Aрpellant Leroy Ayers and appellee Dorothy J. Carter were divorced in 1974 after having been marriеd for one year. They began to see each other again in 1976, but terminated their relationship in Octobеr 1977. Appellee subsequently sued appellant to recover money which she alleged she had loаned appellant during their renewed relationship, to obtain reimbursement for charges appellant had purportedly placed on appellee’s credit card, and to recover the value of certain property of appellee’s which appellant had in his *681 possession. Through a counterclaim, appellant sought possession from appellee of an ivory box valued at $2,0Ü0. Appellant was awarded the ivory box, and seeks reversal of the $15,200 judgment awarded appellee by the jury. We affirm.
1. Appellant urges as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial on the general grоunds. There was evidence presented at the trial from which the jury could conclude that, when appellant experienced financial difficulties, appellee loaned him money and he agreed to repay her as soon as he sold certain equipment. Appellant admitted that he had used appellee’s credit card and identified as his the signature which appeared on several of the chаrge receipts, but disputed the amount appellee alleged he had charged. Without objectiоn from appellant, appellee introduced evidence of charges exceeding $700. Finally, there was evidence that appellant had taken various articles of appellee’s personal property. From this evidence, the jury could properly render the verdict it handed down.
2. In Enumeratiоns 2 through 5, appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence from the jury by refusing to allоw appellant to inquire into appellee’s present marital and employment status.
Every party has the right to a thorough and sifting cross examination of the witnesses called against him. Code Ann. § 38-1705. However, the trial сourt may restrict the scope of the cross examination to matters relevant to the issues being tried, аnd results of the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless the discretion was manifestly abused.
Clifton v. State,
3. During the cross examination of appеllee, appellant’s counsel also attempted to place before the jury an allegеd prior inconsistent statement made by appellee in a 1978 deposition. The trial court sustained appellee’s objections to the attempt, and appellant now complains that the trial cоurt erred when it excluded this evidence from the jury and thereby again denied appellant his right to a thorough cross examination.
“A witness may be impeached by contradictory statements made by him as to matters relеvant to his testimony and to the case ...” Code Ann. § 38-1803. However, that part of appellee’s depositiоn which appellant attempted to use at trial was not contrary to appellee’s trial testimony. In both, appellee testified that she had requested appellant to repay part of the lоan before they had *682 terminated their relationship in October 1977. Since the prior statement appеllant wished to introduce to impeach appellee did not contradict appellee’s testimony, the trial court did not err when he excluded it from the trial.
4. In Enumerations 8 through 16, appellant asserts that the triаl court erred in admitting into evidence photocopies of various checks written by a savings and loаn association to appellee (one of which checks named appellant as payee) and checks written by appellee to various retailers. Appellant maintains that the exhibits shоuld not have been admitted because they were photocopies and were not the “best evidеnce.”
Code Ann § 38-710 provides that photocopies made in the regular course of business to presеrve permanently by such reproduction the original writing may be admitted without accounting for the original.
Cox v. State,
Judgment affirmed.