*1 (1993), 245 Ill. Board State Labor Relations Village v. Illinois Grove result, As a the Board’s App. 3d management employees within I are not finding that the CLAS Vs the manifest 3(j) of the Act is not meaning of section weight of the evidence. reversed, and reasons, the Board is foregoing the order of
For the Board for further determination the cause is remanded remand, the Board met. On test has been preponderance whether necessary. as it deems may reopen the evidence and remanded. Reversed GARMAN, JJ., concur.
STEIGMANN GENE al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, ESTATE OF v. et PHILIP AUGUSTUS Goodwin, Special for the Deceased, through Adm’r SOMERS, Thomas Decedent, Defendant-Appellee. Somers, Gene Estate of 4—95—0253 Fourth District No. February
Opinion filed *2 COOK,P.J., dissenting. Schiro, Doyle
Nicholas M. Tuggle, Danville, of & appellants. of for Tague, Flynn, Michael J. Tague, of Palmer & Champaign, of appel- for lee. JUSTICE KNECHT opinion delivered the of the court: Plaintiffs Phillip and Augustus Patricia appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Somers, defendant estate of by Gene through and Goodwin, Thomas special administrator for the estate of Somers, Gene decedent. We affirm.
Plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident with decedent April 14, 1992, which allegedly injuries resulted in plaintiffs. Decedent September 26, died on 1992. 21, 1994,
On March complaint filed a titled "Patricia Augustus Phillip Augustus v. Gene Marlyss Summers [szc] and Summers [sic].” Process Marlyss was served on personally. Somers The return for service on Gene Somers shows service attempted was by abode handing Marlyss service a copy complaint Somers of the against Gene by mailing Somers and copy to Gene Somers. April 11, 1994,
On quash filed motion to summons and motion to complaint. dismiss the April On filed a appointment motion for special administrator, petition for a mo- party, and for deceased special administrator substitution April defendant On of a defendant. suggesting noting Thomas Good- petitions, objections to these motions filed appointed special as administrator already win had (No. 317). and mo- petitions Plaintiffs withdrew estate 92—P — amended com- to file May 26 filed a motion for leave an tions and on naming an amended July plaintiffs filed plaint. On deceased, Thomas Somers, special administrator estate of Gene Goodwin, defendant. judgment summary filed a motion for January two-year by the statute complaint was barred
asserting plaintiffs’ excerpt transcript was an to its motion limitations. Attached taken in November testimony Patricia deposition following colloquy occurred: During deposition, the transcript excerpt:] did "Q. When [By not identified counsel passed away? Mr. Somers you learn that evening, picked up the we It late one A. was [Patricia:] shower, taking a bath or a my was newspaper, I think husband screamed, 'Oh, I obituary page I it. And got and saw and I away. passed God, Somers has Phil, my here. Mr. Gene come hit if the same one who you this and see it’s please read Would shivered, I cold yes. just I And And he did and he said us?’ chills, just I shocked. was *3 day you read the that Q. you, you remember Let me ask do ' °
obituary? day his death. I down the A. wrote you day that day his death on the Q. you Did write down obituary? this read
A. Yes. a fair statement be Q. been within —would it would have And you— that days of his death been within several it would have paper? been in the obituary] would have that [decedent’s A. Yes.” run, had statute of because the asserted
Defendant death, not they could knew of decedent’s fact because lim- after the statute estate as the decedent’s substitute against decedent’s not file suit could run and itations had estate. back relate complaint should amended responded
Plaintiffs not aware were because initial i.e., name, last decedent’s spelling mistaken of their because the true than rather "Summers” spelled it had been they believed spelling argued, alternative, "Somers.” Plaintiffs also defen- estopped dant was asserting from the statute of limitations defense Mutual, because defendant’s company, insurance Standard led plaintiffs to believe the case attorney, would be settled. Plaintiffs’ Schiro, Nicholas sent a letter to Standard Mutual dated December stated, you case], which he "[i]f want to settle [the then ten- *** policy $250,000.00 der the limits of immediately. You must real- policy tendered, ize that if the limits are not we will have no choice but to file In a reply suit[.]” letter dated December Standard correctly Mutual spelled responded, decedent’s last name and "We certainly have no information suggest your which would that client’s *** any claim has policy value near our upon insured’s limit. Based hand, the information at $8,500.00 we will increase our offer to amicably resolve the claim juncture.” at this No further offers or counteroffers had been made. granted
The trial court summary judg- defendant’s motion for ment, finding plaintiffs had either actual or constructive notice of personal substitution of the representative of decedent’s estate was proper not no conduct defendant sup- ported plaintiffs’ estoppel argument. appeal. Plaintiffs
Summary judgment proper is only where the pleadings, deposi tions file, and admissions together affidavits, any, with if show genuine there is no issue of material fact moving party and the judgment entitled to aas matter of law. This court summary reviews judgment orders may de novo and affirm the trial court’s result on any permits, basis the record ground even if not the on which the ruling. court based its Sandstrom v. De Silva (Code) (735 Section of the Code of Civil Procedure 616(d) (West 1992)), ILCS governing back,” "relation declares: 5/2 — "A cause of originally named de- fendant is not lapse barred of time under statute or prescribing limiting contract or the time within which an action brought asserted, right following or if all the terms and (1) prescribed conditions are met: the time or limited had not expired (2) original commenced; when the action was failure to (3) join inadvertent; as a defendant was service of sum- upon mons was in fact person, agent partner, his or her as the nature of the appropriate, though defendant made even he or she was wrong capacity agent another, served in the *4 or as of or upon a trustee who power management has title to but no of or property control over constituting real a trust of which the (4) beneficiary; is a person, within time that the action 94 her, against him right or brought asserted might or have grew out of pending and that it original action was that the
knew her; involving concerning him or a transaction or occurrence (5) pleadings original and amended appears from the grew out of pleading in the amended of action asserted the cause original pleading up in the set transaction or occurrence the same action under those preserving the cause of purpose of ***.For adding as a defendant re- conditions, an amendment filing original pleading so to the date of the lates back amended.” 616(d) of of section Here, all five conditions plaintiffs assert however, conditions, all five need not examine are met. We the Code of requisite elements satisfy one of the even the failure because complaint from precludes the amended of the Code section 2— (1994), App. 262 Corp. Service v. Ambulance relating back. Webb 643, 1039, 1043-44, 635 N.E.2d 3d in inadvertence requirement: meet the second
Plaintiffs do not Although pleadings. in earlier failing proper name the "inadvertence,” the term was first defined not define the statute does 61, 55, (1961), App. 2d 32 Ill. Bank Chicago v. National Robinson Appellate Court defined First District where the (Ill. 46(4) Practice Act the Civil of as used "inadvertence” 2—616 of 46(4)), predecessor to section 1959, 110, par. ch. Rev. Stat. 1992)). (West Robinson, (735 ILCS the Code 5/2 —616 defendant, arguing even include pleading to sought to amend her six identity the defendant of aware of the though had been she limitations, her failure running the statute of prior to the months dis court merely "inadvertent.” had been the defendant to name agreed: ignorance, excusable means 'inadvertence’
"In view the word our When facts are discovered. act after the failure to not excusable she knew the interrogatories the answers plaintiff read ignorant of not then She was identity proper defendants. diligence after the reasonable plaintiff must act with any fact. A (Robinson,32 Ill. known.” identity defendants becomes of the true N.E.2d at App. 2d at 176 Shupe v. Cox adopted this definition This court There, after the statute 253-54. N.E.2d complaint to her sought to amend run, been aware defendants, though she had even include additional limita running of the statute prior to the identity 14 months (Ill. 46(4) Stat. Act Rev. Practice the Civil argued section tions. She 46(4)) because defendants add these her to allowed par. ch. fol- This court merely "inadvertent.” so had been failure to do her *5 rejected lowed and plaintiff’s argument. Robinson This court concluded: adopt plaintiff’s would, reasoning theoretically, place
"To no time suit, upon nullify any protection against limit and would stale hold, case, plaintiff’s claims. We under the of this facts that fail inadvertent, parties ure to add the additional inexcusable failure to act with reasonable was not but was
diligence after identity (Cox, 420, defendants’ became known.” Ill. 2d 253-54.) 191 N.E.2d at Cox, Since Robinson and this definition of "inadvertence” has been applied consistently long in a in appellate line of cases courts: " 'Inadvertence’ has been ignorance, defined as excusable discovered,
excusable failure to act after the facts are does not include the true appropriately failure to act where the defendant’s *** identity plaintiff. is known plaintiff Where a has identity made aware of the of a period defendant before the run, of limitations has but does not amend his to add run, defendant until after the statute join has the failure to (Zincoris that defendant will not be considered inadvertent.” v. Hobart Brothers Co. 243 App. 1327, Our research has revealed no case which repudiated has these principles, and no case which has contrary held to these cases and al- lowed a to add a defendant under section 2—616 of the Code when the knew of the identity true of that prior running to the of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs and the dissent would have us rule contrary years to 35 interpreting case law sec- 616, and allow to amend their even though they were aware of decedent’s death prior 18 months to the running of the statute of limitations. We decline to do so. The reason- ing of this court in persuasive Cox is no less today. Plaintiffs cannot rely on section support 2—616 as position. for their
Plaintiffs would have us believe the fact attorney their mistakenly spelled "Somers” as in pleadings "Summers” later they reveals were not aware of the death of decedent Gene "Somers” until after his responded estate in pleadings and indicated decedent had died. However, this contradicts the clear and undisputed deposition testimony in they which they admit became aware of the death of decedent in September early late According October 1992. deposition testimony Patricia, she Phillip and her husband read obituary decedent’s days within a few after his Phillip stated it was the same involved in their car accident and named as a ongoing litigation. Moreover, defendant in their plaintiffs’ "Response to Request Defendant’s to Admit” dated Janu- death within sev-
ary plaintiffs admit knew had died. attorney their decedent days eral of his death and told attorney mistakenly their then response, plaintiffs also state their "Summers,” and after the Gene probate records for searched attorney "Summers,” Gene not indicate the death of search did However, assumption the defendant was still alive. proceeded on the attorney ignored several cor- explanation how their plaintiffs offer no insurer, Mutual, respondences to him from Standard Stan- name of its insured. correctly spelled "Somers” as the which it attorney dated correspondence plaintiffs’ did so dard Mutual 1993. This and December December September November notice attorney at least seven months’ gave plaintiffs’ probate search for limitations to conduct a running the statute of did attorney do this. Plaintiffs "Somers,” plaintiffs’ did not but Gene defendant, of decedent as naming the estate pleading file a not however, July 1994. until *6 facts, they and their at- suggest
Notwithstanding these time because complaint until this file an amended torney did not unaware name caused them to be of last misspelling their decedent’s misrepre- an intentional claim amounts to death. This decedent’s file their 18 months left to Plaintiffs had about to the court. sentation death, but did knowledge of decedent’s having actual pleadings after frame. so in that time to amend to do estate or move not name the they proceeded diligent in the sense may have been Their late efforts original complaint, but filing their weeks of in fashion within this to meet this plaintiffs failed Because delay was not inadvertent. Code, not discuss the we need of the of section condition 2— statutory requirements. other Graber, (1983), 115 Ill. Inc. heavily Evans v. rely
Plaintiffs correctly note Evans They 485-86. App. 3d 616(d) may file under section plaintiff proposition for the stands 2— the pleading where relating to the initial pleading back an amended soon after timely pleading the amend diligently moves at focus our Plaintiffs identity proper the defendant. learning the diligently amended their they on the fact tention learning of after "Somers” soon last name spell decedent’s properly name is However, last spelling of decedent’s spelling. the correct they knew By admission their own irrelevant here. party de as 1992, yet name his estate did not September attorney had notice Moreover, plaintiffs’ July 1994. until
fendant September early as as last name spelling of the correct "Somers,” Gene whether attempt to ascertain no but made informed died, had "Summers,” than Gene rather diligent. him. This is
Although plaintiffs argument, make no such the dissent concludes plaintiffs were entitled to name the estate of Gene Somers as a defen- 209(c) Code, dant under section of the which states: "If against commences an action a deceased expiration whose death is unknown to the before the of the thereof, time limited for the commencement ac- the cause of survives, barred, and is not com- otherwise person’s personal representative menced if deceased following all of the terms and conditions are met: (1) learning party proceeds with reason- After diligence able to move the court for leave to file an amended com- plaint, substituting personal representative as defendant.” added.) (735 209(c)(1)(West 1992).) (Emphasis ILCS 5/13— already As we explained, have plaintiffs were aware of decedent’s death at the time filed their naming him aas defen 209(c) Therefore, dant. appear inap Code would plicable. dissent, however, The although admitting section 13— uses the words "whose death is party,” unknown to the believes these impose words do not a substantive condition and section 13— 209(c) applies even where a is aware of a defendant’s death yet carelessly naming acts deceased instead (See estate. 3d at We understand the dissent’s concern, essence, that form not be elevated over substance. However, proposed reading dissent’s of section is directly contrary to its plain language, as well as the policy behind this section. primary statutory construction, rule of to which all other subordinate,
rules are is to give ascertain and effect to the true intent legislature. In determining legislative intent, a court should first statutory consider the language. statutory Where the language clear, is given will be effect without resort to other aids for However, construction. language ambiguous, where the ap it is *7 propriate legislative to examine history. the (People ex rel. Baker v. (1992), 193, Cowlin 154 Ill. 2d 607 N.E.2d In determining legislative intent, may a court consider the reason and necessity law, for remedied, the the objects evils to be and the to be addition, attained. In a construing court language the of a statute will legislature assume that the produce did not intend to an absurd unjust (1992), result. State Farm Fire Casualty Yapejian & Co. v. Ill. 2d 605 N.E.2d
Here, 209(c) plain the unambiguous and language of section 13— of the plaintiff Code allows a against to commence a suit a deceased’s personal representative if only the deceased’s death was unknown to Therefore, we original complaint was filed. when the give language without resort to other aids statu-
must this effect supports legislative history of this section also tory construction. The interpretation. this 209(c) notes, enacted section of the Code was
As the dissent
13—
v.
Supreme
Vaughn
Court of Illinois
after the decision of
Vaughn,
126 Ill. 2d
The situation here they named death when the decedent’s were unaware of Here, plaintiffs were aware complaint. him in their as the defendant in their him as the defendant they named when decedent’s death was not of the Code Thus, appears complaint. Moreover, interpreting sec here. the situation address intended to are who encourage plaintiffs apply here would tion 13— *8 99 possible aware a failing defendant’s death to fabricate for excuses personal representative to name as a defendant the of the estate of would, theoretically, that deceased. This place bring no time limit on ing suit, a because a could at time after the statute of Surely limitations had run seek to add a defendant under this section. legislature this is not what the enacting intended in section 13— 209(c), why and that is requirement it included the a must be unaware proposed defendant’s death. dissent, however,
The would read "whose death is unknown to 209(c) party” the as stated in section as "whose death is un known party or the party’s attorney.” way, In this the dissent proposes, the statute policy would further the behind section 13— " ' 209, which the dissent "implement legislative notes is to the intent preserve to causes of including sounding wrongful those ’ ” (278 against death by loss pleading.” reason of technical rules of App. quoting 3d at Hardimon v. Carle Clinic Association (1995), App. 117, 121, 272 Ill. 281, 283, 3d quoting 650 N.E.2d Red mond v. Central Community Hospital proposed dissent’s interpretation runs
directly plain counter to unambiguous the language of section 209(c). We can find no authority interpreting for the word 13— "party” anything
to mean other parties than one of the actual to a lawsuit: " 'Party’ a having is technical precise meaning legal word
parlance; by against it refers to legal those or whom suit is brought, equity, whether in party plaintiff law or in or defen- dant, composed whether of one or more individuals and whether legal persons; natural or all others who be affected suit, indirectly consequently, persons are interested but not (Black’s (6th 1990).) parties.” Dictionary Law ed.
Thus, a party’s attorney party is not a to the lawsuit in which that party By reading is involved. "party” as used in section party’s include the attorney, the dissent would us do have what our supreme Vaughn court in authority said it did not have to do: rewrite the Code to allow the pleading amend their after the statute of Regardless, explained limitations had run. as we have earlier, plaintiffs attorney admit informed their soon after plaintiffs’ attorney had notice spelling the correct of decedent’s name well in end advance period. short, statute of limitations does support plaintiffs’ position.
Plaintiffs then assert even if the statute of limitations otherwise
claim,
barred their
the conduct of defendant’s
company,
insurance
Mutual,
asserting
from
the statute
estopped
Standard
has
requires
elements.
Equitable estoppel
six
of limitations as
defense.
First,
against
party
or conduct
whom
there must words
or concealment
estoppel
alleged amounting
misrepresentation
to a
is
al
Second,
estoppel
material facts.
whom
were
knowledge
representations
the time the
leged must have had
Third,
respecting
not true.
the truth
representations
made the
were
claiming
so made must be unknown to the
representations
*9
were made
estoppel
representations
at the time the
the benefit
Fourth,
by
him.
they
and
the time
were acted on
at
reasonably expect
representa
estopped must intend or
his conduct
Fifth,
estoppel.
by
party asserting the
upon
tions will be acted
good
faith
claiming
estoppel
the benefit of the
must have
detriment, and this reliance
upon
misrepresentation
relied
to his
Sixth,
estop
party claiming
the benefit
must be reasonable.
party is
prejudiced if the first
pel must have acted so he would be
162-63,
126 Ill. 2d at
deny
Vaughn,
the truth thereof.
permitted to
Plaintiffs assert failed to because Stan naming estate as a defendant decedent’s be settled. Conduct them to believe the case would dard Mutual led instances, can, give appar rise to "an in some defendant’s insurer claim” from rais estop will defendant pay ent intent to which (See 126 Ill. 2d at Vaughn, as a defense. ing the statute of limitations 891.) is what occurred 164-65, Plaintiffs assert this 533 N.E.2d at However, is without merit. here. this contention attorney and their correspondence between Plaintiffs assert settle, and intent to demonstrated defendant’s Standard Mutual by failing to file suit detrimentally on this intent plaintiffs relied let assertions, language of these Contrary plaintiffs’ sooner. a lawsuit would expressly informed defendant shows ters $250,000 them. tendered to policy limits of were unless the full filed instead made rejected plaintiffs’ offer and expressly Defendant their $8,500. rejected the defendant to settle for When counteroffer counteroffer, plaintiffs were ultimatum, grossly disparate made a and claim unless to resist intended aware argue defendant Plaintiffs cannot now their demand. greatly reduced (See Vaughn, 126 pay the claim.” "apparent an intent to exhibited interpretation No reasonable Ill. 2d at The this contention. supports correspondence from defendant law, conclude, no conduct as a matter of trial court was entitled going claim was to believe their Mutual induced Standard to be settled. they detrimentally
Plaintiffs also contend relied on "defendant’s implied apparent regarding misrepresentations decedent’s death” because decedent’s insurer never mentioned the death of decedent during negotiations. This contention is without merit. Even if Stan- misrepresentation, plaintiffs dard Mutual’s conduct amounted to a knowledge September had actual of decedent’s death in 1992. alleged misrepresen- Plaintiffs cannot now contend relied on an contrary. concluding tation to the The trial court did not err in conduct, law, estop insurer’s as a matter of did not defen- raising dant from the statute of limitations aas defense. judgment
The of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCullough, j., concurs. COOK,
PRESIDING JUSTICE dissenting: I respectfully dissent. injured
Plaintiffs were in an April 14, automobile accident on two-year personal injury statute of limitations was to expire 14, 1994, April 21, 1994, but on March plaintiffs filed their complaint against Marlyss defendants Gene Somers Somers, mis- spelling their names. Unfortunately, Gene Septem- Somers had died ber and an administrator had appointed for him on *10 11, (replaced March by special 1993 a administrator, Thomas Good- 1993). win, 27, on October After quash, defendants filed a motion to 11,1994, April on plaintiffs appointment filed a motion for special of a 22, April 1994, administrator on a then motion to add Goodwin as a May
A similar fact
Vaughn,
plaintiffs’
situation existed in
where
com
plaint,
days
filed a
expiration
few
before the
of the statute of limita
tions,
Speaker
named Wilbur
as a defendant. When summons was
unserved, plaintiffs
returned
Speaker
learned that
was deceased and
attempted to serve the executors of his estate. The court decided the
616(d)
(Dl.
case under
of the Code.
Rev. Stat.
ch.
2—
616(d).)
par.
simply
The court refused to
a
label
suit
a
"nullity.”
deceased
a
(Vaughn,
157, 159-60,
In the majority notice, case the rely upon does not lack of 102 616(d) of the Code that the upon requirement
but of section (735 join "failure to as a defendant was inadvertent.” 616(d) (West 1992).) majority failure to ILCS The finds that the 5/2 — something more than inadvertence name the estate this case was inadvertence?), "knew,” (gross because before their com- filed, recognize plaint was that Gene Somers was deceased. I we attorneys, encourage slipshod part on the but should not work in this case does not further punishment plaintiffs’ carelessness 616(d). policy of section 2— filed, suit is Complications may arise when defendants die before cases should legislative policy and the is that such have bring where have additional time to action. Even (See right bring their action. carelessly they still have a acted 892.) at 533 N.E.2d at "Inadvertent” Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d "INATTENTIVE,” matter,” turning the mind to a means "not (Webster’s Dictionary Collegiate Ninth New "UNINTENTIONAL.” (1986).) intentionally name plaintiff A not be allowed to should filing gain or to wrong attempt in an to extend the time for of such intentional advantage, other but there is no indication some in this case. misconduct a suggests allowing that the estate to be added as majority
The bringing time limit on "theoretically, place would no limita suit, time after the statute of because a could (278 3d at had run seek to add a defendant.” tions however, cases, filed and service is commenced all a lawsuit is these limitations. These cases two-year period of the statute of within the quash is filed always a motion to dismiss or come to head when just could running of the statute. If the statute days few after the weeks, In the absence of problem. be no a few there would extended misconduct, that the stat legislative policy is the any intentional litigants do majority’s approach rewards who The ute be extended. it is too late for of a defendant until not mention the death anything it. to do about did supreme court implication Vaughn an
There is legislature should appropriate and that consider the result (See 161, 126 Ill. 2d at changes Vaughn, in the rule. consider ("Nor inher a rule under our may we formulate such at 890 N.E.2d procedure” rules of statutory authority to formulate ent and added)).) sugges on that apparently acted legislature (emphasis (c) the Code. 13—209 of to section and added a new subsection *11 (added 209(c) (West 1992) 793, eff. by Pub. Act 735 ILCS 5/13 — 86— 4195). 1990) (1989 January Ill. Laws 209(c) Code, a commences when Under section 13—
103 unknown, against death the ac an action deceased whose is against person’s personal represen be refiled the deceased long complaint years so the is filed two of tative amended within expiration the original the the statute of limitations. If amended of letters, the of complaint is filed more than six months after issuance only protected by liability is to extent it insur estate liable is (735 209(c)(West 1992).) It anee. 209(c) ILCS is true that section 13— 5/13 — (735 party” uses the death words "whose is unknown to the (West 209(c) 1992)), only in my ILCS but view those words are 5/13 — descriptive ap of the situation where section is meant to ply impose rigorous and are not intended to substantive condition. Section lists four "terms which and conditions” must A party’s knowledge met. lack of of death is not one of those conditions, although required learning terms and it is of that after proceeds diligence death the with reasonable seek leave an complaint. to file majority sug amended That was done here. The gests plaintiffs that "knew” decedent’s death before the statute (278 95.) App. Actually, ran. Ill. at can most that be said is plaintiffs that should have undisputed known decedent’s death. The obituary, evidence is that communicated read the with attorney, attorney but when the checked out the information (mistakenly) he determined it was not accurate. A who told something, it, but does believe be said cannot to "know” it. majority opinion *12 Marlyss apparently
was to be
on Gene.
notified
in-
served
Somers
herself,
company
attorney
surance
which insured Gene and
and the
represented Marlyss
represents Gene Somers.
who
also
estate of
Goodwin, in
Special
deposition,
having
administrator
his
admitted
knowledge
April
running
this suit
stat-
any event,
notice
ute of limitations.
substituted
requirement
under
Code.
Code,
I
Under both sections
would
court
judgment
of the trial
and remand so that
estate
reverse
of Gene
could be
defendant.
Somers
added
FERNANDES,
PONTHIEUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BILLIE V.
JACK
d/b/a
Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Fernandes Construction
Fourth District No. 4—95—0363
Opinion
February
filed
notes
that
"were aware
prior
running
decedent’s death 18 months
to the
of the statute of lim
(278
App.
situation, however,
itations.”
Ill.
3d at
This
not a
was
which was
passage
made worse
point
of time. The critical
was
attorney
when
learned of Somers’ death and the
determined
occurred,
information was not accurate.
Once
made no dif
days passed
ference whether 18
or 18 months.
Hardimon
involved
which recited that
duly
administrator,
appointed
a special
ap
although no such
pointment had then been
made
none was made
run
ning of the
statute
limitations. What the court said
that case is
"
616(b)
equally applicable here. Section
was adopted
imple
'to
legislative
preserve
ment
including
intent
causes of sounding wrongful
those
loss
reason of technical
” Hardimon,
pleading.’
rules of
App.
3d at
Redmond,
quoting
3d at