Defendant Kroger Company (Kroger) appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court’s November 14, 2002, postjudgment order awarding plaintiffs, Raad Ayar (Ayar) and Vincent, Inc. (Vincent), statutory interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013 on an earlier June 24, 2002, order awarding costs and mediation sanctions. 1 We reverse.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs, Ayar, Vincent, Joliet, Inc., and R & D Wholesale, Inc., filed a complaint alleging various contract and tort claims against Kroger and Foodland Distributors (Foodland) on October 7, 1993. Livonia Holding Company, Inc. (Livonia), was later added as a defendant by stipulation. The trial court’s April 27, 1998, judgment followed a jury trial and found Kroger individually liable in the amount of $20,481,434 with regard to Ayar’s contract (right-of-first-refusal) claim and Kroger and Foodland jointly and severally liable in the amount of $9,441,801 on Ayar and Vincent’s intentional (silent) fraud claims. On August 20, 1998, the trial court entered a second judgment, which found *107 Livonia jointly and severally liable on the intentional fraud claim in its capacity as a partner of Foodland.
Kroger, Foodland, and Livonia appealed the judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded for a bench trial with regard to Foodland’s liability to Vincent on the intentional fraud claim only. See Ayar v Foodland Distributors, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 21, 2000 (Docket No. 214293). Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment on June 21, 2002, that reduced the joint and several liability of Kroger, Foodland, and Livonia to $674,680.26 with respect to the fraud claim. Without explanation, the trial court also held Kroger individually liable to Vincent (as well as Ayar) for an additional $6,200,149.74 on the same fraud claim.
On June 24, 2002, the trial court entered an order awarding costs and mediation sanctions to Ayar and Vincent in the “total amount of $555,275.00 plus statutory interest, if any, to be assessed,” of which $381,752 was allocated to Kroger and $173,523 was allocated to Foodland and Livonia. On November 14, 2002, the trial court entered an order stating that prejudgment interest on costs and mediation sanctions pursuant to MCL 600.6013 would accrue from the date the complaint was filed (October 7, 1993).
II. STANDARD of review
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo.
Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
III. ANALYSIS
Kroger argues that statutory interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013 should accrue from the date the trial court awards costs and mediation sanctions, not the date the original complaint was filed. MCL 600.6013 was amended in both 2001 and 2002, and these amendments were effective in March 2002. The most recent amendment enacted, as part of
(1) Interest is allowed on a money judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in this section. However, for complaints filed on or after October 1,1986, interest is not allowed on future damages from the date of filing the complaint to the date of entry of the judgment. As used in this subsection, “future damages” means that term as defined in section 6301.
(8) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (5) and (7) and subject to subsection (13), for complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, interest on a money judgment recovered in a civil action is calculated at 6-month intervals from the date of filing the complaint at a rate of interest equal to 1% plus the average interest rate paid at auctions of 5-year United States treasury notes during the 6 months immediately preceding July 1 and January 1, as certified by the state treasurer, and compounded annually, according to this section. Interest under this subsection is calculated on the entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney fees and other costs. The amount of interest attributable to that part of the money judgment from which *109 attorney fees are paid is retained by the plaintiff, and not paid to the plaintiffs attorney. [Emphasis added.]
The purpose of prejudgment interest is “to compensate the prevailing party for expenses incurred in bringing actions for money damages and for any delay in receiving such damages.”
Phinney v Perlmutter,
The provision for attorney fees and costs was added to MCL 600.6013 by
The 1993 amendment of MCL 600.6013 confirms that interest may be imposed on attorney fees and costs. The pertinent language in the 1993 amendment has been carried forward into the most recent amendment, and it evidences an intent to impose interest on attorney fees and costs. It confirms that interest accrues from the date of the complaint and is to be calculated on the entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney fees and other costs.
Morales, supra
at 491-492;
In Morales, supra at 489, the Supreme Court considered the defendant’s argument that prejudgment interest should not accrue during a four-year period while the case was on appeal because the delay was not the defendant’s fault. The Court stated that MCL 600.6013(8) “confirms that interest accrues ‘from the date of filing the complaint’ and that it ‘is calculated on the entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney fees and other costs.’ ” Morales, supra at 491. The language of MCL 600.6013(8) clearly and “unambiguously states that prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date the complaint is filed” and “makes no exceptions for periods of prejudgment appellate delay.” Morales, supra at 489, 492. “In the face of the Legislature’s clearly expressed intent, this Court will not read such an exception into the statute.” Id. at 492. Because the issue in Morales concerned interest accrued during appellate delay, and the instant case *111 involves interest calculated before mediation sanctions were awarded, Morales is distinguishable.
This Court has recognized several exceptions to awarding interest from the date of filing the complaint under MCL 600.6013. See generally Phinney, supra at 541. A majority of the Michigan Supreme Court concurred with Justice RlLEY’s opinion in Rittenhouse, supra at 218, that the purposes of MCL 600.6013 are not furthered by allowing interest for periods during which “no claim existed against the defendant.” Phinney, supra at 541. In Wayne-Oakland Bank, supra at 22-23, this Court upheld the trial court’s award of interest on costs and attorney fees from the date of entry of the order that dismissed the complaint, instead of the date of filing the complaint.
In
Pinto, supra
at 312, this Court relied on
Wayne-Oakland Bank, supra
at 22-23, and held that prejudgment interest may be awarded on fees assessed pursuant to mediation sanctions. The Court held that “the trial court did not err in awarding interest on the award of costs and fees from the date of the entry of the order that awarded the costs and fees until the date of satisfaction.”
Pinto, supra
at 312. Neither
Pinto
nor
Wayne-Oakland Bank
controls the instant case because they were issued before April 1, 1994, the effective date of
In
Univ Emergency Services, PC v Detroit,
In
McKelvie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
Such an award exceeds the purpose of compensating for a delayed payment, overcompensates for the related litigation, and departs from the purpose of providing an incentive for prompt settlement by both imposing a penalty upon the defendant and conferring a favor upon the plaintiff. Such a result was not permitted at common law, and we are not persuaded that the Legislature intended such a result under § 6013. [McKelvie, supra at 339.]
This Court applied the
McKelvie
rationale in
Beach v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co,
Although the allegations in the formal complaint filed in 1993 formed the basis for mediation, the mediation sanctions award did not exist when the formal complaint was filed. “That the Legislature intended plaintiffs to be compensated for periods during which no disputed claim even existed against the judgment debtor strains credulity.” Rittenhouse, supra at 218 (RILEY, J.). Hence, at the earliest, the date of filing or service of the request for costs under MCR 2.403(O)(8) would be the proper date for accruing statutory interest. But actual costs that may be awarded under the mediation rule include (1) taxable costs and (2) a reasonable attorney fee determined by the trial judge for services necessitated by the rejection. MCR 2.403(0(6). Because a judicial determination is required, we conclude that a claim for interest on mediation sanctions does not arise until the trial judge enters its order awarding sanctions.
The trial court’s award authorizes interest for a period during which there was no fund in existence upon which to calculate interest. We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended such an illogical result *114 under MCL 600.6013. McKelvie, supra at 339. Accordingly, the trial court erred in providing that statutory interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013 on the mediation award accrues from the date the original complaint was filed, October 7, 1993. Statutory interest on the mediation award should instead accrue from the date costs and mediation sanctions were awarded, June 24, 2002.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the November 14, 2002, order providing that statutory interest on the award of costs and mediation sanctions accrues from the date the original complaint was filed. We remand for entry of an amended judgment that provides for accrued statutory interest from the date costs and mediation sanctions were awarded, June 24, 2002. Kroger is awarded taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219(A) as the prevailing party in this appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
MCR 2.403 was amended in 2000 to substitute the phrase “case evaluation” for “mediation.” We will use the term “mediation” because the mediation in this case took place in 1995. In general, this Court applies the version of MCR 2.403 in effect at the time of mediation.
Haliw v Sterling Hts,
Justices Ryan, Levin, and Boyle concurred with Justice Riley’s opinion regarding the prejudgment interest issue, making it a majority opinion. Id. at 219-220.