*1 tío. 5lf v. Próksch Áutio Í966] CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. AUTIO PROKSCH Court. Compensation—Rights, Remedies, and Procedure— Workmen’s 1. Curing Defects—Courts. compensa- Rights, remedies, procedure under the workmen’s provides, being as tion act are such and such the statute by legislative necessary cured rather than that defects be (PA Sess], as judicial pronouncements Ex No [1st amended). Same—Piling 2. Claim—Limitation of Actions. provides compensation claims for bene- The workmen’s act fits thereunder must be filed within 6 months after occurrence injury, physical incapacity, of the but event of or mental injury, disability, incapacity develops and where the actual or given injury employer more than months after of which notice, years (CL the claim must be 411.1 filed within § seq., amended). et Same—-Piling Actions—Report 3. In- of Claim—Limitation jury. employee
The within which an must file a elaim time limitation against injured does not run for workmen’s employee dependents, employer had or his where the timely knowledge injury report but filed no notice injury department (CL 1948, §412.15). [1, [2, [5-8] [10] [9] [12] 3,11] Am5 20 Am Jur 20 Am Jur 20 Am Jur Am 58 Am Workmen’s Jur Jur, 2d, References 2d, 2d, Jur, 2d, Appeal Workmen’s Courts Courts Courts and Error § §§ § 194. Compensation 198. Points Compensation 186. § 1009 et Headnotes § seq. 26 et §§ seq. 409. 377 Statutes—Hardship. oe 4. Same—-Construction not, by judicial legislation, write into may Supreme The legis- provision aet the workmen’s enact, the misfortune so as to relieve fit to lature has not seen hardship. may awork the law in a class of someone *2 Statutes-—Legislative Silence—Over- oe 5. Courts—Construction ruling Cases. previous has made as to may properly a error it A court correct by overruling earlier ease interpretation of a statute ex- cases, by subsequent enactment unless the prior judicial construc- plicitly recognizes of the correctness tion. 6. Same—Stare Decisis. discretionary stare decisis The doctrine of is a rather than an appellate obstinate rule of conduct declares that precedent adhere to save when eourts should consideration to firm conviction that the earlier decision or decisions leads more, less, injustice unjust, rather than are and that will flow perpetuation found to be from of that which is erroneous. Injury—Limitation Compensation—Hand 7. Ac- Workmen’s oe Injury—Filing op Injury—Report tions—Notice oe oe Claim— Overruled Cases. Employee right who suffered the loss of the industrial use of his injury during hand as the result of a 1952 his em- sustained ployment defendant, injury timely of which defendant had loss, report notice but failed to file an accurate was compensation not disentitled to for sueh loss reason of compensation the faet that his claim for was not filed until Sajduk Inc., June, 1961, Copper Brass, overruling v. Revere thereon, being and other eases based the cause proceedings. remanded for further Opinion.
Dissenting Black, op Courts—Correction Erroneous 8. Precedents—Workmen’s op Compensation—Limitation Actions. may regarded hy he as an which That erroneous determination imposition period filing a the claim, limitation a of of of compensation against employer workmen’s an for injury plaintiff had had notice an to the hut claimant report, upwards had not a which determination was made filed years previously, hy legis- is a matter SO correction v. Proksch Construction hy wholly prospective be, lature; then is not to hut such if overrulement. Costs—Overruling Precedent. 9. proceeding to workmen’s com- are recover No costs allowed filed, belatedly overruling pensation where on a claim years’ standing precedent is involved. over SO Courts—Precedents. dignity construing approach act an does One decision interpretation. a well-settled
Dissenting Opinion. Kelly, JJ. Dethmers Compensa- Compensation—Proceeding Recover 11. Workmen’s tion. proceeding he workmen’s should com- A recover act within under the workmen’s menced period injury not tolled sustained, the time the from (CLS hy employer report accident file failure of 1961, §412.15). *3 Cases. 12. Courts—Precedents—Overruled compensation overruling interpreting the workmen’s The cases during rendered act the decisions were some after legislature and period the the act has been before hy judicial legislation many times would amount amended fiat. Compensation Appeal from "Workmen’s
Appeal No. (Calendar June 1965. Board. Submitted Decided 1966. 51,042.) April Docket No. for his claim workmen’s
Arthur Autio presented compensation against benefits Company Mutual Insurance Company Liberty a hand. injuries by appeal Benefits denied and remanded. appeals. Plaintiff Reversed board. Wisti & Jaaskelainen W. (Sterling Sckrock, for plaintiff. counsel), 517. compensation act1 The workmen’s Souris, within constitutes discrete enclave
this State
law.
departure,
workmen’s
law is
“The
by
provisions speak
procedure
law,
from the common
and its
statute,
subject.
all
intended
procedure
Rights, remedies, and
thereunder are such
provides.
If the statute
such
statute
prevent
is
of what it should contain
order to
short
injustice,
legis
must be cured
future
defects
by judicial pronouncement.” Luyk
lation and
Hertel
*4 The act for limitational within brought provides which claims must be and also running periods of such limitational shall employer, having timely tolled until the notice of employee’s injury, injury report files a department with the workmen’s with prescribed period.2 Ordinarily in a a claim for compensation must be made within six months after injury, the occurrence physical but in the event of incapacity or mental to make a within claim, three-year regaining capacity. six months after limitational A provided period where the “actual injury, disability, incapacity” develops more than employer injury six months after the of which the given principle notice. with the Consistent supra, Luyk, and the time enunciated limitations in the has held that the act, contained application general statute of limitations3 has no brought under the act. Bankers Trust claims (1932), Detroit v. Tatti Jelusich as 1952, § 27A.5801 2 See, currently, [1] amended). (Stat PA See, currently, § 411.1 [1912] Ami 1965 Cum et eí seq.). (1st seq., Ex CLS CLS as amended Sess), Supp 1961, §412.15, No § § 17.165). 600.5801 10, (Stat as amended Ann 1950 Rev as amended et seq. (Stat (CL § Ann 1962 Rev [1948] 17.141 PA and et CLS seq., No Autio Co. op the Court. (1934), Mich Lumber Land & Wisconsin 313, acknowledgment
Notwithstanding its nominal applicable general of limitations is statute the to Hajduk compensation claims, Court workmen’s Copper Brass, Inc. & v. Revere judicially, imposed anal Mich ogy, nevertheless period six-year claims. such limitational a sight employee plaintiff lost the ease In that eye an result of 1922, as the October, left his department found The accident. industrial plaintiff employer timely no given defendant had injury, had the latter nonetheless but tice of failed injury. compensable report In to file a by defendant, discharge year May, after his a department of labor plaintiff filed a claim with compensation industry for loss was awarded and argued eye. claim that the Defendant his general limitations. statute of barred 223): (p said The Court has no general of limitations statute “While th¿ depart- application because case in the instant pro- industry not a court is
ment of labor and yet can con- ceeding action, we not an before why a limit not be there should reason ceive of no proceeding for which a of time within time must be That limit of should be commenced. by analogy one, which statute a reasonable years. Cruse will to be be deemed six of limitations (23 Chicago, Co., 138 Kan 117 P2d I., & P. R. v. 471).” R. opinion had noted Earlier in its the Court speci- provision fact, which, of the act cited above proceeding “a limit time within which fied limit That commenced.” should be of limita- act “the statute is referred tions”, Hajduk expressly found reference (p 223) within the act “the limitation meant *5 377 Mioh Opinion op the Court. general Moreover, of limitations”. statute not the provided expressly time also the statute claiming compensation “shall not run limitation for employee injured against or his the the claim of employer dependents, or or in favor of either said report have of said accident shall his until insurer, employer department by with the been filed”4 the given employer in all in which the has been cases timely knowledge happening of the notice or has only pro legislature not Thus, the accident. the proceeding vided for a time limitation within which compensation commenced, a time limi for must be by Hajduk, recognized but, also, tation the Court provided it for the extension of such time limitation long employer timely as an notice so with or knowl edge neg happening failed, of the accident report the accident to the de lected, refused partment. Hajduk imposed upon compensa-
Yet, the Court in period tion claims a limitational in addition to that expressly provided by the act and made absolute judicially imposed in the sense that the limitational period by employer’s was not tolled failure report department file a of the or, accident apparently, any other The effect of what reason. Hajduk Court did was write into the act compensation a limitation entitlement to legislature, provision, tolling its had mani- expressly impose. fested an intention not to If prevent injustice”, what the Court did it did “to purpose language opinion of the Court’s seems clearly to indicate it had in mind, the Court must forgotten Luyk have what it had written earlier in supra, Hertel, v. about the workmen’s 4 “Injury” was substituted for “aceident” PA No 245. See, currently, 412.15, CLS PA as amended No 44 § (Stat Ann Supp 17.165). 1965 Cum § op the Court. respective roles law and judiciary therewith. connection supreme majority court im- of the Wisconsin A judicially upon the Wis- posed limitation a similar Federal Rubber Com- law in consin pany Wisconsin Industrial Commission *6 491). per- (201 The ALR 261, 40 NW 185 Wis suasive 303) applicable (p to is in that
dissent case Hajduk: scrapped servant was law of master and “The old sup- and was and economic obsolescence social as comprehensive
planted by complete the not been for scheme compensation accidents. It has industrial of
customary to resort to the old law mas- analogies to aid in the construc- ter and servant tion compensation workmen’s act because that of the entirely incompatible principles act based is with the former law. The framers of the workmen’s compensation expressly provided limita- act for two logical they tions. The intend not inference is that did provide any to further limitations. regard “I cannot in but the decision this case as a dissent.” invasion of the I field, and must Hajduk ambiguous If act in construed had been if period it had omitted reference to a limitational within which claims for were to be Hajduk might filed, the result reached been have justifiable in the that it sense would have been an appropriate judicial power of the exercise con- statutory provisions, but in the face of such strue expression legislative purpose, clear what the Hajduk completely unjustified. Court did approached task then The should have its earlier when it construed it did 16 as deny claim of law to workmen’s injured Furnace an Holland workman Cooke v. op Court. Cooke Case In the Mich 192. 196): (pp 195,
Court said having question, full re- powers approach this must “We gard found but to the division that under for the fact duty to enact is not our Constitution, in the legislate expound to con- but law, not apply legislation; it, law as we find strue integrity written it has been to maintain its as government. If the a co-ordinate branch of the State special hardships in class of law as written works govern- remedy lies with the branch cases the duty enacting charged laws. If ment with the protect rights one does not himself and his under misfortune, the law as written and this Court his by judicial legislation, purpose should for the not, relieving that misfortune, write into the statute provision that the seen fit to enact.” Hajcluk
The Court erred not invasion its legislature’s of citing but it erred also domain, imposition, by analogy authority for its *7 six-year general of a limitations, to the limitational statute of compen- period which claims for within Chicago, R. Cruse v. filed, sation must be the case of (23 471). (1933), & R. 138 Kan 117 P2d I. That P. Co. authority for our did not what Court case is compensation Hajcluk. in The Kansas workmen’s period a limitational within law referred to begun proceedings unlike but, on a claim had to be compensation Kansas act, the workmen’s our own period. was neglected there Thus, to define that law appro- ambiguity law which was in the Kansas an clarify by supreme to priate court for the Kansas circumstances, those and, construction under justification refer- court’s for the Kansas was there general for of limitations Kansas’ statute ence to justi- period. defining such purpose No action for Court’s existed however, fication, 526 1966'j v. Co. PiiOKSoii Áutio the Court. expressly having provided Eajduk, period for only but, also, linxitational for not tolling. its Eajduk
Unfortunately,
followed subse
has been
impossible
it is
quently in
cases. While
a number of
Eajduk
opinion
whether
from the Court’s
tell
imposed
judicially
limi
intended its
then
the Court
compensation
period
applied
all
to bar
to be
tational
following
years
expiration of six
after
claims made
compensa
injury
or
bar
or disablement
made,
claim been
had earlier
which,
tion benefits
prior
six-year period
payable
have
would
been
Eajduk
been’ap
filing
preceding
of the
claim,
presenting
plied
See, for
both situations.
to cases
(1935),
Henry
example,
Mich
v. Ford Motor Co.
273
any compensation to
denied
where the Court
May,
injured
plaintiff,
result
who
disability May,
plaintiff
having
ant total
May,
1934;
for
until
claim
filed
Corp.
Paper
(1942),
Eddy
Mich
v.
303
Sweet
department’s
modified
award
where
petition
on a
for further
of benefits
period
beginning
limiting the
to cover a
award
prior
filing
years
than six
to the date of
no earlier
5
petition.
have
because
disability or for
Ardelian
273 Mich
Brothers
v.
Railway Express Agency (1951),
Scalzo v.
Motor Co.
Motors
(1937),
City
See,
Mich
been
or construe
Corporation (1954),
claim therefor was filed after
also,
v. Ford Motor Co.
15;
*8
Family Creamery
564;
405;
payable
Grand
(1935),
(1936),
Oado
Broadnax
Napolion
Hay
barring only
Rapids
following
668;
more than six
272 Mich
v.
275 Mich
Chileas
Ford
Henderson
(1936),
v. National Concrete Metal Forms
Motor Co.
It
that,
has been
the
because
has reenacted the limitational section of the act
Hajduh
specifically
decided,
after
was
without
dis
avowing
imposed
judicially
six-year
the
limitational
period, see
1943,
245,
PA
No
and PA
175,
No
precluded by
we are now
doctrine of
the
acquiescence
by
correcting
from
the errors made
Hajduh. My
concerning
this Court in
views
the
expressed
unsoundness of this doctrine were
in Half
Paragon Bridge
(1962),
acre v.
& Steel
Co.
finding
I
366, and
here reaffirm those views
applicable
Hajduh.6
them
to the
committed in
errors
Hajduh
I would overrule
cases,
and those
above
upon Hajduh
cited,
have relied
insofar as
they
proposition
compensation
stand
the
for
that
provisions
claims
otherwise barred
the
early
year following
It
that
should
noted
as
Hajduh decision,
justice
at least
argued
one
if
make
of this Court
an
that
employer
timely
employee’s injury
with
an
notice of
failed
report
thereof,
periods
against
no limitational
ran
the claim of the
separate
employee.
lian
opinions
See the
Mr.
Justice
in Arde
Potter
Ford Motor
(1935),
Co.
272 Mich
and Oado v.
Motor
Ford
(1935),
it for consideration sections compensation 2 of 10 of the workmen’s part 9 and Court. company Appellant appeal act.7 claimed that the wrongly applied board section had that, after payment period for the allowed specific fingers leg, 10 for under section loss of the board awarded further for total disability under section 9. This Court referred to sup no than less five unanimous decisions ported appellant’s latter contention that the award *10 ranging in erroneous, the decisions date from 1914 to 1948.
The
focused its attention
one decision
regarded
point,
particularly
which it
Curtis
Hayes
Company (1920),
Wheel
It is to note that sections 9 and 10 had jointly severally subject been action nine times in the interval between Curtis Dorpel and Van decisions,8and as the Court observed Dorpel (p 137), “Despite in Van occasional amend design ments to sections, both the basic each hás substantially unchanged.” Surely remained such “legislative acquiescence” evidence of in five'unani interpretive *11 mous decisions should have bound Jus Dorpel, alleged tice Black Van to as he himself Carney be bound the more recent case of Mosier v. Mich alleges 589-591, now him 532, and although, to bound in this of Autio, self be case with persistent inconsistency, willing “legislate” he is to by Hajdult overruling “unanimously mature” its only progeny, prospectively. but thusly: now Justice Black also accuses this Court legislature “Even could with not, consistent guaranties, constitutional do what the 1965, continued to do in now in that 1966, does PA No PA 238; 1921, No PA 250; No 173; PA No PA 263; 1927, No 195. PA No 1953, 63; No PA 198; 1943, PA No 245; PA No ’ > 1949, 175; the Court. of by destroy rights which, of substance defensive is, long date before the law, had vested become attempt.” legislative Compare em- with what Justice the above Black Dorpel 146-148): (pp in Van
braced split long over throughout land have the “Courts acquiescence silence. legislative this doctrine it recognizing it are that arguments for The usual ‘rights’ that law; stability gives to and sureness regular at acquired disturbed can thus thus predictable one branch but intervals finally, dis- to legislative; that government, and, legislating. judicial regard Now we amounts the doctrine lightly recognize not a court should been interpretation that has of a statute an overrule justice years, little we also see law for 37 but stability utility continuing give or sure- or under- nor do we law; an rule of unfortunate ness employers carriers their insurance or stand interpretation ‘rights’ gained any in the vested have reinterpreta- think that nor we statute; this do of tion long experience light in the a statute interpretation constitutes an unfortunate added.) legislating. (Emphasis interpretation a statute an case involves “This precise This involved. on the issue is silent thought ago the cor- it Court 37 decided what happen interpretation to dis- rect should be. We agree interpretation to make with that old and wish interpretation, a new for the reasons herein stated. suggested because, It is that we this should do original interpretation right whether wrong, inaction since was handed post-enactment down constitutes a sort of informal declaration of possessing assent thereto binding any law; effect of and that new and interpretation variant here and now would on that ‘judicial legislation.’ account constitute implicit “To our mind the doctrine kind *12 judicial reasoning constitutes surrender of the 1966] Armo Opinion op the Court. legislative body. analysis In final
function to objection may fairly be stated thus: Our Court interprets right wrong statute; whether our judicially decision henceforth becomes immutable powerless change we are to it; there is way changed; wrong can it if we are we must legislature long- wait for the tell so; us if its speak silence and inaction the does not wrong perforce any out tell us arewe then it has right; the same token told us we are case powerless this Court is forever fettered and to re- interpret delegated question. statute We have instead legislature. that function to the curi- This ous doctrine can or right be boiled down even more: wrong in the helpless Case, Curtis we are change it. squarely place legisla- “Such a doctrine is to position super supreme ture in the of a court. We judicial responsi- also consider it an abdication of bility. reject flatly along We such a doctrine with the sort of thinking- mechanistic that can arrive at impasse. an such ironic This doctrine has irrever- ently been theory called the ‘one shot’ interpretation. Pip-Van- We ourselves brand it a Winkle stagnation doctrine of and inertia. happen strongly disagree We and in we are not alone.” currently inveighs against “judicial Justice Black legislation”, yet Dorpel (p 153) agreed in Van he completely following, with the which describes the facing regard “rightful now situation us with to the 32-year-old Haj- [in damnation of the Court’s error duk]”: proportion “A little sense realism this might plain
area be amiss. The fact everywhere constantly engage courts last resort ‘judicial legislating’ they in a form of when are con- or other they statutory are—by fronted—as provisions so often ambiguous meaning. or uncertain Such *13 517. 377 Mich Opinion the Court. of interpretations judicial a to often in effect add words might peril that we we act at our statute. Must wrong? solemnly possibly judges declare we Some being of that we must. Yet far from the doctrine they humility have places keeping our that would appear, essentially preach it is not this to infallibility? Scarcely gospel a term of passes obliged that this Court all are not to us interpret Occasionally unclear statutes. we must reinterpret primary them. is It one of our func ; tions that’s what are for. we here It is when judge ignores positive a flies the face of a unambiguous statutory may justly enactment he that judicial legislating, be accused of in the bad sense. That is not our case.”9
But our review of Justice Black’s views need Dorpel. to confined Van Consider Linski v. Em ployment Security Commission 358Mich 239. Employment Security Earlier, in in Cassar v. 1955, Commission, 343 380, seven of this Justices against interpreted Court, as one had sec dissenter, employment security tion dealing 29 of the act,10 disqualification unemployment compensa barring tion employees benefits, as from benefits who discharged conceitedly were violation ceasing after work in majority
a labor Linski, contract. In a including of five, Justice voted to overrule Black, interpretation Cassar and substitute new statutory language adopted for the one I therein. present opinion note that in his em Justice Black phasizes unanimity of erroneous decisions legislature allegedly acquiesced, which the as giving one of the reasons rise his asserted ab overruling sep- from horrence them. his See, also, amended 9 But, CL Cum we Supp §17.531). might acid, PA § 421.29, No 281 as is what the amended See, (Stat currently, judges Ann 1965 Cum PA did do CLS No 1961, §421.29, Supp Bajdulc. § (Stat 17.531). Ann 533' op the Court. Paragon Bridge opinion & acre arate Steel Half Company (1962), It would seem,, vigorous of a dissent in the face when, however, legis interpretation statute, ato court’s mean what no to make the statute action lature takes logically, it follow should meant, said it the dissenter that the approving applauding is statutory language interpretation given realistically, majority. it much at all Viewed likely is a there dis decision more *14 legislative than would to attention sent would come pacifically Thus, a dis unanimous. one which is opinion senting involving stat an in a erroneous case utory interpretation one’s inhibi reinforce should against from which arises tion its later overrulement acquiescence”, “legislative the the legislature doctrine pointed out to it and had the error pur to act. To those nonetheless has declined blindly however, the dissent doctrine, devoted judi judicial hopefully, for future error, out marks cial correction. “legislative acquiescence”
Applying the doctrine of realistically logically cited decisions of to the Linski, that the it followed Cassar should have put upon interpretation approved legislature had the 1955, on 3, 29. Cassar was decided October section 16-page of Mr. the dissent Justice over Talbot Employ Knight-Morley Corporation In Smith. Security 397, Commission, 350 Mich decided ment the Cas 26, criticized 1957, November Justice Smith dissenting opinion doctrine, of a sar in the course by including joined three other Justice Justices, Employment Security Com In Peaden v. Black. April mission, 613, 1959, Jus 13, decided being again Cassar, time criticized tice Smith joined including Justices, two other but not Jus finally, supra, Linski, And, on tice Novem- Black. 377 517. Opinion op the Court. notwithstanding 25, 1959, ber Cassar was overruled legislature’s quite acquiescence the obvious therein. During interval decision in between the Cassar legislature Linshi, and its had overrulement legislated regard employment security to the (although specific regard act not with to the section cases) involved 287, those times, 1957, four PA No adopted adopted 1957, June PA No 13,1957; 311, adopted 21, 1957; June PA No 13, June adopted 1958; and PA No October 30, according When thus acted, theory acquiescers, it had before opinions, Cassar in which seven Justices had inter preted section to bar from claimants benefits interpreted in which one Justice had lan same guage Knight-Morley opin not to claimants; bar the division became four to in which the ions, opinions,
four; and the Peaden in which three the Justices reaffirmed their belief that Cassar was wrong. ity legislature thought major Had the Cassar’s wrong, surely changed it would have pertinent language Instead, this clear. make of four course it left acts, section 29 unchanged. logically Should this not mean that the *15 approved interpretation the of Cassar’s majority rejected interpretation out of hand the in lone dissenter Cassarl Such is the con legislative acquiescer clusion which a should have driven, been in but Justice Black nonetheless felt free, “legislate” by saying Linshi, the that section language 29 meant other than the “Court’s solemn word”11 in Cassar, said it meant and this after the legislature had four times left the untouched section language amending 29 while other sections of the act.
A doctrine which sois flexible that it bars correc tion of in error eases like this of Autio, of 11 Mosier Black, J.). v. Carney (1965), 532, (dissenting opinion 1966] v. op the Court. statutory pertinent section has been the
wherein subject three action times12since interpretative blatantly decision erroneous the Eajduh, in correction the case not bar but such does pertinent statutory Dorpel, sec of Van wherein subject times, nine action such tions had been is indeed useful to reach a desired decision. device emerge from antinomous results when such However, application help single principle, does its a “skilled ordinate court how correspondingly lawyers, sub skilled ” judges, [to] law’ ? ‘know the v. Doehler-Jarvis case of Wilson Consider next the Company (1960), 358 National Lead Division of Muskegon 1954, in Fowler v. Earlier, Mich 510. dealing County, with the 522, 526, 340 Mich case unanimous law, this Court workmen’s ly held: [Luyk Luyk holding Case, our “Under remedy 445] for all Hertel found must be
matters connected holding Case, in the Kermott statute, and our Ayer (1863), [Kermott that inter statutory. stat It must follow that where the est is provide grant none interest, can be ute does ed.” majority including
In Wilson, five, Justice properly concluded Fowler had been Black, erroneously decided and voted to overrule it. Wilson, In Fowler and the interval between subject compensation law had workmen’s been legislation PA No PA 1955, three times, 122, legisla- yet 1956, 195, No and PA No way deci- indicated the unanimous ture no compensa- Fowler, held that workmen’s sion Surely, wrong. interest, no tion awards bore “acquiesced” in Fowler’s inter- then, it must have 175; 1954, No and PA No By 245; PA PA No *16 536 op Court.
pretation, judi- that decision from thus insulated flexibility cial But the extreme overrulement. “legislative acquiescence” to doctrine of comes who, (cid:127)the on selective occa- rescue its advocates imperatives. logical sion, shrink from its unanimous decision Thus it is said one interpretive “legislative followed statute acquiescence”, otherwise, silent or does not inhibit correcting inter from later its erroneous pretation. opinion acre, in See Justice Half Black’s supra. exception Although single-decision is rationally bandied planation I find no consistent ex about, suggested validity. even for its Either legislature presumed all of is act with our to it advance in not. If it so sheets hand or is presumed statutory acquiescence its act, interpretation announced us one decision binding acquiescence should be as in an inter its pretation announced several decisions. , Employment Security In Park Commission (1959), Mich 103, 141, relied Justice Black exceptions acquies “legislative two to the so-called- (“one interpretive doctrine decision isn’t bind cence” ing” interpretive “an decision in which there binding”) escape again is a the then dissent isn’t Chrysler doctrine. In unwelcome strictures (135 900), Corp. (1941), ALR Smith interpreted language six members of the Court had employment security in section 29 of act bar Despite persuasive claimants from benefits.13 dis sent, the in the between Smith interval and Park amended section 29 no fewer than seven language, times,14 remained, but in Justice Black’s griev of our “disinterested correction its hand PA No 14 PA 246; See footnote No 281. PA No 10, supra. 364; No 360; PA 1942 PA (2d Ex No Sess), 251; PA No 1954, No 18; PA 1943, 197; *17 537 v. op the Court. 103, 355 Mich at time”. misinterpretation ous to correct being unwilling 142. The specific opportunities, seven error, despite Court’s the Court why reason no then saw Justice Black not do so itself. could Board Ogemaw County also, Thompson v. See, of Em- 482, Mich and 357 (1959),
Road Commissioners Forging Vulcan v. Security Commission ployment which deci- 374, Mich both 375 Company (1965), statu- construing decisions earlier sions overruled of which decisions Justice in both and language tory concurred. Black legis that steady cited cases show
The which Justice examples horrible lating, Black reports, began of our 375 and 376 up volumes holds support. unqualified and with Ms then well before there are and 376 fact in 375 a matter of volumes As any overruled15 in which the cases Court only four Felgner (1965), v. Anderson of its decisions: prior common-law question Mich 23, involving 375 fully in which of risk and Justice assumption Black concurred; Security Commission Employment 374, in Mich 375 Forging Company (1965), Vulcan statutory inter of a prior an overrulement volving concurred; fully Justice pretation, Black 532, 376 Mich (1965), v. Carney ier Mos which deci common-law prior overruled Court Hardwick extent; Bunda v. a limited sions, 640, in which the overruled decision.16 common-law prior (their have See, involving of those need not (1965) [15] Although Excluded written, judgment, were erroneous , example, have done so. eases that statutory we are cases unsuccessfully, my opinion 608, have confined Justice interpretation, for as he 613. in which less than a in Thom v. State Black indorsed this discussion and deserved overrule now because in Van professes prior decisions Highway Commissioner majority Dorpel respectful 'is (pp main to cases of the Court overrulement interment. chary, we which,, .in 150) : Opinion op the Court. “legislative might this discussion of conclude We eminently by quoting acquiescence” from correct supra, pp writing Park, 145-147, Justice Black yet by hoping may to the that he return fold: (60 Helvering 119-121 Hallock, “In 309 US 1368), the Court ed 125 ALR Ct 84 L today’s controversy. grips identical came to statutory Having an construc- earlier rule of found immediately quite con- untenable, tion court congress, having fronted contention that failed perforce error, to correct the court’s had ratified *18 that error had and thus rendered immune from judicial (pp 119-122) correction. The court said (Justices McReynolds dissenting): Roberts and “ recognize ‘We that stare decisis embodies an important policy. represents social It an element continuity psychologic law, is rooted satisfy expectations. need to reasonable But stare principle policy decisis ais and not a mechanical formula of recent and adherence the latest decision, however questionable, when such adherence in- prior volves ing collision with doctrine more embrac- scope, intrinsically in its sounder, verified * ** by experience.
“ specificcongressional repudia ‘Nor does want of tions an St. Louis Union Trust Cases17serve as implied by congress instruction to us not to re light experience, in the of new whether consider^ conjunction those decisions, with Klein Case,18 make require dissonance doctrine. It would very persuasive enveloping congres circumstances sional silence to debar court re-examining from “We can see no basic difference between a court overruling its former overruling case law and interpretation its former of a statute. law law, Bad birth.” no less ceases to be bad however the accident of its Reporter. 296 US 80 L ed 18Klein 17Kelvering y. (56 United S Ct v. St. Louis Union ALB States, 80 L ed 1239) ; —Reporter. n 35). Beolcer US 231 Trust y. (51 Co., St. Louis Union Trust S Ct US [39] 75 L ed (56 S Ct 996).— Co., Opinion op the Court. explain of non- canse To own doctrines. its congress no by congress itself sheds when action * * * speculative light Various unrealities. into venture tois parliamentary tactics and considerations suggested in- strategy might action reasons for the they treasury congress, but and of that we walk on to indicate be sufficient would try quicksand rective the absence of cor- when we to find in principle. controlling legal legislation a “ from Lords, unlike the House of court, ‘This disability rejected beginning at a doctrine of * * * problem real is wheth- The self-correction. misappli- principle prevail later er cations. shall over its Surely we reason or are bound per- that underlie stare decisis to considerations application in distinctions taken in the of a severe statute appear on further con- which, examination, purposes neither with the sonant of the statute nor conception with this court’s own of it.’ “Here, is our then, a contributed view that stare discretionary decisis is of rather than obstinate rule Fairly analyzed, conduct. it declares that appellate precedent courts should adhere save only when due consideration firm leads to conviction (emphasis that the decision or earlier decisions add- ed) scrutiny wrong unjust, are as well as injustice that more rather than less will flow from perpetuation of that which is found erroneous.” *19 appeal In the instant case of Autio, board record-supported finding plain- amade of fact that tiff had suffered the loss of industrial use of his right injury during hand as the result of an sustained employment by his defendant Proksch Construction Company in 1952. The board also found that report Proksch had failed to file an accurate of this having timely finding loss, had notice thereof, not challenged by Proksch, and the board concluded period expressly pro- the limitational which is .that vided in the workmen’s act was there- 377 Mich op the Court. plaintiff’s' held that However, board tolled.19 of industrial use of for loss claim was barred hand, June, filed his imposed judi six-year period limitational absolute cially by Ilajdulc. Having written to this Court Hajdulc, remand this I would reverse and overrule proceedings. Costs to for further case of Autio plaintiff. J., M. C. T. O’Hara, and and Kavanagh, Smith, J.
Adams, JJ.,
Souris,
concurred with
My
(dissenting).
respecting this
views
Black,
really contagious
amend
now
ment of
business
by retroactively effective
statutes,
effected
steadily accepted
long standing,
overrulements
and
cations
record
ris v.
interpretations
appli
unanimously
and
mature
spread upon
our
thereof, came
extended
485;
Mich
Har
Laan,
v. Van
when Burns
City
526;
acre v.
Detroit, 367
Half
Bridge
Paragon
Co., 368
were
& Steel
handed down
1962.
key
provided
restraint,
vote of
then
Since
proposed over-
in matters of
Justice Carr
Chief
longer
In the resultant cir-
rulement,
no
here.
being—useless time
it is—for the
cumstances
judi-
against
what I look
much more
write
quickly cured—
which—if not
disease; a disease
cial
destroy
which sus-
substance
is bound to
public
judicial system. That substance is
our
tains
(cid:127)statute
National
the
Ann
who claims under
Half
ago
Allen Electric
“This is another
statutory
An inaccurate
acre at
1950 Rev §
so
consistently
Lead
pp 381, 382.
limitational
Company
17.165).
&
provide
long
Equipment
since,
case,
incomplete report
standing
period provided by CL
for him
has said
like recent
See Wilson v.
statute
exactly
unanimously
(1936),
That this Court departed, ly steadily since Chief Justice and Carr legislated grievously just present when so as signed Hajduh re and Case2 criticized It cannot nor denied. doubted leased, is neither Michigan Re 376th The 375th and denied now. be ports large beyond and recall. Such are at lawyer, every confronting legislation fact a naked is go us about citizens, as all of now most and carry necessarily the affairs on continuous effort government society principle according to the of by government men, than the edicts law rather pro being stamped now nunc tunc. of whom are lawyers judges for all come The time has Michigan resign if real, to this themselves legislative power. usurpation temporal, Too, the philosophically accept minority must seated here personnel changed by those our is situation until public have all lifetime office inexorables seekers always feared and have known. ever rightful Agreeing with what I concede (Hajduh, 32-year-old of the Court’s error damnation 268 220), viewing correspond that error as ingly identical with the error considered in Half- I am moved acre,3 to stand favor Hajduh. of the error of If that not to correction certainly wholly prospec I would stand be, then Hajduh subsequent overrulement of and the tive applicatory (the being thereof are latest cases simultaneously unanimously decided Babcoch law). Reporter. ALR enacted an amendment of the statute” 2 Hajduh In 412) Hajduk, (see Severe Half in Boshaw aere Copper at p 382), Sr Brass, J. Newberry Co., “the court Inc. (the (1934), 268 workmen’s just hauled Mich 333 Mieh off and 220.-— n (83 *21 542 377 Opinion Black, Dissenting J. Corporation, 340 Mich Motors 58 and General Employment Security 340 Commission,
Malleis v. 78). Walker, For Linkletter v. reasons see 381 (85 601), 14 L 2d US S Ct ed Tehan v. (86 States, Shott, United ex Ct 459, rel. US S 453), 15L ed and the 2d new text of American Juris prudence (20 p § Am 2d, Courts, Jur “Change statute”). pro in construction of Nunc process judicially by tunc law, enacted of over ruling dealing unanimous and mature decisions standing consummately statutes, is indefensible. why attempts That is no member of our Court practice proceeds defend he with it. simply One outvoted re the above must bide the hopeful passage of time, that this hell-for-breakfast enterprise legislation by of now-for-then the Court transitory really is that it will and not—because cannot—go longer. a'legislature on much Even guaranties, not, could consistent with constitutional do what the Court has continued to and do destroy rights now does in 1966, is, that defensive long- substance which, had law, become vested legislative attempt. before the date of the Too, and government no matter what branch tries it, palpably result is invidious discrimination, effected retrospective in favor of those who seek overthrow obeyed. of laws others of their class have lay profes- At one time citizens, students and and taught everyone presumed sional, were know duty the law, and hence is bound to act in may accord therewith. But how even skilled law- yers, correspondingly skilled subordinate court judges, they “know the taught law” when are law the books is not law at all, unless litigatory majority very test a ordinary bare of this Supreme happens to like it? Former Justice epigram latest at comes to mind Voelker’s Peóksoh by Black, Dissenting Opinion p “Laughing quote Whitefish”, it from point. I 1965): (McGraw-Hill pack- lawyer nightshirt “Clapping on a black capital him thenceforth call-
ing state off to the him fallible ing no less makes him “Mister Justice” home when he was back than he was uncertain and drawing wills.” five-dollar an award of costs.
I without affirm, vote to opinion foregoing to other was submitted Since has written Court, Justice Souris members pages all devoted to the case; for the 14 additional *22 topic, disputatious “now for is, most Court’s standing long and of unanimous then” overrulement legisla- applied which have construed decisions riposte, Beginning tively I unamended statutes. postlude presume has of that the reader this shall clearly perceives pages; that he read the also specificity upon the turns that our continuant debate respect to by constitutional which is due of that against injunction usurpation, of one branch properly to powers belonging government, of the §2). (Const 1963, art another fact, are pages, actual to boiled down The opin- my of two indorsement at unconditional aimed prior to Justice wrote ions Justice Voelker Souris’ to appointment them, come I shall to the Court. sting- noting of a modicum satisfaction opinion, foregoing has ing challenge, in the delivered open; on finally brought out into this debate elaustrally distinguished public from record our The smugness room. conference of the Court’s safe start, challenge, repeated textual and for a here as at- why our of no member this: “That is is pro [nunc tunc over- practice tempts to defend the proceeds- ruling] with it.” as he 377 Dissenting Opinion by Black, really, Now I would rather have the record made by my pen my pertinent subject views, exhibit being “legislative acquiescence,” permit than those selectively views be twisted and turned around long attempt who, one at last, been forced has some policy mushrooming defense amendment of should know My standing Brother statutes:4 pen pretty made, the record that opposed directly well now, he in the 3 since pointedly divisive to which reference was ini cases tially (Burns, opinion made in the above 367 Mich 366). 485; Harris, 526; 368 Mich acre, Half changed Here is that now. record. It cannot be many Michigan lawyers Too on their thousand have it booked p at handed down {Burns
shelves. 1962.) September 10, argument against “The whole ‘extension Stephan’ ruling Montgomery of our recent adds
..up today’s longtime this: Some situation steadily construction of an unanimous old stat power judiciary ute would ‘extend’ the to re write that statute so that it means what in Staal 6 we said it does not mean. Others—the writer ' being respect one—would the almost force conclusive ‘legislative acquiescence’ the doctrine of where, acquiescence proven here, such many years interpretation; unanimous mean remaining acquiescently compliant.” while *23 (Harris pp.536 at and 537, handed down the same day.) by “This not is a case a where, nonunanimous challenged nomnature
and decision at bar, a standing having is statute shown as been miscon- 587-606. with full Fiting, 5 Montgomery [4] [6] Staa'l See 375 Mich comment with detail, Grand v. 440, Stephan, Rapids People 457-488; respect 4’ v. 359 Mich I- P- Holbrook, to and Mosier v. sueh Co-., 33.—Reporter. policy, 57 Mich 373 Mich all unceremonious and Carney, 239.—Reporter. 94, 101; [376] Currie v. 532, by Black, Dissenting Opinion example misapplied. of that kind An and strued right set and examined blunder Security Employment Commission, Park v. 70-and-more-year-old statute, 103. Here its tiff plain- very right of action this created terms long series pleads, construed has been right denying such where as decisions unanimous allege prove a violation pleader and unable to is lawyers know the ‘2-inch come have to of what rule.’ any ‘cogent' question cir-. is whether The sole may judicially no- disclosed, or are cumstanees’ depart might from that which to lead us ticed, which perceive years ago. many I rule which is none, so was settled ap- general would stand and so plicable statutory con- to clecisisin the field stare distinguished that of the commonlaw. from struction general appears in Am Jur, Courts, rule Such subject pp § 288. It was the some little supra. Case, debate in the Park special emphasis is the fact that we “Stressed construing an are asked to overrule unanimous cases unamended not a statute; case line of cases an- nouncing a law.” rule of common (Halfacre ppat handed down 381, 382, 384-388 De- 1962.) cember and Har- another like recent Burns case, “This long-standing claims under stat-
ris, where onewho that it’ us that statute so would have rewrite ute exactly provide Court, what for him this unanimously consistently ago it since, has said public assay provide. So comes does wholly solemnly united word of this recorded repeatedly upon legis- given lawyers, oath to Court, statutory proviso judges, lators, spells rather than 1 kind out kinds of defense against payment illegally of double employed (pp 382.) minors.” “My proposal Brother overrule is too Souris’ impetuous for After me. rashly doctrine' oí all?
546
Opinion fey
J.
Dissenting
Black,
judicial
acceptance
upon
and
legislative reliance
place. Moreover,
its
interpretation
and
value
has its
‘cogent
only
today
cir
present
of those
one
there
Michigan
Sheppard
National
which,
cumstances’
Employ
Park v.
Bank,
348 596-603,
Security
Commission, 355
ment
138-140,
previous inter
overrule
141-151, led this Court
today’s
pretative
we
instance, unless
In
decisions.
(that
employed
ignore
constantly
axiom
a
are
interpretational
legislature enacts with the Court’s
with
as it writes and votes
decisions in one hand
other),
more or less
here most of the
we have
why
legislative
conclusive
acceptance
confronted
tions like Boshaw7
the doctrine
reasons
applied.
legislature,
should be
When
interpreta
constantly
with unanimous
deliberately
progeny,
its
re
statutory
change
interpreted
enacts without
such an
proviso,
running
period
does so 8 times
over
years,
any judge
of it seems to me that
who fails
or unwit
apply
wittingly
to
tingly
the mentioned doctrine
(see
violates the law
Cardozo, Nature of the
p
part
Judicial Process,
I at least
no
want
129).
of a motion to
what
overrule
indeed
law
was bad
but
regularly readopted statutory
now is anchored in a
provision.” (pp 384, 385.)
respect
“With
case of
there are
Halfacre
previous
no
decisions ‘in
In
turmoil and conflict.’
stead there are 3
decisions,
unanimous
contin
strength
legislature presumably
ued
of which the
legislated
tively
today
8 times. Thus and
there is affirma
more than
‘silence.’ There is fre
quent legislative
presumptive
action taken in
reli
upon given
long
ance
advices
since
dissenting judicial
repeat;
never
a
I
voice.
never
dissenting judicial
voice until these cases of Half-
along.
acre and Keller 8 came
for the
“As
Park
Case need
said,
as was
single
said at the time, earlier decision
PORTER.
Keller
Boshaw J. J.
y.
y.
Fraser
Newberry Co.,
Stamping Company,
Mich 333
259 Mieti
(83
397.—-BEPORTER,
ALB
412).—Be-
1966] Aunó v. Dissenting Opinion by Black,
*25
Corp.
[135
(Chrysler
Smith, 297
438
v.
Mich.
ALR
900])
subject
‘sharp
unerring
of
was the
dis
literally
legislature
sent.’
It
the
forewarned
question
up again
when the
came
would be
due
cozy
something
for
more than
reaffirmation. The
Chrysler
actually
divisive
Case
in chan
remained
cery,
engage
phrase,
sporting
the
until it arrived
by
necessity
for re-examination
of
court which
unitary
was concerned with the
for
national
need
(by
construction of like
most
statutes enacted
of
States)
‘part
as a
scheme for
unemployment compensation
by
provi
ihduced
security
(see
sions of the social
act of 1935’
footnote
p
Unemployment Compensation
2, 145,
Commission
Aragon,
[67
Alaska v.
of attested over unanswerable dis presumptive proof has little legis sent, value as acceptance lative thereof. flag It carries its own independability. Three unanimous decisions.how- 10 11 Department Blanton v. Walker Bidley Clay Conservation Products Cleaners, Co., Inc., y. 310 Mich Connor, Mieb [311] 321 Mieli 635.—-Reporter. 4.—Reporter. 648.—Reporter. o Mich 517. Black, Dissenting Opinion each, seemingly solidly supporting other ever, legisla- acquiescent many accepted an repudiation beyond judicial when quite are ture, they law.” rather than common involve statutes (pp 386-388.) People Holbrook, 373 above consider To penned following into 94, 101, Mich by the writer: tendency easygoing an all is, “There I too fear, long and unani
in mous settled our midst to overrule since standing unsatisfactory but constructions supra; Wallace v. acre, statutes. Tripp, also Consider Half City Detroit, 681; Harris v. Carey, In and now re 526, 536-539, *26 precedent of provably errant too, believe “I, especially statutory is that which construction, por- vigorous origin opposed and is recent tentously predictive overruled. should be dissent, by the un- made instance, the contribution See, Employment Security dersigned Commis- Park v. pointed out sion, in that But, 141-151. at as is the contribution, rule, stare decisis exception. exception, is The overrulement justify something application, its more than calls for contemporaneous disfavor.” says, today (ante p 536) But Justice Souris at : it “Thus is said that one unanimous decision interpretive by ‘legislative aof statute ae- followed .q.uiescence’, silent or does inhibit the otherwise, correcting interpreta- from (cid:127)Court later its erroneous opinion tion. See Halfacre, Justice in su- Black’s pra. Although single-decision exception is ban- n died rationally explana- I find no about, consistent suggested validity. legis- tion even for its Either presumed is lature to act all of our advance presumed sheets act, hand or it is not. If is so its, acquiescence statutory interpretation in a 54$ Black, Dissenting Opinion be as bind- decision should us one announced interpretation acquiescence in an an- ing as its decisions.” nounced several rationally my find “no consistent Brother can So validity,” suggested explanation for its refer even exception ring “one decision” he to the does above legislative acceptance. general His rule to the explanation” “rationally consistent for such search memory prolonged, hardly and his could been .have surely five months after release A is bad. scant refer the writer’s definite Halfacre, cre with Hal fa (final paragraph rule the “one decision” ence to joined above), quoted writer, Justice Souris along Kavanagh- T. M. with Justices Smith, Otis (Smith unqualified Lawrence indorsement in the Baking prevail 178; 169, 177, ., Co ing opinion by T. M. Justice Kavanagh) : lightly con decisions settled do not overrule “We any standing struing Wagner Had statute. section of represented views unanimous Case12 resolving might to overrule we hesitate Court, pointedly since, as Brandéis said so case Justice Co., 285 Burnet Oil & Gas US v. Coronado (52 815): L ed S Ct “ usually policy, decisis is the wise because ‘Stare ap- important in plicable it more that the most matters it be
rule of law than that settled be settled right.’
Wagner’s simply postponed dissent, a final however, *27 Wagner’s interpretive And even if decision. ma- jority view unanimous, had been rendered as we thereby necessarily not would be bound since ‘one construing approach decision dignity an act does not interpretation.’ aof White well-settled See (62 Country v. Winchester Club, 315 US 40 S Ct 619), quoting following L 425, 86 ed United 12 Wagner v. La Salle Foundry Co., 345Mieh 185.—Hepor-aer. 517. 377 Mick
550
Opinion by Black,
Dissenting
J.
(58
Raynor,
v.
302 US
Ct 353,
S
States
413).”
L ed
Upon reading all of Justice Souris’
comments
appearing
upon
pages
citations
afore
my
it will
he found
Brother’s indictment
said,
of
solely
my
consistency
record of
is founded
my
opinions
indorsements
Justice Voelker’s
pel
Co.,
Van Dor
Haven-Busch
Mich 135
v.
Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division National Lead
Company,
Dorpel
Van
It would seem
that,
back
Smith
Baking
might prosperously
Co.,
Lawrence
we
re-
present
respecting
solve our
the bound-
differences
of that
a line I concede
line,
aries
grayish,
is somewhat
separates pertinently
power
judicial process.
from the
the writer
Since
along with Justices
what
Smith indorsed
Souris
Kavanagh
T. M.
Justice
wrote into the Smith Case
quotation
per
writing
might well consider
above, the Court
precedential
declaration of redevotion to
quoted
principle,
such
doctrine. It
founded
on
adopted
552)
Raynor (302
from
Smith
(315
US
40),
and White
US
that “one decision con-
struing
dignity
approach
an act
not
does
interpretation.”
well settled
(dissenting).
I
ac-
do
favor
Dethmers,
Hajduk
ceptance
plaintiff’s
invitation to overrule
Copper Brass, Inc.,
v. Revere
&
Kelly, as amended [*] CLS § PA 412.15 (Stat No 44 Ann (Stat 1960 Rev Ann § 17.165). Cum Supp See, § currently, 17.165).