*1 BAGGS, Anderson Diane Karen Plaintiff Appellant, Defendant, R. ANDERSON,
Dennis and Cross-Appellant. Respondent
No. 13422.
Supremo Court of Utah. 6, 1974.
Nov.
142 payment of further
relieved from the It also shown that the defendant is with the met and discussed the matter plaintiff’s fiance, Baggs, then Mr. Ritchie It is stated that the latter told the defend marry planned plaintiff; ant that he the that he not the defendant to visit did want children, the support his nor assistance ing them. The married Mr. plaintiff 19, days Baggs on November 1971. A few the before that event had met at lunch and there con was some discussion and Davis, Ogden, plaintiff Z. James cerning possibility adoption the of future appellant. by the children This did Baggs. Mr. Parker, Ogden, for defend- C. Gerald fact, following not the eventuate. In ant, respondent, cross-appellant. and 1972, spring, the defendant was June unwilling adoption. consent to the The CROCKETT, Justice: ujfon next month there followed demand (now Diane Anderson Plaintiff Karen defendant, a result of and refusal as appeals from a determination Baggs) in our which this action was commenced the court that is estopped district she obligations court to the enforce payments enforcing collection of "certain Our courts Wyoming the decree. divorce a divorce decree. child under credit;2 as give it full faith and court;3 and if this judgment it were a is di- this action The foundation of the the law of County, presumption under the that Natrona decree entered in vorce state like own.4 24, 1970, in sister is our which Wyoming, on June plaintiff custody three mi- awarded was as to the the basis the evidence On for their per nor and month children $200 the granted foregoing facts the trial court payments through support. Defendant made sup- plaintiff judgment for the amount of pay- September 1971. When October port accrued, there- money excepted but en- forthcoming ment was difficulties De- accruing for half of from the amount nature, se- and sued. The exact details 1972, on the ground cember 1971 to July essentials quence dispute.1 But the are plaintiff estopped from that the should be phone and con- pursuant are: that calls collecting support money which accrued exe- plaintiff defendant versations period; during that and ordered 1, agreement a written November cuted executing on plaintiff be restrained from pay that if the defendant would paid defendant judgment long so as (total payments, October and November only per thereon. issue month $100 promise paid) he then which $400 presented appeal on this concern for December the. make $200 be he paid) would ($100 plaintiff estopped of which he later holding that ill; plaintiff Coop, she had been 2. 1.The claims v. 2d Westerfield 6 Utah 311 signed time; she and that lost work had some P.2d 787. agreement was she under duress because gee payments. badly Scott, The defend in need of the 3. 2d 430 Scott v. 19 Utah disputes duress; trial court ant 580. P.2d voluntarily plaintiff found for him: signed agreement. above; Coop, rule the usual Under v. Westerfield footnote accept findings Gardner, trial review we 3 Utah 2d Todaro court as the facts. the support money period collect for the statements plaintiff of'the and Mr. Baggs, stated. which defendant avers had the effect of excusing him from paying payments future accept We the defendant’s conten support. of child This court has hereto tion may there some circumstances fore had prob occasion deal with that under there arise an ; lem and has held right that the to receive *3 money collect accrued under a divorce de current and money belongs future to the cree, estoppel an as there children; minor subject and that it is not any obligation, including to enforce other to being away, estopped, bartered or or in payment the of But the rules of any way by defeated the conduct of the estoppel applicable in the law elsewhere parents or parent (plaintiff) others. If a similarly applicable An are here. essential attempted so, to do that would not affect requirement is that there must be some right sup the of the child. example, For (plaintiff), the obligee conduct of pose improvident profligate an or mother reasonably obligor (defendant) induces the father) so, (or dissipated did and either rely to and make some substantial thereon money, the or even absconded with it and change position in his to his detriment.5 child, the the child would still deserted understanding and For a clear right have a support to from his father contention, it is analysis of the defendant’s ; and the latter him (parent) cannot divest point appropriate mon out obligation, self of the nor defeat ey separate categories: can fall into two right support.7 child’s First, right a ongoing the current and support money his child to receive foregoing .perhaps The should ; second, (parent) right father the and- sufficiently dispose problem here a receive reimbursement presented. However, in view of the fact child after that As to the has been done.6 that the trial court persuaded was that be second, suppose (parent) fails father above, agreement cause of the discussed period sup furnish over of time to plaintiff’s and the failure to in persist at mother, port child, or the and the tempting support money, to collect the else, person it. That someone furnishes estoppel there should be an part as to that right then has the to claim reimbursement entitlement, of the children’s we further parent, any from the the same as observe that there are other obstacles to past This be right debt. of reimbursement A invocation of that doctrine here. se longs support; to whoever furnished the rious one is that we see wherein the cannot settlement, subject and it is negotiation, gave any defendant consideration for discharge satisfaction or in the same man agreement claimed that he would not have any ner as is, other debt. pay any support money. That future value, he suf gave anything neither nor facts From an examination of the any promise. legal fered detriment for that here it will be the defendant’s seen obligated already he Under decree was claim of relates the first situa payments per make the month. of $200 to. right tion above: to receive cur stated an agreement Such to do that which one support. rent and future child His claim already required to do does not constitute primarily signed based on agreement 1, 1971, promise.8 on for a new November consideration Johnson, Wycoff, 386, 7. 2d 5. Easton 4 2d P.2d Id. also see French v. 16 295 Utah 332; 315, Company therein Union Tank Car v. Wheat 401 P.2d authorities Brothers, 1000; 15 Utah 2d cited. Contracts, Restatement of 90." Sec. Lewis, 8. Van Tassell v. See 118 Utah pointing (1950). Discussion 222 P.2d See out this distinction Price, in Price v. 4 Utah 2d 289 P.2d CALLISTER, satisfactory J., C. concurs. is there Neither any sub made defendant showing his because change position stantial ELLETT, (concurring): Justice constituted facts he claims reliance concur, I add doing so wish to sat is not requirement This estoppel. the following: indulged he fact that mere isfied appellant says in her brief the trial assumption that euphoric pleasant and court “domesticated” the Wyoming divorce obligations his to meet not have he would decree, whatever that means.1 expensive car bought a more and that he While the trial judge did not use the apartment. expensive more ato and moved term “domesticate” order: he did time, or the passage Likewise, mere (plaintiff) bedevil a creditor failure of the judgment District [T]hat an create does debtor Court of County, Natrona Wyo- State of *4 estoppel.9 ming, rendered on June which defendant herein was an awarded factor yet another is There absolute plaintiff divorce from herein which bears worthy of note case this and defendant was ordered pay to to estoppel invoking an of question on plaintiff support in the sum of $200.00 support of the against collection per month from the judg- date such appears estoppel is, claimed That that be, ment is, and hereby the same made considerable to a grounded have been
to the judgment and decree of this court. statements and the conduct upon extent I do not think we can make judg- necessarily not Baggs, Mr. party, a third ment aof sister judgment state the less and much plaintiff, chargeable to courts of this State. All we can do awith children these against chargeable is it so foreign judgment recognize is to rights money is support this behalf on whose conferred on the parties by it and to en- being for. sued force it purports insofar give as it to a money judgment party. to a We cannot dis- the matters Upon consideration modify any particular. it in We would herein, with the obli- in combination cussed great create mischief if we undertake to faith and credit full gation give foreign make a judgment our own and state, see do not we a sister judgment of try modify then it or to enforce it. providing a as shown the circumstances an such sufficient foundation TUCKETT, J., concurs the views ex- of his children pay pressed opinion in the concurring of EL- month) until that ($100 for December 1971 LETT, J. re- is the case July Accordingly, 1972.10 judgment manded for correction HENRIOD, (dissenting): Justice money for those adding the Respectfully, I dissent. respects judgment months. In all other bear their It appears affirmed.11 the hallmark of the main opinion considerably is based on gratui- own costs. considered, 1 Johnson, Other errors have been includ 7 above. v. footnote 9. See French ing complaint amending the trial about court’s wipe generally judgment; refusing not out does the ney’s fees, 10. That a court award attor obligation forgive a under defendant’s or have found we to be with Openshaw, Openshaw judgment see out merit: there authorities ap to me term It seems is more in cited. applied propriately to wild animals. ty if anybody, just anybody, pays a — — X, beneficiary decreed amount for of a
judgment, some kind an immutable —has right to judgment collect from the debtor. opinion says
The main if someone judgment
other than the debtor takes care obligation, person “That then has reimbursement,
the right to claim . past as any debt.” is im- It
possible person” to determine who “that husband, Baggs, here unless it her be new
n —who has rights against no contractual
the old husband. concept interloper, allows not an
Such debt,
particeps litigant to a in a
legal proceeding, to on a con- muscle judgment
tract or debt or and collect on a
voluntary payment of someone else’s obli- subject gation, the latter —when creditor,
a legal part defense *5 court, upon
such as fraud full
made, bankruptcy any many suing
such defenses. If Karen is for what paid, thing,
she one has but if she is furnished,
suing Baggs for what is an- has
other, which seems to be the case here. opinion, quot-
The statement of the main above, completely departs
ed principles
known in the law of contracts. Utah, Respondent,
STATE of Plaintiff JACKSON,
Rickey minor, Lee Appellant. Defendant
No. 13661.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov.