1 Gratt. 310 | Va. | 1844
This, it seems to me, as regards the justices, is an action of trespass on the case, brought in a court of equity, to recover damages for a misfeasance in office. It is founded upon no contract of theirs, express or implied, nor upon any benefit or consideration which has enured to them; but seeks to subject them to a loss occasioned, as is alleged, by their official misconduct. The demand of the plaintiffs against the justices was for a retribution altogether uncertain, depending as it did, in the first place, upon the uncertain extent of the malversations, delinquencies and devastavits of their guardian; and, in the next place, upon the uncertain amount of property or money which ho might be unable to surrender or pay.
It is impossible, I think, to treat the justices as debtors of the wards, or sureties for the guardian. A debt can arise only from a contract, express or implied; a surety-ship from nothing but an express contract. It is a mere figure of speech to call a contingent liability, dependent upon the inability of another, and created by statute, without contract or consideration, a supplemental suretyship. This is more emphatically so when the liabi
By the common law, judges or justices of the peace, acting judicially, while keeping within the limits of their jurisdiction, are not responsible to civil actions, however gross their misbehaviour or improper their motives. But ministerial officers are liable for injuries proceeding from their unlawful acts or omissions, though attributable only to ignorance or mistake. Ministerial officers, however, and other public officers, though not employed in the administration of justice, when called upon by law to exercise a deliberative judgment, are not responsible for errors of judgment, in the absence of all corruption or malice. It cannot be doubted that judges and justices of the peace, acting as the judges of a court of record, in the appointment or qualification of a guardian, must be considered as proceeding judicially; and that, according to the principles of the common law, they were in no wise answerable to the civil action of a party injured by any dereliction of duty in regard to the subject.
This complete immunity was considered by the legislature an evil, which called for an amendment of the
How a court of equity can obtain cognizance, against the justices, of such a case as this, is wholly beyond my conception. Let us suppose that they were the only defendants to the bill. Under what head of equitable jurisdiction, would the relief sought by the plaintiffs against the justices bo found ? As to them there is no pretence of fraud, or trust, or mutual dealing, or accident, or mistake ; and no account, nor discovery, nor specific performance sought against them: and so we might go through the whole chapter of equity powers, exclusive, concurrent and assistant, in the vain search for any appropriate head of jurisdiction, until we come to that residuary clause, by which a court of conscience is warranted to grant relief, where none can be had at law. But the legislature certainly thought, they were providing a plain and adequate remedy at law, by the action of trespass on the case for the recovery of damages against the defaulting justices. And there being no peculiar circumstances in this case, if there be no adequate remedy at law, and relief in equity is to be sought on that ground, then it follows that every action of the sort must be brought in a court of chancery.
If equity has no jurisdiction against the justices alone, how can it be acquired by making them defendants to the suit brought against the guardian ? Surely such an invasion of the common law jurisdiction, and the province of a jury, cannot be justified by any other plea than that of necessity. It ought to be shewn, that it is necessary for the exercise of the unquestionable jurisdiction of the court in relation to the guardian. But where is the necessity ? The proceedings against the guardian, the nature and extent of his accountability, and the relief sought against him, are precisely the same, whether the justices have incurred any liability or not.
It will be seen from what has been said, that if, in this case, the court has jurisdiction against the justices, it must be not merely because of their common law liability, occasioned by their misfeasance in office, but because, moreover, of their interest in the question of the guardian’s liability ; and it has been argued here, that it was for their benefit to be made defendants, in order to enable them to controvert the liability of the guardian. It follows, if they are proper parties by reason of their interest, that they are also necessary parties for the same reason; that it was not only the right, but the duty of the plaintiffs to make them defendants; and that the failure to do so would have subjected the bill to a plea or demurrer. Now, this consequence must startle every one, and it serves to shew that the pretence of jurisdiction against the justices is hardly colourable.
I think it clear that where a person has a mere interest in the question, arising out of a collateral liability, though the decree may, upon that question, be evidence for or against him, in some future controversy, such interest does not render him a necessary, or even a proper party. If this were not so, the limits of equity jurisdiction might be indefinitely extended. I can perceive no convenience whatever in the opposite doctrine, and it would carry with it the certain inconvenience of a confusion of boundaries between the common law and equity jurisdictions.
There may be cases, in which a court of equity will transcend the accustomed limits of its jurisdiction, to take cognizance of a claim for damages arising ex delicto, at least where the wrong has enured to the benefit of the wrongdoer; but only under very special circumstances, in order to prevent a failure of justice. This is not a case of that description; and, without consideration of the merits, I am of opinion that the circuit court did right in dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill, for want of jurisdiction, not only as against the justices and their representatives, but also as against the representative of the clerk. The idea that the question of jurisdiction was settled by this court on the former appeal, by its order directing the clerk to be made a party, seems to me wholly without foundation. This court, I think, did not decide, nor had it the remotest idea of deciding, the question of jurisdiction.
I, therefore, think there is no error in so much of the decree as dismisses the plaintiffs’ bill as against the surviving surety; but that it ought also to have dismissed it as against the representative of the deceased surety.
I am further of opinion, that as between the appellants and the appellee, who is the representative of the guardian, there is error to the prejudice of the latter, for reasons which will be suggested in the decree of this court.
The other judges concurred in the opinion of judge Baldwin.