This appeal involves the question of whether a Maryland court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign automobile in *562 surer sued by its own insured. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County held that it did not and so dismissed the claims of the insureds, appellants, Allen K. Bahn and his wife Sansherma Bahn, against the insurer, appellee, Chicago Motor Club Insurance Company (C.M.C.).
These claims arise out of a motor vehicle accident between Mr. Bahn and Loi H. Hang. On December 21, 1988, a vehicle driven by Mr. Hang smashed into a 1984 Volkswagen Rabbit driven by Mr. Bahn. Mr. Bahn sustained personal injuries and damage to his car, which was titled in the name of Lockheed Research, Inc., a family-owned business incorporated by Mr. Bahn and of which he was president. Lockheed is an Illinois corporation, and the car was titled and registered in that state under Lockheed’s name. In 1985, however, Mr. and Mrs. Bahn moved to Maryland, brought the car with them, and then drove it in this State.
The insurer of the car, C.M.C., is incorporated in Illinois and licensed to do business only there and in Indiana. C.M.C. does not advertise in Maryland, maintains no agents in Maryland, and does not insure vehicles registered in Maryland. On February 11, 1986, after the Bahns had moved to Maryland, Mrs. Bahn, on behalf of Lockheed, obtained insurance from C.M.C. on the car. Mrs. Bahn supplied C.M.C. with Illinois addresses for both the mailing address and the place where the insured vehicle was “principally kept.” Although Mr. Bahn swore in an affidavit that he advised C.M.C. “sometime in 1986, and certainly by January of 1987” that the new address of Lockheed was Gaithersburg, Maryland, between September, 1986 and October, 1987, the policy was twice renewed by C.M.C. and each renewal continued to reflect Illinois addresses.
In October, 1987, C.M.C. sent Lockheed a “Lapse of Coverage” notice, which C.M.C. mailed to one of Lockheed’s Illinois addresses. The “Lapse of Coverage” notice stated:
This is to inform you that the required downpayment on your renewal policy has not been received, and your policy *563 has expired at 12:00 a.m. standard time on the expiration date shown above [October 22, 1987].
In order to renew this policy, the required downpayment must be received in this office not later than: 11/02/87. Upon receipt of this notice, the Bahns sent C.M.C., from Maryland, payment and the “Lapse of Coverage” notice, on which the Bahns had crossed out the Illinois mailing address and inserted as Lockheed’s address: P.O. Box 850, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877. C.M.C. then sent Lockheed, at the Gaithersburg address, a policy “declaration,” dated November 23, 1987, for the policy period October 22, 1987 to April 22, 1988. The declaration contained the notation “policy renewed, change mailing address.” 1 C.M.C. sent Lockheed, at the Gaithersburg address, another insurance policy “declaration,” dated April 21, 1988 for the policy period April 22, 1988 to October 22, 1988.
On October 24, 1988, a second “Lapse of Coverage Notice” was issued by C.M.C. and sent to Lockheed at the Gaithersburg address. This notice contained language identical to that set forth above and requested a “total renewal premium” of $655 by “no later than” November 2, 1988 “in order to renew this policy.” A check dated October 22, 1988, in that amount was mailed by Lockheed from Maryland to C.M.C. and was cashed by C.M.C. on November 9, 1988. C.M.C. then sent Lockheed, at the Gaithersburg address, another policy “declaration” marked “policy renewed.” This one was dated November 9, 1988 and covered the period October 22, 1988 to April 22, 1989; it was the renewal in effect at the time of Mr. Bahn’s accident with Mr. Hang.
The policy provided that “the ordinary use of [the] vehicle” was “pleasure/less than 3 miles to work [in Illinois] one way.” The policy at all times also provided:
*564 This policy applies only to accidents, occurrences and losses during the policy period while the automobile is within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or is being transported between ports thereof.
Mrs. Bahn reported the December 21, 1988 accident to C.M.C. on the next day by telephone. In response to that report, C.M.C. sent a letter to Lockheed in Maryland requesting additional information and advising its insureds not to give statements concerning the accident to anyone other than authorized agents of C.M.C. Mr. Bahn later received a letter, dated June 15, 1989, from a representative of Johns Eastern Company, Inc., a Maryland corporation, indicating that he was the local claims adjuster for C.M.C. and requesting that Mr. Bahn contact him so that repairs could be initiated on the vehicle. An appraisal was done of the vehicle in Bethesda, Maryland by Reed Appraisers, Inc., a company located in Wheaton, Maryland and hired by C.M.C. On August 3, 1989, C.M.C. wrote to Lockheed advising that the vehicle was a total loss and making an offer of settlement on the property damage aspect of the accident. A settlement as to property damage was reached and C.M.C. mailed a check to Maryland payable to Mr. Bahn in the amount of $2,250.00 in March of 1991. On March 25, 1991, C.M.C. wrote to the attorney for the Bahns requesting signatures on medical and wage authorizations. C.M.C. accepted a property damage subrogation settlement from Geico Insurance Company in Maryland in the amount of $1,380.00 on August 21, 1991.
The insurance policy included an under-insured motorist endorsement that provided coverage up to $500,000 for any one person per accident. Mr. Hang also was insured at the time of the accident, but his policy provided a $20,000 limit of liability. Therefore, the Bahns demanded payment from C.M.C. for personal injury to Mr. Bahn and loss of consortium in the amounts suffered in excess of $20,000. C.M.C. refused payment.
On December 17, 1991, the Bahns filed a four-count complaint in the circuit court. Counts I and II (personal injury *565 and loss of consortium, respectively) sought damages from Mr. Hang; Counts III and IV alleged that C.M.C. had breached its insurance contract by refusing to pay the Bahns damages for those injuries under the under-insured motorist coverage. Mr. Hang answered the complaint, asserting that he was not liable. C.M.C. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
After hearing argument of counsel, the circuit court dismissed 2 Counts III and IV against C.M.C. for lack of personal jurisdiction. In finding that it had no jurisdiction over C.M.C., the circuit court reasoned:
[T]he essence of the dealings between the parties really came down to a billing situation. The Court finds that is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Maryland. The motion to dismiss on the basis claimed is granted.
Although Counts I and II remained against Mr. Hang, the Bahns moved, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602, to certify the judgment on the counts against C.M.C. as final, with no just reason for delay. The circuit court entered an order certifying the judgment as final, as requested. After entry of judgment in favor of C.M.C., the Bahns appealed. They present a single issue for our consideration:
Whether the court erred in dismissing Counts III and IV of appellant’s complaint on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction over the appellee.
Before addressing this question, we examine the circuit court’s certification of the judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Md.Rule 2-602(b). That rule provides in pertinent part:
*566 ... If the court expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment:
(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties____
The order of the court below clearly is a final judgment within the scope of Md.Rule 2-602(b) in that it finally adjudicates the rights of one, but not all, of the parties. In addition, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is a judgment that, absent the presence of multiple claims, is immediately appeal-able.
See e.g., Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning,
In moving for judgment pursuant to Md.Rule 2-602, the Bahns asserted:
Because of the nature of the case involved herein, Government Employees Insurance Company on behalf of the Defendant Hang has offered its $20,000 policy limits to settle Hang’s potential liability. The Plaintiffs have refused to accept the offer, and cannot accept the offer until the issue of whether or not Chicago Motor Club Insurance Company is or is not properly before the Court is finally determined. If the Plaintiff settles with the Defendant Hang, and gives a release, the Plaintiffs may potentially be releasing any liability against Chicago.
*567 It is a waste of judicial time and effort, as well as an unnecessary expenditure of time on behalf of counsel and the parties to proceed in this case and try it against the Defendant Hang, appeal the issue of Chicago’s dismissal on the jurisdictional grounds, and, if successful, have to return to this Court for the second trial against Chicago. It makes more sense to try the two cases together, particularly the damage issues, at one time.
There is no just reason for delay in entry of Judgment in favor of Chicago under the facts of this case.
When neither C.M.C. nor Hang opposed this motion, the circuit court adopted these reasons as the basis for its decision to certify the judgment as immediately appealable. On appeal, no party maintains that this certification was an abuse of discretion. Without addressing whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, we shall exercise ours and entertain the appeal.
Turning then to the merits, the Court of Appeals has directed that when a Maryland court determines whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, it must engage in a two prong analysis. First, it must determine whether jurisdiction is established under Maryland’s long arm statute, Md.Code (1974, 1989 Ropl.Vol.), § 6-103 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, and if so, then it must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Mohamed v. Michael,
*568 The Bahns suggest that three provisions of the long arm statute confer jurisdiction on Maryland courts in this case:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State;
(6) Contracts to insure ... any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
§ 6-103(b).
Only one provision of the statute need be satisfied in order to assert jurisdiction.
Tate v. Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska,
Under Maryland law, the renewal of an insurance policy is a new contract.
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett,
C.M.C. asserts that it has neither transacted business nor formed any contracts in Maryland because it was told by the Bahns that the insured automobile remained in Illinois, so when it sent renewals to and received premiums from Maryland it was not intending to make any contract here. Rather, C.M.C. argues, the need to correspond with Maryland was initiated unilaterally by the Bahns who moved here and who failed to pay their premiums, necessitating that the insurer send the lapse of coverage notices. In sum, C.M.C. maintains that the renewals do not constitute contracts made in Maryland because the Bahns allegedly concealed from the insurer the location of the car and if it had known the car was located in Maryland, it would never have provided insurance. 4
The problem with this argument is that whether the Bahns breached the insurance contract, thus relieving C.M.C. of liability, is a question going to the merits of the claim against C.M.C., not the jurisdictional issue.
See Jason Pharmaceuti
*570
cals,
Having concluded that C.M.C. “transacted business” within the meaning of Maryland’s long-arm statute, we must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The standard applied in this analysis is whether the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state to justify assumption of personal jurisdiction and whether, under all the circumstances, maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
Generally, when “the cause of action does not arise out of, or is not directly related to, the conduct of the defendant within the forum, contacts reflecting continuous and general business conduct will be required to sustain jurisdiction; ” this is “general jurisdiction.”
Camelback,
When, as here, “specific jurisdiction is at issue, the minimum-contacts inquiry focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Batton,
The parties do not cite, and we have been unable to find, any Maryland case involving the precise issues implicated here. Indeed, the only cases involving jurisdiction over nonresident insurers that the parties have cited are
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
Although not cited by the parties, there is, in fact, a significant body of law addressing whether a forum state has personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company when sued by persons injured by the company’s insured in an automobile accident in the forum state. Typical of these cases is
Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the insurer in
Rossman
had the “requisite connections” to the forum state because it “could anticipate the risk that its clients would travel in their automobiles to different states and become involved in accidents and litigation there.”
Id.
Of particular importance to the
Rossman
court was the policy provision by which the insurer agreed to defend suits arising anywhere in the United States. The
Rossman
court reasoned that such broad coverage benefits insurers because the policy
*574
becomes more marketable, and with that benefit, insurers take the risk of being exposed to suit in many jurisdictions.
Id.
at 287. On the basis of this clause, the court distinguished the case before it from
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
The majority rule seems to be that adopted in
Rossman;
the courts of a state in which an automobile accident occurs have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer of the motorist who is liable to another driver for damages resulting from the accident, when sued by the other driver, if the insurance policy provides for coverage in all fifty states.
See e.g., Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co.,
These cases, while helpful, do not address the precise question at issue here. All of them concern a suit by a driver (or the driver’s passengers) against the other driver’s insurer. The Bahns, of course, are attempting to sue their own insurer. There are cases dealing with such situations; however, most differ factually in some significant respect from the case at hand. In many of these cases, the automobile accident took place in the forum state and the insured, not resident in the forum state, attempted to sue its foreign insurer in that state, to recover medical benefits, uninsured motorist coverage, etc. payable under a policy, that was purchased, renewed, etc. in the foreign state.
See Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.,
The courts have unanimously concluded that these factors do not provide sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign insurer. They have reasoned that while the promise to provide coverage throughout the United
*576
States may evidence that the insurer “has agreed to submit to jurisdiction in any forum that has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against its indemnitee,” its “agreement to defend and indemnify [its insured] in any state does not imply an agreement to allow its insured to bring suit [against it] in any state.”
Batton,
Various post-accident contacts — including letters from the insurer addressed to the insured, health care providers, or others in the forum state, and appearance by an insurer’s representative for deposition in the forum state — were also rejected by these courts as a basis for jurisdiction.
See, Batton,
*577
It seems to us that the logic of these cases is persuasive. An insurer who agrees to defend and provide coverage for its insured in all fifty states may, in doing so, “indicate its willingness to be called into court in the foreign forum,”
Rossman,
[A] party’s investigation of possible legal liability after an accident [does not] create[s] in personam jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist. If it did, insurers would be discouraged from legitimate investigation and insureds would be deprived of its benefits.
Nor does the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Bahn were residents of Maryland, the forum state, at the time of the accident, even when combined with these two factors, provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over the C.M.C.
See Taylor v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. of Canada,
*578
Here, however, in addition to the fifty-state policy provision, the post-accident contacts, and the Bahns’ residence in Maryland there are a number of critical contacts between C.M.C. and Maryland, that were not present between the insurer and the forum state in any of the cases discussed above. C.M.C. sent two “Lapse of Coverage” notices to the Bahns in Maryland. When the Bahns responded with timely payment to C.M.C. from Maryland, C.M.C. then sent them, in Maryland, a policy “declaration” stating that the “policy [was] renewed.” In other words, C.M.C. twice renewed
5
the insurance policy in Maryland. As noted within, under Maryland law, renewal of a policy is a new contract,
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett,
*579
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in
August v. HBA Life Ins. Co.,
Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction over C.M.C. does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The Bahns and Mr. Hang are Maryland residents and the accident occurred here. The tort claim could only be tried in this State’s courts; the information relating to the accident, including medical reports, are located here. Maryland has a great interest in providing a forum for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay.
See Tate,
For the foregoing reasons, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over C.M.C. in Maryland is authorized under this State’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court erred in finding to the contrary.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
Notes
. This declaration and subsequent declarations also contained the following language:
The automobile will be principally kept and used in the above municipality and state unless otherwise specified herein: Downer’s Grove, Illinois.
. Because
in
doing so the circuit court considered matters outside the pleadings, perhaps this should more correctly be considered a motion for and grant of summary judgment.
See
Md.Rule 2-322(c) (so directing when such material is the basis for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). In any event, the material facts are undisputed here, and so it makes little difference in this case.
But see, Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Services of Baltimore,
. In fact, because, as the parties concede, the intent of the General Assembly was to expand the scope of the long arm statute to the full extent that due process permits, it would seem that the statutory and due process analyses would be identical.
See Rossman v. State Farm
*568
Mut. Ins. Co.,
. C.M.C. points out that the premium for the last renewal period was paid by Millicent Systems, Inc., and that there is no indication of its relationship to the Bahns. It is unclear what the significance of this fact is. We note that Millicent Systems and Lockheed share the same post office box in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Moreover, it is obvious that C.M.C. recognized the payment from Millicent Systems as a payment from the Bahns or Lockheed and applied it to renew the Bahns' policy because C.M.C. does not dispute that, absent some contractual defense, the Bahns were covered by the policy renewal.
. On appeal, C.M.C. asserts that these renewals were invalid because they were based on misrepresentations by the Bahns. This may be true; if so, it provides C.M.C. with a defense to the Bahns claims. It does not, however, mean C.M.C. is not subject to suit on those claims in Maryland.