OPINION OF THE COURT
Petitioner Carol Aurecchione prevailed in a human rights employment discrimination claim she filed against her former employer, respondents Classic Coach, Sсhoolman Transportation System, Inc. and Bill Schoolman. Following a finding of discrimination, the State Division of Human Rights (Division) awarded her back pay. The Division refused, however, tо award “pre-determination interest” — interest accruing from the date of discrimination. The sole issue on this appeal is whether victims of employment discrimination аre entitled to predetermination interest on back pay awards. We hold that, under the facts presented, the denial of pre-determination interest was an abuse of discretion.
In April 1986, respondent Classic — a charter bus service provider — hired Aurecchione as a charter reservationist, and eight months later promоted her to the position of office manager. Shortly thereafter, in February 1987, she began to function as a general manager. Her responsibilities were expаnded, yet her salary (at most $350 a week) remained well below that of male office managers (who earned up to $700 a week). In October 1987, following a change of personnel, Classic eliminated Aurecchione’s position as manager, and offered her a position as a reservationist, which paid considerably less. Aurecchione refused to accept the position and ultimately requested a termination letter.
*25 On February 23, 1988, Aurecchione filed a formal complaint with the Divisiоn of Human Rights charging respondents with employment discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The Division held its first public hearing on November 21, 1995, and continued hearings on the complaint until June 27, 1996. In Seрtember 1998, the case was reassigned to a second Administrative Law Judge who ultimately issued her recommended decision and order on March 10, 1999. Finally, on April 29, 1999, apprоximately 11 years after Aurecchione filed her complaint and approximately 12 years after the first incident of discrimination, the Commissioner rendered his decisiоn and order, awarding her $21,500 in back pay and $1,500 in compensatory damages for mental anguish and humiliation. Additionally, the Commissioner ordered that interest be added to the back pay award at the statutory rate of 9% per annum, accruing from the date of his final order. The Commissioner denied Aurecchione’s request for pre-determination interest on the back pay award.
Aurecchione then brought this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298, to challenge the Commissioner’s denial of predetermination interest. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination, noting simply that the “Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights acted within his discretion in not including interest on the award of back pay” (
The Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15), affords employees the opportunity to “obtain employment without discrimination” (Executive Law § 291 [1]). To ensure the protection of this right the Legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme that provides employees with both the means to combat employment discrimination and a framework for redress. The remedial nature of the statute evinces a legislative intent to compensate fully victims of employment discrimination.
The issue of “prejudgment” interest awards on back pay in the employmеnt discrimination context has been addressed on numerous occasions in the federal courts. The Human Rights Law, while unique in many respects, seeks to remedy the same type of discrimination as its federal counterpart — title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e
et seq.).
We have acknowledged the similarities and attempted to resolve federal and stаte employment discrimination claims consistently
(see e.g. Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,
In
Loeffler v Frank
(
Although the Human Rights Law, like title VII, makes no specific reference to pre-determination interest, a liberal reading of the statute is explicitly mandated to effectuate the statute’s intent (Executive Law § 300;
Matter of Cahill v Rosa,
Classic contends that it should not be penalized, by the imposition of interest, for the Division’s delay and inefficiency.
*27
We have, on numerous occasions, rejected such arguments: “interest is not a penalty”
(Love v State of New York,
Here, the Division determined that Classic wrongfully withheld payment of wages otherwise due Aurecchione. As a result, Aurecchione was deprived of the use of money at the time of discrimination. Furthermore, Classic, “who has actually had the use of the money, has presumably used the money to its benefit and, consequently, has realized some profit, tangible or otherwise, from having it in hand”
(Love,
We reject petitioner’s argument, however, that predetermination interest must in every case be awarded as a matter of law, and hold thаt the Commissioner is afforded some discretion in determining the extent of appropriate compensation for violations of the Human Rights Law, subject to appellate review for abuse. Here, neither the Commissioner nor the Appellate Division offered any justification for the denial of pre-determination interest. We conclude, therefore, that the denial of pre-determination interest constituted an abuse of discretion
(see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v State Div. of Human Rights,
Finally, we urgе the Division to complete its interest calculation within 30 days
(see Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights,
*28 Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division shоuld be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Appellate Division, with directions to remand to the New York State Division of Human Rights, for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Levine, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.