*1 1 1028 MARYLAND, ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF v.
Pamela Louise SHAW. 75, Sept. Term, No. 1997. Misc. AG Appeals Maryland. Court of 10, Argued Sept. 1998.
Reargued Dec. 2000.
Decided 2001. Feb. *3 Hirshman, Grossman, Melvin Bar Counsel and Glenn M. Attorney Bar Counsel for the Commission Deputy Grievance Maryland, petitioner. for Reisterstown, for Hedgepeth, respondent. Linwood RODOWSKY, BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, before Argued CHASANOW, RAKER, CATHELL, WILNER and JJ. BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER,
Reargued before WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and F. LAWRENCE (retired, specially assigned) RODOWSKY JJ.
RAKER, Judge. Commission, Counsel, Bar through Grievance charged (Respondent) violating Pamela Louise Shaw Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (Compe- (Bar tence),1 (Fees),2 Rule 1.5 Rule 8.1 Admissions and Disci- (d) (Misconduct).4 Matters),3 8.4(a), (c), and Rule plinary and (Competence) 1. Rule 1.1 states: lawyer provide competent representation Compe- A shall to a client. skill, representation requires legal knowledge, thoroughness
tent reasonably necessary preparation representation. states, (Fees) pertinent part: 2. Rule 1.5 ( n ) lawyer’s A fee shall be reasonable. The factors tо be considered determining following: the reasonableness of a fee include the (1) required, novelty difficulty the time and labor of the involved, questions requisite perform legal and the skill service properly; likelihood, (2) client, apparent acceptance if by particular employment preclude employment lawyer; will other (3) customarily charged locality legal the fee for similar services; *4 (4) obtained; the amount involved and thе results (5) imposed by by the time limitations the client or the circum- stances; ( n ) length professional relationship the nature and of the with the client; (7) ability experience, reputation, lawyer lawyers and of the or services; performing the and (8) contingent. whether the fee is fixed or states, (Bar matters) disciplinary and 3. Rule 8.1 admissions in relevant part: 16-709(b), we referred Maryland to Rule Pursuant Court for Richard T. Rombro of the Circuit Judge to charges make of fact a and City Bаltimore to conduct conclusions of law. proposed and hearing, Judge Rombro conducting evidentiary an
After
1.1,1.5, 8.1, and
had violated Rules
concluded that
8.4(c)
(d).5
Court,
excepted to several
In this
and
fact,
arguing
they
of
were
hearing judge’s findings
of the
matter,
except-
erroneous. As a threshold
clearly
that, although on the inactive
to
Rombro’s conclusion
Judge
ed
list,
to
subject
attorney discipline.
excepted
to
She
she was
that she failed to
judge’s findings
respond
the hearing
Counsel,
herself out
of Bar
that she held
as
lawful demand
workings
of the
attorney,
knowledge
that she had little
market,
for
charged
the fee she
her
stock
services
inordinate,
in the
law.
engaged
practice
and that she had
hearing judge’s
conclusions of law
excepted
She further
8.4(c)
(d).
1.1,1.5, 8.1,
she
Rules
violated
Shaw,
v.
Attorney Grievance
In
knowingly
through
do
the acts
assist or induce another to do
or
so
another;
H*
H*
H*
Hs
sH
H5
fraud,
(c) engage
involving dishonesty,
misrepre-
deceit or
in conduct
sentation;
(d) engage
prejudicial to the administration of
in conduct that is
justice....
Judge
findings support
5. We will not reiterate
Rombro’s initial factual
law,
they
ing
as
are set out in
Grievance v.
his conclusions of
Shaw,
(1999) (Shaw I).
354 Md.
to
to a lawful
of Bar Counsel.
held that
respond
demand
We
subject
of this
disciplinary authority
she was
Court.
id. at
647,
See
We
8.4(c)
Rule
by engaging
violаted
conduct
fraud, deceit, or
See
involving dishonesty,
misrepresentation.
id.
support
“This Court will review the facts in by the Court of opinion Appeals its earlier and discussed opinion. its of that this Court had found Appeals
“The Court stated out as Respondent lawyer held herself a had on behalf of performed legal guardian work the noted, of Appeals only support estate. The Court then “The for former is the gave finding Respondent’s the Court of term in with the disabled ‘Esq.’ correspondence use person’s guardian.” of Appeals quoted
“The Court of had this Court’s in following fact and conclusions of law statement: out as an Respondent attorney “2. That the held herself work on the seeking Berger when she was do matter. The Court notes that her letter of March Shaw, 1993, ... L. signed Esq.” is “Pamela in in “This was remiss not forth detail all of setting Court performed legal for that the work was believing reasons work and that the had held herself out as an Respondent deference, that attorney. say, This Court must with all due of lawyer it believed that the status as a amplification this matter was so clear as to need no Therefore, merely this Court “noted” that Re- reasons. spondent “Esq.” used the title remand, this Court held additional
“Subsequent hearing Respondent again at which the testified and cоunsel argued respective positions. their and conclusion prior finding
“This Court now restates its
out as a
of law that the
did
fact hold herself
legal
that the work
work. This
lawyer
performed
following findings
Court relies on the
and inferences:
which,
in-
“1. The
submitted bills
one
stance,
“Fee for
services ren-
professional
was entitled
nor the
on
original hearing
In neither the
dered.”
what
other
Respondent explain
profession,
remand did the
legal,
represented.
than
the bill
“mеeting
At
one of the bills notes that it is for
“2.
least
of tax documents:
Re-
and review
$500.00.”
case,
documents,
of tax
under the circumstances of this
view
undertaking.
clearly
legal
above,
Finally, and
addition to the
the use
“3.
“Esq.”
Appeals
The Court of
held that
does
designation
attorney/client
relationship,”
not
create an
“automatically
say
it was not a factor
to be considered.
but did
“The record in this case discloses that
*7
that this Court recuse itself since
Rеspondent requested
the
Estate.
underlying
the Court was familiar with the
however,
was,
a
knowledge that this Court had of the Estate
trial
public
Any
judge hearing
matter of
record.
have made himself or herself aware
certainly
matter would
guardianship.
of the administration of the
Respondent
fact is that
the
is the third
unhappy
“The
lawyer
by
to be
the
Commis-
charged
Grievance
attorney
sion in this same Estate. The
who retained the
disbarred;
Respondent
services of the
wаs
her successor
was disbarred and incarcerated as a result of substantial
short,
from
Estate.
In
the
theft
administration
a
Berger
profession.
Estate of Mr.
has been
stain on the
Tow-
“Respondent, although nominally
by
retained
Ms.
son,
person
knew that
the actual client was a
under a
disability
appointed
for whom the Court had
a
a
dealing
person,
handle his affairs. When
such
of
extremely high degree
should be held to an
Indeed,
professionalism.
attention and
thе words of Justice
Cardozo,
he was Chief
of the Court of
Judge
Appeals
when
York,
compass
by attorneys:
of
be the
New
should
followed
forms of conduct
in a
Many
permissible
work-a-day world
for
at arm’s
acting
length,
those
are forbidden to those
A
by fiduciary
something
bound
ties.
trustee is held to
stricter than the morals of the market
Not hones-
place.
alone,
sensitive,
ty
punctilio
but the
of an honor the most
is then the
of behavior.
standard
(1928).
Salmon,
Meinhard v.
Bar Counsel filed no in this Court.6 exceptions again exceptions filed this Court to both the judge’s of fact of excepts and conclusions law. She also hearing judge’s refusal to himself. recuse Respondent argues phrase the use of the “Fee for professional legal services rendered” is not evidence of work consultant, and that was as acting attorney. she not as an argues also of tax review documents is work, not necessarily legal and there is no evidence to demon- that it legal strate work under the circumstances of this Finally, Respondent argues case. of any member Maryland Bar is entitled to use designation “Esq.,” re- Therefore, gardless profession they currently practicе. Respondent’s little, if “Esq.” any, significance. use is of On himself, of Judge issue Rombro’s failure to recuse Respon- argues dent that it was for him to improper consider the fact that, Respondent, before two other attorneys had been disci- plined dealing their actions with the same Estate. also suggests Judge Rombro’s statement that *8 the administration of the Estate of Berger Mr. has been a profession” “stain on the is of racial prejudice, given evidence that thе two attorneys disciplined previously were black. points Judge stating 6. Bar Counsel that out Rombro was incorrect attorney Respondent "the who retained the services of the was dis- attorney barred" us to asks correct the record to reflect that suspended, not disbarred. The record stands corrected. to Judge Respondent’s exception consider first We motion to recuse himself. At of her Rombro’s denial Judge that Rom- evidentiary hearing, Respondent requested himself, that alleging knowledge he had bro recuse the motion. Judge Rombro denied underlying guardianship. I Shaw and, raise the recusal issue did not thus, ruling. excepts that did not address we her and we shall consider proceeding, that in this ruling exception. grounds Judge on the that moved recusal with the Estate of John W. had a connection prior
Rombro wrongdoings with the alleged and was familiar with Berger court who ordered an audit judge Estate. He was the circuit for the Michele Towson was the of the case when motion, Judge of the recusal Rombro Estate. In his denial that, prior in fact have some connection although stated he did “no ideas judge, preconceived the Estate as a he had role, Shaw, at all to me.” anything Ms. about her or about Court, that Respondent argues exceptions In her before of his have recused himself because Judge Rombro should Berger Additionally, Estate. she prior connection with the hearing judge’s Supplemen- comments suggests that the are evidence of racial bias. She Report tal After Remand that two hearing judge improperly considered argues disciplined with the Estate had been attorneys that dealt prior history Berger that of the administration Estate, and, prior lawyers, the conduct of the two particularly, exception, In her she states: is relevant. against respondent as the fact that other
Tо use evidence disciplined that dealt with the estate were attorneys public It is a matter of record beyond pale. If trial to are black. one uses the attorneys he refers inferences, its drawing say court’s one could way preju- “stain” on the remark is evidence of racial profession dice. Rombro cor exception Judge
This is without merit. the issue of recusal disci- rectly pointed out
11 pline province matters is within the of Appеals. Court Hollis, 547, See Comm. v. 347 Griev. Md. 702 (1997) 223, 229 (noting that in types proceedings, these the matter of province recusal is within the of the Court of Moreover, Appeals). hearing remarks judge’s must be in read context. His regarding comments the conduct of the prior attorneys two and that the administration of this Estate is a “stain on profession” were on merely comments obvious, i.e., the overall improper handling legal matter expression and not an of racial animus. is a strong presumption
“[T]here Maryland, and elsewhere, judges impartial are participants legal process, duty whose to preside qualified when as strong as duty their to refrain from when presiding qualified.” State, 99, 107, (1993) v. 330 Md. 622 A.2d Jefferson-El (citations omitted). The decision to recuse oneself ordinarily is discretionary and will not be overturned except abuse. See id. The party requesting heavy recusal has a burden to overcome the presumption of impartiality and must prove that judge has a personal bias or prejudice him against or her or personal has knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con cerning the proceedings. See id. As to allegations of bias on knowledge based gained judicial from a proceeding, this Court stated: bias,
Only prejudice, or knowledge from extraju- derived dicial “personal.” source is Where knowledge is acquired judicial setting, or an opinion arguably expressing bias is formed on the basis of information from “acquired evidence presented in the judicial course of proceedings him,” before neither that nor knowledge that opinion qualifies “per- as sonal.” (citations omitted).
Id. Respondent’s allegation of bias is based on knowledge the hearing judge presumably obtained judicial another proceeding. knowledge Such qualify does not as “personal” knowledge sufficient to require recusal. There is no evidence in this support record to Respondent’s excep- and,
tion, Rombro’s to recuse him- accordingly, Judge refusal self was not an abuse of discretion. After considering Supplemental Report
After Re mand, overrule Respondent’s exception we *10 in finding practice that the of law. judge’s engaged Judge she “Esq.” of beyond Respondent’s Rombro outlined facts use discipline in satisfy convincing the clear and standard matters. judge’s
Finally, excepts healing to the Respondent 1.5, 1.1, 8.1, that she Rules findings and conclusions violated (d). 8.4(c) merely exceptions, and stated her Respondent and however, then farther them. Without pursue did not more, establishing has failed her burden factual she to meet of in the of by matters defense of her the position preponderance Sheridan, 1, v. 357 Md. 17 Attorney evidence. See Grievance (1999). 1143, 18, 741 A.2d 1152 are overruled. exceptions for appropriate We next address sanction of purpose disciplinary proсeed established misconduct. The not to the errant ings punish attorney, protect is but Dechowitz, 184, v. Md. See Grievance 358 public. Attorney 657, (2000). 192, discharged Our duty by 747 661 appropriate light a sanction that is of the nature imposing Tolar, v. of the violation. See Grievance gravity Attorney (2000). 569, 1045, 584-85, The proper 357 Md. 745 A.2d 1053 sanction, therefore, by circum is determined the facts and 585, case. See id. 745 A.2d particular stances at at 1053. urges
Bar Counsel this Court disbar Respondent, basing Respondеnt’s submitting his recommendation on conduct guardian Berger documents to the of the Estate of John essentially only were valueless and were submitted fee, knowing of all the purpose collecting a while these would be by documents used for the administra- addition, tion of In Estate. retained fees, $18,500.00 in represents compelling which such dishones- that she should be disbarred. has offered no ty to an suggestion as sanction. appropriate
13 Counsel, failed to cooperate with Bar per she manner, formed services an incompetent she charged an fee, excessive and she engaged prejudicial conduct justice. administration of It is the view of this Court that the appropriate sanction is that Respondent suspended be from practice of law for a period year, of one thirty effective days See Attorney Griev. filing from the opinion. Korotki, Comm’n v. 646, 672, 318 Md. 569 A.2d (1990) (attorney suspended for period eighteen months for fee); charging Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpel excessive man, 228, 245, (1981) 292 Md. 438 A.2d (attorney suspended fee). for period year of one for charging excessive ORDERED;
IT IS SO RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS TAXED AS BY THE COURT, CLERK OF THIS THE TRANSCRIPTS, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL PUR- 16-715(0, SUANT TO MARYLAND RULE FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN THE FAVOR OF *11 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST PAMELA LOUISE SHAW.
BELL, Chief Judge, Dissenting and Concurring.
In Shaw,
Grievance v.
636,
354 Md.
This Court also hearing addressed the judge’s findings that the respondent 8.4(c), violated Rule engaging in- conduct volving fraud, dishonesty, deceit misrepresentation, or by holding herself out аs competent in the area of stock evalúa- for the she ren- an excessive fee service charging
tion dered, 1.1, matter in by undertaking a competence, and Rule held: As to these we experience. findings, which she had no is respondent’s the only support “The these the undertaking perform inexperience aforementioned was hearing judge task for the determined she very which holding compe- nevertheless herself out as preрared, ill but tent, lawyer, a she fact because she was when presumably thus, hearing the findings, may by not. The be colored was was herself judge’s respondent holding that the conclusion lawyer. a the task as a We lawyer out as and undertook clearly errone- finding have former concluded latter nothing support That on which to ous. leaves respondent finding speculation that except by hearing judge, in collusion. But guardian were meet petitioner its burden finding that did 8.4(a) violation, rejected any Rule alleged has respect charge.” such concluded, 656-57, at at 886-87.
354 Md. We however: seen, are lawyers precedents
“As we have our indicate they practic- when are not disciplined occurring for conduct or only if is conduct ing law that conduct dishonest may profession, they on the not each time adversely reflects may or they tasks for which are under qualified undertake inexperienced. respon- The focus of this case was on the be lawyer аnd not on quality dent’s status as to that status. From the regard conduct without respondent’s can not judge’s opinion, we discern conduct, 8.1, than her violation of Rule is sanctionable. other *12 evi- acknowledge may Because we that the record contain law or practicing was indicating respondent dence relationship guard- with the lawyer-client had entered into ian, findings for further the case will be remanded regard.” 657, 732
Id. at at 887. analyze than the and cirсumstances to deter- Rather facts into relationship whether client entered mine was guardian respondent, between the and the as it was invited to do, the hearing judge sought supply support factual for the finding In respondent practicing the law. addition to of respondent’s the use the it offers designation, “Esq.,” only: which, instance, “1. The submitted bills in one was entitled ‘Fee for In professional services rendered.’ neither the original hearing nor on remand did explain profession, the Respondent legal, what other than the bill represented.
“2. At of least one the bills notes that it for ‘meeting is and review of tax documents: Re- $500.00.’ documents, view of case, tax under the circumstances this is clearly a legal undertaking.”
I that, combination, am not convinced or in singly they add anything significant to the resolution the case. Neither the for professional submission of bills services nor review of Indeed, tax an exclusively legal documеnts is matter. many submit, professionals other have paid, profession- and bills not, services. may fact, al That one trier of satisfactorily to the explain the nature of profession billing for which is made or the trier of is not particular fact convinced that the field of profession, endeavor is a does not render the bill one for legal services, intimates, by default. As respondent consultants submit bills for “Fee for professional services rendered” and they practicing are not they law when do so. sure, circumstances,
To be under some review of tax docu- however, ments can legal undertaking; be a arewe not told it what is about this case that makes that here. the case mere statement that so something is does not make it so and is all correct, that there is The respondent here. also is is there no evidence record demonstrate that what respondent was legal did work under the circumstances of this case.
I would grant respondent’s exceptions as to them, with respect practice of law. With the violations 8.4(c) (d) 1.1, 1.5, of Rules only would fall. The conduct for which sanction is for violation appropriate then
16 8.1, to a lawful of Bar respond Rule failure demand
Counsel. suspension of a one majority imposes year a sanction 8.1, it in addition to Rule upholds, for all of the violations (d). 8.4(c) 1.1, 1.5, fact that it Except Rules 8.1, I of Rule only agree be for violation would year appropriate. sanction of a one suspension AMUSEMENTS, INC., CHESAPEAKE
v. B. RIDDLE. Robert Term, 124, Sept. 1998. No. Appeals Maryland.
Court of Feb. 2001.