59 Neb. 655 | Neb. | 1900
The information, which was drawn under section 12 of the Criminal Code, charges the defendant, Jacob Baer, with having committed a rape upon the prosecutrix, Addie Hill. The trial resulted in a verdict for the state, and the court pronounced sentence accordingly. The alleged insufficiency of the evidence is the principal ground relied on for a reversal of the judgment.
It is claimed on behalf of the defendant that the evidence establishes an alibi, and that it fails to establish non-consent of the prosecutrix to the sexual act. Mrs.
But it is contended that the proof does not show that Baer and Mrs. Hill are’not brother and sister, and that, therefore, the crime committed may have been more heinous and revolting than the One charged. In this connection it has been suggested by the attorney general that if one of two crimes was committed, the law presumes the commission of the one to which is attached the lighter penalty and which involves the lesser degree of turpitude. It will not be necessary to determine whether the presumption of innocence may be employed in any case to establish guilt; for, in our opinion, the evidence adduced upon the point in question is, in the absence of opposing proof, sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. The accuser and the accused were witnesses at the trial, and, according to the testimony of both, while they had lived for several years in Kearney county and knew each other, they were only slightly acquainted. While testifying, each spoke of the other as though they were not related in any degree. The conversation which took place between them when they met at the door of Mrs. Hill’s cottage on the night of the outrage was, also, a circumstance tending to show that they were not brother and sister. And these were not necessarily the only matters of which the jury took cognizance in reaching their conclusion. They may have noted an entire want of family resemblance between the parties. Indeed, it may have been apparent upon the most casual observation that they were not of the same nationality, race or color.
Another question of minor importance remains yet to be considered. • The fifth and sixth assignments of error call in question the action of the court in permitting Frank Meddles to testify on rebuttal to the fact that the defendant declared in Minden on the evening of August 8 that he intended to satisfy his sexual passion before going home that night. This testimony was not properly rebuttal; but the order in which proof shall be introduced is a matter resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we discover no reason to ■ believe that there was, in this instance, an abuse of discretion. In Basye v. State, 45 Nebr., 261, it was decided that “the order in which a party shall introduce his proof is, to a great extent, discretionary with the trial judge, and the action of the court in that regard will not be cause for reversal when no abuse of discretion is shown.” This rule has been followed in Davis v. State, 51 Nebr., 301, and Whitney v. State, 53 Nebr., 287. See, also, Rheinhart v. State, 14 Kan., 318; Blake v. Powell, 26 Kan., 320; 1 Thompson, Trials, sec. 344; 8 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 132.
Other alleged errors argued in the brief of counsel for defendant have not been specifically assigned, and will not be considered. The judgment is
Affirmed.