*1 Easter, Michael BABB, Shilena Standoak Easter, Easter, Standoak Easter, Frederick Daryl Felisha and Curtis Leanna MATLOCK 99-127 Arkansas Court of
Supreme 3, 2000 delivered February Opinion denied March for rehearing 2000.] [Petition *2 Perkins, Willie E. Jr., appellants. Baber,
Brent for appellees. Corbin, Donald L. This is a case Justice. which are asked to the term “benefi- interpret ciaries,” as in Ark. Code provided Ann. 16-62-102(d) (Supp. Babb, 1999). Standoak Appellants Shilena Easter, Easter, Easter, Michael Easter, Felisha Frederick and Daryl Standoak, of Allean who died grandchildren March 1997. four Allean had children: Leanna Mat- Appellee lock, Standoak, Standoak, Curtis Theadoris Appellee and Shirley Standoak. are the children Theadoris Standoak and Standoak, both of Shirley Allean. In December predeceased Leanna Matlock was administra- Appellee appointed special trix of Allean’s estate for the purpose bringing wrongful-death suit. In the Garland August Probate Court entered County an order of settlement in the action. The order of liens fees and satisfaction of attorney’s that after reflected payment Medicaid, settlement remainder held Medicare two children. surviving Appel- divided between Appellees, was filed a motion intervene wrongful- lants subsequently law thus heirs at action, were Allean’s death denied interven- settlement. of the probate judge tion, of this case followed. Our jurisdiction and this appeal of first it involves issues 2(b)(1), Ct. R. Ark. Sup. pursuant 1— affirm. impression. novo, and we will not de
We review probate proceedings
court
it is
errone
unless
clearly
reverse
decision
State,
Barrerav.
(1999);
There was no cause of action for wrongful
Abbott,
v.
First Nat’l Bank
288 Ark.
common law. Simmons
Inc.,
Produce,
v. Ballentine
241 Ark.
S.W.2d (1986); McGinty
Thus,
because
action is
Section 16-62-102(d) provides: the action in this are the
The beneficiaries of created section children, mother, and sisters father brothers and surviving spouse, to the of the deceased person, persons standing deceased and whom deceasedstood in loco person, parentis. of the deceased
Clearly, are not included in grandchildren beneficiaries. It is that clear the term group statutory equally children, “children” means as the entire living of benefi- group Thus, ciaries is the term children are qualified by who “surviving.” not at the time of the deceased living death are not person’s among beneficiaries, and, neither are the statutory correspondingly, deceased children’s heirs at law. Accordingly, reject Appellants’ assertion that are beneficiaries to the they settlement.
We also the claim raised reject Babb and Franks that are they beneficiaries because they to whom the deceased stood in loco Their claim based fact that Allean raised them after each of their mothers had died. that this fact is of no Appellees argue conse- action, quence because both Babb Franks were over the age not disabled eighteen time of Allean’sdeath. assert that the Appellees terminates at the time the children reach the age unless are disabled. The majority, they court agreed Appellees.
Babb and do Franks were both adults at dispute *4 the time of Allean’sdeath and that neither one of them suffers from maintain, however, any disability. that the They loss suffered as they a result of Allean’s death is wrongful not lessened the fact that by them, Allean no otherwise, was longer or at supporting financially time the of her In death. contend that their respect, they legal is no different from that of position who were also adults Appellees, at the time of Allean’s death. We disagree.
This court has defined the term “in loco “in as parentis” of a instead of a place parent; with a parent; charged factitiously duties, and parent’s rights, v. responsibilities.” Standridge Standridge, 364, 372, 496, 803 S.W.2d 500 (1991) Black’s (quoting Law 708 ed. Dictionary (5th One who 1979)). stands in loco parentis a child to or himself herself “in the puts situation of a lawful parent by incident to assuming relation obligations with parental out going through formalities to a 59 necessary legal adoption.” Am. Parent and Child at 217 (1987) (footnote omitted). § Jur.2d
267 either the be will person abrogated by The relationship may Thus, Id. duties or the child. the parental assuming Thrower, one, v. 239 that of Bryant unlike adoption. is a temporary then is when does (1965). Ark. question end, that it is not abrogated voluntarily the relationship provided either party. has not addressed this this court specifically
Although in issue, to be that the loco rule the general appears is child ends when the reaches age majority (foot Child at 551 (1978) 67A Parent & disabled. See C.J.S. a cannot stand in note omitted) (providing “[o]rdinarily, to is not or incapaci an adult who mentally physically with the This is consistent himself’). tated from providing his or her is rule that legally obligated support general parent least until the time the child reaches See child at majority. Towery a child reaches 685 S.W.2d Once (1985). Ark. Towery, and is and mentally duty capable, legal majority physically that child ceases. Id. Conversely, duty parent support child cease at if the is or mentally does not support disabled and needs Id. support. physically
Here, is no evidence that Babb or both of there were adults and suffered from no disability, relying time her are not benefi Allean’s at the death. support statute, as Allean did not stand in ciaries under the wrongful-death at the of her death. We are aware of the them time that this have on the number decision ever-increasing impact may raised, in but not of children this state who formally being Indeed, and other relatives. we bemay by grandparents adopted, loss that their Appellants’ position tempted sympathize Allean no no lessened because was merely contributing way longer Nevertheless, to their we believe that any support. expansion lies within the under the right recovery not this court. thus affirm General Assembly, province because we court’s on this ruling point. Accordingly, that all lacked to claim interest conclude standing any death, result of Allean’s the settlement wrongful procured *5 affirm the summarily remaining points appeal.
BROWN and concur. JJ., ImbER, C.J., Thornton, J., Arnold, dissent. I Imber, Justice, concurring. agree
ANNABELLE Clinton result reached based by majority upon of Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-102 plain language 1999). (Supp. Section 16-62-102(d) for two of in loco provides categories parentis- beneficiaries: loco in to the deceased “persons standing parentis per- “ son,” and to whom the deceased stood persons parentis.'” The first is written in the tense. category present beneficiary status in that is accorded to who stand in loco category only to the deceased the time of death. The parentis statute’s next the second of loco in phrase defining category parentis can be and should be construed to refer similarly only deceased stood loco at the parentis time death. The use of tense in the latter indicates that past phrase merely deceased cannot stand in loco parentis his anyone following or her death. Both inof loco categories beneficiaries are parentis construed thereby capable being consistently harmoniously. would if result Inequities necessarily construed otherwise, with status limited an in beneficiary being at the time death as to one in relationship locoparentis category, but to the other in parentis category. reasons,
For these I would affirm the court’s ruling based of section upon and our plain language 16-62-102(d) case law the term in loco interpreting in this concurrence. J., joins
BROWN, Chief I Justice, disa- Arnold, dissenting. WH. “Dub” with the gree that the holding of in loco does not continue past age majority aas purposes to a suit. beneficiary Standoak Babb and Franks were raised Standoak, their Allean grandmother, after their died. parents “Raise” is defined in the as: “to dictionary give (children) parent’s care : : fostering bring REAR.” Webster’s NURTURE, up Third New International 1877 (1986). Dictionary
Appellees argue termi- nated at the time each children reached their majority. statute sets forth those who are considered as bene- ficiaries. Section 16-62-102(d) provides: *6 this section are the action created mother, children, brothers sisters father and surviving spouse, standing of the deceased person, stood in the deceased deceased person, added.) (Emphasis until this issue addressed Court has not specifically
This when ends holds that now case. The majority reaches age the deceased for whom child stood child reaches when the natural age majority. but not children, or as to whether natural no distinction makes The statute has stood parentis, regarding the deceased those for whom even after age major- are beneficiaries reaching whether they Therefore, has made such I fail to see the majority why ity. I, therefore, dissent. respectfully distinction.
Thornton, J., joins.