83 Iowa 313 | Iowa | 1891
I. The court made special findings-of the facts which it was thought were established by the evidence. We need not set out these findings in. detail, but will recite such as are deemed material to a. determination of the rights of the parties upon an-appeal.
The plaintiff is a dealer in diamonds at the city of Omaha, in the state of Nebraska. In the month of' December, 1888, one J. J. Barker made his appearance-at the plaintiff’s place of business, and represented that he had a customer for a diamond ring and stud, and desired to examine the plaintiff’s goods. He selected the ring and stud now in controversy, and the plaintiff' delivered them to him to take them and show them to the party who desired to make the purchase. The sum of four hundred and fifty dollars was fixed as the price.of the ’diamonds, and Barker was to return them, or return with the price, in an hour. The -plaintiff saw no more of Barker for two or-three days, when he succeeded in having an interview. Barker at first stated that he had been robbed of the diamonds; said he had.
The only real question in the case is whether Clark is entitled to the property as an innocent purchaser. Other facts might be stated which authorize the conclusion that Barker obtained the possession of the goods by fraudulent representations, but enough has been stated to show that the court was fully authorized in finding
It is very plain that the transaction between the-plaintiff and Barker did not pass the title of the diamonds to Barker. He did not pretend or claim that he wanted to purchase diamonds. He was intrusted with the possession of them merely as the agent of the-plaintiff; and, instead of returning them, he embezzled them by pawning them in a gambling house, and by subsequently, in connection with the keeper of the-house, selling them to the defendant. The authorities appear to be uniform that in such case the ¿purchaser from a mere agent or bailee acquires no title, even though he pay value and has no notice of the embezzlement, and that the rule ¡caveat emptor applies. It is idle-to contend that Barker did not have the criminal intent, to embezzle the diamonds when he obtained possession of them from the plaintiff. There is no evidence that he had any friend who was in need of diamonds. All of his acts subsequent to the time he acquired possession indicate that his purpose, from the inception of' his enterprise, was not to procure a purchaser for the-property, but to appropriate it to his own use. There are no other questions in the case which demand consideration.
The judgment of the district court is aeeiemed.