Azeez v. DeRobertisAzeez v. DeRobertis
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Nordberg
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
NORDBERG, District Judge.
Plaintiff Qaid Rafeeq Azeez brings this
pro se
action pursuant to
Plaintiff, a prisoner assigned to Stateville since August 31, 1982, maintains that the defendants’ failure to comply with the grievance procedure mandated by Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative
Plaintiff’s first contention is that the defendants violated his state constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s next contention is that defendants have violated his first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The defendants’ actions have not, however, barred plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). His ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial process. Plaintiff therefore alleges no facts to support his claim that defendants have violated his first amendment right to petition for redress.
Plaintiff’s third contention is that the defendants have violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights. Under this theory, plaintiff contends that a liberty interest giving rise to due process protections springs from the Illinois statutes which created the prison grievance procedure. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.1982), rejects this theory. A liberty interest within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment is a substantive interest of the individual. Id. at 1101-02.. Although state created procedural protections may be evidence of a parent substantive right, they do not in themselves trigger a protected liberty interest. Id. at 1102.
Illinois, by statute, has created a prison grievance procedure which entitles inmates to present their complaints to the prison officials. But the grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the Board’s failure to process plaintiff’s grievances as required by A.R. 845 is not actionable under
Plaintiff’s final contention rests on equal protection grounds. In order to establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must show intentional or purposeful discrimination. See Bloomenthal v. Lavelle, 614 F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir.1980). Purposeful discrimination implies that the decision-maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and “selected his course of action for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on the identifiable group.” Shango v. Jurich, supra at 1104.
Even with the liberal construction accorded
pro se
pleadings under
Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any invidious classification resulting from the Board’s failure to act on his grievances in accordance with A.R. 845. He has not alleged any set of facts implying purposeful, intentional discrimination in the Board’s processing of grievances. An in
Finding that the allegations of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss and directs that judgment be entered in their favor.
Notes
. A.R. 845 is set out in full in Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 831-32 app. (7th Cir.1978).