ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Riсhard Allen MOORE, II
Misc. Docket AG No. 15, Sept. Term, 2015
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
January 20, 2017
152 A.3d 639
Richard A. Finci, Esq. of Houlon, Berman, Finci, Levenstein & Skok, LLC (Greenbelt, MD), for respondent.
Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten and Getty, JJ.
Greene, J.
Richard A. Moore, II (“Respondent“), was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 28, 1990. Beginning in 1990, Respondent served as an Assistant State‘s Attorney in Prince George‘s County for approximately nineteen years. Respon
On May 7, 2015, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner” or “Bar Counsel“), acting pursuant to
The hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2016. Thereafter, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, maintaining that the evidence was clear and convincing, that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16 (a) and (d), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Respondent filed exceptions to the
FINDINGS OF FACT
The hearing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2016, after which he made the following factual findings:
On or about May 9, 2012, Ms. Covington was involved in a four car automobile accident. The fourth driver was insured by GEICO and accepted liability. In August 2012, Ms. Covingtоn retained the Respondent to represent her pursuant to a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement that was signed by Ms. Covington on August 25, 2012. Ms. Covington was referred to the Respondent by a close friend who recommended that she contact Respondent for representation.
It is undisputed that Ms. Covington received medical treatment at least through the month of August 2012. Based on advice from her doctor, Ms. Covington understood that she should not consider a settlement no [sic] sooner than 4 months after she completed her medical treatment.
On September 2, 2012, Ms. Covington advised the Respondent that a GEICO representative would like to speak with him about the claim, and Ms. Covington provided the name and contact information to the Respondent and authorized Respondent to settle her claim. On or about September 6, 2012, the Respondent stated, “After I speak with the GEICO representative, I will give you a call to discuss what she says.” The Respondent did not speak with the GEICO representative or follow-up with Ms. Covington. On October 2, 2012, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and stated that she had received a call from the GEICO repre
On October 31, 2012, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and stated, “Checking in to see where we stand with the GEICO settlement. Thank you so much.” The Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington‘s email in any manner. On December 1, 2012, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington emailed him and stated, “Please let me know a convenient time to speak with you regarding my auto accident.” The Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington‘s email in any manner. On December 17, 2012, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington sent him another email stating, “I‘ve sent you emails and left a message for you and I have not heard anything from you. Please advise me as to the status of my case.” The Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington‘s email in any manner. On January 13, 2013, having not received any response from the Respondent, Ms. Covington emailed him again and stated, “Please proceed in settling my claim with GEICO.”
On January 14, 2013, Ms. Covington spoke with the Respondent during a brief phone call that lasted approximately 3 minutes. During the phone call, Ms. Covington restated that she wanted to settle her claim and authorized the Respondent to make a demand.
On February 19, 2013, the Respondent for the first time, sent a letter of representation to GEICO, stating, inter alia, “As of this date, my client has completed all treatment. Upon my receipt of my client‘s medical records, bills and
After multiple interviews, in February 2013, the Respondent was notified that he would be appointed as an Administrative Law Judge. He was given four weeks to close his practice. Based upon discussions with W. Thomas Stovall, II, Esq., Respondent decided to inform all of his clients that he could provide a referral to another attorney for representation for any work remaining in their cases or they could retain new counsel of their own choosing. Respondent began his employment as an Administrative Law Judge on March 12, 2013, and on March 18, 2013, he was placed on exempt status by the Attorney/Client Trust Fund of the Bar of Maryland.
On April 10, 2013, Ms. Covington, having heard nothing from the Respondent, emailed him and stated, “Just checking in. How‘s the settlement process going?” The Respondent did not respond. On April 17, 2013, Ms. Covington sent an email to [the Respondent] advising that USAA, her carrier had agreed to accept a property damage settlement from GEICO. She further stated, “Where do we stand? How soon can we settle?” The Respondent did not respond. On April 30, 2013, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Ms. Covington emailed him and stated, “Just checking on the progress of the settlement. When do you expect to be able to close out?” The Respondent did not respond in any manner. On May 21, 2013, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and stated, “Please let me know where we stand on my settlement with GEICO. I have suppliеd you with all of the pertinent information requested. I would greatly appreciate a response to my email.” The Respondent did not respond in any manner.
Ms. Covington never received any communication from the unnamed attorney that was to take over her case. Ms. Covington called the Respondent‘s cellular phone and left voice messages on July 1, 2013, July 15, 2013, July 29, 2013, August 7, 2013, August 9, 2013, August 12, 2013, August 14, 2013, and September 27, 2013. The Respondent did not return Ms. Covington‘s calls or respond to her voicemail messages in any manner.
On September 27, 2013, Ms. Covington emailed the Respondent and stated:
Mr. Moore,
When we last spoke at the end of May 2013, you advised me that you were closing your practice and that my case would be transferred to another personal
injury attorney within 1 week. As of today, I have not received any correspondence from you or any other attorney. I have left you several voice mail messages that you have not responded to. At this point, I want to terminate our agreement as you have failed to represent me in this matter. Please contact me immediately to discuss and execute a termination of our agreement. Sincerely,
Cynthia Covington
The Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Covington‘s September 27, 2013 email in any manner. On September 30, 2013, Ms. Covington called the Respondent‘s cellulаr phone and left a final voicemail message. The Respondent did not respond to Ms. Covington‘s voicemail message in any manner. The Respondent did not write to GEICO and advise them [sic] that he was no longer representing Ms. Covington, he did not provide Ms. Covington with a copy of her file and did not execute a termination of representation as requested. In 2015, the Respondent eventually provided a lien release to Ms. Covington.
On February 25, 2014, Ms. Covington filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. On March 19, 2104, Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to the Respondent and requested a response within fifteen days. On April 15, 2014, with no response having been received, Bar Counsel wrote to the Respondent and requested a response. On April 21, 2014, the Respondent called Bar Counsel and received an extension through May 12, 2014. On May 12, 2014, the Respondent provided a written response to Bar Counsel stating in part, “Right around that time, Ms. Covington and I had a conversation about her case. When I reported to her that I had a new attorney lined up, Ms. Covington left me with the impression that she wanted to secure the services of her own attorney to take over the case.”
By letter dated June 2, 2014, Bar Counsel requested the Respondent provide, inter alia, a complete copy of Ms. Covington‘s file, the date he closed his practice, the name of
On July 25, 2014, Bar Counsel again requested the name of the attorney that the Respondent had “lined up” to take over Ms. Covington‘s matter. The information was to be provided by August 8, 2014. The Respondent did not respond, and on August 12, 2014, Bar Counsel again requested the name of the attorney. By email later that day, the Respondent, through counsel, provided the name of Allan W. Steinhorn, Esq., as the attorney with whom he spoke about taking over his practice.
The undisputed evidence presented at trial is that Ms. Covington called the Respondent nine times between July 1, 2013 and September 30, 2013. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence is that on each of the nine occasions, Ms. Covington left a voicemail message for Respondent. The Court rejects the Respondent‘s explanation and finds that Respondent knowingly, and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he had not heard from Ms. Covington and that he was “waiting” for Ms. Covington to contact him. During a deposition on November 25, 2015, Respondent testified that he told Ms. Covington that he accepted a position as an Administrative Law Judge “right around late February or early March.” The Court found that the Respondent [sic] testimony was knowingly and intentionally false.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge made the following conclusions of law:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
This [c]ourt finds the Respondent in violation of Rule 1.1 for the reasons stated in the discussions of violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2—Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer
Rule 1.2(a) provides:
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client‘s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
In September 2012, approximately one month after retaining the Respondent, Ms. Covington authorized the Respondent to make a settlement demand on GEICO. Ms. Covington repeated that directive in January 2013 and March 2013. The undisputed evidence is clear that the Respondent did not send a letter of representation to GEICO until February 2013 and, at no time did he make any settlement demand. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3—Diligence
A lawyer shall act with reasonablе diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4—Communication
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client‘s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer‘s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary tо permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
The Respondent failed to respond to many of Ms. Covington‘s phone calls and emails. On those instances that the Respondent did response [sic], the responses were inadequate in that they failed to keep Ms. Covington reasonably informed about the status of her matter, failed to answer her questions and failed to comply with Ms. Covington‘s reasonable requests for information. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16—Declining or Terminating Representation
Rule 1.16(a) provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer‘s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer‘s ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
Rule 1.16(d) provides:
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client‘s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
The Respondent failed to give Ms. Covington timely notice of the termination of the representation, failed to advise her that she could employ her own counsel, failed to return her file and failed to advise GEICO that he was withdrawing his appearance. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1—Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the mаtter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
The Respondent violated Rule 8.1(a) when he knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel, in his letter of May 12, 2014, that he informed Ms. Covington that he was closing his practice “upon his appointment” as an
The Respondent failed to timely comply with Bar Counsel‘s lawful demands for information made on March 19, 2014, June 2, 2014, and July 25, 2014. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds the Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4—Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
This [c]ourt, as discussed herein, having concluded that Respondent violated multiple Rules, concludes that Respondent has also committed misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4(a).
The [c]ourt finds that each violation of Rule 8.1(a) constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(c). The Respondent‘s conduct, taken as a whole, most certainly brings the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Rule 8.4(d). (internal citations omitted).
Respondent concedes that he violated Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 8.4(a) but has filed exceptions as to the hearing judge‘s conclusions regarding Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 8.1 and 8.4(c). Respondent makes no formal exception to the finding that he violated Rule 8.4(d).
Standard of Review
In attorney discipline proceedings, “this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 152, 879 A.2d 58, 76 (2005). In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Blair, we articulated the appropriate standard of review in attorney disciplinary matters: “we accept the hearing judge‘s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous .... We conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge‘s conclusions of law.” 440 Md. 387, 400-01, 102 A.3d 786, 793 (2014) (citations omitted). It is Petitioner‘s burden to prove averments in the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
....
Exceptions to Findings of Fact
Respondent raises several exceptions to the hearing judge‘s factual findings. First, Respondent challenges the hearing judge‘s omission of the fact that Ms. Covington forwarded an e-mail to Respondent on March 4, 2013 containing a complete list of her medical providers and other documents related to her personal injury claim. Respondent contends that this undisputed fact was presented by Bar Counsel in its case-in-chief, and that this fact is relevant to this Court‘s consideration of alleged violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Bar Counsel disagrees with Respondent‘s characterization of March 4, 2013 as the date which Respondent first received information regarding Ms. Covington‘s medical providers and points that there is evidence Ms. Covington forwarded her medical bills to Respondent on September 2, 2012 and provided duplicates and updated records on March 4, 2013. Bar Counsеl thus contends that the omission was not clearly
Second, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge‘s omission of the undisputed facts that during Ms. Covington‘s initial meeting with Respondent on August 25, 2012, Respondent discussed personal injury claims generally with Ms. Covington as well as how Respondent specifically intended to handle Ms. Covington‘s case and that the retainer agreement signed by Ms. Covington contained language informing Ms. Covington that the personal injury claim process could involve “an extended period of time” where no communication between her and Respondent would occur. We hold that omission of this fact was not clearly erroneous. Respondent‘s misconduct stems from his neglect of Ms. Covington‘s case, his failure to respond to her reasonable requests for information, and his failure to do virtually any work on her behalf. It is of no moment that Ms. Covington was informed that she may not hear from Respondent for an extended period of time because the Rules still impose duties of communication and diligence (
The hearing judge also found that Respondent‘s deposition testimony that he told Ms. Covington of his appointment as an Administrative Law Judge around “late February or early March” was “knowingly and intentionally false.” Respondent explains that in his deposition testimony, he testified that
The hearing judge failed to articulate the basis from which he believed that Respondent‘s deposition testimony was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation. Respondent testified at his deposition that to his recollection, he had the conversation terminating his representation of Ms. Covington sometime in late February or early March. Ms. Covington testified at her deposition that the conversation did not occur until late May, and there is undisputed telephone record evidence showing that Ms. Covington called Respondent at the end of May, and that she continued to call him several times between then and September 2013. If the hearing judge reached his conclusion based upon his determination that Ms. Covington was the more credible witness, he did not specifically articulate so. Even if the hearing judge specifically concluded that Ms. Covington was the more credible witness and that the conversation took place in May, such evidence only pertains to a finding of when the conversation took place and not whether Respondent knowingly misrepresented the facts. The evidence may be сlear and convincing to prove that Respondent made a misrepresentation as to the time that the conversation took place, however, the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that Respondent made such representation with present knowledge of its falsity because Respondent testified that it was his recollection that the conversation had taken place at an earlier time. See Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 78, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000) (“[I]n order to establish its case against respondent, Bar Counsel is required
Fourth and finally, Respondent challenges the hearing judge‘s omission of the faсt that Ms. Covington was able to successfully settle her claim with the assistance of her new attorney. Bar Counsel argues this was not clearly erroneous because this fact has no bearing upon the issue of whether Respondent violated the rules. We agree with Bar Counsel that lack of prejudice to a client‘s case may not be relevant to the issue of whether Respondent violated the
Exceptions to Conclusions of Law
Rule 1.1—Competence
Respondent argues that a lack of diligence does not in and of itself constitute incompetence. ”
Here, Respondent failed to request medical records from Ms. Covington‘s providers notwithstanding having authorization, failed to timely send a letter of representation to GEICO despite Ms. Covington‘s many requests, and failed to ever make any settlement demand. In the hearing judge‘s words, “Respondent did virtually no work on Ms. Covington‘s matter.” It is established law that a complete lack of representation is incompetent representation. See, e.g., Mooney, 359 Md. at 74, 753 A.2d at 26. Accordingly, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Respondent violated
Rule 1.2(a)—Scope of Representation
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Respondent violated
In order for a lawyer to abide by а client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation, the client must be able to make informed decisions as to the objectives of the representation. In order for a client to make informed decisions as to the objectives of the representation, an attorney must give the client honest updates regarding the status of his or her case.
Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 380, 108 A.3d 394, 402 (2015). In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Reinhardt, we held that a lawyer violated
Similarly, in the case sub judice, Respondent did not keep Ms. Covington aware of the status of her case. Respondent made no attempts to settle Ms. Covington‘s claim despite her instructions to do so. Moreover, Respondent did not timely comply with Ms. Covington‘s directive to contact GEICO. Respondent argues that he did not attempt to settle the claim because he did not receive a full list of Ms. Covington‘s medical providers and documentation until just nine days before he began his employment as an Administrative Law Judge. However, the rеcord reveals that Ms. Covington sent Respondent at least some medical documentation as early as September 2012. Additionally, Respondent had authorization from Ms. Covington to request her medical records and failed to do so. We thus conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that Respondent violated
Rule 1.3—Diligence
“Similar to
Rule 1.4—Communication
Respondent concedes that he violated
”
Rule 1.16—Termination of Representation
Respondent concedes that he violated
After representation has been terminated or otherwise concluded, a lawyer still owes a duty to his or her client. “When a client requests his or her file from an attorney at the end of the representation,
Rule 8.1—Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
Respondent challenges the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Respondent made a knowing misrepresentation to Bar Counsel in violation of
Mooney, 359 Md. at 78, 753 A.2d at 29. In Mooney, we held that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence that an attorney violated
In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Lee we distinguished equivocal statements like the statement made in Mooney from unequivocal, “emphatic statements of fact.” 393 Md. 385, 411, 903 A.2d 360, 374 (2006):
In contrast to the equivocal statement made by the respondent to the Bar investigator in Mooney, the respondent in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 894 A.2d 502 (2006), made an unequivocal statement of fact to Bar Counsel, which was proven at the evidentiary hearing to be false. In Kapoor, we adopted the hearing judge‘s conclusion of law that a respondent violated
MRPC 8.1(a) where the respondent communicated to the Commission during a disciplinary investigаtion that his client never tendered a $50 check. The statement constituted a material
In the present case, Respondent contends that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that he knowingly made a false statement to Bar Counsel. The record contains evidence of a May 12, 2014 letter that Respondent sent to Bar Counsel, in which Respondent wrote that he informed Ms. Covington that the representation was terminated “upon” his appointment as an Administrative Law Judge, that Ms. Covington left him with the impression that she wanted to retain alternative cоunsel, and that he was “waiting” to hear from Ms. Covington. On August 12, 2014, Respondent sent an email via his attorney to Bar Counsel and stated that he was “waiting for Ms. Covington to contact him” but “heard nothing from her.” The record also contains evidence that Respondent did not inform Ms. Covington of the termination of representation until May, and that Ms. Covington called Respondent nine times between July 1, 2013 and September 1, 2013. However, Respondent testified that he cannot recall whether he received the calls, and the record reflects that Respondent did not speak with Ms. Covington during this period. Furthermore, Respondent testified that he did not review his notes on the
As in Mooney, we find the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated
The hearing judge also found that Respondent violated
Rule 8.4—Misconduct
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated
Respondent challenges the hearing judge‘s conclusion that Respondent violated
Sanction
Having determined that Respondent violated the Rules, we now turn to our discussion of the appropriate sanction for Respondent‘s misconduct. The Attorney Grievance Commission recommends a sanction of disbarment while Respondent urges that a sanction of a thirty day suspension is
In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Sperling, we cited several aggravating factors from Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, upon which we rely when determining an appropriate sanction:
- prior disciplinary offenses;
- dishonest or selfish motive;
- pattern of misconduct;
- multiple offenses;
- bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
- submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
- refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
- vulnerability of the victim;
- substantial experience in the practice of law;
- indifference to making restitution.
432 Md. 471, 495-96, 69 A.3d 478, 492 (2013). In the case before us, the hearing judge found that this disciplinary
The hearing judge explained that Respondent was motivated by a dishonest and selfish motive to cover up his lack of diligence in his making of misrepresentations to Bar Counsel. Because, as explained above in our discussion of
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge‘s omission of the presence of mitigating factors. Specifically, Respondent draws this Court‘s attention to the fact that although, at the time of the violation, Respondent had been a member of the Bar for over twenty years, Respondent had little experience in the field of civil matters as most of his career was spent working for the State‘s Attorney Office. Moreover, Respondent was a relatively new solo-practitioner5 at the time he took Ms. Covington‘s case. We overrule Respondent‘s exception to the
Having addressed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, we turn to case law where attorneys committed violations similar to those committed by Respondent in an effort to determine the most appropriate sanction. In Brigerman, we acknowledged that “[w]e have imposed the sanction of disbarment in cases involving flagrant neglect of client affairs, including failures to communicate with clients or respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel[.]” 441 Md. at 41, 105 A.3d at 477-78. For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Pinno, a lawyer violated
[t]his case demonstrates a pattern of attorney neglect that affected at least five clients and spanned two years. Mr. Pinno agreed to represent all five complainants, took fees
from all five, without warning or explanation failed to pursue their matters or to appear on their behalf at scheduled court appearances, and failed to return the unearned fees.
Pinno, 437 Md. at 82, 85 A.3d at 166. Furthermore, “Mr. Pinno‘s failure to participate in the disciplinary process [was] also an aggravating factor.” Pinno, 437 Md. at 83, 85 A.3d at 166. Accordingly, we found that disbarment was appropriate. Id.
Unlike Pinno, Respondent did not accept fees from Ms. Covington. Also unlike Pinno, Respondent‘s conduct was isolated to one client, who seemingly “fell through the cracks”6 during Respondent‘s transition from the bar to the bench. Furthermore, Respondent cooperated and рarticipated in the investigation and disciplinary process. Thus, Respondent‘s conduct is far less egregious than that of the lawyer in Pinno and we conclude disbarment would be too severe a sanction to impose in this case.
In Landeo, Landeo, an immigration attorney, took the cases of three distinct clients and failed to perform any substantial work on the cases after accepting a fee, failed to keep her clients reasonably informed or respond to their inquiries, misappropriated funds, and failed to properly terminate representation. 446 Md. at 307-17, 132 A.3d at 204-09. We found that Landeo, like Respondent, violated
We conclude that Respondent‘s case is more similar to Landeo than it is to Pinno and conclude that indefinite suspension is a more appropriate sanction. We have held that “[i]ndefinite suspension from the practice of law is the proper sanction where the attorney violates
Further, as we noted in Sperling, “[w]hile the sanction for dishonest conduct is generally disbarment, we have not, however, always found disbarment to be the appropriate sanction when there is a misrepresentation involved, especially when misappropriation of money is not involved.” 432 Md. at 497, 69 A.3d at 493 (emphasis added). Here, Respondent made a misrepresentation, but no misappropriation of money is involved. Thus, as we said in Attorney Grievance Comm‘n v. Litman, “[i]ndefinite suspension, as the base sanction, is also
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS PURSUANT TO