122 Ky. 580 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1906
Lead Opinion
OPINION op the Court bt
— Affirming.
Tlie appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and its principal place of business is situated in Chicago, Ill. It is engaged in the business of buying, transporting, and selling railroad ties in different parts of the country. In 1903 the board of supervisors of Ohio county, Ky., assessed omitted personal property against appellant amounting $12,500, and to enjoin the appellee, the sheriff of Ohio county, from collecting the tax due on said assessment, this action was brought. It is
In Johnson v. Bradley-Watkins Tie Co., 120 Ky., 136, 85 S. W., 726, 27 Ky. Law Rep., 540, and Ayers & Lord Tie Co. v. Keown, Sheriff, 89 S. W., 116, 28 Ky. Law Rep., 201, it was expressly decided by this court that personal property, situated in this State and owned by a nonresident of the State, is subject to taxation within this State. As appellant has a chief office and place of business in the State at Paducah, in McCracken county, proceeding upon the theory that personal property followis the residence of the owner, it is contended that all its personal property is taxable there, and therefore the taxing authorities of Ohio county, in attempting to list and tax its personal property in that county, Were acting out of their powers and jurisdiction. When the owner resides in this State, whether a corporation or an individual, the general rule and the one followed is that his personal property is taxable at the place where he resides. Grates v. Barrett, 79 Ky., 295, 2 Ky. Law Rep., 218; Wren v. Boske, 72 S. W., 279, 24 Ky. Lew Rep., 1780; Langdon-Creasey Co. v. Trustees, 116 Ky., 562, 76 S. W., 381, 25 Ky. Law Rep., 823; Com. v. Union Refrigerator Co,, 118 Ky., 131, 80 S. W., 490, 26 Ky. Law Rep., 24. But this rule has no application to the question here raised, which is that the personal property in this State of a foreign corporation must he assessed for taxation at the place in this State where its chief office and place of business is situated. This position is entirely untenable, and is not sustained by any authority that we have discovered. If the principle that all personal property followed the
The principal question made by appellant in this case is that these ties, at the time they were assessed for taxation, had been placed in the hands of a common carrier for the purpose of shipping them out of the county, and that they were then 'on their way to foreign ports. In an exhaustive and able discussion of this question in the case of Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S., 517, 6 Sup. Ct., 475, 29 L. Ed., 715, where the
"We regard the rule laid down in this case as the correct one, and as controlling the question involved in the case at bar; but a careful reading of the petition as amended discloses that it does not state facts that come within the principle announced in this case. It is true that the petition avers that “the ties had been taken from the woods and placed in the hands of a common carrier for the purpose of immediately shipping them out of the county, and that they were, on said date, on their way to foreign ports; that as many of them as were on said date within the limits of Ohio county were there only temporarily on their journey from the woods to foreign States, for the purpose of being loaded on barges on which they were to be carried to their destination outside of the
We are. therefore of the opinion that the petition does not state a cause of action, and that the demurrer to it was properly' sustained; and the judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing
Response to petition for rehearing.
A pleading must be construed against the pleader. The allegation of the petition that the ties had been taken from the woods and placed in the hands of a common carrier for the purpose of immediately shipping them out of the county must be read in connection with the other allegations of the petition to the effect that the ties were checked only temporarily on their journey to foreign States for the
Under the allegations of the petition appellant might have sold the ties while waiting’ for the barges to be loaded on, or it might have changed its plan and shipped them to some point in this State. There is nothing to show that appellant had lost control over the property, or that it had started finally on its journey out of the State.
Petition overruled.