Lead Opinion
L.N.K. (“the mother”) petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Shelby Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) to dismiss the petition for custody of B.E.H. (“the child”) filed by B.E.H., Sr.
Procedural History
Based on the materials submitted to this court and the stipulations of the parties, it appears that, in 2003, the Jefferson Family Court entered a judgment establishing B.E.H., Sr., as the father of the child and ordering him to pay child support. That judgment impliedly granted the mother custody of the child. See M.R.J. v. D.R.B.,
On April 22, 2010, the mother filed a contempt petition in the Jefferson Family Court, alleging the failure of the father to pay child support, including certain medical expenses of the child. Five days later, the mother filed in the circuit court a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to
On July 14, 2010, the mother filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this court, arguing that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the father’s petition. On August 6, 2010, this court granted a motion to stay the proceedings in the circuit court. Thereafter, the father submitted his answer and the parties submitted their briefs. Upon review of those briefs, this court dissolved the stay on October 22, 2010. This court now decides that the petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be denied.
Discussion
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte Punturo, [928] So.2d [1030] (Ala.2002); Ex parte Flint Constr. Co.,775 So.2d 805 (Ala.2000).
“ ‘ “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires the showing of: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’
“Ex parte Bruner,749 So.2d 437 , 438 (Ala.1999) (quoting Ex parte McNaughton,728 So.2d 592 , 594 (Ala.1998)).”
Ex parte K.L.P.,
The mother does not dispute that the circuit court has plenary jurisdiction over equitable matters such as child-custody and child-support cases. See § 12-11-31, Ala.Code 1975. The mother instead relies on the rule of law that, once a court of this state establishes jurisdiction over those matters, jurisdiction remains in that court unless and until that jurisdiction is relinquished. See Rush v. Simpson,
The record before us shows that, in 2003, the Jefferson Family Court decided the custody and child-support issues as part of a paternity proceeding involving the child, who was born out of wedlock to the mother and the father. At that time, only juvenile courts could adjudicate such paternity cases. See former § 12-15-31(2), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that juvenile courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction “[i]n proceedings to establish paternity of a child born out of wedlock”). As part of a paternity proceeding, a juvenile court also could decide custody and child-support issues. See former § 12-15-30(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that the juvenile court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction of “[proceedings to determine custody ... of a child when the child is otherwise before the court”); and C.D.W. v. State ex rel. J.O.S.,
Formerly, once a juvenile court decided custody and child-support issues as part of a paternity proceeding, that juvenile court retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction over those issues unless it terminated its own jurisdiction. See former § 12-15-32, Ala.Code 1975 (providing that, once a juvenile court obtains jurisdiction in any case involving a child, that court retains jurisdiction over that case until the child reaches the age of 21 years or until the court, by its own order, terminates that jurisdiction); see also W.B.G.M. v. P.S.T.,
“(a) Once a child has been adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision, jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall terminate when the child becomes 21 years of age unless, prior thereto, the judge of the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over the case involving the child.”
By its plain terms, § 12-15-117(a) does not grant juvenile courts continuing jurisdiction over children unless they have been “adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision.” Thus, this court has held that a juvenile court no longer has continuing jurisdiction over a child based solely on its having made a prior paternity determination. Ex parte T.C.,
Adhering to the principles set out in Ex parte T.C., we hold that the Jefferson Family Court does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the custody and child-support issues asserted in the father’s petition. See, e.g., T.B. v. T.H.,
The mother also argues that the custody-modification standard set out in Ex parte McLendon,
Based on the foregoing, we deny the mother’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Notes
. The father did not allege any facts that could be construed as dependency allegations so as to invoke the juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction under 12-15-114(a), Ala.Code 1975, nor did he allege that the child was in danger of immediate harm so as to invoke the juvenile court’s emergency jurisdiction under 12-15-138, Ala.Code 1975.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
I concur with the main opinion; however, I write specially to point out that the concerns regarding the changes in the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts expressed in my special writing in Ex parte T.C.,