criticized at least one so virulent as to has been become noted, civil practice nent this is previously commentator As negligence. procedure: attempted the client not a case which relationship judg- fact that before agency

“Courts are sensitive the sever the entered, clients in Pa- always is not served when the situation ment as was required the of consequences Thus, to bear of stipulated lack Maguire’s lazzolo. result, attorney As there misconduct. the itself require did not of negligence is an older line of cases that holds judg- the default justice to vacate motion neg- attorney guilty gross when an is of ment. the client innocent of ligence, and is argues next the

wrongdoing, relief from recognize unique the justice failed 60(b)(6) though be had under Rule even It circumstances this case. compelling ‘neglect’ is not ‘excusable’ * * cites to four cases decided this Court 60(b)(1) *. cases Rule This line of existed that were which circumstances con- goes against general the rule that justify granting of relief un- found to arguably some duct within other subsec- 60(b)(6): Palazzolo v. Coastal der 60(b) grounds tion Rule should not be Council, A.2d Management Resources provision for relief under the catch-all * * (R.I.1995); v. Greco Insurance *. of cases This line Safeco America, 107 R.I. Company also is in that illogical, opponent (1970); Albany v. Ins. Shapiro A.2d 50 unacceptable made to the brunt of bear (R.I.1933) curiam); Co., attorney party (per conduct 163 A. 747 while (R.I. attorney that hired the obtains relief.” Dudley, A.2d 107 Crossen Practice, 1984). Moore’s Federal But each of our examination of (Matthew at 60-179-80 60.48[4][b] they too these cases shows that are distin- ed.2001). Bender 3d Shapi- case at bar. In guishable Palazzolo, Crossen, ro, attorney jus- contends that became unavailable party for the defaulted stipulation tice overlooked the that it was representing continue the client in this entered in favor of a default own, through no fault misled it was Shapiro, court party. the other In by its This grossly negligent attorney.4 attorney that the had abandoned found however, argument, recognize fails Palazzolo, left case and the state. agency law imputes “fundamental of which attorney appear failed to on several sched- attorney professional of an attempt- plaintiff uled court dates matters to his client and considers Crossen, engage counsel. ed to though omissions of the was attorney suspended neglect were the of the client himself.” to 156, practice of law and failed 235 from the King, 103 R.I. at A.2d at 875. name on a list of of include agency That fundamental law does Greco, complaint origi- of clients. merely because viral strain mutate criminal, Change while the clients themselves 4. Valvoline Instant Oil also cites Associates, prefaced by a case is F.3d were blameless. But the Franchising v. Autocare 857, Cir.1999) notice, (6th warning was not U.S.App. that it recommended Lexis 1227 Therefore, publication. prece- pre- support argument. case for full-text of this That juris- questionable, dential value is even in extreme circumstances in which sented attorney's negligent, decided. only was not diction in which it was conduct nally served on the insurance commission- ilk—still does not present conditions that er it then followed a are so extraordinary circuitous route and so unusual in country across the circumstances finally accompanying failures to comply sent with the that a attorney to the defendant’s rules of record. would by deny- abuse his or her discretion attorney

That then prepared and filed an ing a motion to vacate the default judg- days answer within a few receiving ment that had entered in the case. Unfor- complaint (approximately one month tunately, the legion cases are in which the service), original after the but a default attorney client’s busy, was too too distract- judgment already had entered ed, or too unconscientious to bother re- time. This Court concluded that each of sponding discovery requests or to other these different and unusual circumstances rule-based filing requirements, or to fol- constituted a basis relief under Rule compel, low-on motions to conditional or- 60(b)(6). In ruling, so the Court discussed default, ders or default judgments.5 application rule, of this section of the And, regrettably, most it is not unusual for noting that “courts have wide latitude attempt to cover up his or grant within which to relief from default wrongdoing by her failing report judgments for reasons other than those set misrepresenting the true status of the case out in the first five clauses of the rule.” to the client.6 Yet such inexcusable mis- Greco, 197, 107 R.I. at 266 A.2d at 51. thereby conduct does not morph into “rea- cautioned, however, The Court that Rule sons other than those set out in the first 60(b)(6) was not intended to be a “catch- five purpose clauses the rule” for the then, all.” persuaded, Id. “We are granting relief under Rule See the ‘other reason’ clause should not be Greco, 197, 107 R.I. at 266 A.2d at 51. applied unless there has been a showing by appropriate evidence of circumstances Maguire contends the circum- that would uniqueness establish a stances of this situation are made more puts the case outside of the normal and compelling by Coffey per- the fact that usual accompanying circumstances failures satisfactory legal formed work for it on comply with the rules.” Id. at during period matters the same A.2d at 52. in which pending, thereby this case was

giving it no reason accuracy to doubt the evident in Coffey’s periodic reports client though hope we and believe about the status of this It case. cites a situation — represent does not the usual Wyoming case in one which of the factors See, Cross, (R.I. See, e.g., Rossi, (R.I. 5. e.g., Daniel v. 749 A.2d 6 6. In re 737 A.2d 880 2000) (entry attorney of default 1999) when failed to (attorney regarding lied to clients status transcript perfect appeal); submit needed to period years); of case over a of several Carter Beechwood, (R.I.1995) Astors’ 659 A.2d 1109 Folcarelli, R.I. (attorney timely failed to rejec- file a written (1979) (attorney negligence misled clients in tion of an arbitration award because he was suit, feigning the case was on the court’s Elliott, “busy”); Vitale v. 120 R.I. docket, when he had transferred the case to (1978) fire, (citing A.2d 1379 an office attor- file); another who failed to Cohen v. ney interrogatories failed to answer until thir- Goldman, (1957) 85 R.I. 132 A.2d 414 later); Corp., teen months Stevens v. Oil Gulf (attorney notify failed to clients he had settled (1971) (because 108 R.I. 274 A.2d 163 authority their case without their and then moving party’s company negligent- insurance pocketed proceeds). the settlement file, ly papers wrong attached suit the to it did not find these documents until two months entry judgment). of a default In Beechwood v. Astors’ by the court was the considered (R.I.1995), Co., at a 659 A.2d 1109 unexpected appear pretrial People failure to Coal conference, previously repre- prejudice when he had the issue of we indicated competently. defendant in sented be such ex- should not even addressed Sanford Co., (Wyo. “Rather, P.2d Arjay Oil the cases. rules cusable-neglect 1984). present But other in factors were missing movant’s focus on the reasons justifying judg- relief from the deadline, missing on of the not the effect Sanford ment, including of the plaintiff the failure party.” the opposing the deadline the written to serve defendant with notice Id. 1116. addition, application. of the default the par- to Although prejudice opposing the before of Supreme case was the can be ty and should considered as an a trial

Wyoming appeal from court’s 60(b)(6), not be the sole should vacating order the default dispositive need not the criterion and be court trial appellate concluded the deciding factor to in whether vacate de- justice did not discretion in abuse his set- in of judgments, especially light fault the the ting judgment against aside default countervailing strong principles favoring A ruling defendant. in favor of finality-of-judgments and attribution the appeal require on this would the opposite lawyer’s agency status to the client that namely, finding: justice the motion weigh granting the of such against relief. had in denying abused discretion the Admittedly, prejudice plaintiffs here the to vacate. motion to appear did not to be irremediable: the Maguire also maintains that the motion posture in pretrial case was and remains a justice ignored prejudice relative the to delay expense attributable to parties case. present Coffey’s have legal meltdown could been greatly prejudiced asserts that it will if by, for an award of example, ameliorated it is denied to opportunity defend this attorneys’ fees to and reimburse- lawsuit, whereas will suffer no any ex- ment to them of other resultant prejudice if significant the case is allowed penses. But the existence of discretion in Palazzolo, proceed trial. justice request how motion rules on A.2d this Court stated: “In this especially vacate a default plaintiff strenuously tried to extricate — often, here, close like this one—is as cases himself from a situation which his case Even appeal. factor on dispositive being severely prejudiced his at- might be inclined circumstances where we torney’s failure protect his interests.” way standing to rule the other if we were rely But did Palazzolo not relative justice, in the shoes of prejudice post-default- to the in a parties the exer- deference that we must accord to Rather, we judgment context. were em- justice’s cise of discretion and phasizing the efforts to client’s obtain new error of absence of reversible law agency and to counsel sever relation- doing so are committed ship counsel Here, that deter us over- entered. considerations in the out, turning that decision—at least ab- plaintiffs point because this is an at- torney-neglect prejudice sence other unusual factors that the issue present opposing party was irrelevant under here.7 ' paid plaintiffs in Maguire may ultimately 7. be entitled to a portion Although Valley partial recovery case. v. Hidden credit or to a Calise 60(b)(1), by The final raised con both the and the at- issue Rule client justice’s cerns the motion comment the be torney must “faultless in their conduct” end of his to the Ma- 60(b)(6)), decision effect that relief to allow under Rule we are guire may well cause possess malpractice persuaded still not that the motion against Coffey of action for negligence abused his discretion in this case when he breach Although of contract. some to grant declined that relief.

authority the supports ad proposition Conclusion by vanced the Maguire namely, — proper client’s recourse for an opinion We are the that the motion ordinary default negligence causing a justice correctly applied previ- this Court’s judgment to enter is the a mal filing of rulings ous to the facts of this case when practice the against attorney, suit the the he denied motion to vacate default the attorney’s gross negligence justify can event, In judgment. any say we cannot the granting a motion to vacate a in refusing that he abused his discretion judgment, Corp. Resolution v. see Trust vacate the Ferri, 120 N.M. 901 P.2d reasons, deny appeal For we the these (1995) Maguire cites Island no Rhode — affirm the adopt cases that reasoning. this line of Goldman, But see Cohen 85 R.I. FLANDERS, Justice, concurring. (1957) (reversing Superior order deleting assessing Court a settlement the relative prejudice the stipulation the reinstating parties by entry from record and caused the of the default merits, hearing justice’s the case for on the and the motion refusal same, an possessed equita- held that client to vacate there is one adequate remedy at law against my judgment, supports ble factor justice’s who discretionary ruling. had settled client’s without knowledge sharing prejudice client’s and without client). proceeds lawyer’s the settlement its own misconduct by caused still Consequently, guess we decline to second could be alleviated if it is able to obtain call in justice’s discretionary from one or more of the other contribution though may possible case. Even defendants for amount the default truly pays plaintiffs some unusual circumstances —de that it spite attorney’s gross pro-rata plain- and inexcusable excess of share negligence damages. a client con whose own tiffs’ See G.L.1956 10-6-4 —for (“[a] duct joint has been faultless to obtain tortfeasor is not entitled to a 60(b)(6), money judgment under Rule but see Davila-Alva final un- contribution rez, til she has (holding payment discharged F.3d at that because he or “mutually liability paid exclusive” from the common or has more than Association, Inc., and, receiving percent

Condominium (R.I.2001), 773 A.2d 834 windfall defaulting we held that a defen- damages Maguire, may their from not litigate propor- dant the issue of its damages Maguire's then recover double from against liability as code- tionate its former Therefore, former codefendants. should plaintiffs, fendants who had settled with the plaintiffs damages recover the remain- judgment paid by recognized we also that the defendants, ing any amount received in excess defaulted defendant would be offset by Maguire paid of that be credited to shall amount the had recovered in settle- Maguire. only can recover Ac- ments from the former codefendants. damages their once. cordingly, plaintiffs here are not entitled to money judgment for contribution final secure a pro or her rata share the accrued”). has money judgment.”). Calise, alleged Here, the other unlike Valley Condomini- Calise Hidden joint neither have settled tortfeasors (R.I. Association, Inc., A.2d

um joint them nor obtained against claims 2001), this Court held that defaulted be- plaintiffs release from the tortfeasor’s could not seek to reduce the defendant against judgment entered fore the default liability plaintiffs amount of its may be enti- (Maguire) who defendant disproportionate alleged based Thus, given that the tled to contribution. joint of the other tortfeasors fault who defen- against the other plaintiffs’ claims already settled with the yet possi- pending, may dants are still R. Super. hearing Civ. P. pay ble this case damages. But did not Calise address con- judgment and then to obtain whether defaulted defendant —after or from one more of other tribution defendants, by filing cross-claims either discharged liability has its against by filing independent them judg- of a default by paying amount action such relief. seeking rata pro ment excess share of plaintiffs’ damages con- still obtain —could joint alleged

tribution from tort- (providing

feasors. See 10-6-8

joint tortfeasors are not released lia- joint make

bility to contribution another given “unless release is be-

tortfeasor right

fore the other tortfeasor

Case Details

Case Name: Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date Published: Jan 30, 2002

Citation: 788 A.2d 478

Docket Number: 2000-315-Appeal

Court Abbreviation: R.I.