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Avemco Insurance Company, and Lynn U. Goodfellow v. Cessna Aircraft Company
11 F.3d 998
10th Cir.
1993
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*2 BALDOCK, Corp., Before HOLLOWAY and & n. 1 SCM KELLY, (3rd Cir.1978); Judges. Corp. Circuit Republic Health instead, that, Fla., Inc., Hospitals of Lifemark required Cir.1985). “real interest” itself is the 17(a). at 20. This under Fed.R.Civ.P. applying prosecuted “every shall be rule states *3 law to address to state look

jurisdiction, we party in interest.” of the real in the name involving the na questions the substantive pay- full Thus, argues upon its Avemco rela scope the insurer-insured ture and the claim is Kasamis settlement of the ment Tompkins, 304 R.R. v. tionship. Erie See Goodfellow; rather, it is way to in no related 817, 822, L.Ed. 1188 64, 78, 82 58 S.Ct. U.S. alone. Avemco’s Co., 827 (1938); Prudential Pochiro Cir.1987). apply 1246, We 1249 contrary, To the Californialaw states that law. California paid an insurer who has a claim an required by 13(a) provides that insured whom it is contract to Fed.R.Civ.P. indemnify subrogated is to its insured's a counterclaim shall state as [a] to from a third who serving the at the time any claim which has contributed to the loss suffered any op- pleader has pleading the subrogated right insured. An insurer's is the transac- if it arises out of posing party, put position to be the loss which the insurer has both insured of its insured for subject mat- that is the tion or occurrence claim and opposing party’s does ter paid. words, and subrogee In other the insurer as adjudication pres- require for its not position stands in the same the court of whom ence of third assignee-in does an the shoes of the sub- jurisdiction. acquire rogor assignor. rule, compulsory if a counter- light this 872, Manor, Cal.App.3d 197 v. Parks Smith claim is later brought, (citations (1987) 256, Cal.Rptr. 243 Liquors, 417 Seal See Baker Gold barred. omitted). quotations California Under 1, 2506 n. 41 n. 94 S.Ct. 469 U.S. therefore, is derived Avemco's claim (1974); v. Beech Sams L.Ed.2d Aircraft Goodfellow, despite payment. Cir.1980). n. Corp., 625 F.2d argument respect is simi this Avemco’s that, argues as the insurer Avemco § 875 larly at with Cal.Civ.Proc.Code odds “opposing it is neither liability “a insurer who provides that therefore, and, al- “pleader” party” nor a liability of a discharged the by payment has accident, its though arising out of same judgment shall subro- debtor tortfeasor Aplt. compulsory. pay If right of gated to his contribution.” does, however, 11, 14. Avemco Brief at all removed ment of the whole insured, subrogee of its agree that it is the transfer rights which could the insured’s Brief, (undisput- Aplt. ex. atA Goodfellow. this and Parks subrogation, then both statute dismissal). court ed fact district order on the nothing confer Manor would “[ujnder such, principles, an insur- settled As However, step if the insurer is insurer. greater no than er as as if the insured of the insured into the shoes insured, its by its claims possessed those claim, Underwriters had see himself Liberty subject to the same are defenses.” Policy LHO Lloyd’s No. at Under Fales, Cal.3d Mut. Ins. Co. Storage Peerless (1973). 21, 24, P.2d Cal.Rptr. Cir.1977), laws then have California these opposing party in was an Since Goodfellow Thus, might have sue Avemco substance. litigation and the Barker answered 17(a), under in its name own 13(a) applies complaint, Rule third-party scope claim would doing but so and, by subrogation, to Avemco. him rights derived indemnification be limited to subrogation rela- that the argues paid the had the insured from the upon tionship ends settlement. Aplt. Brief settlement amount. disposes similarly of Avem- California does not insured Avemco contends pos- “never” argument that Goodfellow co’s asserting possess the claim which upon sessed the claim which Avemco sues. tion this, such as where the insurer has Aplt. Brief at 17. authority Cessna cites controlled the actions, defense both there applies counterclaim rule is little to commend allowing the insurer to pay insurers who the entire claim amount. idly by sit during subsequent litigation, that since the settlement was only bring separate paid directly by Avemco, and Avemco’s inter- very same defendant at a later date. ests protected, were therein these cases are Avemco also claims that applica this inapposite. argument, however, Avemco’s tion of Rule process. violates due It directly odds with Parks Manor. argues lack of notice. Avemco not had *4 approached Avemco has this issue as notice of the proceedings, however, but also though it has an independent right to indem was extensively involved in them. Avemco’s nification pure rather than a subrogation counsel the handled Kasamis settlement on right. This appears also to be approach the behalf of Goodfellow. Avemco was aware of of the dissent. The Second Circuit distin the later litigation supplied also guished types these two rights, however, of the same counsel. Under California law States, Great Am. Ins. Co. v. United Avemco’s claim is merely derivative of Good- (2d Cir.1978). F.2d 1031 The court held that fellow’s. already Goodfellow “day had his while indemnification sometimes arises from court.” Because the claim is derived independent contract with the third per though Goodfellowas he himself had son, an right insurer’s claim, and Avemco was involved in both ac subrogation entirely dependent on the tions, we find process no due violation. insurance contract. Great Am. Ins. Plaintiff further F.2d at 1034. that injection The situation this case is of of the existence of type. the latter Avemco insurance lacks an into an indepen insured’s tort prejudicial. case is dent While indemnification based on full this concern understandable, payment; instead, is easily remed- has succeeded to ied. right arising a solely from the insurance

policy. For the foregoing reasons the of result, As a we find no merit in Avemco’s the district court is argument that it had an independent rela- AFFIRMED. tionship with Kasamis. The Kasamis settle- ment arose directly out anof accident involv- HOLLOWAY, Judge, Circuit dissenting: ing the insured. Avemco’s involvement can I respectfully only have dissent. been on Goodfellow’s behalf. Therefore, California recognizes law majority The opinion correctly *5 proce Cessna,1 in federal partly proper vis-a-vis us into the issue before bring 17(a), Rule which deter applying in- dural law First, personal informal perspective. may in rights be asserted those against mines how passenger Kasamis

jury claim Brocklesby Transport v. East federal court. by settled was pilot Goodfellow (2d 131, Escort, F.2d 133 insurer, ern States release obtained awith Goodfellow’s Cir.1990) (“in gov cases federal Goodfellow, 27,1986, May for on name a lawsuit of in whose erns the issue Exh. at 14-18 App., C Appellant’s others. though law con brought, state even must settlement (hereafter App.). Avemeo’s right of an underlying substantive $102,500 trols the were dated Kasamis for checks Hall, recovery”); Garcia insured to The federal court 10, at 12. 1986. Id. June Cir.1980) (same). (10th 150, 152 n. 4 passenger other complaint of the 6, filed June was against others Cessna triggered subrogation had been Once (Barker’s against Good- separate suit 1986. Kasamis, Avemco’s settlement party was filed November and another fellow only Avemeo to assert permitted 1986.) A. Cessna’s 21, D and Id. Exhs. indemnity against “If Cessna. any claim for complaint against Goodfellowand party third loss an entire suffered indemnity Corp. was for Goodfellow party real it is the by the 24, August on 1986. Barker case first in its own name.” sue interest and must answer Exh. E. Then Goodfellow’s Casualty Surety & v. Aetna United States Sep- complaint was filed party third 207, 215, 366, 380-81, Co., 70 S.Ct. 338 U.S. 23, Exh. F. Id. at 1987. tember (1949); Electric Power Kansas 94 L.Ed. 942, Janis, Cir. 194 F.2d Co. v. it clear that chronology makes This before 1952) (“And pay the ... the insurers where against any claim was asserted in full loss and become subro- for the was called owners Goodfellow Goodfellow before rights thereto, owners to all of the gated responsive pleading to file a wrongdoer, alleged against any rights of Goodfellow subrogation of wrongdoer to recover alleged against the indemnity or otherwise in the name of must be tort maintained by operation of law. Thereaf- occurred had insurers”).2 Accordingly, at the time that only by possessed rights those were ter tortious appears against whose conduct subrogation third equitable The doctrine 1. loss”). See, caused the e.g., recognized. generally American Co., Fidelity Casualty F.2d at 9-10 and Hunt, cases (citing and federal 183 F.2d numerous state n. 1 2. See also Gas Service Cir.1950) (same); public liability Fidelity ‘‘[o]rdinarily showing when a American (same); Co., Krueger v. fully Casualty at 10 company reimburses its insured 179 F.2d insurance coverage policy, Cartwright, losses within the (same); Brocklesby Transport Eastern States subrogated to the of the insured becomes Goodfellow’s answer to Cessna s third Goodfellow with a defense to claims made filed, complaint was Goodfellow did not have against him, pursuant to its insurance con- against claim Cessna. Avem- tract. possessed eo fully subrogee. it as Moreover, because Cessna’s third Thus there was no failure against Goodfellow and not Avem- any state claim for violation of co, Cessna cannot be characterized as Avem- 13(a). requirement of Rule After subro- co’s “opposing party” in Barker within the gation operation occurred by Goodfel- 13(a). meaning of Rule This court has held low was not entitled to assert the counter- that “an ‘opposing party’ must be one who claim in his own name. American Fidelity asserts a claim the prospective coun Co., & Casualty (After 179 F.2d at 10. sub- ter-claimant in the first instance. very rogation, the insured “is not entitled to bring concept of a counterclaim presupposes the an action in his own name the third existence or assertion of a claim tortfeasor.”). And when Avemco as- party filing it.” First Nat. Bank Dodge serted its claim for indemnity in the instant City v. Johnson County Nat. B. & T. suit, there was no impediment defense or As stated in attached to that claim no such because de- Product, Nancy’s Inc. Inc., Meyer, Fred fense ever arose subrogor Good- 61 Wash.App. (1991): 811 P.2d fellow, who had not failed to assert a claim he could make Cessna. Although Words contained in court rules which are Avemco is standing in shoes, Goodfellow’s not therein should, defined like statutory Avemco cannot be saddled awith claimed *6 terms, given ordinary their mean- violation 13(a) Goodfellow Rule because ing. ... interpret To the term “opposing such a violation never occurred. party” in the context of the court rules so as to include a nonparty with an adverse Turning to the other federal rule involved interest is a sequitur. non We hold that 13(a) here, Rule compulsory any makes coun- an opposing party for purposes, of [Wash- terclaim “which at the serving time of ington Superior Rule] Civil pleader has any oppos- who one asserts a claim pro- ing party, if it out arises of the transaction or spective counter claimant in the in- first occurrence that is the matter of the claim_” stance. First Nat’l Bank v. Cy. Johnson opposing party’s (Emphasis add- ed). Nat’l Bank Trust plain The F.2d language of the rule pre- cludes holding a Avemco’s claim could Cessna and should have argue, To does, as Cessna implicitly been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim potential because Avemco was a party in the Barker Avemco was not the litigation Barker it required by was Rule “pleader” of Goodfellow’sanswer to Cessna’s (or join joined) in order for it to third party complaint against in its indemnity assert claim the Barker case. Goodfellow alone was. “really point assumes the it should be mak- “pleader” The term refers only to party “the ing. For it is in the event that [the asserting particular pleading.” Black’s relevant] claim in fact met (6th all the Law criteria Dictionary, p. 1990). ed. a compulsory counterclaim turn, term as “party,” in in person outlined means “a whose Rule designated name additional on must plaintiff record have or brought been added). defendant.” in (emphasis court had the coun- never Barker, a pleading requested.” in terelaimant so nor Mesker Brothers designated was it party. on record aas Iron Corp., In- Donata 401 F.2d stead, its sole (8th function provide Cir.1968) there was to (emphasis original). Servs., (same); Escort 904 F.2d at 133 general 6A Charles rale in the federal courts is that if Wright, A. Kane, Mary Arthur R. Miller & K. claim, Fed- insurer the entire it is the real (2d eral 1990) (“The Practice & Procedure 1546 ed. name.”). interest and sue in must its own asserting its from not barred now noted, not a As separate action. in this claim no under also was suit. Avemco in that earli to intervene compulsion to seek Wilks, 490 U.S. Martin

er case. Cf. 104 L.Ed.2d

763, 109 S.Ct. binding (“a

(1989) seeking a person to obligate that another Albany,

intervene....”); City Mann Cir.1989) (“The 999, 1005 2n. expressly in Martin opinion Supreme Court’s Bloom; GOTTLIEB; R. Thomas Feivel mandatory intervent regime of eschews Mott; Leroy Mott; Kim B. Marialice ion.”).3 joined had in fact Only if Avemco Martin; Rosemary Coles; Kirk Mar T. Barker suit joined as a been Cucarola, tin; on behalf Mark G. subject to conceivably have become would similarly situ and all others themselves 13(a). Montgomery of Rule the mandate Schonbrunn, ated; D. Plain and Albert Juster, Corp. v. Dev. Ward tiffs-Appellees, Cir.1991) (“Weigel potential awas joined prior who was defendant Dorothy Timothy L. Welch pleader qualify as a thus does Welch, Appellants, A. compulsory counterclaim purposes of the Bjordahl, 787 bar”); Corp. v. Dev. Ponderosa (“Although Goodman; Q.T. WILES; Gerald join present] defen Koenig; [the plaintiffs Hambrecht; Gary moved to Russell E. R. present] Risinger; pursue Planitzer; [the dants and to N. Patrick Paul E. Parker; suit, Schleibaum; motion was denied. Wil their C. the foreclosure Jesse J. Taranta; Lorea; Kenneth parties is attempt implead additional P. Owen An liam Perry; Huff; Hambrecht & a claim A. Warren materially different Quist 13(a).... Quist Group; Ven Hambrecht already existing party under *7 Lybrand; Partners; Coopers J.H. & ture plaintiffs’ claim defendants Because Whitney Co.; Whitney Associ J.H. & opposing party against an was not (Singapore); Lybrand ates; Coopers & compul not barred earlier is (Hong Kong); Lybrand Coopers Phoe & doctrine.”); Bir see sory counterclaim also (BVI) Q Limited; H & Ven nix Venture Winegardner mingham Fire Q C.V.; H & Ven International tures Inc., Hammons, Hambrecht, IV; William R. tures against parties (proposed claim the Hambrecht Revoca Trustees of impleaded did constitute Hambrecht, Trust; as Trust Sarah ble already opposing against an counterclaim Revocable the Hambrecht 1980 ees of party).4 Trust; Q.T. Joint Ven Wiles Investment stands, made a Inc.; was never I; As it R. ture J.F. Shea Q Rock; Timken; Its H Alliance Arthur Partners; Fund; Hamquist; therefore neither could Banner Crisp; Investments; Bryco H Peter O. of a com- should have nor been Corpora- Q Investors; Crisp Computer is pulsory therein general regard, follows the sup- policy In this majority opinion 3. The designed deprived person position; principle “a ports that Rule joinder proceeding in the same promote legal rights related claims in a his her designed litigation; to reduce and Rule party nor summoned to person neither a multiple litigation. dis- I threat of do proceeding.” City legal Jansen appear way they agree propositions, but in no these Cincinnati, Supreme ex- overcome fact mandatory regime inter- pressly “a eschewed vention” in Martin. notes subrogation relationship beyond the insurer’s governs state the substantive rights of payment of the claim. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code the parties in this Spe- 875; § Manor, Parks Cal.Rptr. at 258- cifically, opinion properly relates the ba- 59. Other courts presented with similar situ- sic principle state-law subrogee a stands ations also have followed approach. this See position the same assignee as an the—“in Employers Casualty Mut. Hanshaw, v.Co. subrogor shoes assignor.” Slip op. (Iowa 1970); N.W.2d Firemen’s opinion at 4. The essentially adopts Cessna’s Bro., Co. v. L.P. Steuart 158 A.2d conclusion that since insurer as (D.C.1960); Casualty General Co. v. greater has no rights than subrogor Fedoff, 11 F.R.D. (S.D.N.Y.1951). because Goodfellowfailed to assert as coun- Policy supports also this application of the terclaim the claim for or contribu- 13(a) rules. Rule designed promote (now tion asserted Avem- joinder of co) related claims in litiga- the same response to Cessna’s third party com- 17(a) tion. Rule is similarly designed plaint, is now barred Federal reduce the of multiple threat litigation Rule Civil Procedure from asserting single defendant based on the same that same claim indemnity or contribution occurrence parties. between the In a situa- Cessna. Brief Appellee at 13-15. in the Barker not a The conclusion. the latter disagree I 13(a) only re- suit Cessna. conse ignores syllogism majority’s any claim quired assertion subrogation to earlier quences Cess- he answered when that Goodfellowhad indemnity claim of Goodfellow’s “A complaint. shall third na’s Kasamis. The upon Avemco’s any claim which a counterclaim on state state premised are rights here substantive pleader pleading the serving the the time rules procedural dispositive But law. party-” any opposing .against has ... solely from federal are derived here added). 13(a) (emphasis Rules impact of specifically Procedure. of Civil Federal Rules turns on identification question Our first Casualty Co. v. All Fidelity & American See assert who could party in interest: the real Lines, Bus American against Cessna when indemnity claim . Cir.1950) third answered bemay answer The complaint him? accurately outlines majority opinion subrogation which partly in the law help- found It is underlying appeal. this facts relevant substantive points determines however, basic ful, to focus on these

Case Details

Case Name: Avemco Insurance Company, and Lynn U. Goodfellow v. Cessna Aircraft Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 15, 1993
Citation: 11 F.3d 998
Docket Number: 92-4149
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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