Bacon v. StateBacon v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Pope
Defendant Donnie Bacon pled guilty to the offense of criminal trespass. On appeal he contends the judgment and sentence entered on the guilty plea must be reversed because the record fails to show that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and understood the possible consequences of entering a guilty plea. We agree and reverse.
The record shows that when the case was called for trial the defendant informed the court that he was waiting for his attorney. The trial judge responded that he intended to go forward and strike a jury without defendant’s attorney and then announced that defendant was proceeding pro se. After a jury was selected, the defendant made a request to approach the bench and informed the trial court that he wished to enter a guilty plea. The transcript reflects that the trial court informed the defendant it was “up to [him],” that it was “not influencing [him] in any way” and that it would delay sentencing pending the outcome of trial on other charges against the defendant. See Bacon v. State, 201 Ga. App. 639 (411 SE2d 783) (1991). The transcript reflects that other comments made during the bench conference, if any, were inaudible.
“Before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial court must determine that the plea is voluntarily made and that the defendant ‘ “intelligently and understanding^” ’ waives his constitutional rights, which requires a showing on the record that the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 13 (287 SE2d 26) (1982). When a defendant enters a plea of guilty and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered ‘ “by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill(ing) a silent [or incomplete] record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” (Cit.)’ Dean v. State, 177 Ga. App. 123, 125 (2) (338 SE2d 711) (1985).” Wood v. State, 190 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1) (378 SE2d 520) (1989).
We agree with the defendant that “[t]here is no affirmative showing in the record [in this case] that [defendant] voluntarily and understandingly entered [a guilty plea to the charge against him]. Indeed, the transcript . . . reveals that none of the substantive requirements of
Judgment reversed.
Birdsong, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur.