Automotive Finance Corporation, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Bernard Kayiji, Appellee-Defendant.
Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CC-1393
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
November 16, 2022
Bailey, Judge.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable James A. Joven, Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 49D13-0909-CC-041482
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Joshua W. Casselman
Rubin & Levin, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert A. Garelick
Stephanie Maris
Cohen Garelick & Glazier
Indianapolis, Indiana
Case Summary
[1] Automotive Finance Corporation (“AFC“) appeals the trial court‘s grant of a
[2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Bernard came to the United States in 1990 as a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following his arrival in the United States, Bernard met Raymond Ohani (“Raymond“) who was also a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Bernard and Raymond became acquaintances and would see each other periodically. Both Bernard and Raymond initially resided in Washington, D.C., but Bernard eventually moved to Virginia. In 2006 or 2007, Bernard purchased a vehicle from S.O.S. Motors, Inc. (“S.O.S. Motors“), which was owned by Raymond. According to Bernard, he never had any subsequent involvement with S.O.S. Motors and was not an owner, officer, director, or employee of the dealership.
[5] On September 8, 2009, AFC filed a complaint against S.O.S. Motors, Raymond, and Bernard (collectively, “Dealer“) in Marion County for the following: Count I, breach of note and security agreement; Count 2, breach of guaranty; and Count 3, “victims of crime: deception and fraud.” Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 34 (emphasis removed). According to the complaint, Dealer had “defaulted” on the loan and owed AFC “the unpaid balance due,” which equaled $83,349.42.
[6] Bernard received a copy of the complaint at his home on September 12. Since the complaint also named Raymond and Raymond‘s business, Bernard approached Raymond about it. Bernard stated to Raymond that Raymond had “used [Bernard‘s] name wrongly, unjustly, and without authorization.” Tr. at 13. And Bernard asked Raymond to “do the right thing” and “remove [Bernard‘s] name” from the lawsuit. Id. Raymond “took [the] papers” and “promis[ed] to do the right thing.” Id.
[7] Based on Raymond‘s assurances, Bernard did not respond to AFC‘s complaint or otherwise appear in court. As a result, on March 10, 2010, AFC filed a motion for default judgment against S.O.S. Motors and Bernard.1 On March 11, the court entered a default judgment against S.O.S. Motors and Bernard. In particular, the court ordered S.O.S. Motors and Bernard to pay AFC $146,496.93 under Counts 1 and 2, which figure represented the amount owed plus interest, late fees, and attorney‘s fees. The court also ordered S.O.S. Motors and Bernard to pay the “treble sum” of $121,853.79 under Count 3. Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 81.
[8] Thereafter, in 2012, Bernard learned that his wages were being garnished in Virginia as a result of the default judgment. In December 2013, Bernard filed a report with a police department in Washington, D.C., for identify theft and fraud; however, the police did not take “any action.” Tr. at 16. Then, in August 2014, Bernard filed a complaint against AFC and Raymond in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and asserted that he had “never signed” the contract and that AFC had “illegally obtained” his name and address. Ex. at 15. The court “dismissed” Bernard‘s complaint. Tr. at 29. Bernard then filed a complaint against AFC in a Virginia state circuit court in July 2017 for
[9] On December 8, 2021, with the assistance of counsel, Bernard filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
[10] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on Bernard‘s motion on February 1, 2022. At the hearing, Bernard testified that, while there is a “likeness” of his signature on the dealer application, he “did not sign” the application. Tr. at 23-24. He then testified that he believed Raymond had obtained his signature when he purchased the car from Raymond. He also testified that the social security number listed next to his name on the dealer application was not his. Similarly, while he acknowledged that a “likeness” of his signature appeared on both the Agreement and the Guaranty, he testified that he “did not” sign either document. Id. at 41-42. He additionally noted to the court that “the contract [was] signed on October 16, 2007” but it was “presented to the notary public, who signed and notarized it, on October 17.” Id. at 43. Bernard also presented as evidence the articles of incorporation for S.O.S. Motors, which do not name Bernard as an incorporator.
[11] Following the hearing, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. In particular, the court found that “Bernard‘s evidence supported his testimony that his signature on the Application, [Agreement], and personal guaranty was not placed there by him in that he did not sign the documents and was never an officer, director or shareholder of” S.O.S. Motors. Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 22. The court then found that, while Bernard‘s attempts to challenge the garnishment proceedings were “misguided,” the attempts “demonstrate his determination to obtain relief from the default judgment.” Id.
[12] Based on its findings, the court concluded that “both extrinsic fraud and an unconscionable plan or scheme existed to influence the court to issue a default judgment against Bernard[.]” Id. at 25. Specifically, the court stated that “Bernard presented substantial evidence that the debt owed to [AFC] was the result of fraud” and that the “unconscionable scheme was furthered by Raymond, who indicated to Bernard that he would handle the lawsuit for Bernard.” Id. The court also concluded that Bernard had presented a meritorious defense. As such, the court
Discussion and Decision
[13] AFC contends that the court abused its discretion when it granted Bernard‘s
Whether to grant a motion for relief from judgment under
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is within the discretion of the trial court, and we reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Jo.W. v. Je.W, 952 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id. When we review a trial court‘s decision, we will not reweigh the evidence. Id.
RAB Performance Recovery, LLC v. Knight, 174 N.E.3d 228, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
[14] Here, Bernard filed his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
[15] It is clear that the crux of Bernard‘s claim is that Raymond had committed fraud. Thus, we agree with AFC that Bernard‘s motion, while framed as a motion under
[16] However, a court may only grant relief from a judgment under
[17] Further, a
[18] In any event,
An independent action can be brought within a reasonable time after the judgment and must allege either extrinsic fraud or fraud upon the court. . . . While intrinsic fraud involves perjury or falsification of documents, extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court require more than just the presentation of evidence that is false. Extrinsic fraud is best characterized as fraud outside the issues of the case, and may be found where the alleged fraud prevented a trial of the issue in the case or improperly procured the exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction. Fraud upon the court, while similar to extrinsic fraud, has been more narrowly limited to include only the most egregious of circumstances where an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court‘s decision, and such acts prevented the opposing party from fully and fairly presenting his case.
[19] Bernard contends that an independent action for fraud exists because Raymond “indicated to Bernard that he ‘would take care of the case and get Bernard out of the case‘” and that he “reasonably relied on Raymond‘s statements” to believe that he did not need to appear or respond to the complaint. Appellee‘s Br. at 21. And Bernard asserts that he “has not had the opportunity to have his case heard on the merits because of Raymond‘s actions and unconscionable scheme to keep Bernard from presenting his case[.]” Id.
[20] But even if we were to agree that Raymond engaged in an unconscionable scheme to defraud Bernard, we cannot agree that Bernard has made a claim for extrinsic fraud or fraud upon the court. Indeed, while Bernard asserts that he has not had the opportunity to have his case heard, that was the result of his own choices. Raymond‘s assurances to Bernard that he would get Bernard removed from the case in no way precluded or prevented Bernard from responding to AFC‘s complaint or otherwise appearing in court. In other words, none of Raymond‘s actions “prevented a trial of the issue in the case” that is required for extrinsic fraud. Jo.W., 952 N.E.2d at 786. Similarly, Raymond‘s assurances to Bernard, while false and misleading, did not “prevent” Bernard “from fully and fairly presenting his case” such that fraud upon the court exists. Id.
[21] Rather, it is clear that Bernard‘s motion pled intrinsic fraud, which “involves perjury or falsification of documents[.]” Id. Indeed, Bernard‘s motion alleged that Raymond had falsified documents when he used Bernard‘s signature without his permission. And an “allegation of intrinsic fraud is governed by
[22] We sympathize with Bernard that Raymond may have forged his signature without his permission to enter into a contract on which Raymond later defaulted. We further sympathize with Bernard that he trusted Raymond, as a fellow refugee, when Raymond said that he would get Bernard out of the lawsuit. But that does not change the fact that Bernard did not follow the proper procedures as outlined by our Trial Rules. Bernard did not appear or otherwise respond to AFC‘s complaint. And Bernard neither filed his motion for relief from judgment based on fraud within
Conclusion
[23] Because Bernard‘s claim was in essence a claim under
[24] Reversed.
Riley, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.