Attorney Grievance v. SandersonAttorney Grievance v. Sanderson
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT:
Respondent, Garland Montgomery Jarrat Sanderson violated several provisions of the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) in his representation of former clients Olugboyega Odubanjo, Sharon Ozel, Duane Wilkinson, Darren Parham, and Toumany Sangare. He also violated these provisions with respect to a non-client Tuesday Isom-Cyrus. Mr. Sanderson engaged in a pattern of mismanaging client funds held in escrow, including making cash withdrawals, depositing funds from his operating account to his attorney trust account, and failing to timely deliver settlement proceeds. In addition, Mr. Sanderson failed to maintain records associated with his attorney trust account, failed to appear in court on behalf of several clients, failed to respond to requests by both Bar Counsel and clients, urged a former client to provide Bar Counsel with misinformation in attempt to interfere with the investigation, and failed to adequately communicate with his clients.
Mr. Sanderson violated: (1)
Greene,
McDonald,
Watts,
Hotten,
Getty,
Battaglia, Lynne A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
The charges emanated from various complaints filed with Bar Counsel against Mr. Sanderson, stretching across Mr. Sanderson’s representation of several clients. Pursuant to
On January 10, 2019, the hearing judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therein, he concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated
Both Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. In terms of his factual findings, both parties agree that the hearing judge incorrectly determined that Mr. Sanderson owed one of his clients, Ms. Sharon Ozel, $6,900 instead of $4,900. Mr. Sanderson also took exception to several of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, and each will be discussed at length within our analysis. Bar Counsel’s sole exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law concerned the hearing judge’s failure to find that Mr. Sanderson violated
This Court held oral argument in the matter on April 5, 2019. Although Larry Rogers, Esq., entered his appearance as counsel to represent Mr. Sanderson in these
BACKGROUND
We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact and the record submitted at the attorney grievance hearing as follows.
Mr. Sanderson’s Legal Practice
Mr. Sanderson has been a member of the Bar of Maryland since 2005. He operates as a solo practitioner with offices in Baltimore City and Silver Spring. His practice has primarily focused on child in need of assistance (“CINA”) cases, personal injury, criminal and immigration cases. Throughout the events described herein, Mr. Sanderson maintained a Maryland attorney trust account with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”).
Bar Counsel Docket No. 2013-297-04-14
The first complaint against Mr. Sanderson originated from his representation of a client, Olugboyega O. Odubanjo before Judge Patricia Mitchell of the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County. In short, Mr. Sanderson failed to appear in court on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo. As a result, Judge Mitchell filed a complaint against him with Bar Counsel.
On January 24, 2013, Mr. Odubanjo was charged with three potentially incarcerable traffic offenses. Mr. Odubanjo’s initial trial date was set for August 9, 2012. After appearing before the court without counsel, Mr. Odubanjo requested a continuance so that
The day before Mr. Odubanjo’s trial, i.e., January 23, 2013, Mr. Sanderson filed a motion for continuance and an entry of appearance on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo.3 In the motion, Mr. Sanderson explained that he was unable to participate in the hearing scheduled for the following day because of a scheduling conflict. Further, Mr. Sanderson entered his appearance of Mr. Odubanjo the day prior to trial, knowing full well he would be unable to appear before the court if his motion were denied. On the morning of January 24, 2013, the district court denied the motion because the court determined that Mr. Sanderson’s action of “accepting a case knowing of [ ] existing, conflicting trial dates did not constitute good cause for a [second] continuance.”4
Unaware of the motion or its denial, Mr. Odubanjo appeared before the district court on January 24, 2013. When Mr. Odubanjo’s case was called, Judge Mitchell delayed the hearing in attempt to locate Mr. Sanderson. Ultimately, Mr. Sanderson failed to appear on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo despite Judge Mitchell’s denial of his motion for continuance. Mr. Sanderson’s absence caused further delay in the resolution of Mr. Odubanjo’s case and required the court to schedule a third hearing. Consequently, Mr. Odubanjo then
On March 14, 2013, after receiving Judge Mitchell’s complaint, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson requesting he explain in writing why he failed to appear in court on Mr. Odubanjo’s behalf. The communication indicated that Bar Counsel required additional information to determine whether the matter should be classified as a formal documented complaint or non-disciplinary in nature. Additionally, Bar Counsel’s letter provided Mr. Sanderson with fifteen days to respond to the request. In a letter dated April 29, 2013, Mr. Sanderson provided Bar Counsel with an untimely response. Therein, he represented that he understood his actions were inappropriate but argued they were driven by a desire to assist Mr. Odubanjo.
In correspondence dated March 14, 2013, Bar Counsel informed Mr. Sanderson that his case required additional review to determine whether he violated provisions of the MLRPC throughout his representation of Mr. Odubanjo. On May 23, 2013, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson that requested he provide Bar Counsel with a copy of his entire client file for Mr. Odubanjo. In the letter, Bar Counsel provided Mr. Sanderson with a fifteen-day period to respond. Again, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond in a timely manner. On July 3, 2013, Mr. Sanderson responded to Bar Counsel’s request for Mr. Odubanjo’s client file. In this correspondence, with reference to a client file corresponding to his representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson replied that “no such documents or documents [sic] exist[,]” and denied that Mr. Odubanjo ever retained him as his attorney. Mr. Sanderson continued by stating, “I attempt [sic] to get a postponement for Mr.
Conditional Diversion Agreement
On January 6, 2014, based on Mr. Sanderson’s alleged misconduct in his representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement (“CDA”), pursuant to
From the time of the CDA until Bar Counsel filed a petition to revoke the CDA on April 25, 2017, Midgett S. Parker Jr., Esq. of the Law Office of Linowes & Blocher, LLP served as Mr. Sanderson’s monitor. Within this period, Mr. Parker filed twelve reports
Over the two-year time frаme of the CDA, Mr. Sanderson completed several of the requirements. Despite this, the twelfth and final report by Mr. Parker, dated September 12, 2016, noted that Mr. Sanderson failed to attend any courses sponsored by the MSBA involving law office and attorney trust account management. On December 15, 2016, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson advising of his failure to comply with the CDA. At the time, Mr. Sanderson did not respond to or contest Bar Counsel’s assertion. Consequently, Bar Counsel revoked the CDA and lifted the stay on the underlying disciplinary proceedings. While Mr. Parker monitored Mr. Sanderson, Bar Counsel received four other complaints against Mr. Sanderson. Bar Counsel engaged in further investigation into two of the four complaints.
BC Docket No. 2017-0152
Shortly after Bar Counsel sent notice to Mr. Sanderson regarding his failure to comply with the CDA, Bar Counsel received a communication from Wells Fargo notifying it of an overdraft on Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account in the amount of $114.83. On January 25 and March 7, 2017, Bar Counsel sent letters to Mr. Sanderson which informed him that Bar Counsel was aware of the overdraft on his attorney trust account, requested a complete explanation of the overdraft, and requested access to records concerning Mr.
A month after Bar Counsel issued the subpoena, Mr. Sanderson left a voicemail for Bar Counsel in which he stated that he could “submit the documents next week.” Bar Counsel returned Mr. Sanderson’s call, was unable to reach him, and left a voicemail. On May 11, 2017, Bar Counsel wrote again to Mr. Sanderson, mentioned the voicemail, and requested that Mr. Sanderson provide the requested documents by May 19, 2017. On June 15, 2017, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson reiterating the contents of the previous letter and providing Mr. Sanderson with a revised deadline to supply the documents – June 25, 2017. In the correspondence, Bar Counsel also requested to be informed if Mr. Rogers was representing Mr. Sanderson in the instant disciplinary matter.
On June 19, 2017, Wells Fargo responded to Bar Counsel’s subpoena and рrovided extensive records concerning Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust and operating accounts. On June 22, 2017, Mr. Rogers wrote to Bar Counsel but failed to clarify the reason for the overdraft. Instead, Mr. Rogers only indicated that the overdraft was related to a filing fee in a civil case and the deficiency had since been rectified. Additionally, Mr. Rogers referred to Mr. Sanderson’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the CDA and stated his intention to discuss subsequent complaints filed against Mr. Sanderson with Bar Counsel at a later date. On July 13, 2017, Bar Counsel sent another correspondence to Mr.
In the interim, Charles E. Miller, IV, an investigator for the Attorney Grievance Commission, began to investigate Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account records as a result of the overdraft notice provided by Wells Fargo. During the review, in addition to the overdraft that acted as a catalyst for the investigation, Mr. Miller determined that Mr. Sanderson engaged in several impermissible practices on multiple occasions, including: (i) making cash disbursements from his attorney trust account; (ii) transferring funds from his operating account into his attorney trust account; (iii) failing to maintain client funds in trust until earned; and (iv) using client funds to pay other clients.7
Mr. Miller determined that Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account overdraft originated from his representation of Sharon Ozel. In 2015, Ms. Ozel retained Mr. Sanderson to represent her in a personal injury matter involving a car accident. Initially, Ms. Ozel met with Mr. Sanderson at the Juvenile Justice Center in Baltimore to discuss the representation. During the meeting, Mr. Sanderson failed to adequately explain to Ms.
In July 2016, Mr. Sanderson contacted Ms. Ozel and asked her to meet him at a movie theater in Owings Mills to provide her with a check for $2,000. Ms. Ozel testified that Mr. Sanderson had her sign a form to release thе $2,000, and never informed her of the $6,900 settlement check from USAA. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Mr. Sanderson had her sign the settlement check and a form to release $2,000.00. However, he failed to provide Ms. Ozel with a copy of the form, never mentioned the $6,900 total, and did not provide her with the $2,000 check they had previously discussed.
The hearing judge determined that “[i]n late July 2016, [Mr. Sanderson] provided Ms. Ozel with an additional $2,000 and told her that money was still owed from a worker’s compensation claim.” Next, in December of 2016, Mr. Sanderson provided Ms. Ozel with a check for $2,900 which he represented emanated from a worker’s compensation claim. Approximately a year later, while under investigation by Bar Counsel, Mr. Sanderson contacted Ms. Ozel. In a telephone conversation, Mr. Sanderson asked Ms. Ozel if she had been contacted by anyone regarding his representation of her. She informed him that, at the time, she had not been contacted by anyone. Approximately four or five days later, Ms. Ozel encountered Mr. Sanderson at the Baltimore City Juvenile Court. She testified that during this encounter, he again asked whether she had been contacted by anyone regarding his representation of her. He then instructed her that, if anyone were to contact her, she should inform them that she retained him in a different matter in addition to the
Mr. Miller’s review of the financial records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account revealed that Mr. Sanderson had mismanaged client funds for several of his clients including Darren Parham and Duane Wilkinson. First, Mr. Miller determined that Mr. Sanderson used funds belonging to one client, Darren Parham, and used them to pay another client, Mattie Hines.
During his representation of Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Sanderson received a settlement check for $40,000 from the Cincinnati Insurance Company. On November 28, 2016, he deposited the check into his attorney trust account. Of these funds, Mr. Sanderson paid Mr. Wilkinson $22,933.28. After disbursing his fee in the matter, funds remained in the trust account stemming from Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Wilkinson. The record does not reflect the eventual fate of these funds.
BC Docket No. 2016-1374
Toumany Sangare is an immigrant from Guinea and was a resident of Montana at all times relevant to these grievance proceedings. In 2005, Mr. Sangare married a United States citizen, and his wife filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
On June 22, 2011, Mr. Sangare remarried.8 On the date scheduled for Mr. Sangare’s hearing, Mr. Sanderson filed a motion for continuance and a notice of entry of appearance on behalf of Mr. Sangare, dated June 28, 2011. In his motion, Mr. Sanderson represented that he had another court appearance on the same date and at the same time in the District Court of Maryland Sitting in Baltimore County. Mr. Sangare appeared before the court without counsel and the court continued the matter until August 24, 2011. On August 11, 2011, Ms. Hamrick, Mr. Sangare’s new wife, filed a new I-130 petition on Mr. Sangare’s behalf.
The court held Mr. Sangare’s removal hearing on August 24, 2011. When the case was initially called, both Mr. Sangare and Mr. Sanderson failed to appear. Therefore, the court moved the case to the end of its docket and, by the time the case was recalled, Mr.
In the interim, UCIS denied Mr. Sangare’s second I-130 petition. The court provided Mr. Sandеrson with notice of the denial, but he failed to advise Mr. Sangare of it or its significance. On July 17, 2013, Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Sangare appeared again before the U.S. Immigration Court for a status hearing. There, the court requested the basis for UCIS’ denial of Mr. Sangare’s I-130 petition but Mr. Sanderson indicated that he had not yet had a chance to review it with his client and therefore was unable to respond to the court’s inquiry. Thereafter, the court set the matter for a voluntary departure hearing.
On August 2, 2013, the court scheduled an individual hearing for Mr. Sangare for November 14, 2013 and sent notice of the hearing to Mr. Sanderson. Mr. Sanderson informed Mr. Sangare of the November hearing date. Afterwards, Mr. Sangare attempted to contact Mr. Sanderson to ascertain the time of the hearing. Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Mr. Sangare’s inquiry. On November 12, 2013, however, Mr. Sanderson called Mr. Sangare and inquired as to the time of the hearing. Mr. Sangare was unsure and informed Mr. Sanderson that he believed it would occur at 1:30 p.m. – the time at which the court had scheduled his prior hearings. Mr. Sangare asked Mr. Sanderson to confirm the time of the hearing and to contact him with that information but Mr. Sanderson ultimately failed to do so.
On June 20, 2016, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals denied Mr. Sangare’s appeal. On July 11, 2016, Mr. Sangare filed a complaint against Mr. Sanderson with Bar Counsel. On July 18, 2016, Bar Counsel forwarded a copy of the complaint to Mr. Sanderson and requested that he provide a written response within fifteen days of receipt. Mr. Sanderson failed to reply in a timely manner in writing. Therefore, Bar Counsel sent another correspondence to Mr. Sanderson via certified mail requesting that Mr. Sanderson respond to the complaint within ten days. On approximately August 22, 2016, Mr. Sanderson’s agent received the correspondence. Mr. Sanderson again failed to provide a timely response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry. On September 16, 2016, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Sanderson yet again, including copies of the prior correspondences, advising him that an investigation was forthcoming, and requesting a response within ten days. Again, Mr. Sanderson failed to provide a timely response to Bar Counsel’s correspondence.
BC Docket No. 2015-2413
On November 26, 2015, Mr. Sanderson was representing the parent of a child in a CINA case at a hearing before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Tuesday Racquel
On November 30, 2015, Ms. Isom-Cyrus filed a complaint against Mr. Sanderson with Bar Counsel in reference to the incident that occurred four days earlier. On December 10, 2015, Bar Counsel sent a correspondence to Mr. Sanderson regarding Ms. Isom-Cyrus’ complaint and requested that he respond within ten days. Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiry in a timely manner. Therefore, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Sanderson again requesting that he respond within ten days. Again, Mr. Sanderson failed to provide Bar Counsel with a timely response. After failing to obtain a response from Mr. Sanderson, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Parker, Mr. Sanderson’s monitor, requesting Mr. Sanderson provide a response to their inquiries. In a letter dated January 19, 2016, Mr. Sanderson responded to Bar Counsel’s previous communications and indicated that he did not recall using any profanity toward Ms. Isom-Cyrus.
On February 3, 2016, Bar Counsel sent another letter to Mr. Sanderson requesting additional information regarding his interaction with Ms. Isom-Cyrus. Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to the request. Accordingly, on March 15, 2016, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Sanderson again and requested that he provide the additional information requested in the prior correspondence. On April 27, 2016, Mr. Sanderson contacted Bar Counsel and requested an extension of time to provide the information. However, Mr. Sanderson ultimately did not comply with this extension and he failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court reviews the hearing judge’s findings of fact for clear error and reviews the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference. See
DISCUSSION
A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact
Mr. Sanderson notes several exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Specifically, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s findings regarding the
With regard to the first exception, Mr. Sanderson contends that the hearing judge improperly determined that he entered into the CDA with Bar Counsel because of his failure to provide competent representation to Mr. Odubanjo. Instead, Mr. Sanderson represents that he entered into the CDA primarily due to Bar Counsel’s concerns over the management and oversight of his law practice. However, there is little merit to Mr. Sanderson’s exception. The CDA itself is included in the record and sets forth the circumstances surrounding Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA. The document provides the following summary of events which led to Mr. Sanderson’s first encounter with Bar Counsel and ultimately his entry into the CDA:
In his representation of Olugboyega O. Odubanjo, the Respondent failed to provide competent representation. Specifically, he failed to appear at trial on a motor vehicle matter on behalf of his client, Mr. Odubanjo, in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County before the Honorable Patricia Mitchell. Mr. Odubanjo was charged with three (3) incarcerable traffic violations. At the time Mr. Odubanjo retained [Mr. Sanderson], [Mr. Sanderson] was aware that he would be unable to appear at Mr. Odubanjo’s scheduled hearing due to a conflict in which he had a court appearance on a separate client matter. [Mr. Sanderson] assumed that a continuance of the hearing would be granted by the court. [Mr. Sanderson] filed a motion for continuance the day before Mr. Odubanjo’s hearing, which was denied by the court. Subsequently, [Mr. Sanderson] did not appear at Mr. Odubanjo’s hearing. Mr. Odubanjo terminated [Mr. Sanderson’s] representation. No refund was rendered to Mr. Odubanjo since he had not yet paid [Mr. Sanderson’s] attorney’s fee.
The CDA additionally indicates that Mr. Sanderson’s conduct constituted a violation
Therefore, the agreement clearly indicates that Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA was compelled by his representation of Mr. Odubanjo which ran afoul of
Accordingly, we determine that the hearing judge did not err in determining the catalyst of Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA with Bar Counsel. The agreement itself indicates that, although Mr. Sanderson failed to establish sufficient management and oversight procedures within his legal practice, the primary causal thrust for Bar Counsel’s initial investigation of Mr. Sanderson, which led to his eventual entry into the CDA, was Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Odubanjo. Accordingly, Mr. Sanderson’s exception as to this finding is without merit and therefore overruled.
Next, both Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel take exception to the hearing judge’s finding regarding the total amount due to Ms. Ozel and the number of payments Mr.
During the hearing, Ms. Ozel also testified that, although Mr. Sanderson neglected to discuss his fee with her in great detail, she understood that he would receive $2,000 from the settlement. Similarly, Mr. Sanderson agrees that the total amount owed to Ms. Ozel was $4,900. Although the settlement check from USAA General Indemnity Company (“USAA“) was made payable to both Ms. Ozel and Mr. Sanderson, was for $6,900 the record indicates that $2,000 of the sum constituted Mr. Sanderson‘s fee and Ms. Ozel was only entitled to recover $4,900. Therefore, the hearing judge clearly erred with respect to the amount of money due to Ms. Ozel, and we therefore sustain this exception.
Another related exception involves the balance in Mr. Sanderson‘s escrow account during the period surrounding his receipt of funds from USAA and their disbursement. Mr. Sanderson argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that, two days after receiving the settlement check from USAA, Mr. Sanderson transferred $500 from the escrow account to his business account which brought the balance below the amount owed to Ms. Ozel. However, this is primarily based on and related to the hearing judge‘s error regarding the total amount of funds Mr. Sanderson owed to Ms. Ozel.
Also, on July 20, Mr. Sanderson transferred $500 from the account to his business operating account. As a result, the balance in his attorney trust account dropped to $2,405.00, $495 less than the amount Mr. Sanderson owed to Ms. Ozel at the time. In fact, the balance remained below $2,900 until July 27, 2016, when Mr. Sanderson deposited $700 under Ms. Ozel‘s client name without any descriptive phrase or words in the memo line, which brought the attorney trust account‘s balance up to $2,905.
Ultimately, this surplusage of funds was short lived, because on August 4, 2016, Mr. Sanderson transferred $250 from his attorney trust account to his operating account, again under the client name of Ms. Ozel, but neglected to provide any indication as to its purpose. At this point, the balance in his attorney trust account fell to $2,605, leaving the
Next, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge‘s factual findings concerning potential misappropriation of funds from his former client, Ms. Brown. With reference to a monetary exchange between Mr. Sanderson and Ms. Brown, the hearing judge found Mr. Sanderson deposited a settlement check from the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (“MAIF“) in the amount of $8,601.88 into his attorney trust account on June 28, 2016 which is adequately supported by the record. However, the same cannot be said for the hearing judge‘s ultimate determination regarding Mr. Sanderson misappropriating funds from Ms. Brown. The hearing judge found that, two days after the check was deposited, Mr. Sanderson withdrew $8,101.88 on June 30, 2016 and that “there is no evidence that payment was ever made to Ms. Brown.” However, the hearing judge‘s finding is problematic in two respects.
In the instant grievance proceedings, Bar Counsel‘s Petition lacked any corresponding allegations of disciplinary action with respect to Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Brown, and therefore, Mr. Sanderson was not adequately notified of the charges against him. Moreover, the finding is not sufficiently supported by the record. Although the records associated with Mr. Sanderson‘s attorney trust account do not indicate that the withdrawal made on June 30, 2016 was given to Ms. Brown, during Bar Counsel‘s deposition of Mr. Sanderson, he stated under oath that Ms. Brown accompanied him to the bank and received the payment upon withdrawal, because she did not hold a
Lastly, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge‘s finding of fact emanating from his representation of Ms. Ozel. More specifically, he asserts that he did not promptly disburse $2,900 of settlement funds to her because he was in the process of settling a “boni [sic] fide lien from the Worker‘s Compensation fund[.]” In support of his position, Mr. Sanderson attaches to his exceptions a purported email from an individual associated with Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company. In this email, dated March 12, 2018, the individual represents to Mr. Sanderson that the insurance company should have recovered $1,437.10 from “[his] client[,]” but the organization allowed the client to retain the funds. However, there are several problems associated with this exhibit.
First, the email does not indicate that the communication is in reference to Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Ozel. In all actuality, the email does not identify Ms. Ozel by name. The only potentially identifying information contained within the correspondence are usage of female pronouns in reference to the client and reference to one of Mr. Sanderson‘s clients receiving a third-party settlement in the amount of $6,900.00. The link between this email and Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Ozel without more identifying information is tenuous. Nevertheless, other circumstances
Although Mr. Sanderson submits that his payment to Ms. Ozel was significantly delayed due to the potential worker‘s compensation lien, the exhibit he provided and the associated timelines clearly demonstration that his contention is without merit. Particularly troubling, the email from Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company is dated March 12, 2018. However, Mr. Sanderson did not disburse the remaining $2,900 to Ms. Ozel until December 12, 2018. In the email, an employee of the insurance company informed Mr. Sanderson that Ms. Ozel will be able to retain the funds which, prior to this point, a question remained as to whether they would be subject to Injured Worker‘s Insurance Fund (“IWIF“) withholding. Therefore, based on Mr. Sanderson‘s own exhibit, he received notice that there would be no withholding associated with Ms. Ozel‘s claim nine months before eventually releasing the funds to his client. Despite Mr. Sanderson‘s insistence that he had “a legitimate reason for not promptly dispersing [sic] the $2,900 in settlement funds to Ms. Ozel[,]” whatever legitimacy can be attributed to that reason ceased at some point after March 12, 2018. Mr. Sanderson offers no explanation for the nine-month delay in providing the funds to Ms. Ozel. Therefore, on this basis, we cannot conclude that the hearing judge clearly erred with respect to this finding. Accordingly, we overrule this exception.
B. Review of the Hearing Judge‘s Conclusions of Law
In addition to Mr. Sanderson‘s exception to the hearing judge‘s findings of fact, he also takes exception to several of the hearing judge‘s conclusions of law. Specifically, Mr.
In terms of exceptions to the hearing judge‘s conclusions of law, Mr. Sanderson first takes exception to several of the hearing judge‘s evidentiary rulings. Mr. Sanderson argues that the hearing judge erred when he permitted several pieces of evidence to be admitted, because the exhibits lacked appropriate evidentiary foundations. The records Mr. Sanderson contends were erroneously admitted by the hearing judge include: (i) bank records; (ii) communications from the Attorney Grievance Commission to Mr. Sanderson; and (iii) complaints from the Attorney Grievance Commission. In addition, Mr. Sanderson argues that the hearing judge erred in admitting records and testimony provided by Mr. Miller, because he was not properly qualified as an expert witness.
Mr. Sanderson first takes issue with the hearing judge‘s admittance of bank records that the Attorney Grievance Commission acquired from Wells Fargo through subpoena. In his exceptions filed with this Court, Mr. Sanderson fails to identify any specific basis upon which he takes exception to this evidentiary ruling. However, at the hearing, Mr. Sanderson objected to the introduction of the Wells Fargo Bank records on grounds that he was not informed of Bar Counsel‘s intent to introduce the bank records prior to the start of his hearing as required by the associated Rules.
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it was made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular prаctice of that business was to make and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in the record lacks trustworthiness. In this paragraph, “business” includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
In close connection with this Rule,
(1) Procedure. Testimony of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required as to the original or a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted business activity, within the scope of
Rule 5-803 (b)(6) that has been certified pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, provided that at least ten days prior to the commencement of the proceeding in which the record will be offered into evidence, (A) the proponent (i) notifies the adverse party of the proponent‘s intention to authenticate the record under this subsection and (ii) makes a copy of the certificate and record available to the adverse party and (B) the adverse party has not filed within five days after service of the proponent‘s notice written objection on the ground that the sources of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Mr. Sanderson next takes exception to the hearing judge‘s admission of communications, i.e. letters, sent by Bar Counsel to Mr. Sanderson. Again, in his exceptions he does not specifically identify the grounds upon which he takes exception to the admission of these letters. However, at the hearing, Mr. Sanderson objected to admission of the documents on hearsay grounds.
Hearsay is defined as a statement made by an out of court declarant offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Mr. Sanderson also takes exception to the introduction of testimony and records compiled by Mr. Miller, Bar Counsel‘s investigator, tasked with reviewing the records obtained from Wells Fargo. Mr. Sanderson argues that Mr. Miller acted as an expert witness in this capacity and the court erred by not requiring his qualification as an expert. However, we have held that individuals testify as expert witnesses where they opine in a particular matter on subjects which laypersons would typically be unable to grasp. See Dorsey v. Nold, 362 Md. 241, 257 (2001) (holding that a doctor was an expert witness rather than a fact witness where, in his testimony, he gave an opinion on the medical cause of a death).
The activities which Mr. Miller engaged in do not require any particular expertise in a subject-matter. Mr. Miller, in his role as investigator, reviewed the bank records obtained from Wells Fargo and placed some of this information, concerning Mr. Sanderson‘s trust account, in tables detailing the transactions. In this regard, Mr. Miller acted as a fact witness and merely noted data from the financial records and recorded this information in tables for greater ease of access. In his review, Mr. Miller offered no
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
MLRPC 1.1 provides that, “[a]n attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” We have previously held that an attorney may violate this Rule in multiple ways. First, “the failure to pursue a claim after filing a complaint demonstrates not only incompetence, but also insufficient diligence.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 44 (2018) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 371 (2015)). In addition, “[a]n attorney [ ] violates MLRPC 1.1 by failing to attend a court appearance absent sufficient explanation.” Id. (citing Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Storch, 445 Md. 82, 87 (2015). See also Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 180 (2015) (“[f]ailure to appear in court when expected to do so is a particularly egregious violation of MLRPC 1.1.“); Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 226-27 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 551 (2014) (commenting that “[c]ompetency includes, “at a minimum, the attorney‘s presence at any court proceeding for which he or she was retained, absent an acceptable explanation for that attorney‘s absence.“).
Mr. Sanderson first argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that he failed to provide Mr. Odubanjo with competent representation. Specifically, he contends that the
In the instant grievance proceedings, the record clearly reflects that Mr. Sanderson filed a motion for continuance and an entry of appearance on January 23, 2013, the day before Mr. Odubanjo‘s trial was scheduled to begin. Mr. Sanderson conceded that he would be unable to attend trial the following day. This demonstrates that Mr. Sanderson entered his appearance in the matter, on the day before trial, knowing full well that he would be unable to attend if his motion for continuance was not granted. Apparently, Mr. Sanderson expected the court would grant his motion for a continuance, which would enable him not to attend the hearing. Unfortunately for Mr. Sanderson, the court denied the postponement request and he failed to appear on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo despite filing his entry of appearance. Although Mr. Sanderson argues that his absence should be excused, because he was required to attend court in another part of the State contemporaneously with Mr. Odubanjo‘s hearing, he was fully aware of this at the time he entered his appearance. Therefore, based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in the course of his representation of Mr. Odubanjo.
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Next, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge‘s finding that, throughout his representation of Ms. Ozel, he violated MLRPC 1.1. Primarily, Mr. Sanderson contends that the record fails to sufficiently demonstrate that he did not provide competent representation to Ms. Ozel. He points out that Ms. Ozel obtained a reasonable settlement
However, Mr. Sanderson‘s exhibit does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in providing Ms. Ozel with the funds. Although the exhibit provides an explanation for a portion of delay, as discussed above, the email from the IWIF clearing any worker‘s compensation lien and eliminating the possibility of any withholding against Ms. Ozel‘s recovery occurred in March. Mr. Sanderson did not provide her with the funds until December.
Overall, Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in several ways with respect to Ms. Ozel. He violated this rule by unreasonably and without justification failing to promptly deliver the remaining settlement funds to Ms. Ozel. An attorney‘s failure to provide his or her clients with funds due implicates MLRPC 1.1. In prior cases, we have recognized that “failure to promptly deliver money to a client and to pay third parties demonstrates incompetence.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 369 (2015). See also Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 357 (2005). We have also determined that MLRPC 1.1 is violated in situations where an attorney fails to inform a client that settlement funds have been received. Id. at 369.
Based on our indeрendent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in his representation of Ms. Ozel by
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2016-1374)
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in his representation of Mr. Sangare. Specifically, the hearing judge found that Mr. Sanderson violated the rule by failing to appear at Mr. Sangare‘s removal hearing on July 6, 2011 and a voluntary departure hearing on November 14, 2012. In addition, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated the rule by failing to demonstrate adequate legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. The hearing judge found that this failure was evident through several of Mr. Sanderson‘s actions including: (i) his failure to timely review the order denying Mr. Sangare‘s I-130 Petition; (ii) Mr. Sanderson‘s failure to include evidence of exceptional circumstances when he filed a motion to re-open Mr. Sangare‘s case; and (iii) arguing under the incorrect standard in his motion to re-open.
This Court has previously indicated that an “[a]ttorney‘s failure to appear at clients’ hearings, or to perform agreed-upon services on clients’ behalf violated [MLRPC 1.1 and
Despite his failure to appear before the court, Mr. Sanderson filed a motion to re-open Mr. Sangare‘s case. However, in his motion, Mr. Sanderson neglected to attach the necessary affidavits and incorrectly identified the applicable standard for such proceedings. Previously, we have held that “[e]vidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of [MLRPC] 1.1.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Conwell, 462 Md. 437, 462 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 398 (2008)). Therefore, we determine that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson‘s conduct, in his representation of Mr. Sangare, violated MLRPC 1.1.
MLRPC 1.2 (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
Mr. Sanderson next excepts to the hearing judge‘s finding that he violated MLRPC 1.2(c).12 The hearing judge found that Mr. Sanderson acted in violation of MLRPC 1.2 by
(c) An attorney may limit the scope of the representation in accordance with applicable Maryland Rules if (1) the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances, (2) the client gives informed consent, and (3) the scope and limitations of any representation, beyond an initial consultation or brief advice provided without a fee, are clearly set forth in a writing, including any duty on the part of the attorney under Rule 1-324 to forward notices to the client.
MLRPC 1.2(c).
As evident, an attorney may make reasonable limitations to the scope of representation if they are communicated to the client in writing. The record contains no evidence that Mr. Sanderson provided Mr. Odubanjo with a written agreement indicating that his representation of Mr. Odubanjo would be conditioned on his ability to obtain the initial postponement. Therefore, at the outset, we determine that Mr. Sanderson failed to comply with MLRPC 1.2(c)(2) and (3). In addition to his failure to provide his Mr. Odubanjo with written notice of any limitations, Mr. Sanderson also violated MLRPC 1.2(c)(1). As the hearing judge noted, Mr. Sanderson attempted to condition his representation of Mr. Odubanjo on his ability to obtain a postponement in the matter.
MLRPC 1.2 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Next, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.2(a) in his representation of Ms. Ozel, by failing to consult with her regarding the status and eventual disbursement of settlement funds Mr. Sanderson received on her behalf. At the hearing, Ms. Ozel testified that she had never seen the settlement check, Mr. Sanderson had not provided her with a settlement disbursement sheet, and Mr. Sanderson failed to provide her with any document that identified the total settlement amount or the fee Mr. Sanderson would receive.13 Ms. Ozel also testified that, in addition to this confusion, Mr. Sanderson neglected to inform her how much she would receive from the settlement. Based on Ms. Ozel‘s testimony, it is apparent that Mr. Sanderson failed to consult with her regarding the potential settlement. Such conduct constitutes a violation of MLRPC 1.2(a). See Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 370 (2015). Therefore, we
MLRPC 1.3 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 1.3 establishes standards concerning the necessary diligence that must exist within the attorney client relationship and provides that, “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” This rule may be implicated by an attorney‘s failure to appear before a court absent sufficient reason. Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Butler, 426 Md. 522, 534 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Byrd, 408 Md. 449, 459, 484 (2009) (holding that an attorney‘s failure to attend court proceedings constitutes a violation of both MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3). Undoubtedly, Mr. Sanderson‘s failure to appear for Mr. Odubanjo‘s hearing constitutes a violation of MLRPC 1.3. Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 229 (2012) (“Even a single, inadvertent failure to appear at a hearing may constitute actionable neglect of a legal matter.“)
As indicated above, Mr. Sanderson filed his entry of appearance and a motion for continuance the day before Mr. Odubanjo‘s trial was scheduled to begin. Despite having a potential reason for his absence, Mr. Sanderson‘s conduct demonstrates an underlying lack of diligence esрecially considering the temporal proximity of his motion and entry of appearance in relation to the start of Mr. Odubanjo‘s trial. As a result, the hearing judge‘s determination that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Mr. Odubanjo is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The hearing judge also found that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Ms. Ozel by failing to disburse settlement proceeds in a timely fashion. Our review of the record indicates that Mr. Sanderson fails to offer sufficient evidence to justify the delay in disbursement of the settlement proceeds. Even assuming he withheld these funds due to a potential worker‘s compensation lien, Mr. Sanderson failed to provide Ms. Ozel with information concerning the status of this work and nine months ultimately elapsed between any potential worker‘s compensation offset being cleared and Mr. Sanderson eventually distributing the settlement proceeds to Ms. Ozel. An attorney runs afoul of MLRPC 1.3 where he or she fails “to keep a client informed about the client‘s case, to promptly disburse settlement funds, or to respond to reasonable requests for information[.]” Smith, 443 Md. at 371. Here, Mr. Sanderson failed to keep Ms. Ozel informed and failed to promptly disburse settlement funds owed to her. As a result, we conclude that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3.
MLRPC 1.3 (BC Docket No. 2016-1374)
In addition to the two prior violations of MLRPC 1.3, the hearing judge also found that Mr. Sanderson violated the Rule in his representation of Mr. Sangare by failing to appear at two immigration hearings held on July 6, 2011 and November 14, 2013.14 As
Mr. Sanderson also failed to act with diligence in his representation of Mr. Sangare by failing to keep Mr. Sangare informed regarding the status of his case and by failing to respond to Mr. Sangare‘s reasonable requests for information. See Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. 180, 188 (2012) (determining that failure to keep a client informed as to the status of a case and failure to respond to a client‘s inquiries regarding a case constitute violations of MLRPC 1.3). For example, Mr. Sanderson failed to advise Mr. Sangare that his second I-130 was denied and failed to advise Mr. Sangare of the consequences emanating from its denial.
In addition, Mr. Sanderson called Mr. Sangare to inquire about the time of the hearing on November 14, 2013. First, this was information Mr. Sanderson should have been aware of. Mr. Sanderson, and not Mr. Sangare, received the notice of the hearing date from the court. Although atypical that an attorney would contact his or her client requesting scheduling information, nevertheless, at the end of the discussion Mr. Sangare asked Mr. Sanderson to confirm the time of the hearing and then relay this information back to him. Ultimately however, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Mr. Sangare‘s request, which eventually led to both Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Sangare appearing late for the hearing and the court entering an order of removal against Mr. Sangare. Accordingly,
Regarding his representation of Ms. Brown and Mr. Wilkinson, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated
Mr. Sanderson violated
(a) An attorney shall:
- promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client‘s informed consent, as defined in
Rule 19-301.0 (f) (1.0) , is required by these Rules;- keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
- promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
- consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney‘s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
In his representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson violated As mentioned above, Mr. Sanderson also failed to communicate to Mr. Sangare other things including the denial of his second I-130 petition, its significance, and the time of Mr. Sangare‘s hearing scheduled for November 14, 2013. Consequently, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‘s conclusion on this point. In his representation of Ms. Ozel, Mr. Sanderson committed numerous violations of (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by section (d) of this Rule or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the attorney in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be responsible whether or not the client is thе prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the attorney shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter, and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination. The record contains a form entitled “attorney-client agreement” which summarizes certain aspects of Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Ozel. However, the agreement is unsigned, does not contain an area for signatures, and does not contain Ms. Ozel‘s signature.15 There are several other shortcomings associated with Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Ozel. As mentioned above, Mr. Sanderson did not provide Ms. Ozel (a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney‘s possession in connection with a representation separate from the attorney‘s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created. (b) An attorney may deposit the attorney‘s own funds in a client trust account only as permitted by (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the attorney‘s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, an attorney shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, an attorney shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon (e) When an attorney in the course of representing a client is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the attorney) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the attorney until the dispute is resolved. The attorney shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated As detailed above, Mr. Sanderson received a check from USAA in the amount of $6,900 on July 18, 2016. Within the two days, Mr. Sanderson transferred $2,000 of this amount to his operating account and withdrew $2,000 in cash at a Wells Fargo branch. According to the evidence and testimony adduced at the disciplinary hearing, after the initial payment to Ms. Ozel, Mr. Sanderson still owed her $2,900. Assuming arguendo the legitimacy of Mr. Sanderson‘s representation concerning the potential worker‘s compensation lien on the funds, the exhibit he provided indicates that the funds were cleared on March 12, 2018. However, Mr. Sanderson failed to disburse the remaining $2,900 to Ms. Ozel until December 12, 2018 — nine months later. During this period, the available balance within the trust account fell below $2,900 on several occasions. To interrupt the deficient trust balance, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from his firm‘s operating account into the attorney trust account numerous times. In addition, the financial Mr. Sanderson‘s failure to adequately maintain records concerning his attorney trust account add a certain degree of opaqueness to our review of the associated financial records. Within the proceedings below, Mr. Sanderson offered no documentary evidence which could have explained some of the deficiencies associated with his attorney trust account and specifically those concerning his representation of Ms. Ozel. Mr. Sanderson violated Mr. Sanderson violated Mr. Sanderson violated In addition to these violations, Mr. Sanderson violated The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated this Rule in his representations of Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Parham. Specifically, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated The record reflects that Mr. Sanderson continued in his habit of transferring funds from his operating account into his attorney trust account throughout his representation of Mr. Parham. Between March 27, 2017 and April 4, 2017, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds With respect to Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Sanderson received a settlement check in the amount of $40,000 from the Cincinnati Insurance Company and deposited it into his attorney trust account on November 28, 2016. On December 3, 2016, Mr. Sanderson issued a check to Mr. Wilkinson for $22,933.28. Two days later, Mr. Sanderson transferred $9,967, accounting for his fee in the matter, from his attorney trust account to his operating account. Thereafter, $7,099.72 remained in the trust account stemming from Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Mr. Wilkinson. The totality of evidence adduced throughout the course of these disciplinary proceedings does not indicate that Mr. Sanderson ever paid these remaining funds to Mr. Wilkinson. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated In addition to the violations of the MLRPC that originated from Mr. Sanderson‘s representation of Ms. Ozel, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated (b) No Cash Disbursements. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash withdrawal may be made from an automated teller machine or by any other method. All disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by check or electronic transfer. (c) Negative Balance Prohibited. No funds from an attorney trust account shall be disbursed if the disbursement would create a negative balance with regard to an individual client matter or all client matters in the aggregate. (a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons: (b) Monthly Reconciliation. An attorney shall cause to be created a monthly reconciliation of all attorney trust account records, client matter records, records of funds of the attorney held in an attorney trust account as permitted by (c) Electroniс Records. Whenever the records required by this Rule are created or maintained using electronic means, there must be an ability to print a paper copy of the records upon a reasonable request to do so. (d) Records to be Maintained. Financial institution month-end statements, any canceled checks or copies of canceled checks provided with a financial institution month-end statement, duplicate deposit slips or deposit receipts generated by the financial institution, and records created in accordance with In several correspondences to Mr. Sanderson throughout these disciplinary proceedings, Bar Counsel requested that he provide copies of ledgers, records, and client files. In response to these requests, Mr. Sanderson provided only purported retainer agreements for several clients and two “waiver of conflict” agreements. However, he failed to provide any records concerning his attorney trust account, and, therefore, the record is entirely devoid of any indication that Mr. Sanderson complied with (a) General Prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by Rule 19-404 or permitted to be so deposited by section (b) of this Rule. (b) Exceptions. Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person. Further, the restrictive language of The record is replete with instances in which Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from his operating account to his attorney trust account. In fact, between March 15, 2016 and April 4, 2017, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from his operating account to his attorney trust account more than nineteen times. These transactions totaled an amount of In his conclusions of law, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated First, Mr. Sanderson engaged in a practice of making numerous impermissible cash disbursements from his attorney trust account as discussed above in reference to his violation of The hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated Our review of the record clearly indicates that Mr. Sanderson contacted Ms. Ozel regarding the pending disciplinary proceedings. He was aware that she would likely be An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Bar Counsel‘s communication, dated December 15, 2016, which expressed Bar Counsel‘s intention to declare him in default of the CDA and requested a written response. Second, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to several requests by Bar Counsel concerning the overdraft on his attorney trust account. Third, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to multiple written correspondences from Bar Counsel In addition to the above findings, the hearing judge also found that Mr. Sanderson violated subsections (a), (c), and (e) of It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (e) knowingly manifest by words or conduct when acting in a professional capacity bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status when such action is prejudicial to the administration of justice, provided, however, that legitimate advocacy is not a violation of this section; First, Mr. Sanderson violated In addition, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson ran afoul of When Mr. Sanderson made the disparaging remarks shortly after a CINA hearing in which Ms. Isom-Cyrus represented the BCDSS, he was acting within his professional capacity at the time. Clearly, based on the verbiage alone, Mr. Sanderson in his exchange with Ms. Isom-Cyrus, knowingly manifested bias or prejudice based upon sex, through his words, while acting in a professional capacity in violation of Additionally, Bar Counsel takes exception to the hearing judge‘s legal conclusions premised upon Next, we must determine the sanction to impose where an attorney commits a myriad of rule violations as found by the hearing judge in this case. The primary aim of sanctions is to protect the public and not to punish an attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 (2005). See also Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Shryock, 408 Md. 105, 126 (2009) (commenting that sanctions are intended to “protect the public, deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.“) In fashioning an appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary proceedings, “[w]e determine the appropriate sanction by considering the facts of the case, as well as balancing any aggravating or mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 337 (2013) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 262 (2008)). We often refer to Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association‘s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provides the following aggravating factors: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; (k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances. We have previously explained that “[a]ggravating factors militate in favor of a more severe sanction[.]” Kremer, 432 Md. at 337. Before the hearing judge, Bar Counsel argued that existence of ten aggravating factors compelled disbarment: (1) prior disciplinary offense; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple offenses; (5) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (7) refusal to acknowledge wrongful First, Mr. Sanderson was previously disciplined and received a reprimand on February 25, 2014, for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 3.2, and 3.4(c). Second, Mr. Sanderson demonstrated a dishonest or selfish motive throughout his representation of clients and his interactions with Bar Counsel. Mr. Sanderson failed to disclose to Ms. Ozel the amount or timing of her settlement and knowingly urged her to make false statements to Bar Counsel in an apparent effort to obfuscate his improper handling of settlement and client funds from Bar Counsel‘s view. Third, Mr. Sanderson clearly engaged in an overarching pattern of misconduct. Throughout Bar Counsel‘s investigation, Mr. Sanderson consistently failed to respond to Bar Counsel‘s inquiries. Moreover, Mr. Sanderson engaged in the questionable practice of making impermissible cash withdrawals from his attorney trust account then supplementing the trust account‘s by transferring funds to it from his operating account. Additionally, Mr. Sanderson demonstrated a pattern of misconduct by failing to appear at Fourth, as evident from our analysis above, Mr. Sanderson committed multiple violations of the Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge‘s determination that Mr. Sangare was a vulnerable person, which undergirded his finding that factor (h) – the vulnerability of victim – was applicable.21 American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012). However, contrary to Mr. Sanderson‘s position, “[w]e have recognized previously the special vulnerability of immigrants as clients[.]” Thomas, 440 Md. at 558 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011)). Therefore, In contrast to aggravating factors, the existence of mitigating factors tends to lessen or reduce the sanction an attorney may face. Kremer, 432 Md. at 338. Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association‘s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions also provides a non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors that we regularly consider within the context of attorney sanctions. The standard provides the following potential mitigating factors: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when: (1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) The respondent‘s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely. (j) Delay in disciplinary proceedings; (k) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; (m) remoteness of prior offenses Id. See also Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63 (2010) (providing a non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors). In attorney discipline cases, the burden of proving allegations raised in the Petition, by clear and convincing evidence, falls upon Bar Counsel. First, he contends that, in his representation of Ms. Ozel, he prоvided her with additional legal services, i.e., obtaining a release of funds from the worker‘s compensation carrier, without additional attorney fees. Mr. Sanderson‘s exception regarding the additional work he performed for Ms. Ozel neither fits easily into any of the above categories of mitigating factors nor within any recognized mitigating factor discussed within our case law. However, when viewed in terms of its substance, Mr. Sanderson‘s argument on this point is most likely subsumed under the mitigating factor concerning the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. However, Mr. Sanderson failed to establish this mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of his explanation that he performed additional work for Ms. Ozel, staving off a potential worker‘s compensation lien, Mr. Sanderson provides an email from a subrogation adjuster with the IWIF that cleared Ms. Ozel‘s settlement funds from any IWIF withholding. Mr. Sanderson failed to provide any documentation which would show the amount of work he performed in releasing these funds or any expenditures throughout this period. Second, Mr. Sanderson argues that, although he failed to comply with the CDA in its entirety, he worked with his CDA monitor for an additional eight months past its expiration. Mr. Sanderson‘s contentions on this point are largely misguided. Although he may have met with his monitor beyond the time-period required by the CDA, he failed to Third, Mr. Sanderson argues that he was depressed and abusing alcohol throughout the time period in which these events occurred. Regarding mental disability or substance dependence, we have indicated, in cases of intentional dishonesty misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney‘s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the [MLRPC]. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise. As demonstrated above, Mr. Sanderson misappropriated client funds throughout his practice of repeatedly withdrawing cash from his attorney trust account, then reimbursing the underfunded trust account by transferring funds to it from his operating account on several occasions. Mr. Sanderson provides us with no evidence confirming his struggles with alcoholism and depression or demonstrating that his struggles in managing his attorney trust and operating accounts were substantially attributable to them. We determine that he failed to adduce sufficient evidence linking any alcohol abuse or depressive disorders to his deficient performance and grievous professional failings as an attorney. Fourth, after reiterating that he had worked with his monitor under the CDA past its expiration, Mr. Sanderson contends that the public has not been demonstrably harmed by his conduct, the financial allegations raised in the Petition do not stem from a complaint originating from the public, and that none of his clients are owed any reimbursement. However, оur precedent reveals no distinction between situations where financial complaints originate from Bar Counsel, judges, or an attorney‘s clients. In fact, in this Lastly, Mr. Sanderson argues that he acted as an attorney without any additional allegations of misconduct between the time of the complained activity and Bar Counsel‘s filing of the Petition. As mentioned above, Bar Counsel filed the Petition on March 26, 2018. Although a lack of prior disciplinary record is a potential mitigating factor, Mr. Sanderson attempts to establish this mitigatory effect by arguing that he practiced law for a little over a year, after receiving Bar Counsel‘s complaint, without incident. However, twelve months of good behavior is insufficient to mitigate or overcome the litany of sanctionable conduct Mr. Sanderson committed. Therefore, Mr. Sanderson‘s brief period of not committing sanctionable conduct is insufficient to operate as a mitigating factor. Disbarment is often warranted in situations where an attorney neglects or abandons clients, makes misrepresentations to clients and Bar Counsel, and knowingly misappropriates funds. Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 712 (2019). We have previously held, that “[w]hen a pattern of intentional misrepresentations is involved, particularly those misrepresentations that attempt to conceal other misconduct by the attorney, disbarment will ordinarily be the appropriate sanction.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Framm, 449 Md. 620, 667 (2016). In this case, we sustаin the hearing judge‘s findings that Mr. Sanderson violated Based on our assessment of Mr. Sanderson‘s misconduct, the existence of aggravating factors, and the absence of any mitigating factors, we agree with Bar Counsel and hold that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction. For the above reasons, we disbarred Mr. Sanderson and awarded costs against him by per curiam order dated April 5, 2019.MLRPC 1.5 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 1.15 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Md. Rule 19-410 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Md. Rule 19-407 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Md. Rule 19-408 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
BOP § 10-306 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 3.4 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 8.1 (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
MLRPC 8.4
SANCTION