AZHAR LAL v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al.
Case No. 18-02056-SPG (DFM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 25, 2024
HON. SHERILYN PEACE GARNETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to
In Plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 125 (“Reconsideration“)), which the Court construes as an objection to the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff raises two objections. First, Plaintiff argues that the Court failed to appoint counsel as was required, given his insulin-dependent status and mental health issues. Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant falsely alleged Plaintiff required a single cell. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff first argues that he is entitled to appointment of counsel in this Case because he is “an insulin-dependent diabetic with metal [sic] health conditions[.]” (Reconsideration at 1). As the Ninth Circuit has consistently held, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil rights case. See, e.g., Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). However, a court has discretionary authority under
Here, the Court finds, although this case raises reasonably complex legal issues, Plaintiff‘s likelihood of success on the merits is low, and thus that the “exceptional circumstances” requirement is not met. Moreover, Plaintiff has shown that, despite “limited access to the law library and limited knowledge of the law,” he has prosecuted his case diligently and competently – citing relevant authorities and filing (usually) timely briefs in this matter – for over two years. (ECF No. 1 at 32).
Looking again at Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation that there are no genuine disputes of material fact to show that Defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to Plaintiff‘s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1970). Significantly, Plaintiff has not presented evidence to suggest - contrary to both Plaintiff and Huynh‘s integrated housing designations (SUF ¶¶ 6-7) - that Plaintiff and Huynnh would be incompatible. In fact, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did not tell Defendant that he would attack Huynh or that Huynh would attack him if Defendant housed them together. See (ECF No. 76-9 at 16) (“I didn‘t tell
Moreover, although Plaintiff states that Huynh was a gang member, it is undisputed that Defendant had no knowledge that Huynh was a gang member. See (ECF No. 76-3 (“Carranza Decl.“) at 7) (“He was never a validated or suspected gang member in prison. Based on these factors, I concluded that inmate Huynh and Plaintiff could safely house together, and that there would be no risk to either inmate‘s safety.“).
From the Court‘s assessment, there are no genuine disputes of material fact to show that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff‘s safety by housing Plaintiff with Huynh. This is so because both Plaintiff and Huynh had compatible housing code designations; Defendant had no reason to believe that placing the two inmates together was objectively against the safety of either prisoner; and, finally, the subsequent statements by Defendant corroborated that this housing arrangement was acceptable. (SUF ¶ 68) (“During the [post-fight] interview, both inmates stated that the fight was an isolated incident and they did not consider each other enemies, and signed a Compatibility Chrono indicating they could continue to program together on the same facility without further incident.“).
Next, the Court addresses Plaintiff‘s contention that “Respondent falsely alleged that I [Plaintiff] required [a] single cell in order to be housed in one of the 30 totally empty cells that were available in Housing Unit 3.” (Reconsideration at 1). As far as the Court can tell, nothing in the Report and Recommendation rests on whether Plaintiff requested a single cell. Because the truth of this contention is immaterial to the outcome of this Report and Recommendation, the Court declines to address this contention.
IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation is accepted and adopted; and (2) Judgment shall be entered granting Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76) and dismissing this action with prejudice.
Dated: March 25, 2024
HON. SHERILYN PEACE GARNETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
