AMY AVALOS, CHELSIE CARTER, SHELBY HUGHES, MARCELLA MADRID, MARGARITA MELENDEZ, FRANCINE SIMMS, JEAN SMITH, and ANGELA CAVENDER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, in its capacity as the body politic for NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY and DOÑA ANA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
NO. 35,251
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
July 26, 2017
Jerry H. Ritter Jr., District Judge
Opinion Number: ___________
Treinen Law Office PC
Rob Treinen
Albuquerque, NM
Almanzar & Youngers PA
Joleen K. Youngers
Las Cruces, NM
The Pickett Law Firm LLC
Lawrence M. Pickett
Las Cruces, NM
for Appellees
Miller Stratvert P.A.
Cody R. Rogers
Luke A. Salganek
Las Cruces, NM
for Appellant
SUTIN, Judge.
{1} Plaintiffs are a group of former students who were enrolled in Doña Ana Community College’s associate’s degree nursing program (the program) in 2012. When Plaintiffs enrolled in the program, written documents provided by the Doña Ana Community College stated that the program was nationally accredited by, among others, the National League of Nursing Accrediting Commission (the Commission). Before the students completed their studies, the Doña Ana Community College lost its Commission accreditation and Plaintiffs sued. They brought an action that included a claim for breach of contract against the Board of Regents of New Mexico State University in its capacity as the body politic for the university and Doña Ana Community College (collectively, Defendant).1 Defendant sought summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, arguing that it was immune under
DISCUSSION
{2} Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim alleged that “[a] written agreement existed between Plaintiffs . . . and [Defendant] . . . whereby [Defendant] agreed that it would provide a nationally accredited education in nursing in exchange for [Plaintiffs’] enrollment and tuition.” Plaintiffs asserted that they entered into a valid written contract with Defendant for a nationally accredited nursing program as evidenced by (1) the offer letter that they received from Defendant that offered admission to the program and required a written response accepting or declining a position in the program; (2) a student handbook that included a statement that information about accreditation of the program could be obtained from the Commission and included a ledger that stated, in relevant part, that the program was accredited
{3}
{4} The parties discuss several cases in which our appellate courts have considered the application of
{5} In Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, 1996-NMSC-029, 121 N.M. 728, 918 P.2d 7, our Supreme Court considered whether a personnel policy that set forth “certain rights, expectations, obligations, and other promises between the [employer] and its employees” constituted a valid written contract such that the plaintiff’s governmental employer could be held liable for breach of an employment contract. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. The plaintiff sued for breach of an employment contract after he was demoted, which resulted in a reduction in pay. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. In analyzing the case, our Supreme Court first noted that although an employment contract for an indefinite period of time is terminable at will, New Mexico recognizes implied contracts as an exception to the at-will rule. Id. ¶ 10. The Court determined that the employer’s personnel policy contained “provisions relating to most every aspect of an employment relationship, including job description, compensation (including salary on promotion, demotion, or transfer), overtime, compensatory time, time clock violations, tardiness, sick leave and annual leave, and holidays.” Id. ¶ 12. And the Court recognized that the policy was part of an implied employment contract because “it controlled the employer-employee relationship and [the plaintiff] could reasonably expect [the] employer to conform to the procedures it outline[d].” Id. ¶¶ 11-13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court then held that, under the particular facts of Garcia, the implied employment contract, which was based on terms set forth in a personnel policy, constituted a “valid written contract[,]” and thus immunity was waived for such claims under
{6} In Espinoza v. Town of Taos, 1995-NMSC-070, ¶ 1, 120 N.M. 680, 905 P.2d 718, the plaintiffs sued the defendant for breach of contract after the plaintiffs’ child was injured at the defendant’s day camp. Our Supreme Court considered whether the breach of contract claim based on the plaintiffs’ written application to the day camp was a valid written contract that waived governmental immunity under
{7} In Ruegsegger, 2007-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 4, 17, 21-22, this Court considered whether athletic scholarship agreements and a student handbook created a valid written contract under
{8} In Ruegsegger, this Court first analyzed the scholarship agreements and held that the scholarship agreements required the plaintiff to maintain acceptable academic performance, play basketball, and comply with university regulations, and in exchange, the university was obligated to provide the plaintiff with scholarship assistance for her education. Id. ¶ 19. According to this Court, the scholarship agreements made “no reference to any duty on the part of [the university] to comply with any . . . regulations or to investigate claims of harassment, sexual assaults, or any other misbehavior by other students[,]” and thus, the agreements could not form the basis for the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Id. ¶¶ 18-20.
{9} The Ruegsegger Court next analyzed the provisions in the student handbook to determine whether there was a claim for breach of implied contract. Id. ¶¶ 21-37. In analyzing the handbook, this Court assumed without deciding that
{10} The handbook in Ruegsegger contained:
(1) a student code of conduct and sanctions that [could] be imposed against a student who violate[d] the code, (2) a description of academic standards and procedures that [would] be used when considering the imposition of sanctions for poor academic performance and appeal of those sanctions, (3) a provision for a disciplinary committee that [would] hear[] cases involving student discipline without specifying the type of hearings that should be conducted except to recognize a student’s right to due process, (4) a drug and alcohol policy with specified procedures for any student who violate[d] the policy, and (5) a general nondiscrimination policy.
Id. ¶ 25. It also contained a section regarding the student appeals committee, a sexual harassment policy, and a section titled “response to an alleged sexual assault,” which outlined a procedure for the university regarding its response to sexual assault allegations. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
{11} The Ruegsegger Court held that the provisions in the handbook did not contractually guarantee rights to specific types of investigations, support, and sanctions in the event of a sexual assault, but rather provided guidelines. Id. ¶¶ 30, 33. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiff had cited to a number of cases in which courts across the country have held that the relationship between students and postsecondary educational institutions is contractual, but differentiated those cases from Ruegsegger on the ground that those cases involved claims by students that the institution had “breached promises relat[ed] to academic matters or access to
{12} In Campos de Suenos, ¶ 1, this Court considered whether to expand the analytical framework of Garcia, which allowed implied-in-fact contracts to be considered valid written contracts, outside of the employment context. In Campos de Suenos, the plaintiff began negotiating with the defendant for the sale of a ballpark. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. At a public meeting, members of the defendant’s commission voted in favor of purchasing the ballpark. Id. ¶ 3. However, in the months following that meeting, the parties were unable to negotiate a proposed sales agreement and no written contract was ever executed by the parties. Id. Eventually the defendant decided not to move forward with the purchase. Id. Although the parties never entered into an express written contract for the sale of the complex, the plaintiff offered “a slew of partial writings as evidence of its contract with the [defendant].” Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Specifically, the plaintiff pointed to “transcripts of meetings, staff summaries, and the like[.]” Id. ¶ 23. This Court held that allowing the plaintiff to “cobble together a contract in such a manner undermine[d] the purpose of having a comprehensive document,” i.e., “a valid written contract” as required in
{13} In the case now before us, Plaintiffs recognize that “[o]rdinarily, to be legally enforceable, a contract must be factually supported by an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent.” Garcia, 1996-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). They argue that a contractual offer and acceptance is evidenced by the offer letter and the representation that the education provided would be a nationally accredited nursing education as evidenced by statements in the handbook and supported by the handbook acknowledgment form. Plaintiffs assert that whether the statement in the handbook regarding accreditation is sufficient to allow a breach of contract claim does not impact contract formation but rather impacts only breach of contract and contract interpretation, and therefore
{14} We begin by noting our disagreement with Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant’s
{15} We hold that the offer letter, the handbook, and the handbook acknowledgment form do not constitute a valid written contract under
{16} The offer letter—which Plaintiffs argue evidences offer and acceptance—does not mention accreditation, the handbook, or the handbook acknowledgment form. The offer letter is similar to the application to the day camp in Espinoza and the scholarship agreements in Ruegsegger. In both cases, the appellate courts rejected the plaintiffs’ respective breach of contract claims because the writings, at best, created contracts that were not implicated by the plaintiffs’ particular breach of contract claim. See Espinoza, 1995-NMSC-070, ¶ 15 (holding that the defendant “did not undertake contractual obligation for liability” for damages by virtue of the plaintiffs’ day camp application because the language in the application simply ensured space in the program); Ruegsegger, 2007-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 18-20 (holding that the scholarship agreements could not form the basis of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because those agreements did not obligate the defendants to investigate sexual assault claims but rather simply required the plaintiff to maintain acceptable academic performance, play basketball, and comply with regulations, and in exchange, the defendants were obligated to provide the plaintiff with scholarship assistance). Here, the offer letter, at best, evidences an agreement that Plaintiffs would or intended to enroll in the program. It does not, however, evidence an agreement to provide a nationally accredited education.
{17} We also reject Plaintiffs’ argument that there exists a contract sufficient to waive immunity because it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to expect contractual rights based on the handbook and the handbook acknowledgment form. See id. ¶ 24. Although Plaintiffs argue that “nothing need be implied to show there exists a written contract that the education to be provided will be a nationally accredited education[,]” this “reasonableness” argument is an implied contract argument similar to the argument made in Ruegsegger. See id. ¶¶ 4, 22 (construing the plaintiff’s breach of contract argument based on the student handbook as an implied contract argument).2 As noted earlier, in Ruegsegger, we held that, based on the language in the student handbook, the plaintiff could not reasonably expect that the defendants would be obligated to perform a comprehensive investigation and provide her with more support after she disclosed the alleged assault to officials. 2007-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 24, 30. And although we suggested that the outcome of the implied contract analysis in Ruegsegger might be different in cases involving academic matters, we noted that the inquiry would center on what was reasonable. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.3
{19} Plaintiffs’ assertion that the offer letter can and should be read in tandem with the handbook and the handbook acknowledgment form does not alter our holding. As stated earlier, the documents are insufficient to create a valid written contract on their own, and our conclusion that there is no valid written contract for Defendant to provide Plaintiffs with a nationally accredited education is not altered merely by reading the multiple, insufficient documents together. Moreover, although a contract can consist of several related writings, see Crow v. Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co., 1995-NMSC-018, ¶ 29, 119 N.M. 452, 891 P.2d 1206, we reiterate our concern that allowing Plaintiffs to “cobble together a contract in such a manner [would] undermine[] the purpose of having a comprehensive document,” i.e., “a valid written contract” as required in
CONCLUSION
{20} As to Plaintiffs’ contract claims, Defendant is immune under
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge