Attorney Grievance v. IbebuchiAttorney Grievance v. Ibebuchi
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION
This attorney grievance matter involves an attorney who represented a client in a District Court action in which the client was alleged to be an at-fault driver in a multi-vehicle collision. In connection with this representation, the attorney failed to timely respond to discovery requests, failed to appear for trial, and failed to advise his client that a default judgment had been entered against him. After the client learned about the default judgment from a notice issued by the Motor Vehicle Administration, the attorney advised his client that he would file a motion to try to have the case reopened. Despite these assurances, the attorney failed to take any action to assist his client with vacating the judgment, failed to follow up with the client, and failed to refund any portion of the fee charged for his services. After the client filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission, the attorney failed to respond to several letters requesting information in connection with the investigation.
The Court concluded that the attorney violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (1)
Barbera, C.J.
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Getty
Booth
Biran,
JJ.
Opinion by Booth, J.
Filed: November 20, 2020
The AGC, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Mr. Ibebuchi. Bar Counsel charged Mr. Ibebuchi with violating the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”). After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law to this Court, concluding that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 3.2, 3.4(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d). As set forth more fully herein, we agree that Mr. Ibebuchi violated the Rules as charged by the AGC. We suspend Mr. Ibebuchi from the practice of law indefinitely.
I
Background
A. Procedural Context
On August 16, 2019, the AGC, through Bar Counsel, filed the Petition against Mr. Ibebuchi, alleging that he had violated numerous provisions of the MARPC1 in connection with his representation of a particular client. Specifically, Bar Counsel alleged that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4 (Communication); Rule 1.5 (Fees); Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and Rule 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct). The violations arose in connection with Mr. Ibebuchi’s representation of Carlos Morales Jacome (“Mr. Morales”) and Bar Counsel’s investigation into Mr. Morales’ complaint.
Pursuant to
Mr. Ibebuchi filed exceptions to a number of the hearing judge’s findings of fact
B. Facts
When no exception is made to a hearing judge’s finding of fact, we accept it as established.
Mr. Ibebuchi’s Law Practice
Mr. Ibebuchi was admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland on December 14, 2005.3 During the time period that spans the client matter involved in this proceeding, Mr. Ibebuchi maintained an office for the practice of law in Greenbelt, Maryland.
Representation of Mr. Morales
Mr. Morales is a native of Guatemala. Spanish is Mr. Morales’ first language. He cannot speak or read English4 and testified through an interpreter at the evidentiary hearing. On June 7, 2015, Mr. Morales was the at-fault driver in a multi-vehicle collision in Prince George’s County, Maryland. At the time of the accident, Mr. Morales did not have insurance. Carlos Garmendez, the driver of one of the other vehicles, sought uninsured motorist coverage from his insurance provider, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (“State Farm”). State Farm denied Mr. Garmendez’s claim. On June 16, 2016, Mr.
On July 6, 2017, Mr. Morales appeared without counsel for trial. The court postponed the matter until October 13, 2017 and instructed Mr. Morales to obtain counsel. Mr. Morales contacted the Office of the Public Defender, seeking representation. The Office of the Public Defender provided Mr. Morales with Mr. Ibebuchi’s contact information. On July 14, 2017, State Farm served interrogatories on Mr. Morales.
On October 5, 2017, Mr. Morales met with Mr. Ibebuchi and executed a retainer agreement for a flat fee of $2,250. During the meeting, Mr. Morales’ friend, “Felipe,” served as an interpreter and explained the provisions of the retainer agreement to Mr. Morales. The agreement required an initial payment of $1,000 and subsequent payments of $650, to be paid by November 1, 2017, and $600, to be paid by December 1, 2017. Mr. Morales made the initial $1,000 payment to Mr. Ibebuchi on October 6, 2017. The retainer agreement was written in English. Mr. Ibebuchi did not provide Mr. Morales with a Spanish translation.5
During the pendency of Mr. Ibebuchi’s representation of Mr. Morales, Mr. Ibebuchi communicated with Mr. Morales in English and required Mr. Morales to rely on his friend, Felipe, for translation services. Felipe attended all the meetings between Mr. Ibebuchi and Mr. Morales. Mr. Morales also utilized Google Translate to communicate with Mr. Ibebuchi by text message.
On October 13, 2017, Mr. Ibebuchi entered his appearance in Mr. Morales’ case, and appeared at a hearing in the District Court. Mr. Ibebuchi and State Farm’s counsel requested a continuance, as they had both recently entered their appearances, and there was outstanding discovery. The court granted the continuance. On October 17, 2017, the court rescheduled the matter for November 29, 2017 at 1:15 p.m.
On November 14, 2017, State Farm filed a motion for sanctions against Mr. Morales for failure to answer interrogatories. A copy of the motion for sanctions was mailed to Mr. Ibebuchi. Mr. Ibebuchi failed to draft or complete answers to interrogatories on behalf of Mr. Morales.6
Bar Counsel admitted into evidence a copy of Mr. Ibebuchi’s client file for Mr. Morales. The file included a letter dated October 23, 2017 from counsel for State Farm addressed to Mr. Ibebuchi which stated “[e]nclosed is a copy of the interrogatories served upon your client prior to your, or my, entry into the case. Responses are well overdue. Please have your client respond to them as soon as possible.” Mr. Ibebuchi’s file also included a copy of the motion for sanctions that had been filed with the court and mailed to Mr. Ibebuchi on November 9. As the attorney of record in Mr. Morales’ case, Mr. Ibebuchi knew or should have known that it was important to deliver answers to interrogatories as soon as possible, particularly given the pending motion for sanctions. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Ibebuchi explained to Mr. Morales the urgency of responding to the overdue discovery requests. It is counsel’s role to explain the importance of responding to discovery and the effect of a motion for sanctions to his or her client, and even more so where the client speaks no English and is unfamiliar with the legal system. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Ibebuchi failed to respond to the outstanding discovery and that the failure was not excused by any delay or conduct by Mr. Morales. Mr. Ibebuchi’s exception is overruled.
Mr. Ibebuchi also excepts to the hearing judge’s factual finding that he failed to file a response to the motion for sanctions. Mr. Ibebuchi asserts that the hearing judge’s finding is “incomplete, misleading[, and] irrelevant.” Mr. Ibebuchi attempts to shift the blame for his dereliction of services onto Mr. Morales, pointing us to Mr. Morales’ testimony in which he admitted that he arrived late to one meeting, which had to be rescheduled as a result. We overrule Mr. Ibebuchi’s exception. It is undisputed that Mr. Ibebuchi never filed a response to the motion for sanctions. The motion was served on Mr. Ibebuchi and was filed over one month after Mr. Ibebuchi’s appearance was entered. Mr. Ibebuchi’s client file contained a copy of the motion for sanctions. We determine that Mr. Ibebuchi’s attempt to blame his client for his failure to respond to a motion for sanctions is without merit. It is the attorney’s duty to file appropriate responses to motions. Mr. Ibebuchi also makes a “no harm, no foul” argument that, asserting that in light of the default judgment entered against Mr. Morales, his failure to file a response to the motion for sanctions is “irrelevant.” We find this argument equally unavailing. Where
On November 28, 2017 at 6:14 p.m., Mr. Morales sent Mr. Ibebuchi a text message stating “Tomorrow. I have court,” along with a picture of a notice of a court hearing. The notice stated that the proceeding originally scheduled for October 13, 2017 was rescheduled for November 29, 2017 at 1:15 p.m. Mr. Ibebuchi texted Mr. Morales, stating that he “never received this from the Court.” Mr. Morales replied, “What to do then?” Mr. Morales sent another text message to Mr. Ibebuchi at 7:23 p.m. stating, “I need an answer.” Mr. Ibebuchi replied, “I don’t think we have court tomorrow. But I will call them tomorrow morning to confirm. And I’ll call or text you to let you know.”
On November 29, 2017 at 10:57 a.m., Mr. Morales sent Mr. Ibebuchi a text message stating, “I need to know what’s going to happen with today’s court.” At 11:39 a.m., Mr. Ibebuchi informed Mr. Morales that “[w]e don’t have court today. It was postponed from last time, but we don’t have a new court date yet. But it isn’t today.” On November 29, Mr. Morales also paid the additional $650.00 toward the retainer.
On November 29 at 1:15 p.m., the District Court called the case for trial. State Farm’s counsel was present, but neither Mr. Ibebuchi nor Mr. Morales appeared.8 The court entered a default judgment against Mr. Morales in the amount of $15,000. On November 30, the court mailed notice of default judgment to Mr. Ibebuchi. Mr. Ibebuchi failed to advise Mr. Morales of the judgment.
On December 7, Mr. Morales sent a text message to Mr. Ibebuchi, stating, “I need to know when the new court is going to be.” Mr. Ibebuchi failed to respond to the text message. On January 8, 2018, Mr. Morales sent Mr. Ibebuchi two text messages. The first message stated: “Hi, I’m Carlos Morales. I want to know how my case is going.” The second stated: “I do not know anything about the case.” Mr. Ibebuchi failed to respond to these texts in any manner.
On February 22, 2018, Mr. Morales received notice from the MVA that his driving and registration privileges would be suspended if he did not satisfy the judgment by March 15, 2018. Upon receiving the MVA notice, Mr. Morales learned about the default judgment for the first time. After receiving the notice, Mr. Morales contacted Mr. Ibebuchi, who advised Mr. Morales that he would try to reopen the case. However, Mr. Ibebuchi failed to
Mr. Ibebuchi failed to provide Mr. Morales with a refund of any portion of the fee paid by Mr. Morales for his services in connection with the representation. Mr. Morales eventually retained successor counsel to represent him in the matter.
Bar Counsel’s Investigation
On April 8, 2018, Mr. Morales filed a complaint with the AGC. By letter dated April 13, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Ibebuchi, provided a copy of Mr. Morales’ complaint, and requested a written response no later than May 4, 2018. Bar Counsel sent the letter to Mr. Ibebuchi’s office, which is located in Greenbelt. After receiving no response, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Ibebuchi on May 17, enclosing its previous communication and requesting a response by June 7. After receiving no response, on June 25, Bar Counsel sent a third letter, enclosing the previous April and May communications, and requesting a written response by July 3. Each of the letters was sent to Mr. Ibebuchi’s office in Greenbelt.
On August 1—over four months after Bar Counsel’s initial letter—Mr. Ibebuchi wrote to Bar Counsel and stated that he was “still working on the response to [Bar Counsel’s] inquiry.” Mr. Ibebuchi further stated, “I am in the process of finishing this and sending the response to [Bar Counsel’s] office. I appreciate [Bar Counsel’s] patience and my response will be provided very shortly.”
On August 21, having received no additional substantive response, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Ibebuchi again and notified him that the matter had been docketed for further investigation. Bar Counsel requested that Mr. Ibebuchi submit a written response by September 5. Bar Counsel also requested that Mr. Ibebuchi provide a complete copy of Mr. Morales’ client file and an explanation for his failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s prior correspondence. Bar Counsel once again sent the letter to Mr. Ibebuchi’s office in Greenbelt.
On October 4, Bar Counsel investigator Cheryl Trivelli interviewed Mr. Ibebuchi at his Greenbelt office. Mr. Ibebuchi ended the interview after about 15 minutes and stated to Ms. Trivelli that he “had to go to the Howard County Courthouse.” Mr. Ibebuchi agreed to continue the interview on the following day. On October 5, Mr. Ibebuchi appeared at Bar Counsel’s office in Annapolis to continue the interview. At the October 5 interview, Mr. Ibebuchi provided a copy of Mr. Morales’ client file, but failed to provide a written response to any of Bar Counsel’s other requests for information.
II
Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Ibebuchi had committed all the violations pursued by the AGC. Mr. Ibebuchi filed exceptions to those conclusions. Taking into consideration Mr. Ibebuchi’s exceptions, we review the hearing judge’s conclusions de novo.
Competence and Diligence—Failing to Satisfy the Fundamentals
An attorney’s obligation to provide “[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Rule 1.1. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 1.1 when he: (1) failed to respond to discovery requests; (2) failed to file a response to the motion for sanctions; (3) failed to appear at the November 29, 2017 merits hearing; (4) failed to advise Mr. Morales of the default judgment or file a
The hearing judge found that the violations of Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.4 (Communication) discussed supra, constituted a violation of Rule 1.3 (Diligence). Rule 1.3 requires that an attorney “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” An attorney may violate Rule 1.3 by doing “nothing whatsoever to advance the client’s cause or endeavor.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bahgat, 411 Md. 568, 575 (2009). It is hard to identify what, if anything, Mr. Ibebuchi did to advance Mr. Morales’ case. To the contrary, his inaction resulted in the entry of a default judgment against Mr. Morales in the amount of $15,000. Mr. Ibebuchi failed to appear for the November 29 hearing, failed to respond to his client’s inquiries concerning the status of his case in the ensuing two and one-half months after the hearing, and failed to file a motion to vacate the entry of default after learning of the existence of the default judgment against his client. Mr. Ibebuchi’s complete failure to take any action on behalf of Mr. Morales constitutes a violation of Rule 1.3.9
Failure to Communicate
Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (3) provides that “[a]n attorney shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” Additionally, Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a]n attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” The hearing judge found that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) when he: (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to communicate with Mr. Morales in Spanish and instead relied upon Mr. Morales to find a means to translate his English language communications; (2) failed to provide Mr. Morales with a Spanish translation of the retainer agreement; (3) failed to advise Mr. Morales that a motion for sanctions had been filed;10
Mr. Ibebuchi excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 1.4 because he failed to provide Mr. Ibebuchi with a copy of the retainer agreement in Spanish and failed to make reasonable efforts to communicate with Mr. Morales in Spanish. Although Mr. Ibebuchi did not provide a copy of the retainer agreement in Spanish, the undisputed testimony at trial was that Mr. Morales’ friend, Felipe, attended the meeting between Mr. Ibebuchi and Mr. Morales, and translated the retainer agreement and explained the terms to him. Mr. Morales testified that he trusted Felipe, and that Felipe can read and write English. Mr. Morales admitted that Felipe assisted with explaining the contents of the retainer agreement, which Mr. Morales signed after Felipe explained its terms. Mr. Morales also testified that he never met with Mr. Ibebuchi without Felipe in attendance. Mr. Morales also confirmed that he was able to communicate with Mr. Ibebuchi through either group texts (where Felipe was included), or through text messages using Google Translate. Under these circumstances, we do not find that Mr. Ibebuchi’s failure to provide a copy of the retainer agreement in Spanish or his failure to secure independent translation services constitutes a violation of Rule 1.4.
Although we sustain Mr. Ibebuchi’s exceptions pertaining to a Rule 1.4 violation in connection with the language barrier issues described above, we nonetheless determine that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 1.4 by failing to advise Mr. Morales of the entry of the default judgment, by failing to respond to Mr. Morales’ texts requesting information about his case, and by failing to follow up with Mr. Morales after telling him that he would try to have the case reopened. The record is devoid of any communications from Mr. Ibebuchi between November 29, 2017—the date that default judgment was entered against Mr. Morales and February 22, 2018—when Mr. Morales independently learned about the default judgment from the MVA suspension notice. The hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 1.4 is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Fees—Failure to Earn and Failure to Return
Rule 1.5(a) provides that “[a]n attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses[]” and describes the factors that determine the reasonableness of a fee. Rule 1.16(d) requires an attorney to refund any unearned fee to the client upon the termination of representation. We concur with the hearing judge that Mr. Ibebuchi violated these rules. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that, although the initial fee collected in the amount of $1,650 may have initially been reasonable, Mr. Ibebuchi failed to earn the fee when he failed to perform any legal services of value for Mr. Morales.11 A fee that is reasonable at the
Failure to Advance Litigation Efforts on Behalf of Client
Rule 3.2 provides that “[a]n attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Rule 3.4(d) prohibits an attorney from “fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort[s] to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” These rules ensure that the litigation process is undertaken in a manner that promotes the efficient administration of justice and fairness to the parties. The hearing judge determined that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rules 3.2 and 3.4(d) for the same reasons discussed in connection with the violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3. We determine that the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rules 3.2 and 3.4(d) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. As noted supra, Mr. Ibebuchi entered his appearance in Mr. Morales’ case prior to his attendance at the hearing on the motion for a continuance that was held on October 13, 2017. Bar Counsel’s trial exhibits reflect that on October 23, 2017, State Farm provided Mr. Ibebuchi with copies of the interrogatories that had been served upon Mr. Morales prior to Mr. Ibebuchi’s entry into the case and advised Mr. Ibebuchi that the interrogatories “are well overdue.” Counsel for State Farm requested that Mr. Ibebuchi have his client “respond to them as soon as possible.” After no answers to interrogatories were forthcoming, State Farm filed a motion for sanctions. The certificate of service reflects that the motion was mailed to Mr. Ibebuchi on November 9. Mr. Ibebuchi did not file a response to the motion on his client’s behalf. Mr. Ibebuchi’s failure to complete discovery, and failure to respond
Failure to Respond to Bar Counsel’s Request for Information
In connection with an investigation, cooperation with Bar Counsel is paramount. Rule 8.1(b) provides in part that, in connection with a disciplinary matter, an attorney shall not “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority[.]” We agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 8.1 pertaining to disciplinary matters. Mr. Ibebuchi excepts to this conclusion of law, asserting that his lack of response was not undertaken in “bad faith” but was the result of his attempts to investigate the matter in order to provide truthful and accurate information to Bar Counsel. We overrule Mr. Ibebuchi’s exception. The rule does not require proof of bad faith—it simply requires that the attorney “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information” from Bar Counsel. Over the course of five months, Mr. Ibebuchi received five separate letters from Bar Counsel requesting a written response to Mr. Morales’ complaint. His only written response was on August 1, when he advised that he was in the “process of finishing” his response to Bar Counsel and that he was thankful for Bar Counsel’s patience. No response was forthcoming. We find unavailing Mr. Ibebuchi’s excuse that the client matter giving rise to professional grievance was “complicated” and that his delayed response was the result of his “attempt[ing] to figure out what happened[]” in order to “prepare a comprehensive response to Mr. Morales’ complaint.” Bar Counsel’s investigation involved the representation of a single client in a relatively run-of-the-mill tort defense of an automobile accident in a District Court action. We determine that Mr. Ibebuchi was aware of the investigation and failed to provide written responses in a timely manner. There is clear and convincing evidence of a violation of Rule 8.1(b). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 403 (2017) (finding that the attorney violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing to provide any substantive response to Bar Counsel’s reasonable requests for information).
General Misconduct Violations
Finally, we address two general rules—Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d)—the former of which is “easy to apply but . . . adds nothing to the discussion” and the latter of which is “broadly and vaguely phrased but often goes to the heart of the misconduct.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 498 (2020). Under Rule 8.4(a), an attorney who violates any other disciplinary rule also violates this rule. Rule 8.4(d) provides that an attorney commits professional misconduct when he or she “engage[s] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” We agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Ibebuchi violated these rules, but only discuss Rule 8.4(d).
As the hearing judge summarized, Mr. Ibebuchi violated Rule 8.4(d) when he failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to file a response to the motion for sanctions, failed to appear at the November 29 merits hearing, failed to advise Mr. Morales of the default judgment or file a motion to vacate the judgment, failed to respond to Mr. Morales’ texts requesting information about his case, and failed to assist Mr. Morales with the MVA suspension arising from the entry of the default judgment.13 Mr. Ibebuchi failed to provide
III
Sanction
Bar Counsel recommends that Mr. Ibebuchi be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. During oral arguments, Mr. Ibebuchi stated that he believed a suspension of 30 to 60 days would be appropriate.
In an attorney discipline case, it is well settled that we select a sanction primarily with the purpose to protect the public and deter future misconduct rather than to punish the attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 456 Md. 483, 497–98 (2017). We evaluate each attorney grievance matter on its own merits, taking into consideration the particular facts and circumstances when fashioning the appropriate sanction. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 205–06 (2014). When considering the sanction to be imposed in a particular case, we typically consult the list of aggravating and mitigating factors developed by the American Bar Association. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blatt, 463 Md. 679, 707 n.19 (2019) (listing aggravating and mitigating factors).
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
In this case, the hearing judge found one mitigating factor, namely, that Mr. Ibebuchi has no prior discipline.14 The hearing judge found several aggravating factors,
specifically that Mr. Ibebuchi: (1) committed multiple offenses while representing Mr. Morales; (2) obstructed Bar Counsel’s investigation by refusing to provide a substantive written response to the complaint and to Bar Counsel’s multiple requests for information; (3) refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and has instead attempted to place the blame on the conduct of Mr. Morales and opposing counsel; and (4) made no effort regarding restitution to Mr. Morales “until the virtual eve of the evidentiary hearing[.]” The hearing judge also determined that Mr. Morales is an immigrant who does not speak English fluently, which makes him a vulnerable victim. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions with respect to the presence of one mitigating factor and the presence of several aggravating factors.
We agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate sanction is indefinite suspension. Our decisions in prior attorney grievance cases, combined with our consideration of the mitigating factor and aggravating factors present in this case, support this sanction. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kirwan, 450 Md. 447, 466–67 (2016) (imposing a sanction of indefinite suspension where the attorney
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d) FOR WHICH JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST FERDINAND UCHECHUKWU IBEBUCHI.