Awadelkariem v. State

Appeals ade- I the Court of to show a As believe tended when it concluded relevancy of the evi- quately addressed plan. scheme or common 404(b), I not remand Rule would dence under proposition, I believe for the second As I dissent on that issue. for consideration relevancy that the threshold determination join opinion II otherwise Part and by need is not the State’s relative affected Court. (or thereof) Even if in for the evidence. lack true, Montgom it said in some cases as we McCORMICK, P.J., and MANSFIELD (Tex.Crim. ery WOMACK, JJ., join. and App.1990) rehearing), that deter (opinion exclusively a function mining relevance is not it logic, I think that in most cases just that. It not take much for

will be does have

evidence be relevant —it need consequence

any tendency a fact of to make probable. or less Whether State

more logical the evidence does not affect

needs act relation between extraneous AWADELKARIEM, E. Husham issue, nonconformity purpose although it Appellant, probative whether the value well affect substantially outweighed of such evidence is Hence,

by prejudicial effect. its The STATE of Texas. needs the evidence is not a consider State No. 0570-97. Rule ation under Rule 404 but under 403. Texas, Appeals of Criminal Court of by At least some the cases cited Banc. En my majority position. seem to (Tex. Morgan v. June Crim.App.1985), involving a case admissibili ty of extraneous acts of sexual assault

children, disposed the court of the relevance “[Wjhere thus, guilty intent knowl

edge an the offense essential element of prove must to obtain a con State

viction, materiality saying.” goes its disputed question involved the admissi evidence, not relevance.

bility of the but (Tex.Crim.

Prior v. similarly,

App.1983), the admissi discussed

bility of еxtraneous acts when intent was testimony about the offense

established case, however,

itself. There is not

slightest suggestion that the ‍​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‍acts extraneous irrelevant.

were says that “evidence

So when the alleged touching

tending to show mistake would not be accidental yet if has to make

relevant the defendant accident,” disagree.

claim It is relevant tendency to make fact

because (intent) probable.

consequence more Such under Rule

evidence be inadmissible it is not irrelevant. but Nation, Dallas, D. appellant.

John Horn, Jeffrey L. Asst. Van State’s Attor- Austin, Paul, ney, Attorney, Matthew State’s for State.

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW KELLER, Judge, opinion delivered the McCORMICK, Presiding the Court in which MANSFIELD, PRICE, Judge, and WOMACK, Judges, joined. HOLLAND and question presents This case of whether' power a trial court has the to rescind an a new tidal. Past cases have held that the trial court does not have that power. petition discretionary re- view, the State contends that those cases should be and that overruled this Court recognize should a trial court’s to re- scind the a new agree. trial. We I.

Appellant pleaded guilty to the indict- right jury ment and to a waived his trial. On trial, 21, 1994, December after a bench appellant guilty trial court found charged passed case offense. The was 20, 1995, punishment. On March the sen- held, tencing hearing and the trial probated an eight-year assessed term and a $1,000 day, fine. On the the trial court granted appellant’s motion for new trial. La- ter, however, crossed out the signature on the order the motion notation, and added the “No action taken on this order.” April On court conducted a hearing on the for new trial. At motion hearing, explained that it had pursuant the motion for new trial agreement appellant appellant plead adju- guilty would and receive deferred dication and trial court crossed out that the cited We statutes adopted. signature previous on its order because rеneged agreement: appellant had indicated those statutes concluded that eight regular you years sentenced “ought to be Thereafter, your you at-

probation. explained the Id.1 We regarded as final.” day and torney came before me the same bringing in a defen- difficulties theoretical me, you your plea, asking changed if mo- the court to reconsider you dant before the giving Inot would consider that And noted discussion, Id. we tion for new trial. you pre- After some deferred. including and many jurisdictiоns, I Oklahoma me for trial and sented the motion new California, any granting action y’all had held that sign did on the condition that that that go magistrate’s final. Id. We also stated going to the a new trial was were before other states guilty, which find no authorities from plea court and enter at we could okayed grant fact a new gone I had ahead and the a trial court to permitted that would, mag- I been you that had authorized the new trial had trial after motion for years plea eight istrate to de- enter that the overruled. Id. We conceded .Thereafter, y’all I ferred... understand a motion new grant to trial after for go magistrate. did not the At that before the might imply overruled trial had been point my granting I the rescinded granting of a power to the converse rescind for new that the motion trial. And new trial. Id. only I reason rescinded. reason not elaborate The cases that followed did day signed the motion that ’ cases, reasoning. In two old on Matthews changing plea and you your to facilitate Matthews, further we relied magistrate entering going the and comment, attempts to rescind overturn plea guilty, you do. which did not State, 51 trial. Jones v. granting of a new Therefore, I rescinded the order on (1907); Parte Ex Tex.Crim. S.W. and let it in the motion stand Alexander, 89 S.W.2d Tex.Crim. you place as of time I sentenced (1936). Then, English years probation. to eight (Tex.Crim.App.1980), we distin- Relying upon Tex. Matthews guished that case Matthews (1899) subsequent Crim. S.W. 368 “judicial” than errors rather authorities, Appeals the Court held In at 955-956. clerical errors. possess the trial court did not English, the order the motion to rescind an order a motion for inadvertently by the signed new trial was 05- new trial. Awadelkariem No. judge. at We held that trial Id. 95-00779-CR, slip op. (Tex.App at 7 . —Dal trial court could set aside such las, April 1997)(unpublished). The State at 956. We overruled made mistake. Id. progeny contends Matthews and that it could be con- the extent should be overruled. holding. English, in conflict with our strued re- passing, In we also 592 S.W.2d at 956. II. had followed marked that Matthews not been Matthews, court set aside an trial recently opinions following Mat- granting a motion because and did not set out thews were terse misapprehen- under a order “was made setting aside underlying facts complained of.” 50 S.W. sion of evidence granting new trials. Id. of the orders reversed, holding that at 368. This Court Drewery, Subsequently, Parte had to set aside Ex no (Tex.Crim.App.1984), ad- explained that, we although its order. We cases, attempt by trial to rescind had such in civil dressed courts three months after it no that rule a new trial more than could find criminal case which place.” Id. We among provisions trial had taken cited was a wаs before 1. Included concerning significance provision special the effect no accorded statutory for new trial: "The effect of a new trial provisions motion apart other cited. from the place position the cause the same granted.2 had been upon English We relied Rodriguez, a new trial. proposition for the “long that we have held disagreed 518. We with the Court of that a trial court cannot rescind an order Appeals’ assumption that mistrials and new granting a new trial absent clerical errors.” But, trials were the same. we also Drewery, 677 emphasized S.W.2d at 536. We opined same, even if were the language in then Article 40.08 of the Texas Matthews prohibit did not the trial court’s Code of Criminal Procedure “that the effect Rodriguez, actions. 852 S.W.2d at 518. of a motion for new trial is to failing We criticized Matthews for to cite place position the cause in the same noif ” any authority holding. of its Rod- trial had ever place taken and stated that riguez, addition, 852 S.W.2d at 519. In the statute nowhere judge authorizes a trial ’ remarked that Matthews ‍​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‍contention that the to rescind the granting of a motion for new statutes required to new trials trial. Drewery, (emphasis 677 S.W.2d at 536 holding was “far from Rodriguez, obvious.” original). at S.W.2d 519. We noted that much of again We upholding made statements language statutory provisions those validity of the Matthews doctrine in Moore v. had been carried over into our current rules State, 749 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). appellate procedure, explained but we that case, In that the trial court attempted to “nothing in language purports even rescind an granting order a new trial due to address the trial court’s or lack of insufficient evidence. Id. at 56. We cited authority to granting rescind an order a new Drewery, English, and Matthews for the trial.” Id. at 519 n. 4.3 We stated that proposition errors, that “absent clerical á Moore, English, and Alexander all failed to granting cannot rescind an order give any further rationale for the Matthews Moore, new trial.” 749 S.W.2d at 58. We Rodriguez, rule. at 519. S.W.2d And held, however, also that granting of a specifically distinguished Moore as involv- new trial in grounds that on of insuffi- jeopardy double considerations. Rodri- evidence, cient was equivalent the functional guez, 852 Finally, S.W.2d at 519. we criti- acquittal, of an causing juris- the trial court’s cized being Matthews for out of line with the lapse diction to jeopardy under double princi- jurisdictions that have addressed ples. Id. at 58-59. Rodriguez, the issue. 852 S.W.2d at 519. years later, Several the Matthews’ doc- We concluded “without a expla- better trine Rodriguez came under fire in why nation a trial court not rescind (Tex.Crim.App.1993). trial,” an order a new we would not Rodriguez, granted the defen- ’ extend, by analogy, during dant’s mistrial motion the middle of setting. Rodriguez, mistrial at trial. Subsequently, Id. at 517. the trial 519. court withdrew its order. Id. The Court of Appeals Subsequent Rodriguez, commented, held that the trial court did not have passing, rescind its order that “absent clerical errors a trial (1) mistrial because a trial court’s court cannot alter order orders a new trial granting a mistrial functionally was outside plenary power” indistin- the time of its guishable trial, from an “any attempts to rescind” an order (2) Matthеws, under court did upon judicial new trial “based not have the Bates, to rescind an reasoning” must fail. State v. 12, 1983, granted January The new trial Granting a new trial restores the case to its attempted and the trial court to rescind that position including, before the former trial May order on 5. Id. at 534. The trial court's option party, arraignment pre- of either rescinding reason for the order was that it did proceedings party; initiated jurisdiction- grant not have the new trial. prior regarded conviction shall not be as a We hеld that the trial court did in fact have presumption guilt, nor shall it be alluded to jurisdiction. Id. at See 534-537. argument presence jury. or in This is now found at current Rule 21.9 (1995), Tex.R.App. 3. Former P. 32 in effect at the minor, with nonsubstantive revisions. trial, appellant provided: a new concerning the effect of appellate rule (Tex.Crim.App.1994). This designed may simply granting a simply an illustration discussion in Bates was sequence of parties of the pro to inform the power to nunc of a trial court’s issue prevent jury and to proceedings to fоllow way did tunc orders and not relate by knowledge of the being influenced case. See id. a resolution of jurisdic- prior other proceedings. Several Moreover, Bates did not even mention Rodri- statutory language have tions with similar guez. See Id. Supreme Court of this view. The taken wording of similar Indiana held that statute III. accused. protection as was intended precedent We should not overrule presumption of provision, legal By this conducting a lightly. reexamination of When or weak- innocence could not be overcome precedent, should take into account the “we knowledge that there had ened underlying interests of stare decisis: against him. been a verdict right.” Often it is better be consistent than 663, 190 Ind. N.E. (Tex. Hefton Malik v. (1934). opinion, Later in its Crim.App.1997). Those interests have much recognized power of re- trial.court however, force, precedent itself less when the granting a so scind produce consistency. fails to Id. When older term. Id. The the court acts within the same precedent newer deсision conflicts with a held that Supreme of Kansas likewise Court reasoned, soundly that to more is found prevent a trial court provision such a did not may inconsistency we resolve the in favor of rescinding granting a new soundly the more reasoned decision. See trial: State, 529, Castillo 913 S.W.2d was, specifi- purpose provision The (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(overruling Caldwell v. of the second cally, to forestall abatement (Tex.Crim.App.1991) 818 S.W.2d 790 jeopardy, and plea trial on a of former due to its conflict with Garrett generally, any inoperative to render (Tex.Crim.App.1993)). Although occurring purpose anything done or at the nearly important consistency not as as within no The has reference first trial. system, the criminal the achievement of har during of the term to the the court mony precedent between criminal and civil term, the and contem- over the work of may determining also be considered what plates orders new trials those rule to fashion. See Clewis ultimately become orders 126, And, (Tex.Crim.App.1996). S.W.2d final subject. the reject in determining whether to a retain law, particular may rule of we consider 553, Luft, 104 Kan. 179 P. State v. justifications proffered added). for the rule (1919)(emphasis passage been undercut with of have the time. are mindful of the maxim We Malik, (justification See at Legislature the intends the presume doctrine based fed BensonIBoozer to a same construction to continue jurisprudence eral constitutional undercut Legislature the meets without statute when adopt the failure of federal circuit the overturning State v. Har that cоnstruction. repu specific doctrine and the Fifth Circuit’s dy, (Tex.Crim.App.1997). as diation of that doctrine a rule of federal applies maxim whether the construction That law). constitutional judicial judicially- or a at decision a (judicially promulgat promulgated rule rule. beginning the the Matthews has From of Evidence 509 as con only rule much The ed Rule Criminal been a without basis. repealing the Medical justification for the rule struction of statute clearly articulated eases). applies it criminal Drewery, although imрlicit Practices Act as (given perhaps Matthews) concerning recognize that the rule granting a new trial We also is that granting a trial was a new pretrial its status and the effect of restores the case to But, long pursu restoration, for a time. no con- codified statute after such there is Constitution, Legisla- However, the Texas the language the ant to viction to reinstate. delegated rule-making ture of application most au- criticize the the rule in its of even thority concerning appellаte procedure logical original implication context. of 518; Hardy, criminal cases this Court. Rodriguez longer is that Matthews is no Const., 31; Code, § Tex. Art. Rodriguez Tex. Gov’t good open law. While did leave § appellate our Although 22.108. rules possibility maintaining the of the Matthews “abridge, enlarge, modify” litigant’s precedent (by distinguishing line of mistrials rights, Hardy, trials), substantive see at 518 and seriously from new undercut 22.108(a), § finality we find that of an desirability doing so. Just as Garrett cast proce- Caldwell, new trial purely is a viability continuing doubt on the Hence, question. durаl this has Court free Rodriguez so also doubt on the continu- cast reign relating or revise a viability create rule of Matthews. subject, legis- presumed and there is no Moreover, the Matthews rule creates respect. Any lative intent to construction of split jurisprudence civil between criminal and former Rule Appellate Procedure 32 that good doing so. reason for Even finality of an concerns a Matthews, recognized that our implicates principle stare Further, diverged practice. from сivil rules; judicial decisis as it relates to Supreme recently recog has Texas Court weighty statutory more concerns that, under Rules of nized Civil Proce interpretation present. are not dure, vacate good The case at is a example hand trial so such action occurs consequences adverse can from the flow day period the 75 that a trial within hampers ability Matthews rule: rule a motion for trial is overruled before parties and the trial court to make operation Corp. of law. v. Carril Fruehauf arrangements. plea If the upheld rule is lo, (Tex.1993)(citing will be reluctant (d)). courts 329b(c) According Supreme & post-judgment agreements, consider even Court, by supported practical such a rule was appropriate, seem such where because justifications recognized by similar us agreements not be While could enforced. today: flexibility plea judgment the revise after Denying the trial the court may significant many not seem other as for reconsider its own order new trial dur- justice sys- issues that the arise in criminal 75-day needlessly period the restricts tem, reducing flexibility plainly seems court, unnecessary litiga- the trial creates unnecessary in persuasive the absence of tion, and is with the notion inconsistent justification according finality for in plenary power vested inherent granting of a motion new trial. courts. might Stare decisis nevertheless Further, regarding the the time rules unnecessary rule where it con- has been very limits for new trial are similar motions sistently applied. present But the systems. The in both the criminаl civil and First, several inconsistencies exist. the Mat- provide: civil rules power thews court conceded that the to re- original event an or amended mo- the overruling consider the of a motion for new modify, motion to tion for new trial or a might also indicate to reconsid- judgment correct or reform a is not deter- such a er motion. But that by signed mined written within sev- order apparently v. court overlooked Gonzales judgment enty-five days after State, 62, (1897), 38 41 Tex.Crim. S.W. 605 by signed, it shall be considered overruled possessed trial court which held that a operation expiration peri- of law on of that overruling power to set aside an order od. motion for new trial when the defendant 329b(c). provi- Tex.R. Civ. P. The criminal complained being about the order decided sion is similar: Second, his absence. 605-606. Id. at (1) applied setting, is court shall not mistrial Time to Rule. The deter- fact, opportunity harshly days trial within 75 we took the mine motion for new

727 (Ind.)(vacating of or Hefton, cited imposed suspend- previously after date sentence is or term); Luft, occur within same open ed in court. der must (Kan.)(if with cited order vacated previously grants or extension in same term trial (3) timely not Failure to Rule. ‍​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‍A motion term); Fine v. at another to reconsider order signed determined written 252, Commonwealth, 44 N.E.2d 312 Mass. by op- judge shall be considered overruled Beath, 473, (1942); People 277 Mich. v. 659 upon expiration period eration law (1936)(if within order is vacated 269 N.W. 238 (e)(1) prescribed of time in section of this Cimino, time); People v. 163 reasonable rule. (2 217, Dept.1914); A.D. 147 N.Y.S. 1079 31(e).4 P. Tex.R.App. sub- Former Larkin, 516, App.3d v. Ohio State is stantive difference between these rules (1 Dist.1996); Ussery v. N.E.2d 906 time for civil runs from period that the cases order is (Okla.Crim.App.1988)(if P.2d judgment “signed” when while the time); reasonable State vacated within period for criminal cases runs from when Oren, (1993); 245, 627 A.2d 337 Unit 160 Vt. judgment “imposed suspended open (5th Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961 Cir. ed States , Compare the court.” two rules cited above. 1979), denied, 935, cert. U.S. 100 S.Ct. Likewise, periods ap- perfecting the time 2151, (1980); 64 L.Ed.2d 787 United States v. (both peals pending with and without a mo- (4th Arrington, Cir. 757 F.2d trial) tion for new are identical both the 1985). couрle jurisdictions A have ex system except criminal and civil for the event to rescind a pressly allowed a periods (signing from which those time run have indicated that mistrial order and suspension judgment imposition versus reasoning new trial orders also. sentence). Compare former Rule Thompson, Ill.App.3d People v. 41(a)(l)(now 26.1) Rule Rule former (5 Dist.1976); N.E.2d 481 Christian 41(b)(l)(now 26.2). Rule the similar- We find (1987); Md. 522 A.2d 945 Alston v. ity just in both sets of rules to be more than (1992)(ex- Md.App. A.2d 72 harmonizing a coincidence. While criminal tending regard with Christian’s jurisprudence and civil have seemed mistriаls to rescind an allow decided, very important when trial, so as that similarity today’s between criminal and court). term of action occurs within argues civil rules new trials greater convergence in how for new motions jurisdictions A few conclude that Supreme po- trial are handled. The Court’s generally authority court has no to rescind a persuasive weight in sition carries Fruehauf granted. motion for trial that been concerning hand. the issue at held that Supreme The Delaware Court has that, authority

Finally, point no unless out when Matthews court has such decided, mistakenly or weight authority ap of ordered in was 99, argue ability 28 Del. peared against advertently. Naylor, to a trial court’s State v. 90 (1913). not allow a of a new trial. This A. 880 California does rescind grant opin made in the or denial observation was reconsider Levi, But, today weight authority ap a motion for new trial. Ex Parte 39 ion. (1952). 41, 403, pears run in the Most P.2d 405 n. other direction. Cal.2d permit jurisdictions expressly generally does not a trial addressing the Florida an order a new trial allow а trial court rescind the court vacate if the order permit acts in does such action trial —at least if the but Weller, misrepre People as a of fraudulent timely fashion. See v. 679 obtained result (Colo.1984); v. Bur to the trial court. State P.2d 1077 Britain v. sentations (Fla.1975). ton, 136, 137-138 Loui (Ala.Crim.App.1988); So.2d 684 Bowen So.2d (1977); prohibits of an order reconsideration 239 Ga. 238 S.E.2d siana 21.8, changes. current Rule which is the The is minor, except for some nonsubstantive granting a new trial legal question that is “final” but allows here —where does a trial court prevent thе State to such an order from derive its to so act?

becoming by applying stay. final for ‍​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‍a State Dial, (Tex. In Garcia v. 596 S.W.2d 524 Bullock, (1972). 263 La. 269 So.2d 824 Crim.App.1980), suggested pow a court’s er to specific act must be authorized Hence, we conclude that the Mat source: rule, having thews always question rested on foundations, power viable, able Unless the or longer is no of a court to espe perform cially light contemplated in holding Rodriguez. of our in act can be found Nevertheless, issue, the Constitution or ap our review of laws enacted there- our rules, under, pellate jurisdiction it is without Supreme the Texas and its acts Court’s pronouncement, validity. and the in other jurisdictions leads us to conclude that a time surely But this is too narrow a view power limitation must exist on the to rescind require would be seem to lawmakers a new trial appellate give order. The rules contemplate every permissible action a trial days trial court 75 judgment imposed after specifically provide take and for it. suspended open uрon court to rule We have recognized since in addition to motion for new trial. We hold that an order express grants power conferred consti granting or denying a motion for new trial tution, statute, law, or common courts have freely be rescinded so as such implied powers inherent and provide action occurs days provided by within the 75 much upon broader foundation which to act. (i.e., 21.8(a) (c)); the rules current Rule & Johnson, State v. 821 S.W.2d the extent that progeny Matthews and its (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(eitingwith favor Eichel were held to during period, this time (Tex. berger v. Eichelberger, 582 However, are overruled. after the 75 1979)). Implied authority specif arises day period expires, grants power. ic powers may Id. Inherent denying “final,” a new trial becomes “call[ed] aid the exercise of progeny Matthews and its control. jurisdiction, justice, in the administration of preservation or in the independence of its present Id.; integrity.” Eichelberger, 582 rescinded its order a new trial with 398-99; see also Matchett v. day in the period provided by 932-33 & fn. appellate Hence, rules. that court was act (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(daily application of law power doing within its so. duty judicia facts is and inherent judgment The Appeals of the Court of ry). reversed, judgment and the of the trial court heavily Rodriguez relies is affirmed. State, 852 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), that Matthews should MEYERS, J., a concurring opinion files so, doing they be overruled. In point to BAIRD, J., joins. Rodriguez’ express criticism of the rule in OVERSTREET, J., majority Matthews. The misses the more dissents. important assumption underlying the Court’s MEYERS, Judge, concurring. holding Rodriguez a court has in- —that agree I correct, vacate, with the that a trial modify, herent or words, rescind its order a new trial. rulings. amend its own In other so majority gives But while the policy long numerous by ruling as the court does not its divest action, reasons in jurisdiction of such statutory never itself of or exceed a explore table, only important what view as the simply change it can its mind on a Garcia, cause, 1. In citing court dismissed the indict- state the 40 Tex. Act, pursuant (1899), Speedy ment Trial then later Crim. 50 S.W. 368 the case over by reinstated the cause. We held that majority today, stating ruled "[t]he indictment, dismissal of the reasoning equal application the trial court lost has [Matthews] jurisdiction authority and thus had no to rein- before [case] us[.]” necessary ability so is ruling. do BAUDER, judiciary. Appellant. Eichel of an See parte

function efficient Ex Samuel berger, (citing 398 & fn. No. 0079-97. of cases where “Texas courts have dozens Texas, Appeals of Court of Criminal powers recognized or utilized inherent their En Banc. change, ... control set aside or otherwise judgments”). Certainly, their if the trial 10, 1998. June mistake, has it perceives it made ought in an effort to be able to correct itself potentially

to avoid a reversible error. regardless ease

And this is the for

a trial court has a motion new Nothing it. Court’s or denied suggesting be taken as should to a trial court’s reconsideration its

limited ability of a new trial. The to recon- limited, however, by ruling

sider its jurisdiction statutory

court’s retention of recognized by over the matter. As majority, ‍​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‍court’s to rescind days expires upon provided

its the 75 (trial the rules. PROC. 21.8 Tex.R.App.

court must motion with- rule on days suspending

in 75 imposing after sen-

tence). addition, jurisdiction a court’s

may, days, expiration before the filing appeal

severed of one of (defen- parties. Tex.R.App. Proc. 26.2 days

dant appeal; State has 15

days instance, perfect appeal). if For grants defendant’s motion timely appeals trial and the State days, order within 15 Tex.Code GRIM. PROC.

44.01(a)(3), juris- the trial court has lost its

diction over the cause and has no change ruling. comments,

With these I concur.

BAIRD, J., joins.

Case Details

Case Name: Awadelkariem v. State

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Jun 3, 1998

Citation: 974 S.W.2d 721

Docket Number: 0570-97

Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.