56 Ga. 406 | Ga. | 1876
The defendant was indicted for the offense of simple larceny, and on the trial thereof was found guilty. A motion was made for a new trial, mainly on the ground that the court re
It appears from the record and bill of exceptions, that the defendant was indicted at the April term, 1874, of the court; that at that term he continued his case on the ground of the absence of Hudson, who the defendant stated was his leading counsel, on whom he relied to make his defense, Hudson being absent by leave of the court on account of the sickness of his family. When this showing was made, Stewart was present, and Speer was absent without leave of the court. At the next succeeding term of the court, when all of the defendant’s counsel were present, after an ineffectual attempt to continue the case for the absence of witnesses, the defendant absented himself from the court, and his recognizance was forfeited. At the April term, 1875, the defendant was present, and again moved to continue his case on the ground of the absence of Messrs. Speer & Stewart, one of whom had leave of absence from the court and the other being detained at home by sickness, Hudson being the only one of defendant’s counsel who was present. The defendant stated that he had relied on Hudson as his leading counsel until a short time before that date, but that he then relied on Speer & Stewart to manage his defense, and could not go safely to trial without their presence; that until Speer & Stewart were employed he had relied on Hudson, but since their employment he had relied on them almost entirely. The presiding judge states in his certificate, that he had no doubt that the defendant did rely on Messrs. Speer & Stewart from the first, almost exclusively, to make his defense, but that he swore, at the April term, 1874, after he had employed them, that he relied on Hudson, and that he was of the opinion that the last motion for continuance was made for delay, and therefore refused it. This court is reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the court below in refusing to grant a continuance of cases pending therein. The de
Let the judgment of the court below be reversed.