147 Ga. 201 | Ga. | 1917
(After stating the foregoing facts.) It was perfectly legal for the Thomasville club to contract with Davenport to play baseball as a member of its team. Such a contract is one to perform service as a ball player. The right of the Thomasville club to assign its contract without the consent of Davenport is not a question in this case. So far as the record discloses, Davenport, upon being released from the Thomasville club, rendered acceptable service to the Augusta club. Although the language of the contract of release, which is the consideration of the note, may be a little confusing and contradictory, enough appears from the instrument to establish its true character. The manifest purpose and intent of the two baseball clubs was that one should release to the other its right of contract to the services of one of its players. If the ball player consented to this arrangement and contracted with the Augusta ball club to perform services for it, we do not think the contract of release violative of the mandate against involuntary servitude in the Federal and State constitutions.
This case is unlike that of Pitts v. Allen, Ga. 69, where it appeared that one of the parties paid the fine of a negro man eon
Judgment affirmed.
