B.C.B. v. StateB.C.B. v. State
This is the direct appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Montgomery County
The transfer of a juvenile from juvenile court to circuit court is governed by
Under § 12—15—90(i), a juvenile court may order a child committed “to the custody of the state department of mental health and mental retardation on the basis that [the child] is mentally ill ... if substantial evidence proves that:
“(1) The ... child sought to be committed is mentally ill; and
“(2) As a consequence of the mental illness, the ... child poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others; and
“(3) The threat of substantial harm has been evidenced by a recent overt act; and
“(4) Treatment is available for the ... child’s mental illness or that confinement is necessary to prevent the ... child from causing substantial harm to himself or to others; and
“(5) Commitment is the least restrictive alternative necessary and available for treatment of the ... child’s illness.” (Emphasis added.)
A juvenile court may order a child committed to the custody of “the state department of mental health and mental retardation on the basis that [the child] is mentally retarded ... if substantial evidence proves that:
“(1) The ... child sought to be committed is mentally retarded; and
“(2) The said mentally retarded ... child is not borderline or mildly retarded....; and
“(3) The ... child, if allowed to remain in the community, is likely to cause serious injury to himself or others, or that adequate care, rehabilitation and training opportunities are available only at a facility provided by the department of mental health and mental retardation.”
In the present ease, there is not “substantial evidence” that the appellant is either mentally ill or mentally retarded. In his forensic evaluation report, clinical psychologist Karl Kirkland stated that the appellant “does suffer from a long-standing conduct disorder that appears to be evolving into a full-blown antisocial personality disorder.” C.R. 33-34. Dr. Kirkland also stated in his report that his evaluation revealed “pervasive deficits in [the appellant’s] personal growth, moral development, academic achievement, and vocational growth and development.” C.R. 34. However, he discovered no “mental disorder that would render [the appellant] unable to appreciate the criminality of his behavior at the time of this particular offense” and he stated that the appellant “is at least of borderline intelligence.” C.R. 33. Dr. Kirkland concluded that the appellant “does not appear to need treatment for any mental condition at this time,” C.R. 34.
As noted above, “mental illness” is not defined in Chapter 15 of Title 12. The psychologist appears to have equated “mental illness” with the “mental disease or defect” defense found in § 13A-3-1. That section provides:
“(a) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the*285 offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts....
“(b) ‘Severe mental disease or defect’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”
We find the application of the concepts embodied in § 13A-3-1 proper in view of the fact that
Although “mentally retarded” is not defined in Chapter 15 of Title 12,
While the psychologist stated that the appellant’s “conduct disorder ... appears to be evolving into a full-blown antisocial personality disorder,” it is clear from the remainder of his report that the appellant does not suffer from a mental illness or from mental retardation. The evidence in this case was supply insufficient to satisfy the requirements of either
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.