82 Mass. 559 | Mass. | 1860
The infirmity of the plaintiff’s case is that there is nothing from which the court can infer that the restriction in the deed from Downing to Boardman was inserted for the benefit of the estate now owned by the plaintiff. If it appeared that the parties to that conveyance intended to create or reserve a right in the nature of a servitude or easement in the estate granted, which should be attached to and be deemed an appurtenance of the whole of the remaining parcel belonging to the grantor, of which the plaintiff’s land forms a part, then it is clear, on the principles declared in the recent decision of Whitney v. Union Railway, 11 Gray, 359, that the plaintiff would be entitled to insist on its enjoyment, and to enforce his rights by a remedy in equity. But there is an entire absence of any language in the deeds under which the parties claim, from which it can be fairly inferred that the restriction in the deed to the defendant against erecting his building above a certain height was intended to enure to the benefit of the estate now owned by the plaintiff. The restriction is In the most general terms, and no words are used which indicate the object of the grantor in inserting it in the deed. Nor is there any language in the deeds under which the plaintiff claims title, which refers specifically to 'this restriction, or from which any intent is shown to annex the benefit of this particular restriction to the plaintiff’s estate. Generally, when such a right or privilege is reserved, the purpose intended to be accomplished by it is stated in the conveyance or can be gathered from a plan referred to therein, or from the situation of the property with reference to other land of the grantor. All parties then take with notice of the right reserved and the burden or easement imposed. But the conveyances in the present case contain no such clause, nor is there anything in the terms of the grant, or