*1 to the fact, terms of a agreement, when, marital settlement they Although had not. puzzled by we are pertaining lack evidence the respective attorney-client relationships between 1995 and we find the supports record before us Judge Carmody’s April 2003 order vacating judgment redistributing parties’ as- sets and Judge Carmody jurisdiction debt. Because find we had to set aside the judgment, Judge 1995 final affirm denying we Lewis’s order petitioner’s “motion to dismiss.”
III. CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing For the judgment. we affirm the trial court’s Affirmed. KNECHT, JJ.,
STEIGMANN and concur. BAGENT, Plaintiff-Appellant, SUZANNE v. BLESSING CARE CORPORATION, al., Community Hospital, et Defendants- d/b/a
Appellees. Fourth District No. 4 - 05-0495 Opinion filed Argued January 18, March 2 0 06.
TURNER, EJ., dissenting. Offices, Quincy, appel- for (argued), Law
Kent R. Schnack of Schnack lant. Awerkamp (argued), Robertson, Gena J. of Schmiedeskarnp, &Neu Mitch-
ell, Quincy, appellee Blessing Corporation. Care JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion the court: August 2004, In plaintiff, Bagent, Suzanne a complaint filed against defendants, Blessing Care Corporation, Community Illini d/b/a (Illini Hospital), and Misty Young, alleging breach of health- care practitioner/patient confidentiality, privacy, invasion of negligent distress, infliction emotional and intentional infliction of emotional (as Young only). distress In April March and both defendants summary judgment. filed motions for In June the trial court granted Hospital’s summary judgment motion for in whole and in part, reserving motion trial claim for dam- ages for privacy. the tort of invasion of
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial granting court erred in Hospital’s motion. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND August 2004, plaintiff complaint defendants, filed a against al- leging, counts, in multiple practitioner/patient breaches health-care confidentiality, privacy, negligent invasion of infliction emotional (as distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress alia, only). complaint alleged, inter was a Quincy Medical Group September Between date and *3 12, 2003, September samples blood records were sent to Illini and/or Hospital 12, 2003, and examined Young. September On or about Young public revealed the results of those records a tavern. The complaint sought damages $50,000. in excess of 2004, answer,
In September Illini Hospital defendant filed an admitting Young plaintiff, revealed one fact about from discovered her records, plaintiffs medical sister at a tavern in Pittsfield. Illini information, Hospital alleged Young that when revealed she was scope employment of her Illini Hospital. with answer, 2004, Young admitting In filed an December she was an Hospital of Illini at the time of the occurrence. She also admitted inadvertently revealing private the test results in conversa- plaintiffs asking with tion twin sister after the sister how feeling. was
In Hospital summary March Illini filed a motion for judg- pursuant ment section 2—1005 the Code Civil Procedure (Procedure (735 (West 2004)). Code) Hospital ILCS al- 5/2—1005 leged, alia, the Illinois did inter Constitution and statutes private action, Young’s right authorize statement was not at- to Illini actions not within Hospital tributable because were confidentiality in Young was trained employment, scope her as told rights as soon she plaintiff’s had violated and knew she also Young April In pregnancy. plaintiffs about plaintiffs sister summary judgment. motion for filed a friends she was best discovery Young testified deposition, her
In “on-site, hands-on” Young received two weeks sister. plaintiffs with Hospital from at Illini and worked training phlebotomist to become a train- She stated she had August 2001 October 2003. She understood confidentiality agreement. ing signed had everything because] say anything!, mean “don’t confidentiality rules to private.” fax, which she from a plaintiff’s pregnancy learned tavern, Young At and doctor records. copies made for medical plaintiffs deposition In her sister. engaged a conversation with as follows: testimony, she recounted conversation Suzanne, sister, feeling? how And your “And is she then how is you thought pregnant, I like what do mean? I’m like she she’s her, out, I told I you know. And she’s like no. And there really sorry. Actually, sorry. please I her I was I said said I’m told you. don’t I I Because told me she’s tell Suzanne said that told she you just asking more like how did find this out? And she was me like, questions. well, I’m I seen her result. I [sic] and more And this, get really sorry, I I said could fired for I’m didn’t realize that like, no, you just okay, I it’s didn’t know. assumed. And she’s it’s all blah, care, blah, right. like Suzanne won’t She’s blah.” Young accepted hospital’s resignation offer lieu of termina- tion on October May hearing
In the trial conducted a on the motions find- summary entered an order judgment. June the court Young’s negligent in the sister disclosure tavern jury and no was not made the course and purposes find of Illini could the statement was made to serve summary judgment as to Illini Hospital. The court found ac- jury no could find appropriate as matter law because done in the course or of her to serve tions were Hospital’s purposes. ap- summary judgment The trial court further determined statutory alleged complaint action propriate cause of *4 private of ac- provide not intended to causes because statutes were tion. specifically pleaded, is the federal statute
It noted while not area, Portability and Account- governing this the Health Insurance 1936) (HIPAA) (Pub. 191, Act L. No. 110 Stat. ability of 1996 104— 920 not support private also does University cause of action. Colorado
Hospital Authority Co., 1142, v. Denner Publishing Supp. 340 F. 2d (D. 2004). does, however, Colo. It expose hospital Department for fines of Health and Human Services ac- tions of employees. its Young,
As summary the court found judgment appropriate as to statutory action, causes of but a right-of-privacy common-law cause action existed for of plaintiff’s right violation privacy. granted The court also partial summary motion for against judgment Young on the question Young improperly whether revealed regarding plaintiff, confidential information but issues as to damages infliction of emotional distress and were to be determined at trial. just The trial court found “no reason delaying appeal of this 304(a). judgment.” See R appeal 155 Ill. 2d This followed.
II. ANALYSIS argues Plaintiff the trial in granting Hospital’s court erred summary judgment motion for and in holding Hospital was not liable for breach of privacy confidentiality. We agree. importance
With the patient’s medical (West (see 2004); in mind records 735 ILCS 210 ILCS 5/8—802 85/ 6.17(b) (West 2004) (patient’s medical protected information must be disclosure)), we Illini Hospital must determine whether should patient confidentiality potentially liable for the breach of its theory employee respondeat under a superior. appeal this requires grant summary judgment, us review the trial court’s our Clark, 1033, 1044, is novo. v. 3d Corp. review de Goodrich (2005). 953, if, 837 N.E.2d “Summary judgment proper is when light nonmoving party, plead viewed most favorable to the admissions, ings, depositions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that genuine moving is any there no issue as to material fact and that the is party judgment entitled to as a matter of law.” Illinois State 653, 922, Filan, 2d Chamber Commerce v. 837 N.E.2d (West 1005(c) 2004). (2005), citing 735 ILCS 5/2 — summary
Generally, judgment inappropriate cases involv Witmer, 129 2d scope-of-employment Pyne issue. v. Ill. (1989). However, as whether 543 N.E.2d the issue “may an act falls within the be decided as mat Lulay Parvin, 359 Ill. sufficiently ter of law if the answer is clear.” (2005). 653, 657, “Only if no reasonable 834 N.E.2d person could that an conclude from evidence course of should a court hold as a matter of *5 921 at 543 Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d acting.” so the was not law that Inc., Milestone, Ill. 1308; see also Maras at N.E.2d (2004). N.E.2d tort under employee’s to be held liable an employer For an been commit the tort must have respondeat superior, the doctrine of 359, 543 129 Ill. 2d at Pyne, scope employment. ted the of within contempora the The has the burden to show N.E.2d at 1308. scope employment. tortious act relationship between the neous 360, 543 at 1309. Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at N.E.2d be held to be long may that a master recognized It been has responsible of its servant. for the tortious conduct
“(1) his subject liability for the torts of servants A master is to employment. acting scope of their committed while (2) his subject to for the torts of servants A master is scope employment, the of their unless: outside
(a) or consequences, the the master intended the conduct or (b) reckless, negligent or or the master was (c) master, ]delegable duty of the non[ the conduct violated a or
(d) of the speak act or to on behalf purported the servant to he upon authority, or principal apparent and there reliance the by tort the existence of accomplishing was aided the (Second) Agency 219, § agency relation.” Restatement (1958). activity the goes type on to define for which Restatement
a master bemay liable:
“(1) employment, must be scope To be within the of the conduct authorized, the general or incidental to the same nature as that conduct authorized.
(2) conduct, determining although not In whether or not the authorized, is so similar to or incidental to the conduct nevertheless following employment, authorized as to within the the fact to matters of are be considered:
(a) commonly one done such whether or not the act is servants;
(b) act; time, placet,] the (c) servant; previous the master and the relations between (d) ap- of the master is the extent which the business servants; portioned between different (e) enterprise or whether not the act is outside or, enterprise, if has not been entrusted master any servant;
(f) expect that such or not the master reason whether done; an act will be
(g) the similarity quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) instrumentality whether not the by which the harm is done servant; has been furnished master (i) departure the extent of from the normal method of ac- result; complishing an authorized (j) seriously whether or act criminal.” Restatement (Second) (1958). Agency § at 506 determining parameters phrase “scope employ ment,” supreme our has stated follows: “ ‘(1) if, Conduct a servant is within of employment only
but if:
(a) it employed perform; is of kind he is *6 (b) it substantially occurs space within the authorized time and limits; (c) actuated, it part, by purpose is at in a least to serve the ***
master
(2)
a
Conduct of
servant is not within
of
scope
employment
the
if
authorized,
it is
in
from
beyond
different
kind
that
far
the
limits,
space
by
authorized time or
too little actuated
a
(Restatement
(Second)
to serve the
of Agency §
master.’
228
(1958).)”
Pyne,
As to her in her deposition testified she training received and as a phlebotomist worked at Illini August through During typical day, Young 2001 October 2003. stated people,” filing billing, she would do drug “stick some conduct screens, and deliver medical records to doctors’ boxes.
Young Hospital, testified that when she started at Illini she entered type confidentiality[-]type agreement.” into “some Her understand- patient everything “[b]asi- is confidentiality private that so cally say anything.” confidentiality don’t exhibit No. 7 Plaintiffs is signed February 25, 2003, agreement by Young indicating part on in disclosing patient proper that information without authorization No. 8 agreement. Plaintiffs exhibit a violation of would constitute 2, 2001, August on signed by confidentiality statement confidential not discuss indicating she could she understood information. s here, Young’s disclosure partial
The conduct issue Nor employed perform. to record, of the kind she was medical was not improper of her working phlebotomist at the time she as a falls in whether the conduct factor to consider disclosure. last actuated, at least is whether it is scope part, by purpose employer. serve the to and the unique employment environment
It is because of environment that employees working of the unique duties the master-servant concepts concerning the traditional authority case in this area apply. are difficult to Most relationship sought where the master the law arises from factual situations conduct of its servant because avoid the tortious of the master’s acting at a time when he was outside servant was i.e., training direction, engaged hospital’s control in a frolic. The employee to maintain employees duty of its did not limit the only during working patients’ medical information its its Rather, imposed by hospital execution of duty, hours. duties, was, times according training, to its extend all own effect, purposes patient confidentiality, Young all places. In duty day, days hours a a week. appellate Our court dealt with a similar view of extended regard police officers. relationship the master-servant with Gaffney City Chicago, N.E.2d (1998), entry judgment of a n.o.v. entered reversed *7 against city. There, jury against verdict in favor the the of weapon police employed by city brought his service home officer 44, App. in an 302 Ill. 3d at (Gaffney, and stored it unlocked container 916). possession weapon, son of the teenage 706 N.E.2d at His obtained it brought party, ultimately to a shot the decedent. 44, Ill. at at Gaffney, App. 3d 706 N.E.2d surrounding After an extensive recitation of the facts need his when he possession the officer to have of service revolver shift, every including expectation police department on of the police duty” any criminal act or officer was “on in the event of evident disturbance, Gordon, public writing majority, for the found Justice when he effectively duty police as a officer officer here was home, as no expected weapon his at his was off shift and was to store Ill. storage Gaffney, at the station. weapon provided police Gaffney 51, police at at as the officer App. 3d 706 N.E.2d 920-21. Just had a continuing duty possess off-shift and maintain his service weapon protect so that he could public, Young continuing had duty off-shift to maintain the confidentiality of records. This duty derived only hospital’s from the of employment, rules but patient’s right noted, also from the privacy. Gaffney As the even the of violation a master’s direction does not the liability obviate theory master under a respondeat superior. Gaffney, 302 Ill. (Second) 55, 923, 3d quoting at 706 N.E.2d at Restatement (1958). 230, Agency § at 511
The
traditional limitations of a master’s
under respon
derived,
superior
way,
deat
are
in a
reverse
the duties that the
imposes
master
on the servant and the servant’s function of advanc
Pyne,
master’s business. See
officer’s at-home service whether or what extent question servant’s actions were within the is a question appeal. jury fact. We find the same of fact in this should her employment decide whether acted within the when disclosing the confidential medical information.
III. CONCLUSION stated, For the we reverse the trial court’s order sum- reasons mary judgment proceedings. and remand this cause for further and remanded.
Reversed
MYERSCOUGH, J, concurs. *8 TURNER, dissenting: PRESIDING JUSTICE granting in did not err case, I the trial court In this would find Therefore, I respect- summary judgment. Hospital’s motion Illini dissent. fully plaintiff’s notes, Young’s majority partial disclosure perform to employed not of the kind she was
medical record was App. working phlebotomist. 363 Ill. as a did not occur while she to however, question exists as a majority, 3d at 923. The contends actuated, part, by purpose in a at least Young’s conduct was whether by conduct was not moved I would find employer. to serve the purpose Hospital. a to serve Young told purpose was served when judice,
In the case sub no The indicated plaintiffs pregnancy. evidence plaintiffs sister about taught and had Young signed confidentiality agreements been maintaining importance hospital personnel about made a mistake as soon as she privacy. Young testified she knew she of the confidential medical information made mention sister. in school and minimum-
Plaintiff makes much of troubles problematic yet appeal, on wage phlebotomist, work as a patients on attempts portray Young provider checking as a medical as a officer for during public-relations off hours and trial hospital. presented such the latter was to the No evidence of Young’s testimony part job description court. did not indicate venturing community into check the status of included out on serving hospital. in Based patients hopes purposes record, no such a person reasonable could draw conclusion.
Here, nothing supports Young an inference that record divulged attempting employer to benefit or serve her when she fact, in direct plaintiff’s medical records. In such disclosure was nothing and did agreements contravention to the majority The this case Hospital. further the of Illini claims business duties that “unique” employment “unique” offers a environment of the master-servant relation concepts concerning make majority 3d at 923. The contends ship apply. difficult to purposes of “Young day, days a a week” for duty was on hours However, majority patient confidentiality. 3d at 923. of confidential Young’s inappropriate fails to state how disclosure actuated, in part, at least information could be found to have been majority The not done so because purpose Hospital. to serve nothing in such a the record allows for conclusion. facts fires to liken the majority attempting also a blank police officers. involving off-duty us cases
before with employed to use the confidential information for the idle tavern; chitchat police might contrast officer who use *9 gun emergency tavern, in an while “off shift.” At the did not identify working Hospital herself as her representing employer’s committing interests. fact that she was a serious breach confidentiality, resigned, which she later indicates act one that falls within employment. reasonable No jury could find actions partly were even motivated purpose to Hospital. serve Illini conduct within her employment, went far beyond the authorized time space limits, and was not motivated serve employer, vicariously cannot be held liable this case. I would affirm the judgment. therefore trial court’s al., Special JOHN SCHWALBACHet and as Indiv. Adm'rs of Estate of Schwalbach, Deceased, Nicholas Parents and Next Friends of Alex al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Roosevelt et v. MILLIKIN KAPPA SIGMA al., Defendants-Appellants.
CORPORATIONet Fifth District No. 5 - 03-0515 Opinion filed December