B.L. v. StateB.L. v. State
Lead Opinion
B.L. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his confession. We reverse.
After interviewing the five-year-old victim of an alleged sexual battery, the police contacted B.L.’s mother and scheduled an interview with thirteen-year-old B.L. His mother told the officers she wished to be present during the interview; nevertheless, the officers arrived an hour and a half late, after B.L.’s mother had left for work, and proceeded with B.L.’s interview despite his mother’s аbsence. The officers did not advise B.L. of his Miranda
At the hearing on the motion to suppress the statements obtained from B.L., the court made no inquiry in cоnformity with Doerr v. State,
Seeking to uphold the court’s decision permitting the admission of the statement as voluntarily obtained, the state argues that the interview constituted noncustodial interrogation, apparently because the police did not arrest B.L., citing United States v. Mendenhall,
In Alberti v. Estelle,
*1179 We have attributed special significance to four factors: (1) probable cause to arrest, (2) subjective intent of the police, (3) subjective belief of the defendant, and (4) focus of the investigation, [United States v. Corolio,507 F.2d 50 , 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 874 ,96 S.Ct. 143 ,46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975); Brown v. Beto,468 F.2d 1284 , 1286 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Phelps,443 F.2d 246 ,247 (5th Cir.1971); United States v. Montos,421 F.2d 215 , 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1022 ,90 S.Ct. 1262 ,25 L.Ed.2d 532 (1970)].
In Alberti, the court rested its decision on two prior opinions dealing with custodial interrogation, United States v. Phelps,
The Court spoke to the issue оf whether Phelps was in custody within the meaning of Miranda as follows:
[I]f the investigation was not focused on the defendant when the officers еntered the building, it certainly focused on him a few seconds later when the investigators discovered the illegal weаpon in the showcase. We think that the presence of four officers in a man’s place of business holding a wеapon which they discovered on the premises and which they have announced is illegal, presents a situation which is intimidating enough to warrant the application of the Miranda privileges and protections. The investigators had рrobable cause to arrest Phelps, and he had reason to believe that they would do so. Once the officers found the illegal weapon the investigation focused on Phelps, and the panoply of rights enunciated in Miranda became applicable.443 F.2d at 248 .
In Agius ... [t]hе Court discussed the question of whether the defendant was ‘in custody’ at the time of the agents questioning in the following language:
[I]t is clear that appellant was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way at least immediately after the agents saw the toy gun in his car. Assuming that prior to that time the questioning was non-custodial and investigatory, it is beyond thе capacity of a reasonable mind to suppose appellant was ‘free to go’ after the discovery of the gun, viewed from whatever standpoint. The discovery of the gun, along with the resemblance between аppellant and the robber, established probable cause and focused the identification. It must have madе clear to both agents and appellant that the latter was going to be detained unless and until the investigation was clearly to take a different direction. The adversary process had, at least at that point, begun. Thus, the trial court’s findings regarding the admissibility of the statements made by appellant as a result of questioning initiated by the agents in an аttempt to explain the presence of the gun are clearly erroneous.413 F.2d at 918-19 .
According to the cited authorities, no single factor renders the setting custodial. On the other hand, all the factors need not be present to establish a custodial setting. A case-by-case analysis is necessary. United States v. Lueck,
The principles adopted in Alberti were recognized in earlier cases. For example, in Windsor v. United States,
The Government agents’ testimony that Windsor was not a suspect and not under arrest when questioned in his motel room is belied by the facts of the case. We cannot permit Miranda principles to be so easily frustrated. Windsor was definitely the central figure in their investigation and should have been informed of his right to the presence of counsel.
In the case before us, both probable cause and fоcus were present. B.L. was the sole, suspect. One officer testified that he had both probable cause and the intent to arrest B.L. According to Alberti, these facts are sufficient to qualify the interview as a custodial interrogatiоn requiring Miranda warnings. See also United States v. Henry,
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
Notes
Miranda v. Arizona,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
The result is further compelled by a recent state supreme court case which seems to hold that police questioning can be custodial, requiring that Miranda warnings be given, even in a noncustodial setting, and that the test is, as a matter of law, the intent and purрose of the police without regard for the defendant’s subjective belief. DeConingb v. State, (Fla.1982) (Case No. 61,008, opinion filed Octоber 28,1982).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
The trial court found that there was no custodial interrogation and, consequently, any concern with Doerr v. State,