737 N.E.2d 605 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2000
In October 1998, the Board issued a notice of opportunity for hearing to appellant alleging he violated certain sections of R.C. Chapter 4715. In December 1998, appellant and the Board entered into a consent agreement in which appellant agreed to a ninety-day suspension of his dental license from January 1, 1999 to April 1, 1999. Although no record exists in the file, appellant alleges his attorney sent a letter to the Board seeking its opinion on permitting another dentist to work in appellant's office during his suspension. *680 Appellant's counsel then sent a letter to an assistant attorney general regarding the transfer of appellant's practice in order to determine whether appellant would need to file a declaratory judgment action to determine the applicability of the Dental Practice Act outlined in R.C. 4715. On December 30, 1998, appellant's counsel sent another letter to the assistant attorney general that outlined the transfer and included a draft of the trust agreement. Appellant's counsel also requested that the assistant attorney general inform the Board of the trust agreement.
On January 1, 1999, appellant placed his practice into a revocable trust, transferring legal title to his dental practice to a trustee, Mark A. Springer, D.D.S. and Associates, Inc., and naming himself as the sole beneficiary. The trustee then entered into an independent contractor agreement with Jerry Detwiler, D.D.S. The duration of the trust was for the same period as the suspension. During the suspension, the trustee retained appellant to provide management services for the practice, including personnel services, dental equipment ownership, assumption of leases, and performance of clerical and marketing duties.
On January 25, 1999, the Board began an investigation to determine if appellant had violated the consent agreement or the Dental Practice Act. The Board issued subpoenas to appellant requesting patient records and other documents. Appellant initially failed to comply with the subpoenas, resulting in the Board filing a petition in a separate action to compel production of the subpoenaed records. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted the petition, and appellant eventually produced the requested documents.
On February 8, 1999, appellant filed the present action for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that he was not in violation of the Dental Practice Act and an injunction to stop the Board's investigation. On March 10, 1999, the Board filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). On July 15, 1999, the trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and entered judgment on August 10, 1999. Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment, asserting the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT BY GRANTING THE OHIO STATE DENTAL BOARD'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT APPLYING THE PROPER STANDARD.
Appellant argues in his assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting the Board's motion to dismiss his complaint for declaratory judgment. In order to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. York v. Ohio StateHighway Patrol (1991), *681
A declaratory judgment action is a civil action and provides a remedy in addition to other legal and equitable remedies available. See Arbor Health Care Co. v. Jackson (1987),
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis that appellant had another available administrative remedy and because the matter was properly committed to special statutory proceedings. Appellant first argues that a declaratory judgment action is available in this case despite the existence of an alternative administrative remedy under R.C.
* * * "[w]here an administrative practice requires a party to incur substantial expense to obtain an administrative determination of a question which, standing *682 alone, would not require such expense, the administrative remedy to determine the question is not equally as serviceable as an action for a declaratory judgment." [Swander Ditch, at 135, quoting Burt Realty Corp. v. Columbus (1970),
21 Ohio St.2d 265 , paragraph one of the syllabus.]
Thus, declaratory judgment is available as an alternative to an unnecessary onerous administrative remedy. Id. In Swander Ditch, the court found that the administrative remedy would not have resolved all of the issues and would have required separate appeals. Therefore, the court determined that the administrative remedy was unnecessarily onerous and that the declaratory judgment action was an appropriate alternative because it would resolve all of the issues in one proceeding. Id. at 134-135.
Appellant contends that, like Swander Ditch, he will:
* * * suffer the onerous burden of responding to an unnecessary investigation, an interference with his practice and patient care, and potential new Board allegations that he breached the terms of his Consent Agreement by "practicing dentistry" during his suspension. [Appellant] would be forced to produce voluminous records at great expense, which would also seriously interfere with the treatment of patients.
However, we find appellant's argument unpersuasive and the circumstances inapposite to those in Swander Ditch. The problem underlying the decision in Swander Ditch is not present in the current case. In the present case, unlike Swander Ditch, the administrative remedy would have resolved all of the issues and would not have required separate appeals. The issue involved in appellant's declaratory judgment action is the same issue that would have been decided in the administrative proceedings; that is, whether he engaged in practicing dentistry pursuant to R.C.
Further, the administrative remedy in the present case is not unnecessarily onerous. Appellant cannot demonstrate that the administrative proceedings would have necessarily entailed a lengthy or more onerous burden than declaratory judgment proceedings. He also cannot demonstrate the administrative remedy would have forced him to incur substantially more expense than the declaratory judgment action. Because the issues, time, and expense involved would be virtually the same for both proceedings, we cannot say that the administrative remedy was not an equally serviceable remedy. See Raceway Park, Inc. v. Ohio State RacingComm. (Nov. 6, 1998), Lucas App. No. L-98-1160, unreported. It is clear that in the present case, declaratory judgment is merely a substitute for the administrative process provided by the legislature in R.C.
The trial court also dismissed appellant's declaratory judgment action on the basis that the matter was committed to special statutory proceedings. In State ex rel. Albright v.Delaware Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991),
Appellant attempts to make the distinction that the Board's actions cannot be considered a "proceeding" because the Board had only begun an investigation and no formal administrative proceeding was actually pending. However, nowhere in Albright
does the court require that the administrative proceeding be currently pending. In Albright, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "it is always inappropriate for courts to grant * * * injunctions that attempt to resolve matters committed to special statutory proceedings * * *." Id. at 42. Thus, the issue is whether a special statutory procedure has been set forth by the legislature to address a particular type of case, not whether a "proceeding" has actually commenced. See, generally, State exrel. Iris Sales Co. v. Voinovich (1975),
However, even if we were to find that Albright applies only when a special statutory proceeding is currently pending at the time a declaratory judgment action is filed, we find that the investigation initiated by the Board is part of the special *684
statutory proceedings set forth in R.C.
For the reasons set forth above, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's assignment of error, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
PETREE and McCORMAC, JJ., concur.
McCORMAC, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned to active duty under authority of Section
