187 F. 254 | 5th Cir. | 1911
(after stating the facts as above). [1] As the contract, which is the basis of the demands made in this suit, provides for separate items and the price is apportioned to each item, it is severable (see 2 Parsons on Contracts, 517), and it may be shortly stated as follows: To furnish the preliminary sketches for 1 per cent, on the cost of the building, and payable on the acceptance thereof; for the working drawings and specifications two per cent, and payable on completion; for supervision of the construction 2 per cent, to be paid pro rata with the architect’s certificates issued during the progress of the work. It seems to be a conceded fact that the preliminary sketches had been made and substantially accepted prior to the execution of the contract in writing for compensation; and that prior to default $12,000 had been paid therefor leaving the sum of $3,000 due on that item. The contract was one of agency, and the general rules in regard to principal and agent apply.
We do not understand that these propositions governing the relation between the parties are at all disputed; the contention of counsel for the defendant in error being that under the particular facts
The first bill of exceptions shows that the agreement admitted to have been made between Andrews & Co. and McWilliams & Co., under which the latter were to prepare the working plans and specifications covering the mechanical construction and equipment of the proposed hotel, was that, if the said McWilliams & Co. as bidders for that portion of the work should obtain the contract therefor, no charge would be made by them for their services, whereas, unless they did obtain the work, they should be paid by Andrews & Co. for their services 3 per cent, of the cost of the work; and, in regard to the mat-' ter, the same hill shows that the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that such an arrangement was customary among architects in the East where Andrews & Co. practiced their profession; that McWilliams & Co. were distinguished experts and mechanical engineers, and that the purpose and effect of the arrangement was to give the architects and the owners the benefit of their technical knowledge and experience; that McWilliams & Co. were not manufacturers, but purely mechanical engineers and contractors; that, except as manufacturers, no advantage as a bidder could result to McWilliams & Co. for preparing such plans and specifications ; and that the fact that McWilliams & Co. would be the only bidder for the mechanical equipment could not have been known to Andrews & Co.
We cannot agree with these contentions. Under the contract of employment, the architects owed their best skill, judgment, and experience, and they had no power to delegate their duties. See 2 Ivncy. Taw, p. 822. Under the arrangement, if McWilliams & Co. should
The fact that thereafter McWilliams & Co. were the only bidders for the mechanical equipment instead of aiding to relieve the architects by showing that no injury could have resulted rather tends to accent the suspicion that the law throws on the propriety and good faith of the admitted arrangement. We think it clear that the arrangement between Andrews & Co. and McWilliams & Co. as a matter of law based on sound public policy deprived Andrews & Co. of the right to recover at law compensation for furnishing the complete working drawings 'and specifications for the Audubon Hotel Company.
. The verdict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff for $45,000 subject to a credit of $12,000. This verdict shows that the jury allowed compensation under that part of the severable contract providing for furnishing the working plans and specifications, and denied commissions for superintendence of construction; and this brings us to consider whether the errors relating to the trial judge’s instructions to the jury are well taken. The judge’s charge did not sufficiently and clearly cover the law of the case, but it was not specifically excepted to, and each one of the refused special charges is subject to criticism which warranted the refusal to instruct the jury as therein requested.
However, the necessity for more specific instruction in relation to the effect of McWilliams’ agreement than that given in the charge of the court was called to the attention of the court and decidedly emphasized' by the special instructions requested and as shown by the eighth bill of exceptions as follows:
“Evidence having been offered by tbe plaintiffs and tbe defendant tending to Show the facts as set forth in bill of exception No. 1, and argument having been heard and the court having charged the jury as set forth in bill of exception No. 1, and having failed otherwise to instruct the jury upon the subject of the McWilliams & Oo. agreement with the plaintiffs and the issue raised thereon, defendant then and there excepted in open court before the jury, and before the withdrawal of the same.”
The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed and a new trial granted, unless, indeed, the plaintiffs below shall within 20 days from filing mandate enter on the judgment in the Circuit Court a remittitur of $30,000, the amount of excessive recovery, in which case the judgment shall stand affirmed, the defendant in error to pay the costs of this court.
And it is so ordered and adjudged.