*1 Judge Fahy grant opinion of gree trial Part I of the him a new murder and majority expressed charge the view of com- an instruction of that application the Youth expressed. court on formably with the views above Act, and was concurred Corrections convic- in affirmance I concur majority Part II of the of the court. robbery. tion of Judge Fahy, joined opinion Baze- Wright Judge, Skelly lon, and J. Chief Robinson, III, Spottswood Circuit W. Judges, from the determination dissented validly jury trial was waived. Judge Mac- Part majority expressed the view of Kinnon application of the the court on HARVIN, Appellant, Augustus E. Part II of Act. Correction joined Judge MacKinnon, opinion of America, Wilkey, Robb, UNITED McGowan, Leventhal, STATES Appellee. Judges, expressed the conclusion Circuit validly jury No. 22317. that a trial was waived. Judge Tamm, joined Robb Appeals, United States Court agreed Wilkey, Judges, Circuit District of Circuit. Columbia jury validly trial was waived. Argued Jan. 1970. Robb, Skelly Wright, Tamm, joined J. Reargued En Banc Jan. Judges, Wilkey, dissented Circuit May 7, majority’s toas Decided determination from the application of the Youth Act. by Fahy,
Opinions filed were Senior Judge, Circuit and MacKinnon and Tamm, Circuit-Judges. *2 petit larceny,
eral Sessions for in viola- 22-2202, tion of Code and for un- D.C. § entry property, lawful on in violation of D.C. Code Both offenses 22-3102. § He demand misdemeanors. withdrew his court, jury, for a asked to be tried tried in that was He was manner. petit larceny acquitted of and convicted entry. penalty The for this unlawful 22-3102, offense, prescribed Section exceeding imprison- is a fine $100 jail ment for not more than six months, sentenced, or both. He how- was ever, Act, under the Youth Corrections seq., provides et 18 U.S.C. § that a sentenced under the Act conditionally shall su- be released pervision expiration on or before the years four shall from his conviction and discharged unconditionally be- on or
years fore six from conviction.
Appellant contends his sentence under the Youth Corrections Act caused the Court General to have Sessions jurisdiction try been him be without support pros cause to such a sentence been ecution should have indictment. additionally He contends that his waiver by jury had trial was invalid since he previously court been advised that he could be sentenced entailing possi Act, bly longer liberty deprivation of than is 22-3102 for authorized Section Lamb, Washington, D. B. Mr. David violation was convicted. court), appel- (appointed C. Appeals District of Columbia Court of lant. affirmed. Harvin v. United Atty., Aldock, Mr. S. John D. Asst. U. (D.C.App.1968). A.2d 307 We allowed Flannery, Thomas A. whom Messrs. appeal an to this court. Terry, Atty., Asst. U. and John A. U. S. hear Thereafter the court decided to brief, appellee. Atty., were on S. prior judgment the case en banc and the accordingly BANC of a of the court EN division ON REHEARING hearing Following banc vacated. en Judge, BAZELON, Chief Before in favor consideration the court decided Judge, FAHY, Circuit Senior of affirmance of the conviction. TAMM, WRIGHT, McGOWAN, LEV- MacKINNON, ROBINSON, ENTHAL, Judges Bazelon, McGowan, Leventhal, Judges, WILKEY, sit- Circuit ROBB Spottswood Robinson, III and Mac- W. ting en banc. Fahy’s join Judge Kinnon Part Skelly Judges opinion. Bazelon, J. PER CURIAM: Wright Robinson, Spottswood III W. Judge Fahy’s join opinion. in Part II of an Information tried on Appellant was Judges Bazelon, Fahy, McGowan, Leven- of Gen- of Columbia the District Robinson, Spottswood (1876), III W. thal and L.Ed. 889 Mackin Judge States, supra, join place v. United I of MacKinnon’s in Part Leventhal, McGowan, Judges opinion. sentenced those Judge against join offense Wilkey in Part II of the United States for a Robb and period longer By Judges year. opinion. than a Robb 18 U.S.C. MacKinnon’s history which traces its Wilkey join Tamm’s *3 2, 1895, 189, 1, Wright Skelly joins Judge in March ch. 28 J. 957, Congress provided Stat. thereof. Parts I-IV penitentiary, a federal what the decisions Affirmed. made clear is in now embodied statute following form: Judge, FAHY, Circuit Senior Persons convicted offenses whom BAZELON and Cir- Chief * * * against the United States LEVENTHAL, Judges McGOWAN, cuit punishable by imprisonment for more in ROBINSON and MaeKINNON concur year may any than one in be confined Judge BAZELON, I, and Chief Part penitentiary. United States Judges Circuit WRIGHT ROBIN- II. With the in Part law this situation Rule 7 SON concur (a) of the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, adopted 1945, carried for- I. requirement ward the indictment provides part Fifth Amendment The Fifth the Rules as Amendment into fol- as follows: lows: person held to shall be answer No punished by An offense which crime, capital, a otherwise infamous or imprisonment exceeding for a term one presentment or indictment a unless on year prose- or at hard shall be labor * * Jury *. of a Grand * * * cuted indictment [unless U.S.Const, waived]. amend. V. original The Note to Committee “or in the amendment to reference The explains: Rule crime” infamous became
otherwise
subject
Supreme
deci-
gives
of several
This rule
to the
effect
follow-
ing
sions, by
established
provision
it was
of the Fifth Amendment
punishable
im-
such a crime was one
Constitution
United
years
prisonment
hard
at
person
for a term
or
States:
shall be held
“No
417,
Wilson,
5
parte
114
capital,
U.S.
labor. Ex
answer for a
or otherwise in-
(1885);
935,
crime,
present-
89
Mackin
29 L.Ed.
famous
on a
S.Ct.
unless
348,
6 S.Ct.
Jury
117 U.S.
United
ment or
v.
indictment of Grand
-x-* -x->>_
Claasen,
777,
(1886);
In re
29
909
^n infamous crime has
L.Ed.
been
735,
200,
409
punishable
35
140
11 S.Ct.
defined
U.S.
L.Ed.
as a crime
death
Moreland,
(1891);
by imprisonment
penitentiary
v.
258
States
United
368,
433,
labor,
700
parte
66 L.Ed.
U.S.
42 S.Ct.
or at hard
Ex
Wilson, 5
935,
427,
417,
make
decisions
clear
S.Ct.
29
The
U.S.
L.Ed.
114
Moreland,
years
89;
imprisonment
a term of
States
368,
433,
700,
prison
peniten-
one
in a
66 L.Ed.
state
served
early
Any
which,
tiary,1
sentence of im-
992.
A.L.R.
Karstendick,
prisonment
parte
for a term of over one
Ex
see
Stat.
Bridge.
palace
originally
with confinement
It
built
This is
contrast
*
*
*
by Henry
called
St.
work
VIII.
So
“house
correction
* *
(or
by.
parte
Bridget’s) well near
A
Ex
Bride’s
bridewell
house and
jail
correction;
loosely,
Wilson, supra,
house of
at
prison.
“Bridewell” is defined
Web
Dictionary,
International
Webster’s New
ster as follows:
Unabridged.
standing
Ed.
2nd
till
house of correction
A
near Blackfriars
in London
Fifth
Clause of the
penitentiary,
Process
Due
year
be served
Amendment,2
General,
it is
true that
Attorney
also
by the
if so directed
de-
for an offense
available
sentence
[now
753f
§§
18 U.S.C. [former]
* * *
infamous.3
Consequently
termines whether
punishment,
4083].
however,
which determines
punishable
offense
infamy
question
that which
year is an in-
of over one
for a term
itself, in Harvin’s
the offense
related to
famous crime.
imprison-
exceed six months
case not to
enlarge
require-
The Rule does
is the
ment. That
beyond
“capi-
ment of an indictment
gov-
prevailing
reflects
erning authorities,
views
crime,” of
tal,
infamous
or otherwise
represented
brings
simply
Amendment.
the Fifth
law, as
the offense
to the seriousness of
together
the criteria which
form
rule
—its
or non-infamous char-
infamous
*4
by
Supreme
the
had been established
acter.4
infamous
an “otherwise
for
A
under the
Correc-
sentence
by
crime,” namely,
punishable
an offense
following
Act,
tions
in this
case
exceeding one
a term
for
misdemeanor,
viction of a
is not a
year
at hard labor.
legislature
flection
the
of the serious-
of
sen-
ness
that offense. Resort
the
foregoing it is clear
From the
tencing judge to the Youth Corrections
led to Harvin’s
that the offense which
punish
Act
not
for the
Harvin
crime, for
an infamous
sentence was not
misdemeanor;
carry
it
the
out
by imprisonment
punishment
carried a
congressional purpose represented by the
exceed
months. Both adults
not to
six
society
Act—to
serve the interests of
youths may
prosecuted for that
be
youth
prefer-
of
in
selected
an
The sentence
offense on
information.
statutory
ence to the
the
sentence for
imposed under
Youth Corrections
the
Act
misdemeanor. A sentence under the
prose
for
Act does not alter the basis
the
itself,
not related to the
and it
offense
the offense
an
cution
transform
into
punishment
the
the latter which
infamous one. A sentence under the
prosecution
determines whether the
must
Act it is true
result
loss for
year
liberty
Sentencing
protected
than a
the
more
of the
indictment.
under
Pilkington
Cunningham,
236,
v.
do
Jones
83
not
think
inter-
371
is to be
;
preted
holding
373,
“greater pen-
the
9
as
L.Ed.2d 285
United
alty”
U.S.App.D.C.
Fort,
States v.
under
the Youth
Act
(1969) ; Pilkington
to which the court
referred is such im-
maximum for first offender. cision, it that notice of assumes because Columbia, 194 District In Dobkin v. of available af- the nature of the sentence (D.C.App.1963), District A.2d 657 fects to exercise the decision whether Appeals before had of of Columbia Court right jury, tried a whereas to be had been a in which the sentence case estab- nature the sentence Dobkin the of § authorized D.C.Code increased as goes beyond right itself, lishes the The trial 22-104 for a offense. second pertinent to ours. case and more becomes judge of the Court had a of been jury. The without a General Sessions case, appellant’s In decision in how- its uphold Appeals could not Court of ever, of the District of Columbia brought enlargement because its sentence avoided, unpersuasively, Appeals I think conferred the case within class implications of its Dobkin right by jury, he had trial holding Lawrence, by and its decision right. The this not advised of been appellant’s under the Youth sentence court stated: punishment, Act was subjected a defendant to be If though longer possibly duration than fifty greater percent penalty under § A a authorizes. sentence Section 3102 22-104, of this notice he entitled to having the sentence under the Act not ** * prior In this case to trial. punishment, dura- characteristics of its gave ap- government notice to no the pellant prior enlarged, held, not- tion be the court could might be to trial that he withstanding appellant so had not been subjected penalties the added § right to admonished when he waived his 22-104; consequently he could out, pointed by jury. trial The court subjected them. have been however, perhaps fairness procedure better the court A.2d at 660. might to inform a defendant he sen- question whether have is While the we Act, tenced under the Youth Corrections intelligently appellant competently and so doubt that there could no he know- by jury, he trial not whether was waived ingly right intelligently waived his tried, ap- Dobkin entitled so to be by jury. to trial ground in pellant’s on common case are right jury in Dob- neither accept I cannot the distinction drawn jury appel- kin nor the waiver punishment the court between the issue case concerned with lant’s under the sentence Act insofar waiver guilt with the of might but sentence by jury trial is concerned. While follow conviction. true, is opinion, I have Part this said in I of States, 224 A.2d Lawrence v. does not lead to (D.C.App.1966), of Co- District punishment the kind of Appeals affirmed Dob- lumbia Court of requires prosecution which grand to be on further kin and went somewhat jury action, enlarged duration appears appellant’s As enlarged direction case. liberty, similarly to an loss opinion, punishment offender, from the as a second factor of be ad- which the accused must [A]ppellant and had entitled to deciding vised in tried. The how to be trial, originally jury but for a asked length situation, in one voluntarily demand later withdrew length liberty deprivation and the court. to be tried chose other, in de- knowledge are of like relevance had At that time he no termining 22-104 under be sentenced the accused is en- advice *9 waiving trial, second offender]. prior jury [as titled to have to though liberty deprivation even the A.2d at 224 684 by jury; offense which makes the of trial for at date the waiver the the basis of the whole matter
infamous.
simple
ad-
fact that the accused should be
reaching
have
In
I
the above conclusion
vised
alternatives available to
those
by
place
trial
mind the fundamental
sentencing judge
the
which bear
guaranteed
jury
by
Amend-
the Sixth
make,
decision the accused must
whether
crim-
ment has in our administration of
plead guilty
be to
or to waive
Supreme
inal
Decisions of the
law.
right
by jury.
Sixth Amendment
to trial
by
have establishd strict
standards
Straite,
validity
United States v.
determine the
of waiver
App.D.C. 163,
(1970),
right.
prior A 1959 section amendment to convicted law. following against produced of an offense result: courts-martial, punisha- Penitentiary imprisonment; “§ by imprisonment ble more than 1 consent. any peni- year, confined offenses Persons convicted tentiary.” H.R.Rep.No.934, 86th against courts- the United States Sess., Cong., accompany 1st S. punishable imprisonment martial Cong. p. Ad.News, 2 U.S. Code & year than more one peniten- fined in United States legislative emerged history From such tiary. present section 4083. punisha- “A sentence an offense Turning language then sec- year one ble *13 constituted, presently tion as when 4083 peniten- be less shall not served my considered, all factors are is con- tiary de- the of the without consent import the clusion that the clear 1959, 14, September ofAct fendant.” gressional intent the indicates 86-256, Pub.Law 73 Stat. punishable to statute refers “offense [s] to this was The effect of amendment by imprisonment,” Congress intended to for substitute the first sentence to alter imposed punishment by refer to the the reading to “and sentenced clause criminal statute the sub- which defined imprisonment the shorter of” terms of stantive and not to “treat- offense reading by imprison- “punishable clause by supervision” ment authorized for.” ment by compelled YCA. This is conclusion purpose amendment of this 1959 The congressional several indicia of intent. Report ac- stated the House First, provisions the basic of section companied to as follows: the bill be long 4083 were enacted before the YCA pres- “Briefly, part the first contemplated and thus never a YCA (which title is 4083 statute sec. ent question sentence.6 There is thus no Code) provides that States at its time of the term “sen- enactment impris- persons terms of sentenced to solely tence” referred to the sentence year of more than 1 onment by prescribed statute, the criminal penitentiary. a U.S. confined contemplated type disposi- never pro- part statute of that “The second possible YCA, tion now be- for an offense that a sentence vides did cause such not then exist. year imprisonment by for punishable Secondly, pure is additional YCA peniten- not be served less shall legislation. pro- repeal It carries no de- tiary the consent without (64 seq.). et The vision Stat. fendant. any repealer absence of and the tenor is si- law noted that “It bewill entire Act indicates an intent to respect persons who to lent with provisions harmonize the of the YCA is, any felony (that aof convicted existing sup- and not to statutes by imprisonment punishable offense plant them. year) are sen- who than 1 but for more construed, (sec- year purpose the entire statute The So less. to tenced gap pro- 4083) tion an intent to manifests bill is to close the instant probation enacted ers could be or to Act was sentenced The custody Attorney (64 1085). The General for September Stat. juvenile’s exceeding preceded Delinquency terms not minor- had Juvenile ity proviso being years, with the further enacted June two 857). (62 “commitment” shall not exceed the term Jurisdiction Stat. imposed might Delinquency have been had proceed the Juvenile alleged been tried and convicted of the “consent” based Act was 5034) (62 858). (§ required 5032) juvenile Stat. (§ violation which was writing (§ 5033). offend- Juvenile inbe confinement, penitentiary period federal institution for vide variable might year. different non-penitentiary, for two time that one exceed offenses, e., categories those i. Additionally, since Government “more punishable by imprisonment place required to all other criminal of- punish- year,” (2) those than one categories pen- fenders in insofar as two year or “for one able itentiary concerned, I see however, generally YCA, less.” hardship no or violence administrative proceeds different standard. legislative do, conclude, intent is wheth- and that has one criterion sen- under § has committed er the under the YCA tenced misdemeanors imprison- “punishable offense that of the same are receive benefit (c). 5010(b) ment.” 18 U.S.C. § categories purposes two classification supervision” Thus, the “treatment and if determining eligibility pen- their considered the YCA were authorized itentiary punishment, to be which section the “sentence” subjected to more onerous offender, every youth applied to be respect, than adult violators .of concerned, far as section 4083 so accordingly my same statutes. It is view penitentiary confinement. subject youth offender, that no committed sen- variable circumstances Under punishable tenced for an offense misdemeanants for felons *14 defining provisions of the sub- it was section 4083 intended stantive crime for to one wiped completely out enacted would year less, any may be confined youth all of- since offenders all penitentiary. And this the absolute is have the YCA under fenders sentenced regardless rule of desirable how or neces- 6-year period of potential maximum sary person position some in an official supervision.7 sub- It is treatment might consider it to be to confine absurd an mitted that this would be youth offender of a misde- convicted to an intent it attribute as would sult my view, penitentiary. meanor Congress more provide a harsher to entirely interpretation keep- is youth form infamous ing applies with the YCA and also sec- provided for adult than that offenders pre- tion in the manner reasonable However, of the same statute. violators congressional sumed to be intended all everything in- an in the YCA indicates require “proper acts and so to Congress provide milder and tent implied by adequate treatment” understanding and su- more U.S.C. § in- pervision that considerate broad Judge point constru- not be furthered Tamm’s tent would on this ing completely suggests so as to render that the YCA the YCA modeled on Chapter nugatory of section the second sentence 305 of Title United States involving (18 youth (1964)), of- in all cases Code U.S.C. 4081-4086 §§ parallel independent are sentenced under fenders who constitutes system produce processing offenders, youth so YCA. To do would youth congruous supercede of- result those and thus would other more statutory general penal are fenders who convicted correctional statutes. under and sentenced have misdemeanors been remodeled somewhat imprisoned chapter parallel under on would be 305 and it YCA legislation applicable And if rules to felons. but this is true to the parallel provisions held that so sentenced extent were those contains any parallel pro- and it to be confined does not the YCA were contain felons, applicable there vision to 4083 as indicated foot- rules § apply Thus, opinion. rule not to the same note 3 of Tamm’s be no reason juvenile all there no reason to conclude that offenders 2, supra. 7. See note completely in language prohibiting the that a sentence is YCA of 4083 clear § purpose keeping penitentiary beneficent
imprisonment in
without
interpretation
that statute and that such
persons convicted of
consent of
their
any
hard-
would not cause
administrative
punishable
a misdemeanor
offense
ship.
sen-
applicable
offenders
for misdemeanor
the YCA
tenced under
accordingly my
It is
conclusion that
nothing
YCA
There is
offenses.
Congress
any
YCA,
never intended the
provisions
that is inconsistent with
enacted,
other statute it
to be construed
nothing
there is
and hence
§
so
adult misdemeanor offenders
any
a conclusion that
to base
penitentiaries
could
be confined
supplements or
provision of the YCA
but
offenders convicted of
parallel to it.
replaces
even
4083 or is
§
same crimes could be so confined. To so
5011,8
particularly,
And more
§
hold would run counter
entire
segregation
provides for
warp
congressional leg-
woof
all
treatment,
completely
subject.
islation on the
provisions of
with the
consistent
§
penitentiary
prohibiting
II
any
(youth
adult)
convicted
In the absence
of a misdemeanor.
However, I do
not concur
Part
the two statutes
some conflict between
Judge Fahy’s opinion.
point
II
theOn
given
provisions
to be
both
there discussed I fail to see
error
gener-
is not to be
effect and
conflict
appellant
in the manner in which
waived
legis-
ated
references to remote
broad
right
jury
prejudice
to a
trial and no
history.
lative
him in
the fact that the record does
guarantees
jury
of 4083 not disclose
To hold
that his waiver of a
against
preceded by any
penitentiary
confinement were
trial
statement
inap-
judge
applicable
appellant,
trial
to adult offenders but
the
victed, might
if con
*15
youth
plicable
a
would be
offenders
be sentenced under the
contrary
to the
YCA rather
discrimination
whole
than to the
Actually,
purpose
by
tent and
YCA.
and
of the
fine authorized
D.C.Code
22-
3102,10
dealing
a
since
are
with
criminal
which
we
the crime of un
defines
strictly
in
entry.
always subject
statute it should
construed
lawful
be
He was
being
favor of the accused.9 This rule
interpretation
sentenced
the YCA wheth
applied
jury
as
to the statute
er he was tried
a
the court.
appellant’s
waiving
jury
in
would result
His
a
trial did not alter
being
ap-
any respect
restriction
in
controlled
the available sentence
plicable
possibilities.
However,
to misdemeanors. And to
is of course
argument
importation
a
judge
that the
of such
desirable for
trial
a
advise
youth
charged
“alien
limitation into a YCA sentence is
offender who is
with a
underlying philosophy,” my
possibility
to its
con- misdemeanor of the
of his
being
exactly
contrary.
find
clusion is
sentenced under
Cor-
offenders,
“Committed
offenders not
of
youth
condi-
committed
and such
tionally
undergo
segregated
released shall
shall he
offenders
from
security,
offenders,
in
me-
institutions
of maximum
other
and classes
security
security,
types,
segregated
dium
or minimum
shall he
ac-
schools,
hospitals,
including
training
cording to their needs
treatment.”
forestry
farms,
camps,
(emphasis
supplied).
other
U.S.C. § 5011
agencies
provide
es-
other
that will
Cook,
257, 262,
United States v.
384 U.S.
Di-
sential varieties
treament.
The
1412,
(1966) ;
86 S.Ct.
gQI
23(a)
pro- procedures prescribed by
warning
Such
Rule
Act.
rections
litigation.
my
understanding
view
is
and avert
sufficient.
mote
argu
Appellant
support
claims
for his
my
be concluded
it cannot
view
point
ment
on this
decision
jury
properly waived
not
a
trial was
Appeals
District of
Columbia
does not
show
the fact that
record
Columbia,
Dobkin v. District of
open
court
accused was informed
(D.C.App.1963).
A.2d
That decision
judge
of a fact
entitled to
held that
defendant was
way
waiver.
affected
Judge
prose
advance notice of an intention to
Fahy’s
opinion
on cases
11
relies
cute him as a second offender where
which
Fed.R.Crim.P.
under Rule
pos
additional
which became
procedure
judge
prescribes
a
must
adding
charge
sible
virtue
guilty.
accepting plea
The
a
follow in
right
he was a
created
second offender
do
Procedure
Federal Rules Criminal
jury
to a
trial
had not existed
proceedings in the
apply
criminal
States, 224
before. Lawrence v. United
for the Dis
Court of General Sessions
(D.C.App.1966),
A.2d
and Brandon
case was
trict
where this
of Columbia
(D.C.App.
A.2d
being referred
are
tried.12
rules
Such
1968),
cases,
upon.
are also
These
relied
they
involved
were
to here
because
Dobkin,
like
both deal with second of
Judge Fahy’s
in several cases cited
charges
fender
in which the Government
Rules
and because
Federal
give
required
final notice of its
recognized
providing
widely
prosecute
as a
intention
accused
acceptable procedures in criminal trials.
second
offender before withdraws
specifically
Federal Rule
states
jury
demand for a
trial.
defendant
the court should address the
however,
cases,
guilty
accepting
plea. Rule
These second offender
before
distinguishable
Fed.R.Crim.P.,13 however, provides
from situations aris-
are
ing
procedure
under the Youth Corrections Act.
a different
waiver
(1)
jury
In the
offender cases
accused
trial.
waiver must
second
Such
writing,
(2)
approval
placed
is not
on notice of the maximum
with the
charged
court,
punishment he
the consent of the
faces when he
actually
procedure
with an offense
sec-
Government. This
fol
additionally charg-
court,
opin
ond offense until it is
lowed
the trial
but
Any
formally
Fahy
effect im
ed
“second offense.”
ion
would in
however,
youth offender,
always
pose
procedural requirements
sub-
the same
*16
jury
imposed ject
possibility that
will
for
of a
trial
are
the
be
waiver
to
by
entry
plea
guilty.
from the mo-
for
of a
sentenced under the YCA
Rule 11
of
charged
required
and
maximum
To
is no
for the ment he is
the
me this
more
exposed
punishment to
he is
can-
Court
it would
of General Sessions than
enlarged
way.
in
not thereafter be
However,
be
Court.
the United States District
fully complied
maximum
the YCA the
trial court
with the
judgment upon
may
jilea
a
1 1.
The court shall not enter
“Pleas —A defendant
guilty
or,
guilty, guilty
it is
a
of
unless
satisfied that
the
of the
with
consent
idea
j)lea.”
may
court,
is a
basis
the
there
factual
nolo contendere.
The court
accept
jilea
guilty,
Fed.R.Crim.P.
of
refuse to
a
accejit
jilea
jilea
a
of
shall not
54(a)
(1)
12. See
and 54
Fed.R.Crim.P.
addressing
nolo contendere without
first
(c).
determining
personally
the
defendant
by
required
Jury.
jilea
voluntarily
“Trial
Cases
be
made
with
by jury
tried
shall be so tried unless the
charge
understanding of
nature
of the
jury
writing
consequences
defendant waives a
trial
jilea.
a
and the
of the
If
approval
with the
of
court
jilead
or if the court
defendant
refuses
government.”
accejit
consent of the
Fed.R.Crim.
jilea
guilty
or if a
refuses to
a
23(a).
P.
corjioration
ajijiear,
defendant
fails to
guilty.
jilea
court
shall enter a
of not
Supreme
possible punishment remains the same
which the
content of
tests
traditionally applied
altered Court
and is in nowise
has
deter-
at all times
mining
right
by
jury
the Fifth Amendment
a
trial.
waiver of
prosecution by
indictment attaches.
procedure required
Thus,
since
Judge
According to the
cited in
cases
by Rule
District Courts
States
guid-
Fahy’s opinion,
principle
the first
Fed.R.Crim.P., for
the waiver
ing analysis
present question is
of the
my
jury
followed, it is
view
a
trial
the determination of whether
protected
fully
procedure
all
that such
by
crime is
infamous should made
ref-
rights
appellant, and
we
punishment
erence to the
which could Dis-
should
the decision
affirm
statutory
imposed under the relevant
Appeals in
Court of
trict of Columbia
provisions,
rather than
reference
A.2d
Harvin
v. United
actually given
penalty
particular
(D.C.App.1968).
aspects
pos-
case. Two
of the maximum
punishment
significant
sible
in de-
TAMM,
Judge,
Cir-
whom
Circuit
termining whether the crime is infamous
concur,
Judges
cuit
ROBB WILKEY
meaning
within the
of the Fifth Amend-
Judge
and Circuit
SKELLY WRIGHT
J.
(1)
punitive
ment:
the nature
ac-
concurring
part
I-IV,
concurs in Parts
tivity
infamous,
inherently
itself
dissenting
part:
as,
example,
the case
hard labor
Judge
I
MacKinnon’s
concur
corporal punishment;
if the
validly
appellant
conclusion
punishment
is not
its nature
right
by jury.
waived
ever,
How
a trial
famous, then the duration and locus of
agree
either of
cannot
must
confinement
ically,
be examined. Histor-
suggested
Judge Fahy
approaches
standard for
infamous crimes
statutory
provides
MacKinnon
applied pursuant
inquiry
latter
this
satisfactorily re
construction
will
punish-
has been
whether
offense is
appellant’s challenge
practice
solve
to the
jail
peniten-
able
tiary
imposing
sentence under the Federal
year. Finally,
than
more
Youth Corrections
when the defend
Act
principles
cases
clear that these
make
prosecuted by
ant
ra
information
applied pragmatically
are to be
rather
Moreover,
ther than
even if
indictment.
mechanically,
appre-
than
with realistic
accept
persuaded
I could be
one of
partic-
ciation of the manner in which a
interpretations
governing
these
presently
ular
form
statutes, I do not believe that
case
community;
viewed
as the Su-
undertaking
can be decided without
leading
preme
stated in
case of
meaning
careful re-examination
parte Wilson,
417, 427,
Ex
phrase
punishment”
“infamous
(1885),
by panel, other members the of this there I have no doubt that the relevant sec- concerning is dispute little doctrinal the tions of the Federal “ person penalty ‘Youth offender’ means a lieu of the of other- age twenty-two years by the provided law, youth of the time wise sentence the 5000(e). custody Attorney conviction.” U.S.C. the to supervision “If the shall find a court that convicted General person youth offender, pursuant chapter discharged is a and the of- to this until punishable by imprisonment provided fense is un- the Division as section provisions applicable chapter.” 5017(c) der of law other of this 18 U.S.C. § subsection, may, 5010(b). 2, supra. than this the court *18 in U.S.C. 18 tion of treatment contained hu- edge particular of varieties to how 5006(g) (1964). changed § im- or man behavior can be that insuf- proved, the fact to obscure addition, practical diffi- there is a In correctional Judge for our Fahy’s interpre- ficient resources culty inherent 694 promise often render of stitutions restrictive rules in all its cases con illusory. cerning
therapy
rights
juvenile offenders,
through Winship
from Gault1
2—and if
practical
This
is of
as well as
concern
duty
all,
this
should be undertaken at
significance
theoretical
of earlier
because
discharged
should be
in the manner
holdings
certainly suggest
which
disruptive
which is least
and burdensome
appellant
like
have
for both the courts and the correctional
right
presumably,
and,
officials.
right
judicial
they
relief if
are con
III.
“in
under conditions which are
fined
sufficiently
approach
famous” or
“rehabilita
MacKinnon’s
seeks
1,
Gault,
by applying
22-23
tive.”
In re
avoid these
387 U.S.
difficulties
18
Cf.
1428,
exception
n.
87
L.Ed.2d 527
as an
S.Ct.
18
U.S.C.
4083
to the
§
(1967);
Stone,
U.S.App.
Creek
broad
administrative discretion confer-
If the
red
379 F.2d
the FYCA.
I do not
D.C.
believe
legislative history
provides
interpretation
comports
the Act
with the
distinguishing
purpose
design
firm basis for
between
of the Federal Youth
of in
treatment and the incidents
FYCA
Corrections Act. Section 4083 is con-
punishment,
Chapter
famous
then these factors
tained
Title
305 of
ought
precision
(18
set forth
to be
with
States Code
4081-4086
U.S.C. §§
advantage
clarity;
(1964)),
least, I
generally
at
see no
which deals
with the
postponing
prob
pris-
consideration of this
commitment and transfer
federal
Construing
oners,
lem until future cases arise.
and which was in
effect
sub-
necessarily
im
stantially
present
the FYCA this fashion
its
at
time
form
reviewing
poses
promulgated.
on the courts the task of
FYCA
concerning
many
parallels
provisions
administrative decisions
close
between
handling
post-adjudicatory
Chapter
of
305 and the relevant sections
Supreme
FYCA,
fenders —an area in
which are set forth
imposing margin,3 strongly suggest
has
careful to avoid
been
that the Youth
Gault,
petence,
presents important
1. In
n.
re
387 U.S.
87 S.Ct.
the case
chal-
1428, 1445,
(1967)
police
lenges
procedure
erty clear com- the most pelling reasons. Allen, of Criminal The Borderland F. (1964). kinds These were Justice 37 UNITED STATES of America court in led of considerations v. hold that v. Reef13 United States HOLLAND, Appellant. Clifton W. Amendment of the Fifth awas violation No. 24083. Youth Cor- impose sentence under prosecution had rections Appeals, United States indictment, and think initiated been District Columbia Circuit. follow this do well to that we would Argued Jan. teaching. that benevo- I cannot believe May 10, Decided purpose science rhetoric and social lent avoiding grounds provide sufficient “a acts mandate which constitutional safeguard against oppressive substantial proceedings.” arbitrary Smith
997, L.Ed.2d 1041 scholarly phraseology of the ma- fails, impressive; jority opinion is my apprehension however, to overcome shortcomings. its constitutional potential Thus, these in order avoid infirmities, obvi- constitutional *25 complicating or frustrat- ate the risk ing our correctional administration of stitutions, sentence can I would hold that imposed under Youth Corrections prosecution initiated appeared If that such indictment. dislocation cause severe a decision would judicial, prosecutorial, or rehabilita- (D.Colo.1967) F.Supp. 1015, : Cunningham, Jones Cf. “im- between delicate distinction Tlie 242-243, 373, 377, 9 L.Ed.2d prisonment”, “confinement : supervision” prison It is not relevant conditions and appreciated probably * * * may parole] [on strictions behind bars. who is important parts desirable the defendant fact cold process ; rehabilitative what matters period subject for a they significantly petition- restrain “[a]pplying exceeding year, one liberty tilings those discipline er’s to do euphemism ‘treatment’ country men during free are entitled to do. not alter does enough present arithmetic, Such restraints are to invoke and is immaterial help purposes.” Pilkington AVrit. of the Great v. United 1963). (4th Cir. F.2d notes See 1 and primarily (FYCA) provide tation of the Act which a misdemean- arises that vagueness long implicit six from the as term be confined as ant can language my reading years, clear “treatment.” From their and that Attorney majority opinion, precisely provisions, Gen- it invest not clear these applied Bureau to me what test is to deter- be eral the Director mining to select discretion what kind Prisons with broad FYCA confinement place is mandated under Fifth of confinement—discretion Amendment the which, statute, prosecution does on the face when the initiated possibility point not exclude formation. At one as- imposed and sen- of a misdemeanor convicted serts that sentence be incar- under the FYCA could tenced FYCA must carried “in an be out institu- penitentiary. By reference cerated tion where the confinement consistent leg- vague language in the purpose rather to some with the the Act to afford Congress’ history on and reliance islative treatment and and that rehabilitation” enacting generally purpose in benevolent the confinement must not “of a be char- IAct, can- punish- Federal Youth Corrections acter which constitutes infamous provisions of knowledge conclude ment.” Since it common governing place of confinement many FYCA correctional facilities which conditional, and “designed” and transfer fact actually are are do to rehabilitate respect that, to misdemean- at least quite opposite, interpret I this lan- information, prosecuted guage offenders to mean that the institution possibility they encompass do sentenced under infamous incarceration. de- FYCA is confined must not be signed rehabilitation, for treatment and agree result falls I cannot provide If these must benefits. fact statutory proper within the ambit of Judge Fahy this is the test intends developed more As will be struction. enunciate, I believe should state Congress’ fully below, I em- believe explicitly because the Act itself offers “pun- phasis than on “treatment” rather determining guidance in what scant types ishment” in its consideration permissible un- starting point as the FYCA should serve 5006(g) provisions. der its Section inquiry than the conclu- of our sion, rather “ merely ‘treatment’ means states that dangerous is a oversim- that it guidance preventive corrective and legislative plification say his- that the training designed protect public merely Congres- tory demonstrates correcting provide antisocial tendencies purpose “milder” or sional youthful language, offenders,” of- “less harsh” treatment for be- This the FYCA was fenders. Enactment of just easily employed lieve, as could be vague solely desire not motivated admittedly purpose of describe Congress wayward children; nice peniten- infamous pragmatic than that. was much more virtually confinement; all, tiary after theory primary behind the decision sys- every correctional institution our differently young to treat lip service to the tem offers at least patterns of that the behavior the belief defining per- ideal. habilitative easily, young more can be altered right, we imeters of a constitutional protected society and that eradicating should scrupulous uncritical to avoid should be before behavior antisocial unexplicated a nebu- reliance personality This hardens. offender’s which can history like “treatment” legislative lous word from the much clear whole, easily knowl- defini- a lack of as from the to mask as a well used too
