34 Neb. 210 | Neb. | 1892
This is a proceeding in error to the district court of Dakota county, where the cause was heard before Judge W. F. Norris, upon a proceeding in error to the board of county commissioners of that county.
The facts disclosed by the record are that a petition was presented to the county boai’d of Dakota county, asking said board to call an election for the purpose of voting upon the question of the relocation of the county seat of Dakota county. The application was resisted by a remonstrance of what was shown and claimed to be more than two-fifths of the legal voters of Dakota county, and the remonstrants filed their answer, setting up and alleging that the petition was insufficient, and denying that the persons whose names were set out in the answer, and were attached to the petition as signers, were legal voters of the county, the number of the names alleged to be fraudulent being 201, and the names being set out in the remonstrants’ answer. It was also alleged in the answer that thirty-six persons and more had signed the petition more than once; the names of the thirty-six known to have done so were set
It appears that a supplemental petition was filed and also an answer to it was presented, containing practically the same denials and averments, setting out the names therein attacked, by proper schedules attached thereto.
The record states that thereupon the board proceeded to consider the petition and remonstrance, calling two from the petitioners and two from the remonstrators and others as needed, and then took up for consideration the supplemental petition; and now, at this time, on motion of the remonstrators that the names on the supplemental petition that appear on the remonstrance be stricken therefrom and not counted for the petitioners, upon consideration of which the same was overruled, to which ruling the remonstrators duly excepted for the reason stated by them
The board found that there were 1,028 names signed to the petition and seventy-nine names to the supplemental petition, making in all 1,127, and that. 841 of these were legal voters; 286 of the 1,127 names were rejected. If the claim of the plaintiffs in error can be proved in full
there were names procured by fraud..................... 150
There were names procured by bribery.................. 200
There were illegal voters................................... 201
There were those that did not comply with the law... 50
There were those that signed more than once........... 30 There were those that signed both remonstrance and petition .................................................... 35
There were those that signed the remonstrance since signing the supplemental petition ..................... 40
706
Sec. 1, art. 3, ch. 17, Comp. Stats., provides: “Whenever the inhabitants of any county are desirous of changing their county seat, and upon petitions therefor being pre
The petition must be signed by resident electors of said county equal in number to three-fifths of all the votes cast in said county at the last general election, and in addition to such names shall state the section, township, and range on which, or the town or city in which, the petitioner resides, together with his age and time of residence in the county. The evident purpose of these provisions is to identify every petitioner so as to protect the bona fide residents of the county. The latter being permanent residents of the county may reasonably be supposed to be anxious to promote its welfare either by the removal of the county seat when deemed necessary or in any other respect; therefore only resident electors have any right to sign such petition. Persons who are stopping temporarily in the eounly are not resident electors within the meaning of the
In regard to the alleged bribery of voters it may be well to say that our laws are designed to secure the free and voluntary expression of the electors at every election. To secure this every form of bribery is frowned upon by the courts; and the fact that the election is for the relocation of a county seat, instead of calling for a relaxation of the rule, renders it important that no corrupt means be sanctioned which would or might have a tendency to prevent the voluntary expression of a part or all of the electors. As was said in Herman v. Edson, 9 Neb., 156: “The whole course of our legislature is against every species of bribery or inducement of that nature at elections. What would be thought of a candidate for a public office who should promise the electors $3,000, or any other sum, in case of his election? And does it make any difference that the candidate is a town contending for the county seat instead of an individual seeking an office? It may be said that the location of a county seat at a particular point will enhance the value of property at that place sufficiently to enable the citizens to offer a' bonus as an inducement for its location. But may not a candidate for an office say with equal propriety that if he secures his election his income will thereby be increased so that he will pay each voter a specified sum ? The cases do not differ in principle, but merely in the mode of compensation. Then, if a candidate for a county seat may offer a bonus of $3,000, why not $30,000, or a still greater sum? The intention
Reversed and remanded.