OPINION
The “going and coming” provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, § 59-10-12.-12, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1,1975 Supp.) is the subject matter of this appeal by defendants. The trial court аwarded a judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal. We affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant Pleasuretime Soda, Inc. as a manager of a retail soda pop outlet. She opened and closed the business. In addition to her usual duties during regular working hours, plaintiff closed the business and made nightly depоsits at a bank every working day. The bank was located at 1900 Bridge Boulevard, S.W. in Albuquerque, a point east of Coors Road and Bridge Boulevard. Plaintiff drove her own car at her own expense.
Defendant Pleasuretime’s business was located at 1248 Coors Road, S.W. Plaintiff’s residence was located at 425 65th Street, S.W., north of Bridgе Boulevard and west of Coors Road.
Just giving addresses cannot adequately describe the problem. To perform her after hours banking duty for her employеr, plaintiff had to drive north on Coors Road to Bridge Boulevard, then east on Bridge Boulevard to the bank and make the deposit for her employer. On her rеturn home, plaintiff had to drive west on Bridge Boulevard to Coors Road, north on Coors Road to a point at which she would leave Coors Road to drive hоme.
On the night in question, plaintiff made the deposit at the bank. After leaving the bank, she drove west on Bridge Boulevard. Prior to reaching Coors Road, the accident in question occurred.
Section 59-10-12.12, supra, reads in pertinent part:
As used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37], unless the context otherwise requires, “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment” shall include accidental injuries to workmen, . . . as a result of their employment and while at work in any place where their employer’s business rеquires their presence, but shall not include injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties . . . . [Emphasis added.]
The question for decision is:
Did plaintiff, driving west on Bridge Boulevard from the bank to Coors Road, suffer an accidental injury “while at work in any place where [her] employer’s business requires [her] presence,” or did the accidental injury occur after leaving the duties of her employment as provided by Section 59-10-12.12?
To answer the question rеquires an interpretation of § 59-10-12.12.
The assistance of counsel on this appeal has been displeasing.
It requires no citation of authority that the' Workmen’s Compensation Act must be liberally construed to accomplish beneficent purposes for which it was enacted, and that all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of employees.
In a concurring opinion in Cuellar v. American Employers’ Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
The situation of the workman on his way tо and from his duties had long been a no man’s land.
It still is.
The trial court found that defendant’s business required plaintiff to “deviate” from her route home to make the bank deposit. We agree. At the time plaintiff closed her employer’s business, she left the duties of her regular working hours at the place of business. She did not leave thе duties of her employment. These duties continued to the time she deposited her employer’s money in the bank and then returned to that point on the highway whiсh would constitute her normal route home and the termination of her duties of employment.
The area of “deviation” was on Bridge Boulevard from Coors Road to the bank and a return to Coors Road. It naturally follows that during the time plaintiff drove east from Coors Road to the bank and then drove west to Coors Rоad, plaintiff was at work at a place where her employer’s business required her to be.
If the facts in the case are termed a “deviation” or a “detour” for a business purpose, the business character persisted throughout the deviation until the plaintiff made her way back to the personal routе home. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law §§ 19.36, 19.37 (1972); see, Clark v. Electronic City,
Defendant relies on Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Services Dept.,
The trouble with many lawyers in the trial and appeal of a case is a failure to note whether certiorari has been granted in a case relied on. In Edens, supra, certiorari was granted and the ease reversed in Edens v. New Mexiсo Health & Social Services Dept.,
(1) The “special errand” rule is an exception to the “going and coming” rule. Each employee is covered under the Act during transportation to or from work so long as the travel was required at the direction of the employer.
(2) Where the historical facts of a case are undisputed, the question of whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of law.
In the instant сase, the historical facts are undisputed, and plaintiff performed a “special errand” every working day as a matter of law.
In Rinehart and McDonald, relied upon by defendant, the employee was injured after regular work had ended and the employee was on the way home. In Ross, the employee was on the way from home to the place of employment to assume the duties of employment. To these cases we may add, Martinez v. Fidel,
For other exceptions to the “going and coming” rule, see Sullivan v. Rainbo Baking Comрany,
We hold that the instant case is outside the “going and coming” rule.
Plaintiff was employed to perform a “special errand” every working day — the deposit of the employer’s funds in a bank after normal working hours. Here, there is less difficulty in concluding that plaintiff was acting within the scope of her employment.
Youngberg v. Donlin Company,
From an examination of the authorities which discuss the so-called special errand rule it appears that it has been applied where (a) there is an express or implied request that the service be performed after working hours by an employee who has fixed hours of employment; (b) the trip involved оn the errand be an integral part of the service performed; and (c) the work performed, although related to the employment, be speciаl in the sense that the task requested was not one which was regular and recurring during the normal hours of employment.
For cases which support the “special errand” rule, see: Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Commission,
In the instant cаse, plaintiff was at work at the place where her employer’s business required her to be. It was incident to the business. In addition, plaintiff falls within the “special errand” rule. From Coors Road to the bank on Bridge Boulevard, and plaintiff’s return to Coors Road on Bridge Boulevard, before beginning her trip home, plaintiff was acting in the scope and in the course of her employer’s business.
Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 as attorney fees on this appeal.
Affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.