Plaintiff Farhad Azima (an American citizen and resident) is an international businessman who has worked for many years with Defendant Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority ("RAKIA"), which is an investment organ of one of the emirates within the United Arab Emirates. Like many longstanding business relationships, the partnership between Azima and RAKIA has had its ups and downs. Not surprisingly, this lawsuit concerns one of the downs: Azima maintains that RAKIA commissioned the repeated surreptitious hacking of his personal and business laptops from October 2015 to August 2016, and then published disparaging material that was illicitly gleaned from Azima's computers during the hacking. Azima filed the instant lawsuit on September 30, 2016, claiming that RAKIA has violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"),
Before this Court at present is RAKIA's motion to dismiss Azima's first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens . (See Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 31-2, at 7-9.)
For the reasons explained fully below, RAKIA's motion to dismiss Azima's complaint will be DENIED . This Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this case, because Azima has alleged that RAKIA engaged in foreign commercial activities in connection with an act that had a direct effect within the United States, such that this matter falls within the commercial activity exception to
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Commercial Dealings Of Azima And RAKIA
Azima is an American businessman who resides in Kansas City, Missouri (see Am. Compl., ECF No. 28, ¶ 7), while RAKIA is a commercial investment entity that is part of the government of Ras Al Khaimah, one of the emirates in the United Arab Emirates (see
In one such venture, one of Azima's businesses-known as "HeavyLift International Airline"-entered into a joint venture with RAK Airways to build and operate a flight training academy in Ras Al Khaimah. (See
This Settlement Agreement and any dispute or claim arising out of, or in connection with, it or its subject matter or formation (including, without limitation, any contractual or non-contractual disputes, claims or obligations) is governed by and shall be construed in accordance with English law and the Parties agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
(Settlement Agreement at 5-6.)
Notably, Azima contends that, in addition to doing business with RAKIA with respect to the HeavyLift joint venture and other business arrangements, he has also served as a mediator for RAKIA, helping it resolve disputes with other commercial entities. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) RAKIA purportedly employed Azima in that capacity during the 2015 and 2016 calendar years, as RAKIA attempted to negotiate a
For its part, RAKIA vehemently contends that it never asked Azima to mediate between RAKIA and its former CEO. (See Decl. of James Buchanan, Attachment to Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 31-21, ¶¶ 6-7.) Instead, RAKIA recalls that Azima approached RAKIA and offered to serve as "an honest broker"-as distinguished from a neutral mediator-in the dispute between RAKIA and its former CEO. (See
Thus, there is a disagreement between the parties regarding whether or not RAKIA actually hired Azima to mediate a conflict in or around 2015. However, it is beyond dispute that the aforementioned March 2016 Settlement Agreement-which both Azima and RAKIA signed-specifically references the fact that Azima had "recently provided negotiation assistance to RAKIA on an informal basis[,]" and lists this service as one of the reasons for the payout that Azima received through that settlement. (Settlement Agreement at 3.)
B. The Hacking And Its Aftermath
Azima's complaint alleges that, during the time that Azima was allegedly mediating between RAKIA and its former CEO, computer hackers repeatedly accessed Azima's business and personal computers. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 33, 78.) These digital assaults purportedly began on October 14, 2015, when the hackers accessed Azima's computers using two IP addresses; one that was based in Florida, and one that was based in New York. (See
At the same time that the hackers were infiltrating Azima's computers, the negotiations between RAKIA and its former CEO started to break down. (See
On September 23, 2016, Azima's counsel in Washington D.C. received a letter from RAKIA demanding $4,162,500 if Azima wished to avoid a lawsuit. (See
C. Procedural History
Azima filed the instant action on September 30, 2016. His three-count complaint claimed that RAKIA (or one of its agents) hacked his personal and business computers, stole his data, and used that information both to blackmail him and to harm his reputation. (See
Azima has now filed an Amended Complaint, in which he repeats the assertion that RAKIA hacked his computers and used the resulting data to disparage and extort him in order "to gain an advantage in RAKIA's commercial relationship with Mr. Azima." (Am. Compl. ¶ 65; see also
In response to Azima's Amended Complaint, RAKIA has once again filed a motion to dismiss. (See Def.'s Mot.) RAKIA argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, and that the Court should dismiss the action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens . (See
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Sovereign Immunity Under The FSIA
When it enacted the FSIA, Congress made clear that foreign states are "immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States ... unless one of [the FSIA's] several statutorily defined exceptions applies." Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc. ,
Notably, however, a foreign sovereign is not entitled to immunity when it acts in a commercial capacity, as opposed to a sovereign one. See
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States[.]
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... not otherwise encompassed in [the commercial activity exception], in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign statewhile acting within the scope of his office or employment[.]
B. Motions To Dismiss Actions That Implicate The FSIA
"The established standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) in a case that implicates the FSIA is a nuanced one." SACE S.p.A. v. Republic of Para. ,
A facial challenge functions for all practical purposes as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. With regard to such a challenge, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and view all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it would in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ,
But where the defendant has made a factual challenge, the motion more closely resembles a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1). Thus, a court may consider material outside the pleadings in order to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the challenged claims. SACE S.p.A ,
"The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert ,
As the movant, the defendant bears the burden of proof on all points and must demonstrate why the "substantial presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum" should not apply.
III. ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the parties have fiercely debated whether RAKIA is immune from suit under the FSIA, primarily because they disagree over whether the FSIA's commercial activity or noncommercial tort exceptions apply. Notably, Azima and RAKIA hotly contest several different aspects of the FSIA's commercial activity exception as applied to the instant record: (1) where the alleged hacking of Azima's computers took place (i.e., inside or outside the United States); (2) whether RAKIA has engaged in a pertinent "commercial activity" outside of the United States; (3) whether RAKIA's alleged hacking of Azima's computers was undertaken in connection with that foreign commercial activity; and (4) whether the alleged hacking of Azima's computers had a direct effect within the United States. (See Def.'s Mot. at 28-35; Pl.'s Opp'n at 29-39; Def.'s Reply at 8-16.)
For the reasons explained below, this Court has concluded that Azima has adequately alleged (and proven to the extent that RAKIA makes a factual challenge) that RAKIA's hacking of Azima's computers was undertaken in connection with a foreign commercial activity and caused a direct effect within the United States, and thus that the commercial activity exception provides the Court with subject matter jurisdiction over this case. That holding renders it unnecessary for the Court to further opine as to the applicability of the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception. But the Court has proceeded to reach, and resolve, the parties' additional dispute regarding the prudential doctrine of forum non conveniens (see Def.'s Mot. at 35-40; Pl.'s Opp'n at 42-54; Def.'s Reply at 20-23), and it concludes that RAKIA has failed to carry its burden of establishing that England provides an adequate alternative forum. Therefore, both aspects of RAKIA's motion-to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to dismiss for forum non conveniens -will be denied.
A. This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Azima's Claims Under The FSIA's Commercial Activity Exception
As mentioned above, the FSIA's commercial activity exception contains three
Because this Court concludes that Azima has adequately alleged-and, as necessary, has established-that the hacking that is the basis of the instant lawsuit was performed in connection with RAKIA's commercial activity outside of the United States and had a direct effect within the United States, as explained below, the FSIA's commercial activity exception applies without regard to whether the alleged hacking occurred inside or outside the United States.
1. The Record Demonstrates That RAKIA Engaged In Extraterritorial "Commercial Activity" For FSIA Purposes
The FSIA defines the phrase "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."
Notably, drawing the line between commercial and sovereign activities for FSIA purposes can sometimes be quite difficult. Compare Rong ,
Azima maintains that the commercial activity aspect of the FSIA exception set forth at section 1605(a)(2) is satisfied because RAKIA is engaged in ongoing business dealings with him outside of the United States as a general matter, and also because RAKIA specifically engaged him to mediate the dispute between RAKIA and its former CEO. RAKIA's motion to dismiss rejects the arguments that pertain to the parties' longstanding relationship because it claims that those activities are not in connection with the acts in this case (see Part III.A.2, infra ), and, as a factual matter, RAKIA also challenges Azima's contention that he served as a mediator between RAKIA and its CEO (see Def.'s Mot. at 29). In regard to RAKIA's factual challenge, this Court must examine the entire record in order to ascertain whether Azima has "come[ ] forward with sufficient evidence to carry [his] burden of production" regarding RAKIA's participation in a commercial activity, and, if he has, the Court must then assess whether RAKIA, who "shoulder[s] the burden of persuasion[,]" has demonstrated that no such commercial activity actually occurred. SACE S.p.A ,
The instant record is more than sufficient to persuade this Court that RAKIA has engaged in pertinent commercial activity outside of the United States, within the meaning of the FSIA's commercial activity exception, for several reasons. First of all, the information that the parties have presented makes crystal clear that RAKIA and Azima have had an ongoing and active business relationship for many years. There is no dispute that RAKIA is an investment organ of Ras al Khaimah, and it appears that RAKIA's commercial relationship with Azima began no later than 2007, with the HeavyLift joint venture agreement (see Buchanan Decl. ¶ 19), and continued until at least the summer of 2016, when Azima and RAKIA discussed investing in a munitions factory (see id. ¶ 14). Indeed, the record establishes that between October 14, 2015, and August 2016 (i.e., the period in which the alleged hacking occurred), Azima and RAKIA were engaged in several business-related activities; specifically, they engaged in discussions in the fall of 2015 about a possible "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance" joint venture between RAKIA and a company Azima owns (id. ); undertook discussions in summer of 2016 about RAKIA and Azima investing in a munitions factory (see id. ); and continued participating in a joint venture relating to a flight training academy in the United Arab Emirates and between Azima's HeavyLift company and RAK Airways, whose performance RAKIA agreed to guarantee (see id. ¶ 19; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 64; Settlement Agreement at 2).
Thus, the question here is whether RAKIA's involvement in these business negotiations constituted commercial activity as
The trickier (and more hotly contested) question pertaining to RAKIA's alleged commercial activity is a question of fact: whether or not RAKIA specifically engaged Azima's services as a mediator between the summer of 2015 and July 2016. The parties vehemently disagree as to exactly what role Azima served in the negotiations between RAKIA and its former CEO, and on its face, both parties have provided plausible accounts of the role Azima played. All things considered, this Court finds that Azima has met his burden of production regarding his contention that he worked as a mediator between RAKIA and its CEO between the summer of 2015 and July 2016 and that this activity took place outside the United States, and it finds that RAKIA has not carried its burden of persuasion with respect to this same issue.
The emails that Azima has submitted clearly demonstrate that he functioned as one of the "middle men, the messengers" (7/23/16-7/25/16 Email Chain, Ex. B to Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 33-3, at 4), with respect to the dispute that RAKIA had with its former CEO, and that Azima served in a "Henry Kissinger role" (11/28/15-11/30/15 Email Chain, Ex. D to Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 33-5, at 4). He coordinated meetings between RAKIA and its former CEO in Milan and Geneva (see
Nothing that RAKIA has offered undercuts the strong inference that Azima was, in fact, engaged as a mediator with respect to the CEO dispute. RAKIA's primary piece of evidence in this regard-the declaration of James Buchanan, Azima's primary contact with RAKIA during the mediation-emphasizes that RAKIA believed Azima was acting as the CEO's advocate with respect to the negotiations, and also that RAKIA never entered into an agreement to compensate Azima for his assistance (see Buchanan Decl. ¶¶ 7-8), but these assertions do not rebut Azima's clear demonstration that he was actively involved in mediating the dispute. What is more, the other documents that RAKIA has submitted actually provide further confirmation of Azima's mediator role. For example, as noted, the March 2016 Settlement Agreement expressly states that the $2.6 million settlement was tendered to Azima, at least in part, to acknowledge that "Azima has recently provided negotiation assistance to RAKIA on an informal basis which RAKIA recognises and appreciates." (Settlement Agreement at 3.) In addition, the Buchanan Declaration asserts that Azima sought to capitalize on his mediation role by proposing new joint ventures, some of which RAKIA did not immediately dismiss. (See Buchanan Decl. ¶ 14.) In this Court's view, whether or not any such venture ultimately materialized is irrelevant because the acknowledgment that Azima was in a position to make such suggestions belies RAKIA's current contention that Azima was merely a biased, uncompensated interloper with respect to the CEO dispute.
Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Azima has established that he served as a mediator in the out-of-country negotiations between RAKIA and its former CEO, and that his work in these negotiations led, in part, to the agreement that RAKIA and Azima reached with respect to the outstanding dispute over the HeavyLift joint venture. Moreover, and significantly, RAKIA's engagement of Azima's services with respect to the negotiations constituted commercial activity for the purpose of the FSIA. Cf. Lydia Nussbaum, Mediation As Regulation: Expanding State Governance Over Private Disputes ,
The fact that Azima and RAKIA did not formalize Azima's role through a written or oral contract (see Def.'s Mot. at 29), and that RAKIA did not pay Azima
the question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a party engages in "trade and traffic or commerce[.]"
Weltover ,
In sum, because the relevant activity here is the business negotiations and mediation that RAKIA authorized Azima to orchestrate and participate in during the timeframe of the alleged hacking, this Court concludes that those activities did constitute commercial activity taking place outside of the United States for the purposes of the FSIA.
2. RAKIA's Alleged Hacking Of Azima's Computers And Disparagement Of Him Were Acts Undertaken "In Connection With" Its Foreign Commercial Activities
RAKIA has raised a facial challenge to the portion of Azima's complaint that alleges that RAKIA's hacking and disparagement were acts done in connection with either the commercial relationship between Azima and RAKIA or Azima's role as a mediator. (See Def.'s Mot. at 22.) But this Court does not, and cannot, conclude that the complaint's allegations are insufficient, implausible, or otherwise lacking in this regard.
Although the D.C. Circuit has yet to opine on the meaning of the phrase "in connection with" as it appears in section 1605(a)(2), the Courts of Appeals that have spoken to this issue have typically held that this phrase has a narrow meaning in the FSIA context. See Garb v. Republic of Pol. ,
Accepting for the moment these courts' interpretation of the "in connection with" phrase, this Court concludes that Azima has nevertheless made sufficient factual allegations to overcome even that relatively stringent standard. To be specific, the complaint in the instant case alleges that RAKIA "took the acts alleged herein in order to gain an advantage over Mr. Azima in his commercial dealings with RAKIA and to inflict commercial and financial harm on Mr. Azima." (Am. Compl. ¶ 68 (emphasis added).) In this way, Azima's complaint draws a direct causal relationship between the hacking and online disparagement of which Azima complains and the commercial activity that RAKIA and Azima had been engaged in overseas. And the complaint goes further: it alleges that the information RAKIA supposedly obtained during the hacking of Azima's computers was actually used in conjunction with the demand letter that RAKIA sent to Azima to accuse him of defrauding RAKIA in past commercial activities, including the HeavyLift joint venture. (See id. ¶¶ 49, 64.) Thus, the complaint draws a direct line between the hacking and the parties' commercial dealings, and in so doing, satisfies the FSIA's in-connection-with requirement.
Azima has also successfully pled a plausible theory that links the alleged hacking to the mediation services that Azima had been providing with respect to the CEO dispute. Azima starts off noting that the hacking of his computer began in October of 2015 and continued through the summer of 2016-a time period that roughly corresponds with the time in which Azima served as a mediator between RAKIA and its former CEO. (Compare id. ¶¶ 26, 29 (identifying the start and end points of the hack) with id. ¶¶ 23, 34 (identifying the start and end points of the mediation).) That alleged overlap alone supports an inference that there was some connection between the two, but RAKIA's alleged actions during the final stretch of the mediation further underscores the alleged link between the hacking and Azima's role as a mediator. According to Azima, when it became clear that RAKIA and its former CEO were unlikely to reach an agreement, RAKIA upped the pressure by threatening to make Azima "collateral damage" in the all-out war that RAKIA planned to wage against its former CEO. (See id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The complaint then asserts that it was only after mediation had finally broken down that the hackers published Azima's private information on a number of BitTorrent websites, presumably to punish Azima for his role in the failed mediation in accordance with RAKIA's threat. (See id. ¶ 60.)
These allegations are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that RAKIA's alleged hacking had "a substantive connection or a causal link to the commercial activity" in this case. See Adler ,
3. RAKIA's Alleged Hacking Of Azima's Computer Had A "Direct Effect" Within The United States
Finally, this Court must determine whether the allegations in the complaint, read in the light most favorable to Azima, support the contention that RAKIA's conduct caused a direct effect in the United States.
To answer that question, courts in this jurisdiction first determine whether the plaintiff's claims against the foreign sovereign are grounded in contract law or tort law, because the D.C. Circuit has developed two separate tests for whether these types of claims involve a direct effect within the United States. See Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya ,
However, notably, even if a court determines that the locus of the tort at issue is the United States, it must also conclude that the effect felt therein was "more than purely trivial." Princz ,
Azima's complaint asserts several facts that persuade this Court that the alleged hacking of Azima's computers had a direct effect in the United States. First of all, the complaint alleges that Azima is an American citizen and a successful businessman who resides in Kansas City, Missouri and conducts many of his business affairs from within the United States. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 22; id. ¶ 24 ("In the [f]all of 2015 ... Azima frequently communicated with Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Gerrard, through emails and phone calls from and to Mr. Azima in the United States[.]"); id. ¶ 31 (referencing business events Azima had in New York); see also id. ¶¶ 50-51 (noting that RAKIA has threatened to seek enforcement proceedings in the United States against Azima and his business).) Azima's complaint contends that it is precisely because Azima often conducts business when he is inside the United States that Azima has a set of "U.S.-based business and personal laptops" (id. ¶ 78) (emphasis added), and according to the complaint, these were the laptops that were hacked in the fall of 2015 and repeatedly thereafter (id. ).
Because hacking and the installation of malware affects the targeted computer systems, and the allegations of Azima's complaint pertaining to where he works and resides support an inference that at least one of Azima's U.S.-based personal and business laptops was in the United States when the hacking occurred, this Court confidently concludes that Azima has pled that a direct effect occurred within the United States. To find otherwise, as RAKIA insists that one must, would be to require Azima's complaint to account for the whereabouts of all of his computer equipment at each moment when Azima's computers were hacked, and to infer that if any of his computers could have left the United States with him when he traveled during the nine-month period where these hackings took place, then the complaint fails to allege that the hacking necessarily had a direct effect on his computers inside the United States. (See Hr'g Tr. at 31:9-32:8.) Not only is such an inference procedurally improper, see Price ,
Azima's conversion claim presents a more challenging inquiry, but, ultimately, the Court concludes that Azima has alleged sufficient facts that this claim, too, survives RAKIA's motion to dismiss. With respect to torts against property, it is well established that the locus of the tort is typically "where the force takes effect on the thing[.]" See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 note 3 (Am. Law. Inst. 1934). Some courts have understood this to mean that the tort of conversion occurs "where any wrongful retention of plaintiff's property and subsequent injury occurs." RaceRedi Motorsports, LLC v. Dart Mach., Ltd. ,
Assume for the moment that the conversion of digital data is legally possible.
To the extent that RAKIA's rebuttal includes the observation that Azima had his computers replaced after the malware attack, and thus is the one who destroyed his computers or data (see Def.'s Mot. at 34), RAKIA completely misses the point. Azima maintains that he decided, upon the advice of experts, to replace his computers because those computers had already been damaged by the hackings in this case (see Am. Compl. ¶ 33), and that threshold damage constitutes a direct effect for the purpose of the FSIA. Therefore, Azima's actions were not an "intervening element" between the hacking and the effect felt within the United States. Princz ,
Finally, the Court rejects RAKIA's contention that Azima did not suffer a direct effect in the United States due to the theft of his data. While it is true that "loss to an American individual and firm resulting from a foreign tort" is not sufficient to cause a direct effect within the United States (Def.'s Mot. at 34 (quoting Antares Aircraft, LP ,
4. The Court Need Not Decide Whether The Alleged Hacking Occurred Inside Or Outside The United States, Nor Is It Concerned That The Instant Ruling Will Open The Floodgates To A Wave Of Foreign-State Computer Hacking Lawsuits
This Court's conclusion that Azima has plausibly alleged that RAKIA hacked his personal computers in connection with commercial activity outside of the United States causing a direct effect inside the United States renders unnecessary any assessment of whether the alleged hacking of Azima's personal computers is an act that took place inside the United States. (Compare Def.'s Mot. at 18 (maintaining that the location of the hacking is the location of the hackers at the moment they broke into Azima's computers, and arguing that "there is no allegation that the hackers were in the United States at the time") with Pl.'s Opp'n at 29 & n.9 (asserting that, for the purpose of the commercial activity exception, a hacking occurs at the location of the IP addresses used to hack into the target computer, and the IP addresses used for to hack into Azima's computers were in the United States). While an analysis of the location of the foreign sovereign's allegedly tortious act is ordinarily a threshold consideration when a plaintiff contends that a federal court has jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the FSIA's commercial activity exception, the location of the challenged act is obvious in the typical case, and the parties' dispute centers on whether the other elements of the applicable prong of the commercial activity exception have been satisfied. See, e.g., de Csepel ,
Nevertheless, this Court finds that there is no need to resolve the instant parties' vigorous dispute over the location of the hacking under the circumstances presented here. This is because the text, structure, and purpose of the FSIA's commercial activity exception all point to the conclusion that, rather than mandating identification of the location of the foreign sovereign's allegedly tortious act, Congress's primary concern is ensuring that a lawsuit can be maintained if the foreign sovereign acts in a commercial capacity and undertakes a harmful act that occurs in, or impacts, the United States. See Bolivarian Republic of Venez. ,
The plain text of
To conclude otherwise, and thereby require Azima to establish where, exactly, the hacking occurred as a threshold matter,
For what it's worth, this Court is confident that its decision to eschew ruling on the location issue under the circumstances presented here will not automatically expand the FSIA to any and every case in which a foreign state or organ of the foreign state is accused of hacking into computers used in the United States. This is because Congress has made clear that the effect in the United States has to be direct in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, and in the instant case, Azima has alleged actual damage to his computers as a result of the hack, which makes it significantly easier to find that the effect of the alleged hacking activity here was not " 'purely trivial.' " Princz ,
B. RAKIA Has Failed To Prove That London, England Is An Adequate Alternative Forum For This Action; Therefore, This Court Will Not Dismiss This Case Under The Doctrine Of Forum Non Conveniens
As explained in Part II.C., supra , the doctrine of forum non conveniens requires a court to assess different venue-related issues, including whether or not the proposed alternative forum is an adequate one. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad ,
It is important to note that the onus is not on the district court to research the proposed alternative forum in order to make the necessary assessment of its adequacy; rather, "the defendant 'must provide enough information to enable the District Court' to evaluate the alternative forum." El-Fadl ,
In the instant case, RAKIA has provided no such testimony and its arguments do not convince this Court that the English High Court would have jurisdiction over the claims Azima seeks to advance here. The first reason for RAKIA's shortcoming in this regard is the fact that foreign sovereigns typically enjoy a form of state immunity in the United Kingdom (much like in the United States) under Parliament's State Immunity Act of 1978, see generally State Immunity Act of 1978, 1978, c. 33 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978), and similar to the FSIA, that act begins with a general presumption of immunity, then proceeds to carve out narrow exceptions where the courts of the United Kingdom can exercise jurisdiction over a case filed against a foreign sovereign.
Moreover, even if RAKIA did consent to waiving its state immunity for the purposes of this lawsuit and Azima refiled his claims in the United Kingdom, RAKIA has not demonstrated that the United Kingdom offers an adequate remedy for the injuries Azima has complained of in this case. To be sure, "a foreign forum is not inadequate merely because it has less favorable substantive law," El-Fadl ,
RAKIA maintains that, despite the foregoing analysis, this Court should dismiss the instant action on forum non conveniens grounds because the March 2016 Settlement Agreement between Azima and RAKIA demands that it be so. (See Def.'s Mot. at 35 (arguing that "the Settlement Agreement between RAKIA and Azima contains a valid forum-selection clause, which represents the parties' agreement as to the most proper forum, and should be given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) To hear RAKIA tell it, the parties here previously entered into a binding contract that specifically relegates "any dispute or claim arising out of, or in connection with [the Settlement Agreement] or its subject matter or formation (including, without limitation, any contractual or non-contractual disputes, claims or obligations)" (Settlement Agreement at 5-6), and as a result, the instant action must be brought in a U.K. court.
RAKIA's suggestion that, because Azima's complaint links the alleged hacking that is the subject of the instant action to RAKIA's commercial activity (including the HeavyLift joint venture) for FSIA purposes then this Court must also view the hacking and the HeavyLift joint venture as connected under the language of the Settlement Agreement (see Def.'s Mot. at 37; Def.'s Reply at 20-21) only goes so far. That is, it is clear to this Court that the alleged hacking may well have been undertaken in connection with the HeavyLift joint venture as set forth in Azima's complaint (i.e., it was an act that was partly motivated by the parties' disputes in regard to that venture), and yet Azima's claims alleging that the computer hacking violates the CFAA and D.C. common law do not themselves arise from or connect to the "subject matter or formation" of the Settlement Agreement, which is what the parties clearly contemplated when they agreed that claims "arising out of, or in connection with" the Settlement Agreement must be filed in London. (Settlement Agreement at 5-6.) Stated simply, it is the subject matter of the Settlement Agreement that governs the scope and extent of the parties' forum-selection clause, and RAKIA does not, and cannot, maintain that the hacking conduct of which Azima complains here was addressed in, or was a reasonably foreseeable result of, that agreement, such that the forum-selection clause governs.
Without the support of the settlement agreement, RAKIA's forum non conveniens motion depends solely on this Court finding that the balance of public and private interests weigh in favor of a London forum, and then dismissing this lawsuit conditioned upon the lawsuit being litigated in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier du Cameroun ,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Azima's claims under the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, and RAKIA's forum non conveniens argument fails. Accordingly, and as set forth in the accompanying Order, RAKIA's motion to dismiss is DENIED .
Notes
Page-number citations to the documents that the parties have filed refer to the page numbers that the Court's electronic filing system automatically assigns.
The facts contained within this section are derived from Azima's amended complaint and the exhibits that RAKIA and Azima have attached to the briefings in this case. The facts revealed in those exhibits are relevant here, because there is a factual dispute that is pertinent to the Court's resolution of the instant motion. See SACE S.p.A. v. Republic of Para. ,
The parties differ starkly with respect to their description of how BitTorrent websites work. Both sides agree that these websites are sometimes used for illegal activity, such as downloading illegally appropriated files. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 45; Decl. of James Hung, Attachment to Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Protective Order, ECF No. 24-1, ¶ 12 (incorporated into 2nd Decl. of James Hung, ECF No. 31-22).) But RAKIA insists that members of the public can access these websites through a legal and non-surreptitious process (see Hung Decl. ¶ 16), while Azima maintains that only the BitTorrent creator or one of their affiliates can access the BitTorrent website (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, 43, 46). This dispute is immaterial to the Court's resolution of the instant motion.
But see Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo ,
This is not to say that Azima's complaint could not have more clearly pled the allegations relating to the direct effect prong. Indeed, it would have been far preferable if Azima had included an express contention that the hacked computers were inside the United States at some point during the relevant timeframe, even if his assertion could only be made "upon information and belief." But ultimately, the Court finds that such an inference can reasonably be drawn from the allegations that do appear in the pleading. And, of course, RAKIA is free to make a factual challenge to this contention, and to provide evidence that Azima's computers were actually elsewhere during the relevant period, as this litigation proceeds.
Many courts, including one in this district, have concluded that a party fails to state a claim for conversion when it asserts that the defendant converted digital data. See, e.g., 3D Global Solutions, Inc. v. MVM, Inc. ,
The fact that the commercial activity exception expressly authorizes federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over acts of a foreign sovereign that occur outside the United States distinguishes this exception from the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception. See Doe ,
