269 Pa. 350 | Pa. | 1921
Opinion bx
Plaintiff Bachrach, who conducts photographic studios in Baltimore and Philadelphia, was desirous of changing the location of his business in the latter city; his manager there, by his direction, communicated by telephone with the office of defendant Fleming, appellant, who is a real estate agent, and, as a result, Dunn, who was employed, by Fleming as sales agent, called upon plaintiff and arranged that Fleming should endeavor to procure for him a satisfactory property. After this arrangement was made, plaintiff and Dunn looked at the property 1718 Chestnut street, the subject of this litigation, and the latter gave his opinion that it could be purchased for a price in the neighborhood of $100,000; plaintiff instructed him to ascertain the lowest price at which it could be acquired. Some days after this interview, Dunn visited plaintiff in Baltimore and informed him he thought the property could be purchased for $95,000.; whereupon Bachrach gave him a letter addressed to Fleming, authorizing the latter to make an offer of $90,000, and a few days later received a letter written on Fleming’s stationery, signed with his name
That Dunn was Fleming’s fully authorized representative, as found by the court below, there can be no question; Fleming acknowledged letters written by Dunn, in his (Fleming’s) name, as his own, and admitted that
. From the testimony produced before the learned chancellor, the main features of which we have outlined, we fail to see how he could have found other than he did, that Fleming, was employed by Bachrach as his agent for the purchase of the property; that he did not act in good faith, but purchased the property, unknown to his principal, in his own name, and attempted to make a secret profit of $10,000.
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the court in Bergner v. Bergner, 219 Pa. 113, summed up the controlling principles of agency in these pregnant words: “Agency is a recognized fiduciary relation; its vital principle is good faith, without which the relation could not exist.” That case reiterated the established rule: “An agent to purchase cannot be allowed, except as his principal assents, -to purchase for himself. He can acquire nothing by an adverse purchase, even though he contribute of his own means or credit to effect it; the product will belong to the principal exclusively.”
Some question was raised in the court below and here as to whether plaintiff in purchasing the property was acting for himself • individually or for a corporation, Bachrach, Inc., in which he was interested; but, upon ample evidence, the chancellor found he was acting for himself. We fail to see why this question should give appellant any concern; he is being called to account, for his faithlessness, by the person he endeavored to overreach; the corporation is asking nothing of him and, it having had notice of these proceedings, would now be estopped from asserting any rights in the property.
It is further set up that the final and binding contract between Fleming and the owners of the property, was not delivered until after the time when Bachrach had terminated appellant’s agency, and therefore he can assert no rights under it. Where an agent has broken faith with his principal and has been discharged from
The court below correctly determined by its decree that appellant, as to the property in question, was trustee for plaintiff.
The decree is affirmed at appellant’s cost.